3-2-21:
DATO che molti siti internet vengono rimaneggiati o scompaiono più o meno totalmente, meglio lasciare un pò di appunti per chi volesse cercarli...
Appena oggi, per esempio, è scomparso www.airport-data.com, molto utile per localizzare le varie matricole degli aerei e tracciarne l'esistenza (per quanto possibile).
Purtroppo, almeno per ora non c'é modo di ritrovarlo. Speriamo in seguito.
The United States Army | Redstone Arsenal Historical Information
During World War II several countries had studied the use of guided weapons in which wires were used to carry a steering signal from a controller at a launch site to a missile in flight. After the war, this work was continued, notably in France and Australia. By the early 1950s, the work in France had resulted in the SS 10 wire guided missile. The U.S. Army tested the SS 10 during 1953 and found it unsatisfactory for Army use. Shortly thereafter, the U.S. Army initiated development of a wire command link antitank missile system called DART. By the summer of 1958, it was clear that DART would be less satisfactory than anticipated so its development was terminated, and the U.S. Army procured limited quantities of an improved version of the French SS 10, and later ENTAC and SS 11, were acquired for use as interim antitank systems.
In the fall of 1958, at the direction of Office, Ordnance Research and Development (R&D), an Ad Hoc Working Group was established at the Ballistic Research Laboratories (BRL) to study the Long Range Time Period Heavy Assault Weapon (HAW) problem and to recommend a program of work leading to system availability by 1965-70. The Ad Hoc Working Group (chaired by a BRL weapons analyst with representative members from Ordnance development organizations located at Picatinny Arsenal, Frankford Arsenal, Redstone Arsenal, Watervliet Arsenal, Detroit Arsenal and Harry Diamond Laboratories) recommended that initiation of development of a specific system be deferred for approximately 2 years and during that time the program consisted of: a) vigorous supporting research efforts to characterize alternate guidance schemes (leading ultimately to homing systems), and b) field test programs to investigate performance of foreign produced antitank guided missile systems. That recommendation was approved and implemented.
The resulting supporting research efforts were supervised by the Special Projects Group of the Ballistics Research Laboratories. That small group was headed at the time by Charles L. Poor III; his able assistant was Harry Reed.
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In the early summer of 1961, the Office, Chief of Ordnance (OCO) requested the Ballistic Research Laboratories to take account of all that had been learned from the tests and analyses of foreign antitank missile systems and the multiple elements of the supporting research program, most of which had been carried out in cooperation with other U.S. Army Ordnance agencies and non-government industrial advocates. OCO also asked BRL to propose a program for acquisition of a Heavy Assault Weapon for the Long Range Time Period (i.e. initial operational capability [IOC] 1965-70.)
Response was assigned to the Armored Systems Evaluation Branch of the Weapon Systems Laboratory where David Hardison, Branch Chief, undertook the task of producing a merit assessment of the technical readiness, projected performance at operational tasks, and system burden of candidate approaches. His assessment in hand, Hardison reconvened the earlier Ad Hoc Working Group, with a few changes in personnel, for critical review by persons whose parent organizations advocated a variety of candidate systems.
Obviously, there were two main options: a) acquire one of the existing systems, or b) develop a new system. By this time, market prospects had resulted in the generation of a large number(1) of candidate proposals each strongly advocated by its would-be vendor.
The BRL evaluation(2) of the 27 candidates concluded centrally that every one of the 27 system concepts was seriously flawed in one or more ways which would result in it being ultimately unsatisfactory. Needless to say, the proponents of each system/ concept evaluated were not pleased, at least initially, by this conclusion. Extended technical discussions among Working Group members, however, eventually led to its acceptance.
That conclusion had, prior to convening the Ad Hoc Working Group, prompted Hardison in a thought experiment to create a new system concept which would be responsive to the operational needs assessed to be most critical (i.e., not the same as then existing Military Requirements), would not share the flaws of other concepts, and based on demonstrated technologies, apparently could be confidently realized. Heavy considerations included system dependability, ease of operation, responsiveness, high accuracy against stationary and moving targets at all useful engagement ranges, lethality against existing and projected targets, crew “tailgate” transportability, and system costs.
What Hardison had conceived was a new system having key features that were more or less proven in other applications. It would be a rocket propelled guided missile tube launched (as with the earlier SHILLELAGH) to ensure that during its early trajectory the missile would remain ever close to line-of-sight thus greatly simplifying aerodynamic and control issues. The proposed system would use optical (modulated infrared) flare tracking with automatic command control (as demonstrated earlier in SHILLELAGH and, at Redstone Arsenal, in the SS 11/ICU) thus maximizing ease of training and operation. In addition, the system would use a wire data link for cost effectiveness and, especially, for robustness to countermeasure and environmental degradation. Of course, appropriate values for other system parameters such as minimum and maximum range, warhead type and size, chance-of hit, system weight, costs, velocity profile, etc. were called out, but the sine qua non of the concept would be the Tube launched, Optically tracked, Wire data link auto-guided missile. Upon hearing the concept, Harry Reed suggested that it be called TOW so as to forever capture the main defining features of the concept. At the time, it seemed like a good suggestion and the name has lasted.
Two other points bear mentioning: a) the initial notion of an unguided round was never supported, and b) the User’s Requirement from the outset envisaged that the HAW system would be useable from helicopters as well as from ground and ground vehicle mounts. At the time, a sight suitable stable for use with clear line of sight (CLOS) systems such as TOW had not been demonstrated. Rather than dismiss the CLOS approach which appeared superior in the ground applications, the helicopter application simply was set side. Later, of course, suitable sights were developed and air vehicle launch application occurred.
After marathon sessions ending shortly after midnight on the final day of discussing issues ranging from central to minor, members of the Ad Hoc Working Group reached unanimous agreement and supported the BRL recommendation to proceed with the TOW concept.
When the results of the analysis and the BRL-conceived TOW system concept were briefed to Pentagon officials, they correctly pointed out that no prospective hardware development firm had proposed such a concept and that no all-up design had been made. The Department of the Army (DA) tasked BRL representatives to share the concept with industry and, for a period not to exceed 6 months, obtain industry input as to how such a concept would best be packaged. Broadly, the aim was to gain additional information leading to a more confident judgment as to whether the system concept being called TOW could in fact be practically realized. As far as is now recalled, there was no directive that the "studies" should result in demonstration hardware; neither was it discouraged.
On a highly compressed schedule, in an effort led by Harry Reed, BRL obtained and evaluated solicitations from industry. BRL selected three firms—Hughes Aircraft Company, Martin Marietta, and McDonnell Douglas Aircraft—to study the TOW concept in a competitive “skunk work” approach. During the study period, BRL had minimal contact with the study teams, and was limited mostly to getting data to be used in computer simulations and in range facility needs should hardware demonstration firings be offered.(3)
Each of the three contractors delivered paper and hardware products which led to the finding that a system along the lines called TOW could indeed be developed successfully. From the engineering analyses and hardware demonstrations, feasibility was judged to have been demonstrated. The Hughes approach was assessed the best overall but certain of its subsystems were not as good as proposed by others. Shortly after BRL completed the feasibility evaluation, a development program was approved and acquisition responsibility was assigned properly to the U.S. Army Missile Command (MICOM).
(1) A total of 27 specific system concepts were being advocated: 8 manually guided missiles, 3 beam riding missiles, 4 semi-active homing rockets and shells, 4 open-loop systems, 2 (LOBL) guided missiles, and 6 (CLOS) guided missiles.
(2) BRL Memorandum (BRLM) Report 1365, A Study of HAW, David C. Hardison, September 1961. The response initially was in the form of a long briefing which upon request was documented as BRL Technical Note 1417, dated July 1961, which was superseded by the BRLM 1365 cited here.
(3) Competitive pressures caused the selected study firms to deliver both paper and missiles for demonstration firings.
Project Management
As one of his last official acts (1), the Chief of Ordnance on 12 January 1962 designated the MICOM Commander as the weapon system manager for the TOW/Heavy Antitank Weapon. The Missile Command established the Antitank/Aircraft Weapons Commodity Office on 19 November 1962 to manage the TOW weapon system. After higher headquarters approved the TOW development program in January 1963, MICOM established the TOW Project Office on 1 October 1964. Studies leading to the development of the XM65 TOW armament subsystem for the AH-1 series COBRA helicopter started in 1970, and on 5 April 1970 the airborne TOW program transitioned from the Aircraft Weapons Commodity Office to the TOW Project Office.
In 1969, the U.S. Congress House Authorization Subcommittee (HASC) considered replacing the TOW with the SHILLELAGH missile. Extensive studies, presentations, and demonstrations were made to the Department of Defense (DOD) and HASC by DA, the U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC), and MICOM supporting both TOW and SHILLELAGH in their respective operational roles and missions. The TOW/SHILLELAGH controversy was resolved when the joint session of Congress voted in September 1970 to continue the TOW in the heavy antitank weapon role.
In the early days of TOW development and up to first production, the TOW missile reliability was significantly below expectations and requirements. Missile reliability was a measure of the total missile performance from trigger pull to target impact. The first major subsystem problem was the launch motor. The pre-development demonstration missile and the first few development rounds included a launch motor that was 6 inches in diameter (full missile diameter), about 6 inches long, and placed just behind the missile center of gravity. A “blast tube” about 8 inches long and 1½ inches in diameter with a nozzle at the aft end was attached to the motor. The propellant was multi-perforated single base grains, each about a ½ -inch diameter and a ½-inch long, which were “poured” into the motor and trapped during burning. This propellant’s advantages were low cost and a very short burning time. It’s disadvantage was that it was not controllable and resulted in potential gunner hazards. Fortunately the MICOM Propulsion Laboratory had considerable experience in head end suspended double base (M-7) propellant (3.5-inch bazooka and light antitank weapon). The laboratory was given responsibility and authority to direct the prime contractor’s propulsion efforts. The rocket motor design and the propellant were both changed to accommodate double base head end suspended propellant. The launch motor was the only missile subassembly that required a total design change. All of the other subassemblies were at one time or another significant reliability issues.
Possibly the most intractable was the IR lamp. Functioning of the lamp required establishing an arc between the electrodes of a xenon-filled glass lamp. The IR lamp was not turned on until after the launch acceleration was complete. A bridge wire between the electrodes was the means by which the arc was established. The problems included the integrity of the bridge wire during launch and maintaining the arc throughout flight. The wire command link breakage was a problem throughout development and periodically recurred during early production.
The last significant problem before engineering and service testing and production release was the launch container. The launch container was sealed at both ends. When the missile was fired, the launch motor blast ruptured the rear seal and overpressure from the missile gyro stored gas bottle ruptured the front. The shock wave associated with the rear seal caused component failures, while the front seal broke the wire command link. Early in the development program, a decision was made to design the missile for no testing (except flight tests) after the missile was placed in the launch container at the factory. Moreover, during missile assembly the missile skin was permanently joined to each section (except for the warhead) such that missile disassembly would require destroying skin sections. The notion of a non-testable, non-provisioned missile caused some concern both from technical and logistical standpoints. The technical argument was to include test capability and eliminate if not needed; the logistics concern was that once incorporated, it would be difficult to eliminate, especially if provisioning had been initiated.
The TOW production contract was awarded in 1968, and the first TOW production milestone was met in August 1969 with the delivery of the first TOW missiles in accordance with the contract schedule. By September 1970, three TOW training battalions were operational. TOW replaced the M140 106mm recoilless rifle and the French ENTAC missile system. The Army completed the phase out of the latter weapon system by 30 September 1970, after TOW was standardized.
There were two unique features of this production contract: flight acceptance tests on missile lots offered for delivery, referred to as fly-to-buy (FTB), and an award fee for reliability improvement above a specified threshold for all delivered missile lots.
The FTB was new to missile production programs. It had been incorporated in the SHILLELAGH production contract, but at the time of the TOW award, SHILLELAGH deliveries had not begun. FTB was routine in ammunition production, but had not been applied to complex missile systems. The FTB feature provided for the test firing of a random sample from an offered lot. If a specified number hit the target the lot was bought. If not, that lot was the contractor’s responsibility. Various options were provided, e.g., for rework, retest, etc. The FTB feature has remained for subsequent production contracts, and MICOM subsequently used similar features on other missile systems.
The award fee provision was likely a major factor in the TOW reliability growth. At the time of the production contract award, reliability was significantly less than desired. A prior cost effectiveness analysis with reliability as a variable provided a way to estimate the dollar value of incremental reliability growth. Using that analysis as a base, an award fee was established for each fractional reliability improvement demonstrated with FTB test results of all of the acceptance tests for the first 2 years of production—approximately 20,000 missiles delivered. There were no lots rejected. The fee awarded was nearly the maximum, corresponding to more than a 10 percent increase in missile reliability.
After the production contract was awarded all TOW activities were segregated, new vinyl floors replaced oil soaked factory floors, all machines were painted with TOW unique colors, and the TOW area became the premier work assignment. The cleanliness of the TOW production facility and the motivation of Hughes management and production workers were certainly important in achieving the attained reliability. While the award fee provision was certainly a motivator, it is also probable that Hughes Aircraft wanted to demonstrate that the successful completion of their first Army production contract would lead to more orders. Prior to the TOW production contract, Hughes was primarily a U.S. Air Force (USAF) supplier. The plant itself was an Air Force facility—USAF Plant #44.
Significant management actions that had a direct, positive effect on the TOW program included the project manager’s tenure, competitive contracting, strong configuration management with an effective Value Engineering (VE) program, award fee engineering support contracts, and extensive foreign military sales (FMS) activity.
In the 1960s and early 1970s, Army project managers served only 2 or 3 years in their assignment due to selection for Senior Service schools, assignment to Vietnam, or retirement. The first two TOW project managers (PMs) served only 2 years each. When Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Huntzinger was assigned as TOW PM in June 1968, his tour was expected to be 3 years. In 1970-71, the Congress and DOD recognized that PM tours were too short for good management. As a result, Colonel Huntzinger’s assignment was extended year by year until he retired in November 1976. This 8-year, 5-month continuous tour as TOW PM provided continuous and consistent leadership and direction from the negotiation of the TOW production contract through the TOW Vietnam experience, development and fielding of airborne TOW, development of the TOW night sight and other system improvements to complete fielding in U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR) and Korea, and foreign military sales to 22 countries. Colonel Huntzinger, who served under four AMC and 4 MICOM commanders, holds the record tenure for Army PM.
The TOW missile, launcher, and other system components were competitively procured and even a second source was established to ensure competitive pricing and continuous production in case one producer experienced production difficulties.
Starting with the development program, the project office required all contractors to document fully and to provide detailed costing for all proposed configuration changes. These were reviewed by the Configuration Management Board and approved, modified, or disapproved personally by the project manager. To strongly encourage TOW contractors to aggressively look for system improvements in producibility, reliability, performance, or cost reduction, contracts included VE provisions that returned 50 to 90 percent of the initial government cost savings to the contractor. This allowed the contractors to spend their funds on expensive preparation of changes in anticipation of a financial return. The normal VE payment at that time was 10 to 20 percent.
Engineering Support contracts with the prime contractor provide valuable support to the project office. To ensure thorough and responsive support, each task manager’s performance was reviewed quarterly and an award fee of minimum to 100 percent of the available award fee was assigned. In initiation of this type of contract, dramatic improvements in task support were obtained; the contractor posted and tracked closely each manager’s performance, and several task managers were relieved.
In the pricing for foreign military sales a part of the U.S. development costs were included. Due to the extensive TOW FMS program, a substantial amount of TOW development costs were recouped.
On 2 May 1972, the TOW missile made military history by becoming the first American-made guided missile to be fired in combat by U.S. soldiers. During the fighting at Kontum in South Vietnam on that date, the 1st Combat Aerial TOW Team, equipped with the XM26 TOW subsystem mounted on a UH-1B HUEY helicopter, destroyed a total of four M-41 tanks, one 2½ -ton truck, and a 105mm howitzer.
The involvement of the airborne TOW in Vietnam is particularly interesting regarding the speed of its deployment and its efficiency as a tank killer in a combat situation. It is best told by Hugh McInnish, who was the airborne TOW engineer in the TOW Project Office at the time of the system’s deployment. As he recalls,
I was at work one day in April 1972 when the phone rang and an officer up at the Pentagon was on the other end of the line. “I have been reading your article in Aviation Digest,” he said, “and I was wondering if you could put together the same ‘package’ that you had in Germany and send it in the other direction to test it against some real targets.”
The previous spring I had been in Germany as the leader of a Government-Contractor team sent to support the Germans in a lengthy firing test of the airborne TOW. We had two XM26 airborne TOW prototypes mounted on two UH-1B helicopters. These were the only two such systems in existence at that time. After the test I published the article mentioned by my caller. This was at the time of the Easter Offensive, and tanks had just appeared for the first time in Vietnam, so I needed no cryptographer to decode the message: Could we go to war with our two prototypes?
We could, and two weeks later I landed at Saigon, having crossed the Pacific via Hawaii, Guam, and Wake Island in a C-141, catching catnaps on an air mattress atop crates of TOW ammunition in the cargo hold.
In the meantime we had succeeded in finding the pieces of the “package” we had used in Germany: men, helicopters, black boxes, and all. From Saigon we move to Camp Holloway, near Pleiku in the Central Highlands, refitted the helicopters with their XM26 systems, and went into combat.
At that point the airborne TOW was the most novel weapon in the war, and it was a dazzling success. The team never failed to destroy a target once seen. Tanks were the primary target, but also on our list were armored personnel carriers, trucks, and machine gun positions. One of the latter I remember especially. The enemy had a penchant for mounting a machine gun on the pinnacle of a water tower in Kontum. We would shoot it down, he would replace it, and we would shoot it down again. One day someone spotted a small, suspicious looking island in the middle of a river. On a hunch one of our crews shot at the foliage—and sure enough a tank exploded when the missile hit. This led to a suspicion of another island so it too was shot. But this island—was just an island. Only leaves and dirt rose into the air.
When this mission was completed I continued my journey westward and reached Germany via Bangkok, Delhi, and Madrid. I spent some time giving a series of briefings in Europe, then went even further west, finally proving the roundness of the world by reaching Huntsville and home again.
After I returned I received a letter from LTC Thomas P. McKenna, whom I did not know. He had been on the ground during the battle for Kontum when our TOW helicopters were overhead attacking enemy tanks. He wrote, “I may well owe my life to the TOW missiles that broke the back of the enemy assaults.
The Daedalian Society awarded its Wolfe Memorial Trophy to the TOW weapon system in May 1974. Presented annually, the award recognized the individual or group responsible for developing an outstanding military weapon system. Additionally, more foreign nations were using the TOW missile by 31 December 1976 than any other MICOM missile involved in foreign military sales at that time. In November 1977, the TOW became the most heavily produced Army guided missile.
Despite these accomplishments, on 15 April 1977, the U.S. Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command (DARCOM), as the Army Materiel Command was then known, established a provisional Advanced Heavy Antitank Missile System (AHAMS) Project Office to develop a replacement for the TOW. This effort was later cancelled in favor of TOW 2. Later that year, on 29 September 1977, MICOM combined the TOW and DRAGON project offices. Less than three years later, though, the TOW/DRAGON Project Office was redesignated the TOW Project Office, following termination of project management for the DRAGON weapon system. In April 1980, the DRAGON was relegated to Level II management in the MICOM Weapon Systems Management Directorate (WSMD). The TOW missile program, on the other hand, expanded to include five missile variations by 1992, while there were two variations of the TOW subsystem. Effort on a next-generation TOW Fire and Forget missile was under way by FY 2000.
The FY 1987 Defense Authorization Act designated TOW as a Defense Enterprise Program (DEP). The DEP was an initiative designed to increase the efficiency of a defense acquisition program’s management structure as well as enhance program stability through the use of milestone authorization. The TOW was one of two programs managed at Redstone Arsenal nominated to participate in the FY 1988 DEP. Subsequently, Hughes Aircraft Company representatives and various Army and DOD officials marked the production of 500,000 TOW missiles at a ceremony held in November 1989 at the contractor’s Tucson, Arizona, facility.
On 8 January 1990, the MICOM WSMD assumed operational control of the TOW M65 subsystem (COBRA). Four years later, on 2 March 1994, responsibility for the ground TOW weapon system transitioned to WSMD after the TOW Project Office was disestablished on that date. Included in the transfer were the Ground TOW launcher, night sight, M70 trainer, and ancillary equipment. That same day, the Close Combat Anti-Armor Weapon Systems (CCAWS) Project Office was established. The new organization’s management responsibilities included the Improved Target Acquisition System (ITAS), the Improved Bradley Acquisition Subsystem (IBAS), TOW missile production, Bradley/TOW 2 subsystem production, and future CCAWS programs.
As noted in the chronology, TOW studies began some 40 years ago, and the first experimental firings were in the summer of 1962. From that start there has been steady progress in development and deployment of TOW variants to meet the challenges of ever increasing threats. More TOW missiles have been produced than any other Army guided missile. TOW met a vital need of the U.S. Army and has played a critical role in combat operations. Moreover TOW’s capabilities were such that it became the principal heavy antitank weapon for many countries that shared U.S. interests.
The TOW Project Office has also been a rewarding place to work as attested by the extended tenure of many of the project office personnel. Ms. Evelyn Hunter joined the project as a secretary in November 1962. She remained as the secretary in the Engineering Division until her retirement in 1993. Ms. Judy Polly came aboard in October 1964, and she remained associated with the program as of June 2001. She is planning to retire in October 2001, having spent 36 of her 37 years of civil service with the TOW project. Mr. John Wlodarski was involved with TOW from the summer of 1961 until he retired in 1980. John was involved in the study phase and was the configuration manager until his retirement.
Mr. Robert Q. Taylor worked on TOW beginning in early 1962. Mr. Taylor was chief of the Engineering Division until June 1971 when he became the Deputy Project Manager until he retired in 1977.
Mr. Robert P. Whitley, Mr. Taylor, Mr. Ray Turner, Mr. James Alden, and Ms. Hunter formed the TOW Project Office in November 1962 in the Development Division of the Research and Development Directorate. Mr. Whitley was designated as the Deputy Project Manager of the Tow Project Management Office when it was established in October 1964. He held that post until he was reassigned to another MICOM management position in June 1971. Mr. Alden and Mr. Turner remained in TOW until they retired.
Mr. Coy Jackson joined the TOW engineering staff in 1963, and when he retired in 1988 he was chief of the Engineering Division. Mr. Jackson continues to be called on to provide advice and consultation on TOW related matters. As a point of interest, Mr. Jackson spent his entire civil service career in the TOW office.
The first two project managers, LTC Ballard B. Small, Jr. and COL James N. Lothrop, Jr. each served 2 years. By contrast, the third PM, COL Robert W. Huntzinger, served 8½ years, which covered the most critical period of TOW initial and rate production, deployment, and support. Moreover, it was during this period that foreign military sales were initiated and expanded. His leadership also covered TOW’s Vietnam experience.
TOW’s long history has provided an opportunity for several officers to serve two tours of duty in the TOW Project Office. COL Thomas M. Devanney served in the project office as a junior officer and returned in 1987 as the PM. COL Jack Conway retired as the TOW PM in 1993, but had served an earlier tour in the project office. BG William B. Nance’s last position at MICOM was as the Program Executive Officer for Fire Support, to which the TOW PM reported, having served earlier as the manager of TOW’s application to the Bradley Fighting Vehicle.
Many other individuals have given a significant portion of their career to TOW—project office, laboratory, other AMC, and contractor personnel. All have played a vital role in TOW’s success.
This history has focused on the TOW Project Office. However, the reader should recognize that TOW was designed and initially produced by the Hughes Aircraft Company. While the Hughes corporate identity has changed over the years, the people involved and the workplace retained substantial continuity. Although periodic differences regarding the short-term objectives of each occurred between the project office, Hughes, and other contractors involved, the long-term goal was to provide a superior fighting capability to U.S. servicemen and women. It has been and continues to be a highly successful team effort.
(1) From 1962 to 1982, the Office of the Chief of Ordnance was abolished and other Army agencies performed all ordnance-related administrative functions. The position was reestablished in 1983 as a proponent agency for all ordnance-related occupational specialties and career management fields. On 9 May 1986, the Ordnance Corps officially joined the Army’s regimental system, and the Office of the Chief of Ordnance was reestablished as the head of the Ordnance Corps.
System Description
The tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided (TOW) missile system is a crew portable, vehicle-mounted, heavy anti-armor weapon system. It consists of a launcher and a missile that can be effectively employed in all weather conditions to engage tanks; other armored vehicles; and various point targets such as bunkers, crew-served weapons and launchers, and non-armored vehicles. It also has a limited self-defense capability against threat helicopters. The launcher consists of a launch tube, traversing unit, missile guidance set (MGS), night sight, battery assembly, optical sight, tripod, overpack, shroud, and carrying strap. The all-up round missile is encased in a disposable launch container. The TOW can be operated from the ground, vehicles, or helicopters. It is mounted on the Improved TOW Vehicle (ITV), the Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV), the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), and the COBRA helicopter. A total of 46 allied nations use the TOW, and it is co-produced in Switzerland.
There are six versions of the TOW missile. The original missile—the BGM-71A Basic TOW—was fielded in 1970. It had a 3000-meter range and was 6 inches in diameter except for the warhead which was 5 inches. The second missile to be built, the Extended Range TOW, was delivered in 1978. Delivered in 1981, the BGM-71C Improved TOW (ITOW) warhead included an extended probe for greater standoff and penetration. The BGM-71D TOW 2 weapon system, a product improvement program (PIP) initiated in 1979, incorporated a full caliber (6-inch) warhead with extendable probe on the missile. To compensate for the added weight of the warhead, the missile flight motor was redesigned with 30 percent more total impulse. Improved guidance link capability to enhance performance in a degraded environment and guidance link hardening against electro-optical countermeasures were added to the existing launcher.
In December 1984, a further enhancement to the TOW 2 was started to counter the appliqué armor threat. Hughes Aircraft developed the TOW 2A missile for the U.S. Army to defeat advances in the armor threat caused by the advent of first and second generation Explosive Reactive Armor (ERA). The BGM-71E TOW 2A incorporated a tandem warhead armament system to achieve increased lethality against tanks configured with ERA. The newest version of the TOW missile is the BGM-71F TOW 2B, which started production as an engineering change proposal to the FY 1990 production contract. The TOW 2B is a “flyover shootdown” missile with two explosively formed penetrator (EFP) warheads. Designed to defeat the next generation advanced armor threat well into the 21st century, the TOW 2B features a dual-mode sensor and a new armament section equipped with two warheads substantially different from those used in earlier TOW versions. Because the TOW 2B is designed to attack targets from the top, the trajectory places the missile slightly above the target when its two warheads explode downward. The TOW 2B was not designed to replace the TOW 2A, and the U.S. Army concurrently fielded both missile versions. The last TOW missiles for U.S. forces were produced in May 1997.
The TOW Sight Improvement Program (TSIP) effort was started in 1990 to significantly enhance the TOW system’s current capabilities and ensure its effectiveness into the next decade. However, the Secretary of the Army cancelled the TSIP on 15 October 1991 because of declining budget and funding issues. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development and Acquisition directed the PEO, Tactical Missiles to coordinate the development of an affordable alternative. The latter effort subsequently became known as the Improved Target Acquisition System (ITAS) being developed for the Army's light forces. The ITAS was a material change to the Ground TOW 2 weapon system for first-to-deploy light forces. It improved the TOW’s target detection recognition and engagement capability by incorporating a second generation forward looking infrared (FLIR), a laser range finder, and automatic tracking features. All missile configurations can still be fired, allowing room for growth for follow-on missiles. The ITAS is being fielded at battalion level, replacing TOW 2 in light infantry units. The modification kit consists of an integrated (Day/Night Sight with Laser Rangefinder) Target Acquisition Subsystem (TAS), Fire Control Subsystem (FCS), Battery Power Source (BPS), and Modified Traversing Unit (TU). The ITAS operates from the HMMWV and associated dismount platforms. In September 1998, the first unit equipped with the ITAS was A Troop, 1/17th Cavalry, 82nd Airborne Division. On 27 July 1993, the PEO, Tactical Missiles approved the Acquisition Plan for the Improved Bradley Acquisition Subsystem (IBAS), an improvement of the current Bradley TOW acquisition and fire control subsystem. This effort was an extension of the TOW ITAS.
In FY 1998, the U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC) released a request for information on the next generation heavy antitank missile, the TOW Fire and Forget (F&F) which is supposed to replace the current series of TOW missiles. Employed either mounted or dismounted from the TOW launcher, the TOW F&F will have a secondary mode of attack that together with the primary F&F mode will enable the operator to hit any target acquired within the missile’s range. The TOW F&F will integrate an advanced focal plane array and imaging infrared (FPA/IIR) seeker. The IIR seeker and software will provide automatic target tracking and eliminate the TOW wire, significantly increasing soldier survivability and overall system lethality. Designed to engage any target that the gunner can see, day or night, even when faced with battlefield contaminants or countermeasures, the TOW F&F missile will also defeat threat tanks equipped with advanced armor and active protection systems. The system will include the encased TOW F&F missile, the shipping and storage container, and the ITAS platform applique kits. It will also have increased range, lethality, and platform survivability; be able to counter active protection system threats; and have a modular design for future growth and shelf life extension. On 9 September 2000, the Army awarded a $125.9 million TOW F&F missile EMD contract to Raytheon’s Missile Systems business unit in Tucson, Arizona
System Chronology
January 1957 An in-house research effort was started at Redstone Arsenal from which evolved the automatic infrared (IR) command guidance concept on which the tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided (TOW)/Heavy Antitank Weapon (HAW) system was based.
16 October 1961 The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research and Development) and the Secretary of Defense approved a plan which called for in-house and contractor studies to prove the feasibility of the TOW antitank missile system before the start of a large and costly development program.
10 January 1962 Three companies—Hughes Aircraft Company, Martin Marietta, and McDonnell Aircraft Corporation—were awarded 6-month contracts to design and fabricate prototype hardware adequate for a flight demonstration of the technical feasibility of the proposed TOW missile concept.
12 July 1962 As one of his last official acts, the Chief of Ordnance designated the U.S. Army Missile Command (MICOM) Commander as the weapon system manager for the TOW/Heavy Antitank Weapon (HAW).
(Note: From 1962 to 1983 the Office of the Chief of Ordnance was abolished and other Army agencies performed all ordnance-related administrative functions. In 1983, the position was reestablished as a proponent agency for all ordnance-related occupational specialties and career management fields. On 9 May 1986 the Ordnance Corps officially joined the Army's regimental system; and the Office of the Chief of Ordnance was re-established as the head of the Ordnance Corps.)
December 1962 A letter contract was awarded to Hughes Aircraft to continue the TOW effort pending negotiation of a definitive development contract.
January 1963 The TOW missile system development program was approved.
3 May 1963 TOW was the first 100 percent cost-plus-incentive-fee (CPIF) contract negotiated and signed by MICOM.
December 1963 Research leading to the airborne TOW began when MICOM awarded contracts to Hughes Aircraft Company and the Philco Ford Corporation to design, fabricate, and install a stabilized sight on the UH-1B HUEY helicopter that would solve the problem of firing a TOW or SHILLELAGH missile from the air. These contracts called for the preliminary design of a complete tactical missile system (XM26) which would replace the M22 subsystem.
1 October 1964 The TOW Missile System became project managed at MICOM. The system had previously been managed by the Antitank/Aircraft Weapons Commodity Office at MICOM, which had been established on 19 November 1962.
1 October 1964 LTC Ballard B. Small, Jr., was the first TOW Project Manager (PM).
1965 After the Hughes Aircraft Company stabilized sight was selected, MICOM was authorized to develop the XM26 airborne subsystem using the TOW missile.
June 1966 Hughes Aircraft Company received the initial research and development contract for the XM26.
30 June 1966 LTC Ballard B. Small, Jr., the first TOW PM, retired.
26 September 1966 COL James N. Lothrop, Jr., became the TOW PM.
1967 Five prototype XM26 TOW airborne launching systems were built for testing on the UH-1B. The XM26 used three of the same missiles developed for the infantry, mounted in each of two launch pods on either side of the helicopter. The aircraft’s left nose was modified to accommodate an inertially stabilized telescope sight operated by the copilot/gunner in the left seat.
March 1968 The TOW/HUEY (XM26) program was terminated and the effort was redirected to the TOW/CHEYENNE (AH-56A) program.
22 April 1968 The Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development approved the limited production type classification for the TOW.
30 May 1968 COL James N. Lothrop, Jr., TOW PM, retired.
25 June 1968 LTC Robert W. Huntzinger became the new TOW PM. He was promoted to colonel on 22 October 1971.
28 June 1968 The initial TOW production letter contract was awarded to Hughes Aircraft Company.
29 November 1968 The definitized production contract for the TOW was awarded to Hughes Aircraft.
1969 MICOM learned that higher headquarters was again considering replacing the TOW with the SHILLELAGH.
10 June 1969 MICOM awarded a contract to the Chrysler Corporation Huntsville Division as the alternate TOW producer.
August 1969 The first production milestone was met when Hughes Aircraft delivered the first TOW missiles in accordance with the contract schedule.
1970 Studies leading to the development of the XM65 TOW armament subsystem for the AH-1 series COBRA helicopter were started this year.
5 April 1970 The airborne TOW was transferred from the Aircraft Weapons Commodity Office to the TOW Project Office.
September 1970 Three TOW training battalions became operational, replacing the M140 106mm recoilless rifle and French ENTAC system. By 30 September, the Army had completed phase-out of the ENTAC after the TOW missile was standardized.
September 1970 The distribution of TOW launchers to U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR) began.
September 1970 The TOW/SHILLELAGH controversy was partially settled when the Joint Session of Congress voted to continue the TOW in the heavy antitank weapon role.
30 September 1970 A major portion of the TOW system was adopted as standard A.
November 1970 The first tactical Basic TOW missiles were deployed. The first USAREUR TOW unit was equipped on 13 November.
1971 Representatives from MICOM, Hughes Aircraft Company, and Bell Helicopter Company assisted the German Army Aviation School in its evaluation of the TOW missile’s suitability for use in an airborne role. Although the XM26 prototypes used in the tests had undergone considerable engineering testing, they had never been given to the U.S. Army for service tests because the main developmental effort shifted to the more advanced AH-56 CHEYENNE weapons system. The German military, therefore, was the first to test the XM26. Despite adverse spring weather conditions in northern Germany, where the evaluation was conducted, the test program was successful. It concluded with the firing of six TOW missiles with live warheads. Fired from various ranges and flight conditions against actual tank hulks positioned on the range, the final shots effectively demonstrated the potency of the airborne TOW. (See related article... hyperlink opens a .PDF document)
1972 The requirement for an extended range TOW missile for the airborne role materialized.
March 1972 The Army began the Improved COBRA Armament Program. The XM65 TOW/ COBRA development program was a functional upgrade of the XM26 TOW/UH-1B HUEY armament subsystem. The COBRA was the first helicopter designed expressly as a weapons carrier.
30 March 1972 The North Vietnamese Army (NVA) swept across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) on this date in a massive offensive against the south. The NVA was supported by numerous heavily armored Russian and captured American tanks. This action generated an urgent but unprogrammed combat requirement for the TOW antitank weapon system. The NVA “Easter Offensive,” however, gave the Army an opportunity to prove that the airborne TOW missile subsystem could be used as an effective weapon against Soviet armor. An impressive showing would help secure the funding needed for the advanced attack helicopter (AAH) program.
14 April 1972 The Department of the Army (DA) directed MICOM to remove the XM26 subsystem from storage and deploy it to Vietnam on the UH-1B HUEY gunship. The command was ordered to rush the subsystem and a load of TOW missiles to the battlefront. That same day, the TOW contingent at Fort Lewis, Washington, received a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Warning Order to prepare for deployment to Southeast Asia (SEA). The group had originally been organized to participate in the U.S. Army Combat Development Experimentation Command (USACDEC) Experiment 43.6 (Attack Helicopter, Daylight Defense).
21 April 1972 One week after receiving the order to deploy, three C-141 aircraft flew to Vietnam carrying two HUEY gunships, two XM26 subsystems, missile crews, and other equipment. The order to have the experimental airborne TOW system on the way to Vietnam, ready to fight, in 7 days generated one of the most unique deployments ever accomplished by the Army. COL Robert W. Huntzinger, TOW PM, headed the team effort that coordinated the monumental task and completed it in record time. Colonel Huntzinger handpicked the technical support team that accompanied the equipment to Vietnam. Heading the team was Hugh J. McInnish, who had spearheaded the development of the airborne TOW system at Redstone Arsenal. Included on the support team were an expert on the UH-1B helicopter from Bell Aircraft as well as two engineers and two technicians from Hughes Aircraft, each an expert on the TOW and its airborne guidance and control equipment. A last-minute replacement pilot/ gunner was obtained from the AAH program at the U.S. Army Aviation Systems Command (AVSCOM), St. Louis, Missouri.
22 April 1972 The 1st Combat Aerial TOW Team, Vietnam (also known as “Hawk’s Claw”), was designated and deployed to the Republic of Vietnam. The team’s name reflected the first-time use of the airborne TOW missile system in combat against an armored enemy.
24 April 1972 The TOW equipment and personnel arrived at Tan Son Nhut Air Force Base (AFB) outside Saigon. Because none of the Army aviators had ever fired a TOW missile from the UH-1B HUEY helicopter, the support team gave them a condensed course on the XM26 system. As part of their graduation exercise, the crews fired two missiles each from airborne helicopters.
28 April 1972 The NVA overran Tan Canh, northwest of Kontum (a provincial capital north of Pleiku) and began bringing in heavy armor to use against the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) units falling back to the city. U.S. Army leaders ordered the XM26 TOW/HUEY helicopter crews and support team north to Camp Holloway near Pleiku in the Central Highlands.
29 April 1972 The entire TOW team was considered combat ready after undergoing additional gunner tracking training from 26 to 29 April, continuing system checkouts, and installing an armored seat modification.
30 April 1972 Beginning this date and continuing through 2 May, the 1st Combat Aerial TOW Team conducted their first live-fire training in the Pleiku area. The team had never fired a live TOW missile before being deployed to Vietnam.
30 April 1972 DA ordered the deployment of the ground-based TOW system with instructors to train U.S. and South Vietnamese crews to operate the weapon.
May 1972 An 82nd Airborne antitank task force was airlifted to Vietnam with 24 jeep-mounted launchers, 500 missiles, and two ¾-ton trucks from the maintenance contact team. The task force consisted of a 48-man crew plus a maintenance contact team of 10 personnel from the 763rd Ordnance Company. In Vietnam, units of the task force were attached to the 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (CD), whose personnel were trained to operate the TOW weapon system
May 1972 The decision to deploy the 1st Combat Aerial TOW Team to the Pleiku/Kontum area near the Dak Poko River was based on two main considerations. The first was the 2nd Corps Tactical Zone’s (CTZ’s) critical need for an antitank system to counter the high probability of a large number of NVA armored vehicles in that sector. Another reason was the need to protect the XM26 TOW/HUEY helicopter assets from the SA-7 Grail antiaircraft missile system which the enemy had deployed in the 1st and 3rd CTZs.
2 May 1972 The 1st Combat Aerial TOW Team, equipped with the XM26 TOW subsystem, went into combat for the first time. CWO Carroll W. Lain made history on this morning when he fired a TOW missile which struck a tank. This was the first American-made guided missile to be fired in combat by U.S. soldiers. During this day’s fighting, the team destroyed a total of four M-41 tanks, one 2½ -ton truck, and one artillery gun (a 105mm howitzer). Fired from a range of 2700 meters, the TOW missiles hit directly on the tanks and howitzer, and caused secondary explosions a few seconds after impact because of ammunition rounds inside the targeted items.
5 May 1972 Just 5 days after MICOM received movement orders, the first aircraft carrying ground-based TOW equipment landed in Vietnam. This deployment operation, much larger than the first movement of the airborne TOW, involved 87 TOW launcher systems, about 2500 missiles, maintenance support personnel and equipment, repair parts, trainers, and instructors. MAJ Dale F. Norton of the TOW Project Management Office (PMO) was named logistics officer for the ground system. He and Jesse Rich, a civilian missile maintenance technician from the MICOM Directorate for Maintenance, deployed with the system.
9 May 1972 The Army used TOW missiles to destroy three PT-76 tanks from ranges of 2000 to 3000 meters, with first round hits resulting in secondary explosions.
10 May 1972 TOW training for South Vietnamese Marine Corps personnel began on this date and continued through 22 July. They fired a total of 163 TOW missiles. During the course of this training program, the first ground-based TOW was fired in actual combat.
14 May 1972 At 0600, a UH-1B HUEY helicopter equipped with the XM26 TOW subsystem arrived over Kontum after responding to the tactical emergency declared by the Second Regional Assistance Group (SRAG) advisors. Before two of the reported T-54 tanks could cross the river and reach the cover of the thick undergrowth along Route QL-14, TOW missiles fired at a range of 2500 meters stopped the tanks “dead in their tracks.” Flames spouted 30-feet high from the burning armor because of secondary ammunition explosions.
15 May 1972 The 1st Combat Aerial TOW Team continued to seek out the enemy, destroying an ammunition truck and a large bunker in the area northeast of Kontum.
16 May 1972 The first attempt to use the XM26 subsystem at night was a failure. At 0200, an XM26 TOW/HUEY helicopter, along with COBRA gunships from the 361st Aerial Weapons Company, was tasked to engage and destroy T-54 tanks firing 100mm rounds at Kontum City. Initially, the aircrew had extreme difficulty acquiring the tank silhouette. Once adequate flare illumination was obtained, the aircrew fired one TOW missile at the target. However, the missile infrared source blinded the gunner and he was unable to track the missile. The TOW’s impact was not seen. The mission was terminated because of a flare shortage.
Later that same day, the 1st Combat Aerial TOW Team destroyed a truck and a 130mm howitzer from a range of 2500 meters. The first missile fired at the howitzer’s breech narrowly missed, but the second missile hit the target and caused a secondary explosion. The TOW team also destroyed two NVA armored personnel carriers west of Kontum on the same sortie. The second TOW was fired 5 seconds after impact of the first missile, unexpectedly demonstrating to the aircrew that multiple targets could be engaged on the same firing run.
18 May 1972 A forward air controller (FAC) at the Kontum airfield spotted two tanks about 2 miles out from the defenders, indicating the NVA’s reluctance to expose their armor to accurate antitank fire. The FAC also noticed an “island” on the river just north of the Kontum City perimeter that had not been there the day before. The “island” turned out to be a camouflaged T-54 tank that had stalled crossing the river. The 1st Combat Aerial TOW Team succeeded in destroying the tank from a range of 2500 meters. The same controller also spotted two 23mm antiaircraft guns firing on the city from the vicinity of Polei Kleng. The team fired the first TOW at the guns from out of range, so the missile fell short of the target. The second missile, launched from about 2800 meters, destroyed one of the guns.
20 May 1972 To force the withdrawal of enemy forces who had tunneled very close to the positions of the 53rd Regiment—too close for the use of tactical air support—the Kontum defenders used direct fire from nine M-41 tanks, supported by a gunship from the 361st Aerial Weapons Company, and the XM26 TOW/HUEY weapon system.
21 May 1972 By this date, 28 missiles had been expended in training personnel of the 82nd Airborne Division and the 3rd Brigade/1st CD on the ground-based TOW weapon system. Gunners of the 82nd Airborne task force fired 12 training rounds against an artillery bunker at a range of about 2800 meters and scored 12 direct hits. Gunners of the 3rd Brigade/1st CD fired 16 training rounds, with 1 missile malfunction, 9 target hits, and 6 misses due to poor lighting conditions.
21 May 1972 During a 10-day visit to Vietnam, BG William J. Maddox, Jr., the Director of Army Aviation, fired a TOW training round on this date and scored a hit on a previously destroyed M-41 tank.
22 May 1972 The first tank kill by the ground-based TOW deployed with the South Vietnamese Marine Corps occurred when an NVA combined tank-infantry force with 9 tanks and about 200 troops attacked the 369th Brigade command post (CP). When the battle ended 2 hours later, all 9 tanks had been destroyed and 117 enemy were confirmed dead.
26 May 1972 The 82nd Airborne Division task force, previously moved from Bien Hoa to Pleiku, was rushed to positions around Kontum to help counter the NVA tank assault launched on this date. PFC Angel Figueroa scored the division’s first tank kill with the ground-based TOW during the main battle for Kontum that raged until 31 May. About a week later, the 48-man task force turned over their TOW equipment to the 3rd Brigade/1st CD, then returned to the United States.
26 May 1972 The NVA launched its expected attack on Kontum before dawn on this date. Committed to battle at first light (0640), the two 1st Combat Aerial TOW Teams relieved each other throughout the morning, and constantly pressured the attacking NVA armor. Tactical air strikes hit enemy forces within 1 mile of the city, but they were hampered by the closeness of the NVA troops to the city’s defenders in the house-to-house battle under way inside Kontum. The TOW teams fired 21 missiles during several hours of continuous operation and destroyed 10 tanks, an ammunition truck, and a machine gun emplacement established on top of a water tower.
27 May 1972 The 1st Combat Aerial TOW Team returned to battle at the first report of tanks and NVA infantry in the wire near the ARVN 44th Regiment. By 0600 the helicopters were over the northern battlefront at Kontum. The open terrain north of the city provided no cover for the attacking armor, making it easier for the teams to destroy the last two T-54 tanks known to be in the area. Tactical aircraft, the TOW-equipped HUEY helicopters, and the efforts of the frontline soldiers stemmed the enemy advance by 1000.
28 May 1972 An NVA machine gun crew on a water tower overlooking the northern sections of Kontum halted the ARVN counterattack in the hospital compound by keeping the infantry pinned down. This was the same water tower at which the 1st Combat Aerial TOW Team had fired a missile on 26 May to take out an earlier enemy machine gun emplacement. The TOW team was ordered to destroy the machine gun position and the water tower. The team silenced the gun and attempted to topple the tower by firing missiles at the structure’s legs. Two of the three missiles launched hit two of the tower legs, but the multiple supporting cross members of the empty tower kept the structure from collapsing.
31 May 1972 By this date, the main battle for Kontum was believed to be over, although pockets of resistance continued. The ARVN suffered heavy losses, but held the field with the assistance of U.S. advisors, tactical air strikes, COBRA gunships, and the XM26 TOW/HUEY weapon system. Effective enemy resistance in Kontum City ended by 10 June.
8 June 1972 Beginning this date and continuing through 14 June, the 2nd Combat Aerial TOW Team was formed after General Creighton W. Abrams, Jr. decided to keep the XM26 aerial TOW in Vietnam as insurance against any future NVA armor penetration. Replacement members selected from the 17th Aviation Group’s COBRA gunship units were trained by the 1st Combat Aerial TOW Team in the Pleiku area. The second team assumed the combat mission in the 2nd CTZ, while the first team returned to the United States between 18 and 22 June 72.
12 June 1972 Between 26 May and this date, the 1st Combat Aerial TOW Team was never hit by enemy air defenses. The system’s long standoff range and the altitude maintained by the helicopters were two important reasons for this achievement. Additional factors were the disciplined training and experience gained by the crews during the USACDEC 43.6 trials as well as the very close operational procedures and teamwork developed with other airborne elements in Vietnam.
Also by this time, the 1st Combat Aerial TOW Team had recorded a total of 47 kills. These included: 24 tanks, 4 armored personnel carriers, 2 artillery pieces, 7 trucks, 1 antiaircraft position, 2 machine gun positions, 1 wooden bridge, 1 hut with small arms ammunition, 1 small arms ammunition dump at an abandoned fire base, 1 122mm rocket launching position, and 3 bunkers. With the success of the original airborne TOW team and the continued success of the replacement team trained in-country, funding for the next generation M65 TOW/COBRA was secured.
25 June 1972 A limited number of U.S. ground-based TOW missile systems saw combat in Vietnam. These systems destroyed 12 tanks, including 9 in a single action northwest of Hue on this date.
June-July 1972 Between 18 June and 18 July, the 2nd Combat Aerial TOW Team flew few combat missions because enemy action in the 2nd CTZ had subsided and the monsoon season had started. The team’s major assignment in June was to provide aerial coverage in support of the 14 maneuver battalions engaged in the Highway QL-14 road opening operation. Their only combat mission was the destruction of two 2½ -ton ammunition trucks on 20 June.
July 1972 While at Lane Army Airfield in An Son, the 2nd Combat Aerial TOW Team conducted a successful night firing against an abandoned armored personnel carrier. The controlled test showed the system’s night capability using a spectral eyepiece developed in-country by Hughes engineers and 2.75-inch flare rockets fired from AH-1G COBRAs.
4 July 1972 The 2nd Combat Aerial TOW Team used four TOW missiles to destroy a T-54 tank from a range of 2000 meters. Highway QL-14 opened to civilian traffic on 6 July. The team remained in the Pleiku-Kontum area until 18 July.
12 July 1972 Enemy fire at Phu Bai destroyed 78 TOW missiles. Another 16 missiles were destroyed at Fire Support Base Ross on 19 August. Virtually all of the TOW equipment furnished South Vietnam was eventually captured or destroyed.
1 August 1972 The maintenance contact team which had accompanied the 82nd Airborne Division task force to Vietnam remained in-country until this date.
9 August 1972 The Army terminated the CHEYENNE (AH-56A) program. The experiences of the airborne TOW teams in Vietnam played a role in this decision. With a combat-proven point weapon system, the Army was able to convince Congress to support the AAH program.
19 August 1972 By this time, a total of 23 ground-based TOW missiles had been fired in combat engagements, destroying 11 tanks and 6 bunkers.
August-November 1972 The 2nd Combat Aerial TOW Team was moved several times during this period to counter enemy moves and to make better use of the antitank system’s combat capabilities. From An Son the team moved to Danang, then to Saigon.
November 1972 The source selection board convened this month to select the airframe for the advanced attack helicopter. Initial production began in 1973. With the demonstrated combat effectiveness of the TOW antitank missile system, the Army accelerated the production of the XM65 TOW/COBRA to counter the rapidly-growing Soviet tank threat in Europe.
1 November 1972 The 2nd Combat Aerial TOW Team began working with the 12th Combat Aviation Group to help counter a significant armor threat which had developed in the 3rd CTZ. Attached to F Troop, 9th Cavalry, the XM26 TOW/HUEY helicopters were used daily to engage point targets. They also served in a reconnaissance role to further enhance the air cavalry mission. Although the anticipated NVA armor threat never materialized in the 3rd CTZ, the TOW team did destroy one T-54 tank, two armored personnel carriers, and eight ammunition trucks.
1972-1973 The airborne TOW missile system proved to be very adaptable to combat operations, and the XM26 performed very well while in Vietnam. Hughes Aircraft Company technicians were able to handle the minor problems that occurred. Because the airborne TOW system was actually a test bed that had not been designed to be maintained in the field, it required the support of highly trained engineers and technicians as well as extensive laboratory test equipment to keep it operational. Despite the challenges, the airborne TOW achieved a 90 percent reliability rating for the entire period it was deployed in Vietnam. The lack of a limited visibility/night vision capability was the single largest impediment to XM26 system effectiveness during that time.
1973 The TOW thermal night sight (AN/TAS-4) program began. Problems encountered in Vietnam with night firings also affected this program. The TOW system’s daylight combat operations in 1972 were a dramatic success, but the airborne XM26 TOW had limited usefulness at night. The first night firings in combat failed because the gunners were blinded first by the bright infrared source, then by flares. A filter allowed night firings without blinding the gunner, but it was still almost impossible for even experienced gunners to locate a target range at night. Several misses also occurred because the gunner was unable to see the target while guiding the missile. Night combat experience in Vietnam showed the need for a passive night vision system for target detection and tracking before the airborne TOW system had an effective night capability.
11 January 1973 The XM26 airborne TOW system remained in Vietnam until late this month. Between 30 April 72 and this date, the two HUEY gunships fired a total of 199 TOW missiles: 37 in training and 162 in combat. The training firings began on 30 April and continued through 7 August. Of the 162 airborne TOW missiles fired in combat, 151 (93 percent) were reliable and 124 (82 percent) scored hits on a variety of targets. These included: 27 tanks, 21 trucks, 5 armored personnel carriers, 3 artillery pieces, 1 antiaircraft gun, 1 122mm rocket launcher, 5 machine guns, 2 57mm guns, 5 caves, 8 bunkers, 2 bridges, 2 mortars, 2 ammunition storage dumps, 2 TOW jeeps (1 with launcher and 1 with missiles), and 1 house. There were 11 malfunctions and 4 misses. The latter occurred when the gunner fired the missile at a range in excess of 3000 meters and lost it when the guidance wire ran out. Although the HUEYs encountered considerable machine gun fire, neither of the gunships was hit by enemy fire because they stayed high.
28 January 1973 With the cease fire on this date, the mission of the 2nd Combat Aerial TOW Team ended in Vietnam. The UH-1B HUEY helicopters and XM26 TOW systems were retrograded to the United States.
October 1973 A total of 81 TOW launchers and 2,010 missiles were rushed to Israel under Project 9DD for use in the Yom Kippur War. Israeli commandos flew to Fort Benning, Georgia, that same month to train with the system. They returned home in time for a decisive battle in the Golan Heights.
1974 MICOM recommended that the range of the airborne TOW be extended to 3750 meters to improve the survivability of the helicopter against the threat posed by the battlefield of that time.
May 1974 The TOW Weapon System received the Wolfe Memorial Trophy, an award given annually by the Daedalian Society to the individual or group responsible for developing an outstanding military weapon system.
December 1974 The first Army foreign military sales (FMS) case for the XM65 airborne TOW was signed when Italy bought two systems to be delivered in FY 76.
March 1975 Deployment of the Basic TOW to Korea began.
9 June 1975 The engineering change proposal (ECP) to extend the range of the TOW to 3750 meters was approved.
September 1975 Texas Instruments received a contract for development test/operational test II hardware and follow-on full-scale development of the Manportable Common Thermal Night Sight (MCTNS).
November 1975 Deployment of the M65 TOW/COBRA began with the first fieldings to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) during this month.
1976 The first deployment to continental United States (CONUS) and USAREUR units of the XM65 TOW missile system, mounted on the AH-IQ/S COBRA helicopter, began this year.
January 1976 The Extended Range TOW missile went into production.
February 1976 Fielding of the Basic TOW to USAREUR was completed during this month.
March 1976 The M65 TOW/COBRA was deployed to USAREUR under Project Hand-off, thereby meeting the system’s initial operating capability (IOC) date.
June 1976 Beginning this month, all TOW missiles produced were of the extended range design.
30 November 1976 The TOW PM, COL Robert W. Huntzinger, retired. He served for 8 years and 5 months, the longest that a project manager has served in the history of AMC. Colonel Huntzinger served during the most active period of TOW’s history. When he arrived in 1968, the initial production effort had been authorized with a letter contract which was later negotiated and definitized after Colonel Huntzinger’s arrival. Shortly thereafter a competitive solicitation for a second missile production source was released for the purpose of educating a second missile producer to be a competitor to Hughes after qualification. That solicitation resulted in an award to the Chrysler Huntsville Plant. Hughes subsequently won the Chrysler-Hughes competition, resulting in a substantial savings. A different approach was taken with the launcher procurement. Emerson Electric was awarded a contract in a later competition which did not involve an educational procurement. It too resulted in substantial savings.
A major accomplishment during Colonel Huntzinger’s tenure was the development and deployment of a thermal night sight that gave TOW a day/night capability which at the time was the highest infantry priority. During this period TOW deployed in all CONUS and OCONUS theaters including Vietnam. Those fieldings included the M-65 airborne TOW/COBRA. In addition to U.S. Army deployments, by the time Colonel Huntzinger retired, TOW had been adopted by 21 countries.
31 December 1976 Of all the MICOM missile systems involved in FMS at this time, the TOW missile was used by the most foreign nations.
1977 Deployment of the M65 airborne TOW was completed to Europe during the year.
3 January 1977 COL James H. Brill assumed the position of TOW PM.
April 1977 The Army established a new unit known as a TOW light antitank battalion. The Oklahoma Army National Guard (ARNG), selected as the test unit, received its TOW equipment during this month.
15 April 1977 The U.S. Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command (DARCOM) established a provisional Advanced Heavy Antitank Missile System (AHAMS) Project Office to develop a replacement for the TOW.
1 July 1977 COL Arthur L. Goodall became the Acting TOW PM, replacing COL James H. Brill, who retired. Colonel Goodall was permanently assigned to the position on 29 September 77.
August 1977 The TOW night sight was type classified standard. Texas Instruments received the initial production contract.
29 September 1977 The TOW and DRAGON Project Offices were combined.
November 1977 With deliveries for this year, the TOW missile became the most heavily produced Army guided missile.
1978 Deployment of the Basic TOW to all active Army units was completed during this year.
10 July 1978 COL Neil S. Williamson, III, replaced COL Arthur L. Goodall as TOW/DRAGON PM. Colonel Goodall transferred to the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive Materiel Readiness Command (TARCOM) on 7 July.
November 1978 Texas Instruments delivered the first AN/TAS-4 TOW production night sight.
November 1978 The M65 TOW missile subsystem contract was awarded to Hughes Aircraft.
1979 The first M901 Improved TOW Vehicle (ITV) entered the Army inventory. This was the first Army antiarmor system that allowed operators to use the weapon system totally protected by armor.
September 1979 Deployment of the AN/TAS-4 TOW production night sight began with fieldings to training bases in CONUS and USAREUR.
1980 Deployment of the AH-1S modernized COBRA helicopter to U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) units began.
1980 Hughes Aircraft Company began the design of the TOW 2 missile.
January 1980 The AN/TAS-4 TOW night sight achieved IOC.
April 1980 The TOW/DRAGON Project Office was redesignated the TOW Project Office, following the termination of project management for the DRAGON weapon system. The DRAGON was relegated to Level II management in the Weapon Systems Management Directorate (WSMD).
September 1980 The first FORSCOM units received the TOW night sight.
September 1980 The Improved TOW (ITOW) program, started in August 78, was redefined to include both the ITOW and TOW 2 missiles.
30 March 1981 The MICOM Commander approved a full release for the ITOW. The initial operational capability for the ITOW was met after the first deployment to USAREUR.
June 1981 The M65 TOW/COBRA was first fielded to the U.S. Army National Guard.
17 June 1981 COL Neil S. Williamson, III, retired from his position as TOW PM. He was replaced by COL Byron L. Powers on this same date.
9 October 1981 DA approved the type classification of standard for the TOW 2, full production of the TOW 2 missile, retrofit of the existing Basic TOW stocks, and modification of the Basic TOW launchers.
March 1982 MICOM awarded Hughes Aircraft a contract for the full-scale engineering development effort to integrate the TOW 2 with the Bradley Fighting Vehicle System (BFVS).
28 March 1983 The BFVS achieved IOC with the first deployment to Fort Hood, Texas.
5 May 1983 The Hughes Aircraft Company delivered the first TOW 2 missile to the Army at a ceremony held at the company’s plant in Tucson, Arizona.
July 1983 The TOW 2 was first deployed to the U.S. Army Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia.
September 1983 The first BFVS was deployed to USAREUR.
9 September 1983 The MICOM Commander approved a full release for the TOW 2.
October 1983 The IOC date was met with the first deployment of the TOW 2 to USAREUR.
January 1984 DA tasked the COBRA Project Manager to acquire a night vision system for the AH-1S modernized helicopter. Consequently, the COBRA night sight (C-NITE) program was established.
21 April 1984 Hughes Aircraft received a contract for very high speed integrated circuit (VHSIC) exploratory development leading to the insertion of a wireless command link (WCL) in the TOW system.
30 April 1984 COL James B. Lincoln, formerly the Joint Tactical Missile System (JTACMS) PM, was reassigned as the TOW PM. He replaced COL Byron L. Powers, who retired.
1985 The 193d Infantry Brigade, Panama, was the first FORSCOM unit to receive the TOW 2 system.
March 1985 The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA) approved development of the TOW Lethality Improvement Program as an interim capability against the evolving threat of the 1990s. This improvement program encompassed the development and qualification of two different warhead configurations. One was known as fly-over-shoot-down (TOP ATTACK), while the other was called direct attack.
27 September 1985 Fielding of the TOW weapon system to Round-Out/Round-Up National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve units concurrently with TOW 2 deployments to the active Army units to which the National Guard/Reserve units were aligned was completed ahead of schedule.
1 November 1985 The Secretary of Defense approved Canada's purchase of TOW 2 missiles directly from Hughes Aircraft Company. This was the first time that the U.S. government allowed any other country to buy TOW missiles directly from the contractor.
5 November 1985 The first U.S. Army light division—the 4th Battalion/17th Infantry of the 7th Infantry Division (Light)—underwent TOW 2 modification.
December 1985 DA approved the redesignation of the TOW Lethality Improvement Program as TOW 2B, which was to be accomplished as a product improvement program (PIP).
1986 The last buy of M65 TOW missiles to complete fielding of the COBRA helicopter to the U.S. Army National Guard was awarded to Hughes Aircraft.
1986 During the second quarter, MICOM terminated the TOW 2 WCL contracts with Hughes Aircraft for convenience to the government. The command took this action because of the uncertain delivery of two required VHSIC chips to be used in the missile receiver electronics unit.
1986 After reviews with the AMC Deputy Commanding General (DCG) for Research, Development, and Acquisition (RDA), the TOW Project Office implemented a new TOW 2B program strategy in the second and third quarters of this year. Under the revised plan, the project office would pursue only one technological approach based on an analytical down select from the alternative approaches of TOP ATTACK or direct attack.
May 1986 Ballistic Research Laboratories (BRL) conducted the TOW 2B down select analysis this month. The technology chosen was TOP ATTACK.
29 August 86 A new research, development, test and evaluation (RDTE) contract was awarded to Hughes Aircraft to complete the WCL guidance system for TOW.
September 1986 Fielding of the TOW 2 to the U.S. Army Western Command (WESTCOM) was completed on schedule.
September 1986 The Swiss Parliament approved a TOW 2 co-production program with an estimated value of over $500 million.
3 November 1986 Information about the clandestine arms dealings between the United States and Iran became public knowledge. Both TOW and HAWK missiles were involved in the Reagan administration’s “arms-for-hostages” deal. Proceeds from the missile sales to Iran were diverted to support the contras in Nicaragua.
1987 This year was the first time the major components of the M65 TOW system were broken out for competition. This year was also the last buy of the M65 TOW to complete fielding of the M65 COBRA helicopter to the U.S. Army National Guard, which had received its first system in June 81.
1987 The FY 1987 Defense Authorization Act designated TOW as a Defense Enterprise Program (DEP), an initiative designed to increase the efficiency of the management structure of a defense acquisition program. It also enhanced program stability through the use of milestone authorization. In addition, the DEP reduced the number of officials through whom the PM reported as well as decreased the number of regulations, policies, directives, and administrative rules and guidelines relating to acquisition activities to which the system was subject. The act required that DOD nominate at least nine acquisition programs (three per service) to participate in the DEP in FY 1988. Two of the programs designated for the Army were managed at Redstone Arsenal.
15 April 1987 The TOW Project Office approved the TOW 2A Missile Integration Implementation ECP, thereby establishing a new missile configuration for the U.S. Army. Production of the TOW 2A began this same month. This variation of the TOW missile was developed to counter Soviet reactive armor.
June 1987 The BFVS/TOW 2 subsystem (T2SS) and TOW 2 subsystem support equipment (T2SS-SE) were approved for release to TRADOC.
1 July 1987 COL Thomas M. Devanney assumed the position of TOW PM, after COL James B. Lincoln transferred to U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC) Headquarters on 12 June 87.
17 September 1987 The AMC Commander approved the conditional release of the TOW 2A missile.
24 September 1987 The TOW 2B development contract was awarded to Hughes Aircraft Company.
28 September 1987 The first shipment of TOW 2A missiles arrived in USAREUR.
29 January 1988 The first TOW 2 WCL missile was fired at MICOM Test Area I.
30 April 1988 Despite the success of the initial test firings of the TOW 2 WCL guidance system missiles, the contract for this effort expired due to insufficient funding for additional testing.
September 1988 The first fielding of the Bradley A1 vehicles with TOW 2 subsystems was completed.
1989 Despite the need demonstrated in Vietnam for a passive night vision system for target detection and tracking, the C-NITE telescopic sight was not delivered to the Army until this year.
23 March 1989 The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) held a public hearing in Reno, Nevada, on the site characterization plan for the possible construction of a geologic repository for commercial and defense spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. Attendees were part of the most detailed discussion of potential terrorist use of antitank missiles against nuclear waste repository shipments. Testimony at the hearing identified the U.S. TOW and the French/NATO Milan wire-guided missiles as terrorist weapons of choice because of their armor penetration, effective range, and proven battlefield performance.
9 June 1989 A 33-month Alternate TOW 2B development contract was awarded to Hughes Aircraft Company.
12 July 1989 McDonnell Douglas Missile Systems Company (MDMSC) received a $5.4 million contract as the second source for TOW missiles.
November 1989 A TOW Joint Program Review was held at Hughes Aircraft Company in Tucson, Arizona, from 28 to 30 November. During that period, Army and DOD officials, along with contractor representatives and various dignitaries from support organizations worldwide, attended a ceremony marking the production of 500,000 missiles at the company’s Tucson facilities.
1990 The Army approved production of the TOW 2B, the latest version of the TOW antitank missile.
1990 The TOW Sight Improvement Program (TSIP) effort began. The improvement program would significantly enhance the TOW system’s current capabilities and ensure its effectiveness into the next decade.
8 January 1990 The MICOM WSMD assumed operational control of the TOW M65 Subsystem (COBRA) on this date.
26 April 1990 COL Thomas M. Devanney, TOW PM, was temporarily assigned as the Acting Deputy, Program Executive Officer (PEO), Fire Support. Gerald Smith, TOW Deputy PM, served as Acting PM until 21 January 1991.
27 June 1990 Because of budget constraints, the DOD Under Secretary for Acquisition instructed the Army to proceed with termination of the missile second source contract with MDMSC.
2 August 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait and captured U.S.-made HAWK and TOW missiles owned by the latter nation. United Nations (U.N.) Security Council Resolution 660 condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
6 August 1990 U.N. Security Council Resolution 661 imposed economic sanctions against Iraq. Saudi Arabia requested U.S. assistance in its defense.
7 August 1990 Operation Desert Shield (ODS) began (C-Day). The first U.S. forces arrived in Saudi Arabia the following day (8 August).
9 August 1990 The TOW Project Office received word that the 82nd, 101st, and 24th Divisions would deploy immediately to Southwest Asia (SWA). The 1st CD, elements of the 2nd Armored Division, and the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment would follow shortly. Analysis showed that only the 82nd had the latest version of the TOW 2 missile guidance set with new software for improved tracking in a desert environment.
10 August 1990 DA Headquarters directed the TOW Project Office to immediately apply the latest software modification to the TOW 2 launchers and the ITV launch rail modification on TOW 2 systems before units deployed to SWA. The rail modification allowed TOW 2A missiles to load into ITV turrets without binding despite missile cases that were at the maximum width tolerance.
17 August 1990 After the TOW modification team completed its mission at Fort Hood, Texas, deploying units had the most up-to-date TOW 2 equipment available.
29 August 1990 The 82nd Airborne Division arrived in Saudi Arabia.
12 September 1990 Major combat elements of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) arrived in theater.
6 October 1990 The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) arrived in Saudi Arabia.
25 October 1990 Modification of the BFV/T2SS missile guidance set began at Hughes Aircraft Company. This effort was pushed to provide additional capability for deployment in support of ODS.
November 1990 Two Hughes field service representatives were deployed to SWA to support the BFVS materiel fielding team in deprocessing and handoff. They provided in-country troubleshooting and repair of critical TOW subsystem components. One remained in country until January 91 while the other stayed on until March 1991.
November 1990 The Saudi Arabia National Guard was provided TOW night sights, giving them night fighting capability used effectively during Desert Storm.
18 November 1990 The PEO Fire Support sent a team to SWA to support the TOW weapon system. The team remained in theater until 13 March 1991.
29 November 1990 U.N. Security Council Resolution 678 authorized the use of force to uphold its resolutions unless Iraq withdrew from Kuwait by the 15 January 1991 deadline.
30 November 1990 By this date, the TOW 2 optical protection sight exchange program was completed in SWA. During ODS, the TOW Project Office received intelligence assessments that identified the presence of laser range-finders on Iraqi tanks that posed an eye damage threat to gunners looking through optical telescopes like those on the TOW 2 optical sight. Logisticians for the system developed a plan to apply the first deliveries of optical sight objective lenses with laser protective coating to units that had just deployed to Saudi Arabia. MICOM Logistic Assistance Representatives (LARs) exchanged the new items with unmodified sights, then shipped the latter back to Anniston Army Depot, Alabama, for modification. The modified sights were returned to SWA for use by other units deployed in the theater of operations.
21 December 1990 The TOW 2B engineering change proposal was incorporated into part of the FY 90 TOW 2A missile production.
FY 91 Bradley A2 vehicles were deployed in support of Operation Desert Storm (ODS) to the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, 1st CD, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, and the 1st Infantry Division (ID).
FY 91 FMS support to allied forces during ODS consisted of the delivery of 150 TOW 2 launchers to Saudi Arabia, 67 launchers to Egypt, and 8 launchers to Oman. The launchers were directed from U.S. inventory, with a payback from customer procurements.
January 1991 The Alternate TOW 2B program was terminated due to lack of funding.
15 January 1991 COL Jack D. Conway was named TOW PM.
15 January 1991 The United Nations set this date as the deadline for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait.
17 January 1991 The ODS air war began (D-Day). U.S. Marine Corps AH-1T COBRA helicopter gunships destroyed an Iraqi command post with TOW missiles following Iraq’s sporadic shelling of the Khafji area near the Saudi-Kuwaiti border.
27 January 1991 COL Thomas M. Devanney, formerly the TOW PM, was permanently reassigned as the Deputy PEO, Fire Support.
29 January 1991 After AMC tasked MICOM to manage the M901 ITV, a WSMD team began to identify problems and their solutions that helped raise the vehicle’s readiness rates from 80 percent to 95 percent. The initial assessment of the system’s performance during the “100 Hour War” showed that the ITVs had at least 14 confirmed kills.
29 January 1991 Iraqi troops attacked Khafji, Saudi Arabia. Saudi-led coalition forces, which included U.S. Marine Corps units, stormed the town the following day (30 January), but were forced to retreat. The second Saudi-led attack on 31 January successfully retook Khafji. During the series of fire fights constituting the first major ground battle of Operation Desert Storm, TOW antitank missiles immobilized many Iraqi tanks and armored cars.
February 1991 MICOM workers and an employee of the Huntsville Division of the Army Corps of Engineers developed a new internal blast shield for the TOW that would help the missile defeat tank reactive armor.
23 February 1991 The deadline for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait before the beginning of the ground war was set for 12 Noon (8 p.m. in Baghdad). Coalition forces began the ground phase of the campaign (G-Day) on 24 February.
27 February 1991 A MICOM Quality Assurance Technician completed the task of handing off TOW 2 equipment to the Royal Saudi Land Forces.
28 February 1991 President George H.W. Bush ordered the cessation of offensive operations. The following day, cease fire terms were negotiated in Safwan, Iraq.
3 April 1991 U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 set forth a permanent cease fire, the terms of which were officially accepted by Iraq on 6 April. The cease fire took effect on 11 April 1991.
15 October 1991 The Secretary of the Army cancelled the TSIP because of declining budget and funding issues. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development and Acquisition directed the PEO, Fire Support to coordinate the development of an affordable alternative. The latter effort subsequently became known as the Improved Target Acquisition System (ITAS) being developed for the Army's light forces.
(After the Air Defense PEO was deactivated on 29 July 1992, several of the systems formerly assigned to the organization were assigned to the newly created PEO, Tactical Missiles, which replaced the PEO, Fire Support.)
1992 During the second quarter of this fiscal year, the TOW 2B replaced the TOW 2A as the standard production missile.
January 1992 The Army Acquisition Executive (AAE) designated the TOW ITAS program as Acquisition Category (ACAT) III. The ITAS was a material change to the Ground TOW 2 weapon system for first-to-deploy light forces. It would improve the TOW’s target detection recognition and engagement capability by incorporating a second generation forward looking infrared (FLIR), a laser range finder, and automatic tracking features. All missile configurations could still be fired, allowing room for growth for follow-on missiles. The ITAS would be fielded at battalion level, replacing TOW 2 in light infantry units. The modification kit consisted of an integrated Target Acquisition Subsystem (TAS), Fire Control Subsystem (FCS), Battery Power Source (BPS), and Modified Traversing Unit (TU). The ITAS would operate from the highly mobile, multipurpose, wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) and associated dismount platforms.
30 March 1992 Redstone Arsenal was the first U.S. site for a semiannual meeting of 10 international customers for the TOW missile system. The TOW Weapon System Partnership Committee, part of the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA), began its semiannual meeting at the arsenal on this date. Usually held at the depot facility at Capellan in Luxembourg, the one-time invitation gave members an opportunity to see where the TOW system was managed. The meeting ended on 2 April 1992.
30 April 1993 The TOW ITAS Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) contract was awarded to Texas Instruments, Inc.
June 1993 In support of U.N. operations in Somalia, U.S. Army troops fired TOW 2 and TOW 2A missiles from AH-1F/M65 COBRA aircraft. By 30 September 1993, Task Force Safari soldiers had launched a total of 124 TOW 2 and TOW 2A missiles. That same month, a technical team from the TOW Project Office deployed to Somalia to provide assistance and technical advice to U.S. Army units in country.
17 June 1993 COL Robert E. Armbruster, Jr. was assigned as TOW PM. He replaced COL Jack D. Conway, who retired.
27 July 1993 The PEO, Tactical Missiles approved the Acquisition Plan for the Improved Bradley Acquisition Subsystem (IBAS), an improvement of the current Bradley TOW acquisition and fire control subsystem. This effort was an extension of the TOW ITAS.
5 October 1993 Approval of an ECP incorporating changes to the TOW 2A missile generated the TOW 2A Air missile. Production implementation of this unique Navy missile occurred in FY 94.
18 February 1994 The IBAS EMD effort was awarded to Texas Instruments, Inc., as a letter contract modification to the TOW ITAS EMD contract.
2 March 1994 The TOW Project Management Office was disestablished. Ground TOW weapon system responsibility transitioned to the MICOM WSMD. Included in the transfer were the Ground TOW launcher, night sight, M70 Trainer, and ancillary equipment. That same day, the Close Combat Anti-Armor Weapon Systems (CCAWS) Project Office was established. The new organization’s management responsibilities included the ITAS, IBAS, TOW missile production (and TOW missile production close-out), the Bradley/T2SS production, and future CCAWS programs.
August 1994 TOW/COBRA provided a team to support verification and checkout of TOW subsystems scheduled for deployment to Haiti with the 10th Mountain Division.
1 August 1994 Gary L. Lawson assumed the Assistant PM position for the TOW missile production program.
September 1994 The TOW BFVS provided a team to support the 24th Infantry Division at Fort Stewart, Georgia, for deployment to Haiti. The team helped prepare about 60 vehicles by providing a complete checkout of the Bradley/T2SS.
19 April 1995 A massive explosion destroyed the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Two bomb scares occurred shortly after the initial blast. The first scare caused rescuers to be evacuated when an investigator discovered a TOW missile in the rubble about 20 to 30 feet above ground level. The inert missile belonged to the U.S. Customs Service, which had an office on the fifth floor of the building. The missile was reportedly being used in an undercover operation. News reports about the evacuation of rescuers from the bombing site after the TOW missile was found helped fuel conspiracy theorists’ belief in a government cover-up of the true cause of the Oklahoma bombing which killed 168 people and injured 467.
December 1995 The TOW weapon system deployed to Bosnia with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Partnership for Peace forces as part of a peacekeeping mission.
FY 96 Texas Instruments, Inc. delivered the first four IBAS prototypes.
May 1996 Military gunners at Fort Lewis, Washington, test fired the new target acquisition system for the TOW missile. The flight tests with the ITAS were conducted throughout this month, with 42 missiles fired by month’s end.
August 1996 The TOW ITAS completed the original 40-month EMD contract.
30 September 1996 A Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) contract was awarded to Texas Instruments, Inc., for 25 ITAS systems.
October 1996 The TOW production line transitioned to Hughes Aircraft, the prime contractor.
November 1996 COL Roger L. Carter became the new CCAWS Project Manager, replacing COL Robert E. Armbruster, Jr., who was promoted to brigadier general and selected as the Deputy Commanding General at the Space and Strategic Defense Command.
May 1997 The last TOW missile for the United States was produced.
December 1997 By this month, a U.S. District Court judge had imposed prison sentences and restitution terms on five men involved in the theft of military vehicles from Fort McCoy, Wisconsin. Two of those sentenced to terms of imprisonment had been Army employees, one a former range maintenance officer. About 153 vehicles, once valued at $13 million and still conservatively estimated at the time of sentencing to be worth $1.5 million to $2.5 million, were taken from the post between September 1994 and June 1996. Among the stolen vehicles were M901 TOW missile launchers, a Sheridan tank, a howitzer, and other types of trucks. Although no missiles were taken and none of the equipment ended up in the hands of terrorists, the conspirators sold a TOW missile launcher to an individual in Oklahoma, and an undercover agent bought a M901 missile launcher and a jeep. However, the planned sale of a missile launcher and other equipment to Fox Studios for the movie Courage Under Fire fell through. Authorities eventually recovered many of the stolen vehicles. The charges and convictions against the men followed an intensive 13-month investigation by the Defense Criminal Investigation Service and the FBI, with help from Fort McCoy’s senior leadership.
1998 About 2200 TOW 2 missiles were deployed to Bosnia in support of Operation Joint Endeavor.
1998 Release of the formal request for proposal for the Follow-on to TOW (FOTT) Missile System occurred in the first quarter of this fiscal year. The FOTT would have been organic to and provided improved long-range, lethal, antitank capability for light and mechanized infantry forces currently equipped with the TOW missile system. Key FOTT missile system requirements included compatibility with all TOW launch platforms; fire-and-forget primary mode of operation with an alternative mode for backup; increased range, lethality, and platform survivability; and modular design for future growth and shelf-life extension. Although projected to enter EMD in FY 98 and transition to LRIP in FY 04, the termination of funding for the FOTT led to a new search for other options to maintain the viability of the Army’s antiarmor missile capability.
1998 Late in this year, AMC released a formal request for information (RFI) which solicited new technology concepts for a program identified as the TOW Fire-and-Forget (F&F) Missile System. The TOW F&F RFI sought “a low cost near term solution to the FOTT requirement, which [had been] determined to be unaffordable.
January 1998 The ITAS customer test was initiated.
March 1998 The Army awarded LRIP II for 75 ITAS for the first brigade fielding in the fourth quarter of 1999.
September 1998 The first unit equipped with the ITAS was A Troop, 1/17th Cavalry, 82nd Airborne Division. The new system would be fielded over 10 years to all active Army TOW users and selected National Guard units.
1999 The ITAS Limited User Test II was successfully conducted during the second quarter.
1999 The Army awarded the ITAS full-rate production contract for 102 systems, with priced annual options for FY 00-03.
June 1999 The TOW weapon system was deployed to support troops sent to serve in Kosovo as part of Operation Joint Guardian.
2000 The first two ITAS foreign military sales cases were approved for NAMSA and Canada.
During the first quarter of this fiscal year, the Army released the TOW F&F request for proposal. The TOW F&F mission was to provide the next-generation missile for light, early entry contingency forces equipped with TOW ITAS platforms. The system would include the encased TOW F&F missile, the shipping and storage container, and ITAS platform applique kits. In addition to its compatibility with the ITAS ground platform, the TOW F&F missile would not only operate in a fire-and-forget capability but would have an alternate command guidance mode as backup. It would also have increased range, lethality, and platform survivability; be able to counter active protection system threats; and have a modular design for future growth and shelf life extension.
4-5 April 2000 The TOW Weapon System Partnership Committee met in Huntsville for the second time. Usually held in Luxembourg each April and October, the United States agreed to sponsor this month’s meeting, which was hosted by the CCAWS Project Office and the U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command (AMCOM) Deputy for Systems Acquisition (DSA). This meeting also marked the committee’s 25th anniversary. Although several systems had weapon systems partnerships, TOW had the longest running committee. Member nations included Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. The United States was not a committee member, but it did serve as an advisor to the group.
July 2000 From 9 to 29 July, the 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, conducted live fire exercises with TOW missiles at Redstone Arsenal. The unit was invited to shoot the missiles, which had already been scheduled for destruction
9 September 2000 The Army awarded a $125.9 million TOW F&F missile EMD contract to Raytheon’s Missile Systems business unit in Tucson, Arizona. The TOW F&F would integrate an advanced focal plane array and imaging infrared (FPA/IIR) seeker. The IIR seeker and software would provide automatic target tracking, and eliminate the TOW wire, significantly increasing soldier survivability and overall system lethality. Designed to engage any target that the gunner could see, day or night, even when faced with battlefield contaminants or countermeasures, the TOW F&F missile would also defeat threat tanks equipped with advanced armor and active protection systems.
The Road To M65 TOW: i primi elicotteri d’attacco controcarro NATO in Europa | SOBCHAK SECURITY - est. 2005 (wordpress.com)
The Road To M65 TOW: i primi elicotteri d’attacco controcarro NATO in Europa
Nell’ambito del progetto storico dedicato alla US Army Aviation, questa volta vi parlero’ dello schieramento dei primi elicotteri d’attacco controcarro NATO in Europa Centrale.
Sono passati oramai 40 anni dalla consegna degli AH-1Q Cobra/TOW ai reparti addestrativi e operativi dell’US Army, e per questo motivo mi sembrava interessante ripercorrere la storia dietro a questa macchina e al suo particolare sistema d’arma: l’M65. Oltre a cio’, ho deciso di spendere due parole sia sul ruolo ricoperto da queste macchine, sia sulle revisioni addestrative e dottrinali attuate dall’aviazione dell’esercito nel corso dei cruciali anni Settanta.
Ovviamente non potevo tralasciare il debutto dell’Airborne TOW in Vietnam, dove vi furono i primi casi di carri di fabbricazione Sovietica distrutti da elicotteri occidentali.
La chiusura di questo special e’ invece dedicata ad una sintesi sulle differenze che intercorrono tra le numerose varianti dei Cobra monoturbina adottate dall’US Army.
Che altro dire? Buona lettura e Buone Feste!
Gia’ dalle prime fasi del conflitto in Vietnam, l’US Army aspirava a dotarsi di un elicottero d’attacco con autentiche capacita’ controcarro. A seguito della cancellazione dei programmi AAFSS/Cheyenne (1965-72) e il disimpegno dal Sud Est Asiatico, l’esercito statunitense inizio’ a dedicare sempre piu’ tempo, risorse ed energie al Patto di Varsavia e al teatro dell’Europa Centrale (con gran sollievo dei paesi dell’Alleanza Atlantica).
Nel 1972, subito dopo la cancellazione dell’AH-56 Cheyenne, l’US Army avvio’ formalmente il programma Advanced Attack Helicopter (AAH), che avrebbe dovuto fornire all’esercito una sofisticata macchina biturbina specificatamente concepita per la lotta controcarri. In poche parole un sostituto “agli steroidi” del Cobra. Fu pero’ chiaro sin dal principio che il processo di selezione, sviluppo, collaudo e consegna avrebbe richiesto tempi tutt’altro che brevi. L’esercito necessitava, dunque, di una efficace e al tempo stesso rapida soluzione fino all’entrata in servizio del vincitore della gia’ detta specifica AAH.
Tale soluzione era rappresentata dall’AH-1G Cobra della Bell Helicopter. Nato essenzialmente come piattaforma interim per la scorta di elicotteri da trasporto e il supporto di fuoco generico, il Cobra era pero’ sprovvisto di adeguato armamento controcarro. Esistevano, invero, razzi da 70mm dotati di testata HEAT compatibili con le razziere standard M158 e M200, ma queste munizioni non solo erano prive di qualsivoglia sistema di guida, ma si rivelarono inadeguate in termini di gittata e penetrazione, specialmente dopo l’introduzione di carri moderni come il T-64 e il T-72.
IL MICIDIALE AIRBORNE TOW: dall’XM26 all’XM65
A dispetto di cio’, non si puo’ dire che l’US Army partisse svantaggiato, e questo grazie all’allora nuovo missile controcarro filoguidato SACLOS BGM-71 TOW, sviluppato nel periodo 1963-68 dalla Hughes e il Redstone Arsenal (Alabama), ed entrato in servizio nel corso del 1970 (entro quell’anno non meno di 24 battaglioni divisionali stanziati in USA ed Europa ricevettero la versione terrestre).
Non furono pero’ solo rosa e fiori, visto che il TOW andava prima integrato in un elicottero che non era predisposto per ospitare tale sistema d’arma. La buona notizia era che l’esercito aveva precedentemente accumulato una certa esperienza con la versione airborne di questo missile grazie ad una serie di test in patria effettuati negli anni ’60 con l’NUH-1B, che era in buona sostanza uno Huey Bravo (UH-1B) standard equipaggiato con sottosistema XM26 composto da due lanciatori trinati e un visore di puntamento stabilizzato nella parte sinistra del muso.
Il primo XM26 in configurazione ADM (Advanced Development Model) venne installato a bordo di un Bell UH-1B nel 1967. Dal 5 ottobre 1966 al 28 febbraio 1968 vennero lanciati un totale di 30 missili in ogni condizione possibile: in movimento, hovering e attraverso i piu’ disparati percorsi irregolari. Il sistema XM26 ottenne un buon risultato, tanto che dei 30 missili lanciati, ben 22 centrarono il bersaglio. Oltre alle prove condotte in patria, l’US Army porto’ l’XM26 anche in Germania Occidentale, dove venne mostrato anche alle locali forze armate.
Fra la fine del 1968 e la prima meta’ del 1971 si registrarono 62 lanci dagli Huey, di cui ben 57 coronati da successo: un hit rate pari al 92%.
Hughie McInnish, uno dei tecnici civili responsabili del programma TOW elilanciato all’arsenale di Redstone (Alabama), scrisse in seguito un articolo entusiastico su alcune dimostrazioni avvenute in Germania, tant’e’ che venne contattato telefonicamente da un alto ufficiale del Pentagono per discutere di una proposta… impossibile da rifiutare 🙂
IL 1ST AERIAL COMBAT TOW TEAM E I PRIMI LANCI IN VIETNAM
Il 1st Aerial Combat TOW Team venne inizialmente costituito per prendere parte ad un esperimento organizzato dal United States Army Combat Developments Experimentation Command (USACDEC). Tale Esperimento, burocraticamente noto come 43.6 (Attack Helicopter, Daylight Defense), Phase 111.2, aveva lo scopo di valutare e comparare tre sistemi di puntamento e acquisizione per l’Airborne TOW, compreso l’originale XM26 della Hughes. L’addestramento degli equipaggi e le successive prove di valutazione (comprensive di campagne di tiro) si svolsero in due distinte fasi fra l’autunno del 1971 e l’aprile del 1972 presso la riserva militare di Fort Hunter Liggett (California) e la base di Fort Lewis (Washington).
Il 14 Aprile 1972 il 1st Aerial Combat TOW Team ricevette ufficialmente l’ordine di partenza per il Vietnam, fissato per il giorno 22 di aprile.
Sotto la direzione dell’energico Colonnello Robert W. Huntzinger (Project Manager del programma TOW al Redstone Arsenal dal 1968 al 1976), venne pianificato e organizzato a tempo di record l’invio di una di mini-task force composta da aviatori dell’esercito, personale militare di supporto e tecnici della Hughes e della Bell Helicopter.
Fu un compito tutt’altro che semplice in quanto uomini, elicotteri e componenti dell’XM26 erano sparsi per tutti gli Stati Uniti occidentali (ricordo ai lettori che il programma XM26 venne congelato diverso tempo prima a causa dell’AH-56). Ad esempio, i due NUH-1B utilizzati nell’esperimento 43.6 si trovavano a Fort Lewis, mentre alcune componenti dell’XM26 giacevano imballate presso gli stabilimenti della Hughes a Culver City, California. I militari di Fort Lewis dovettero dunque smontare i componenti dagli UH-1B e spedirli a Culver City, dove il personale della Hughes avrebbe provveduto ad assemblare e revisionare il sistema XM26 completo e rispedirlo agli impianti della Hughes Aircraft a El Segundo, California. Come se non bastasse, i missili TOW dovevano essere prelevati dallo stabilimento di produzione della Hughes di Tucson, Arizona.
Il 21 aprile uomini, mezzi ed equipaggiamenti furono riuniti presso la base aerea di McChord (Washington) pronti per essere imbarcati a bordo di due aerei da trasporto C-141 Starlifter.
Dire che il team arrivo’ al posto giusto e al momento giusto e’ puro eufemismo. Quando i due NUH-1B giunsero a Saigon, da piu’ di un mese in Vietnam stava impazzando l’Offensiva di Pasqua.
Contrariamente alle previsioni di molti comandanti Alleati, l’Esercito Nordvietnamita (PAVN) riusci’ ad attuare un massiccio attacco su ben tre direttrici e con l’appoggio di forze corazzate e d’artiglieria. Per gli Alleati fu un completo shock, sia da un punto di vista militare che psicologico.
In totale il PAVN mobilito’ un dispositivo di circa 200 mila uomini, mentre le forze USA disponevano in loco poche decine di migliaia di effettivi, in gran parte assegnati a compiti di supporto e consulenza. Era dunque chiaro che sarebbe stato l’ARVN a dover sostenere il peso dei combattimenti terrestri (d’altro canto la “vietnamizzazione” procedeva, con alterni successi, gia’ da qualche tempo).
Dopo alcuni giorni dedicati all’ambientamento e all’addestramento, il 1st Aerial Combat TOW Team venne dichiarato Combat Ready il giorno 29 di Aprile. Il Team in seguito si diresse da Long Binh verso l’area di Pleiku, dove fra il 30 Aprile e il 2 Maggio effettuo’ una breve campagna di tiro con i missili TOW. Quest’ultima fase fu necessaria in quanto il team sino ad allora non aveva mai sparato un solo TOW che non fosse di tipo inerte (noto come BTM-71A).
Quando il 1st Aerial Combat TOW Team giunse in quel di Pleiku, le forze Nordvietnamite avevano ormai preso possesso della Prima Regione Militare (MR-I) e si stavano dirigendo a “rullo compressore” verso Kontum, posizionata, guardacaso, a poche decine di chilometri a Nord della gia’ detta Pleiku.
Il battesimo di fuoco risale al 2 maggio, quando il team riusci’ a mettere fuori combattimento quattro carri M41, un autocarro da 2 1/2 ton e un obice da 105mm. Da notare che l’equipaggiamento finito sotto i colpi degli Huey era stato precedentemente catturato dai Nordvietnamiti presso la FSB Lima, base che l’ARVN aveva precipitosamente abbandonato il primo di maggio. I missili TOW furono lanciati da una distanza di circa 2700 metri e provocarono esplosioni secondarie dovute alla detonazione delle munizioni stivate a bordo del carro e nei pressi dell’obice.
La singola azione di maggior rilievo riguardo’ la strenua battaglia per la citta’ di Kontum, attaccata da forze meccanizzate Nordvietnamite e difesa da reparti di fanteria del Sud e da piccole aliquote di consiglieri statunitensi. Il 26 Maggio 1972 gli americani lanciarono numerosi atttacchi aerei a supporto dei reparti ARVN, ma l’eccessiva vicinanza del nemico a questi ultimi impedi’ in talune occasioni l’intervento dell’aviazione tattica. L’entrata in scena dei due NUH-1 armati di TOW (in congiunzione con Cobra equipaggiati con lanciarazzi) consenti’ di colpire con elevata precisione i corazzati Nordvietnamiti che stavano impunemente avanzando nel centro di Kontum. Quel giorno le due macchine lanciarono 21 missili che centrarono numerosi bersagli, inclusi nove carri T-54 e PT-76.
L’impatto dell’Airborne TOW nel teatro di operazioni nel quale opero’ fu notevole se si tiene conto del numero di macchine schierate, la natura squisitamente sperimentale di tutta l’operazione e le limitazioni legate all’impiego di una piattaforma anziana e sottopotenziata quale era appunto l’UH-1B.
In effetti, il bilancio dei circa 30 giorni di attivita’ del team in Temporary Duty fu piu’ che positivo. I lanci effettuati furono 94, mentre i bersagli colpiti 81.
Fra questi si segnalavano:
24 carri armati
9 autocarri
4 APC
3 bunker
2 pezzi d’artiglieria
2 postazioni di mitragliatrici pesanti
2 depositi di munizioni
1 ponte
1 un sistema di artiglieria lanciarazzi.
Prima di lasciare il Vietnam, l’originale TOW Team (foto in alto) istrui’ i rimpiazzi, per l’occasione prelevati da candidati selezionati da personale della 1st Aviation Brigade. Quest’ultima continuo’ ad impiegare gli Huey tank-killer fino all’11 Gennaio 1973.
Per quella data risultavano all’attivo 199 lanci, di cui 37 in addestramento e 162 in combattimento. Il rateo di affidabilita’ operativo fu del 93% (151 missili), mentre nell’82% dei lanci i missili colpirono i bersagli acquisiti (121).
In totale i due NUH-1B furono responsabili della distruzione di 27 tank, 21 autocarri, 5 APC, 3 pezzi d’artiglieria, 1 cannone contraereo, 1 lanciarazzi da 122mm, 5 postazioni di mitragliatrici pesanti, 2 pezzi contraerei da 57mm, 8 bunker, 2 ponti, 2 postazioni di mortaio, 2 depositi di munizioni, 2 M151 armate di TOW catturate dal nemico e un singolo edificio.
Di contro si verificarono 11 malfunzionamenti del missile e in almeno quattro occasioni l’equipaggio manco’ il bersaglio perche’ esegui’ i lanci oltre la gittata massima consentita (3000 metri). E a proposito di gittata, le esperienze accumulate in Vietnam evidenziarono che la portata massima del TOW non era sufficiente a tenere l’elicottero al riparo da nuove minacce come il semovente contraereo ZSU-23-4 e il missile spalleggiabile SA-7. Fu cosi’ che al Redstone Arsenal decisero di portare la gittata a 3750 metri semplicemente incrementando la lunghezza dei cavi di guida. Fra maggio e giugno 1973 l’US Army collaudo’ il nuovo TOW a gittata estesa avvalendosi ancora volta di uno Huey (questa volta “Mike”).
In basso: filmato declassificato e rilasciato dai National Archives in cui vengono mostrati alcuni dei bersagli colpiti con il TOW dagli Huey:
Nonostante l’esperienza positiva in Vietnam, lo Huey armato di missili TOW non entro’ mai a far parte dell’arsenale statunitense, anche se questa variante continuo’ a servire in patria nelle attivita’ di collaudo di armamenti.
IL COBRA CACCIATORE DI CARRI
Come accennato all’inizio del post, l’esercito statunitense aveva urgentemente bisogno di un elicottero d’attacco armato di missili guidati. L’AH-1G si era rivelata una buona piattaforma, affidabile, bene armata e poco dispendiosa dal punto di vista della manutenzione. Tuttavia l’attraente Cobra non mancava di difetti. La potenza del turboalbero fu senza dubbio uno dei principali talloni d’achille, e in ambienti Hot&High (come negli altopiani centrali) la pur valida T53-L13 da 1400 shp mostrava tutti i suoi limiti. Sostanzialmente i shaft horsepower disponibili non erano mai abbastanza, tanto che il personale di terra doveva sapientemente bilanciare carburante e armamento installato per consentire all’aeromobile di ottenere prestazioni ed autonomia soddisfacenti.
Ma ad influire negativamente sulle prestazioni e capacita’ della macchina fu soprattutto il cambio del profilo di volo.
Quando l’AH-1G venne concepito, la minaccia del fuoco di terra in Vietnam era per lo piu’ rappresentata da armi leggere portatili e – piu’ raramente – mitragliatrici pesanti (le peraltro temute DShK di fabbricazione sovietica). In questo contesto gli equipaggi dei Cobra procedevano tipicamente a quote attorno ai 1200/2000 piedi sopra la target area, per poi picchiare verso il bersaglio lanciando salve di razzi da 2,75 pollici o, in alternativa, effettuando passaggi con la Minigun e il lanciagranate da 40mm. Tale modus operandi non richiedeva grandi sforzi a turbina, trasmissione e cellula (e, in una certa misura, nemmeno al pilota).
Tuttavia, negli ultimi anni del conflitto il livello di minaccia cambio’ in modo drastico. L’apparizione dei moderni ed efficaci sistemi contraerei semoventi dotati di radar (ZSU-23-4) e dei missili terra-aria a corto raggio (SA-7 e SA-8) costrinsero l’US Army a rivedere la dottrina d’impiego dei Cobra, anche in vista dell’imminente schieramento di questi ultimi in Europa Centrale. Fu proprio in quei frangenti che venne adottato (e rielaborato) il cosiddetto profilo di volo Nap-of-the-Earth (NOE), che consisteva nel volare a quote e velocita’ estremamente basse, utilizzando il terreno e la vegetazione come mascheramento. Tale profilo prevedeva, fra le altre cose, cambi repentini di posizione e quota, nonche’ il frequente ricorso al volo stazionario (hovering). La navigazione vera e propria avveniva invece attraverso l’ausilio di dettagliate mappe tattiche (scala 1:50.000), affiancate da altre in scala minore (1:250.000). Il Nap-of-the-Earth era una tecnica che rientrava in quello che era definito come “Terrain Flight” e che comprendeva, oltre appunto al NOE, anche anche i voli definiti “Low Level”, “Contour” e “Treetop”.
Il primo corso di Terrain Flight fu istituito alla scuola di volo dell’US Army di Fort Rucker nell’Aprile 1973 ed era destinato agli studenti dei corsi Initial Entry Rotary Wing (IERW). Nel contempo l’US Army si interesso’ anche all’addestramento notturno con visori NVG (Night Vision Goggles) e a questo proposito va segnalato l’avviamento dei corsi specifici nell’estate 1975.
Sebbene fosse chiaro che prima o poi ci si sarebbe dovuto occupare del potenziamento della turbina, era innanzitutto necessario risolvere il problema dell’armamento. La decisione di armare il Cobra con i TOW venne presa formalmente nel 1970. Dopo una serie di controversie burocratiche e organizzative sul chi avrebbe dovuto dirigere il programma, il 6 Novembre l’Army Materiel Command (AMC) assegno’ finalmente l’incarico all’Army Aviation System Command (AVSCOM). L’intero progetto, noto come Improved COBRA Armament Program (ICAP), fu dato in appalto alla Bell Helicopter di Fort Worth (Texas) il 3 Marzo 1972. Quest’ultima avrebbe dovuto progettare, sviluppare, costruire, integrare e infine collaudare (in collaborazione con l’esercito) il nuovo sistema d’arma, cosi’ come l’inedito casco di volo con sistema di mira integrato. La Hughes Aircraft venne invece scelta quale subcontractor per il sistema di puntamento e acquisizione (XM65 TSU).
Il contratto prevedeva la costruzione di nove sottosistemi completi, di cui otto da integrare in altrettanti Cobra. A tale scopo l’US Army forni’ alla Bell otto AH-1G, i missili TOW, un chase plane per i test in volo, le parti di ricambio e un certo numero di apparecchiature e strumenti speciali necessari alle modifiche delle macchine. Per contro, la Bell avrebbe dovuto soddisfare i requisiti e le prestazioni minime del committente.
Secondo i piani del Department of the Army la nuova macchina avrebbe dovuto entrare in servizio in configurazione IOC entro il Marzo 1975.
L’US Army assegno’ al nuovo Cobra la sigla YAH-1Q. Quest’ultimo era nella sostanza un AH-1G equipaggiato con i sottosistemi TOW Hughes XM65 e XM128 (noto come HSS o Helmet Sight Subsystem). L’AH-1Q avrebbe dovuto sostituire la modesta flotta di UH-1B armata di sottosistema M22 con 6 missili controcarro MCLOS tipo AGM-22 (SS.11 francesi su licenza). Sia l’esercito che la Bell speravano di semplificare e velocizzare il lavoro di ricerca e sviluppo dell’XM65 partendo dal vecchio XM26 dello Huey. Gli studi preliminari furono pero’ molto deludenti visto che dei 1200 disegni che facevano parte del progetto XM26, solo 50 si rivelarono utili nel programma XM65. Venne inoltre fatto presente che sebbene l’XM26 si comporto’ bene, esso fu giudicato troppo pesante, costoso, complicato e difficile da manutenere.
L’XM65 dovette dunque essere progettato partendo praticamente da zero. I lanciatori, dal design razionale ed essenziale, vennero progettati basandosi sul principio della modularita’. Il lanciatore base, binato, poteva diventare quadrinato semplicemente aggiungendo una seconda unita’ gemella.
Nelle immagini in basso potete osservare meglio le componenti principali dell’XM65, ossia i lanciatori M56, il sistema di puntamento stabilizzato Bell-Hughes noto come TSU (Telescopic Sight Unit), piu’ le black boxes, il pannello di controllo con il joystick e la strumentazione da integrare nel cockpit. Notare l’estrema semplicita’ dei lanciatori, assai diversi dagli ingombranti sistemi trinati dell’XM26.
In termini di peso, affidabilita’ e prestazioni l’XM65 fu un netto passo avanti rispetto al precedente XM26.
Realizzati in alluminio, i due lanciatori quadrinati carichi dell’XM65 pesavano nel complesso appena 412 kg, contro i 571 dell’XM26 in magnesio con 6 soli missili. L’affidabilita dichiarata in termini di MBTF passo’ dalle 113 alle 318 ore. Parlando inveece di prestazioni, il nuovo visore dell’XM65 disponeva di un angolo di visuale in azimut di 110° (dx e sx), laddove l’XM26 si fermava a 90°. Oltre a questo, l’XM65 nacque per poter eseguire lanci fino ad una velocita’ di 190 nodi.
La semplicita’ del progetto, unita alla modularita’ e al vasto ricorso alla microelettronica e ai circuiti stampati permise d’incrementare l’affidabilita’ e al tempo stesso di ridurre la manutenzione. Tutto cio’ porto’ indiscutibili benefici in termini di costi. Una stima del 1974 evidenzio’ che un sottosistema XM65 completo costava all’esercito 100 mila dollari in meno rispetto al precedente XM26.
Altra novita’ riguardava il sottosistema HSS comprensivo di casco di volo, simile ai tradizionali Gentex, ma con alcune peculiari caratteristiche che lo rendevano di fatto unico. Realizzato dalla celeberrima Sperry Univac sotto contratto Bell, l’HSS permetteva di ingaggiare, inseguire e colpire il bersaglio con l’armamento in torretta ma al tempo stesso garantiva all’equipaggio di mantenere la completa visibilita’ dell’area circostante e il controllo dell’aeromobile. Cio’ fu possibile grazie ad un sistema di puntamento a reticolo posizionato sopra l’occhio e a un meccanismo che asserviva l’elmetto alla torretta. In pratica quest’ultima si muoveva in direzione dello sguardo del cannoniere e dava la possibilita’ di identificare il bersaglio e di acqisirlo senza dover obbligatoriamente ricorrere alla TSU. Tale sistema poteva anche essere impiegato per l’acquisizione con i TOW, ma per la guida era ovviamente necessaria la gia’ citata TSU.
In questo breve video potete vedere come funzionava il tutto:
In totale l’US Army ordino’ alla Bell otto esemplari R&D YAH-1Q. Le consegne iniziarono nel Marzo 1973, proprio nel mese in cui si stava completando il ritiro del contingente USA in Vietnam. Nel dettaglio, il programma di sviluppo e test parti’ ufficialmente il 16 Marzo 1973 e si concluse nel Gennaio dell’anno successivo. Per quella data gli YAH-1Q avevano totalizzato 213 lanci di TOW fino a distanze di 3000 metri.
Le campagne di tiro avvennero presso i poligoni di Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona (161 missili) e Fort Knox, Kentucky (52 missili).
I bersagli utilizzati a Yuma erano di due tipi: stazionari e in movimento. I primi avevano una dimensione pari a 2.3 x 2.3 metri, mentre i secondi 2.3 x 4,6 metri. A Fort Knox vennero invece effettuati i lanci contro corazzati veri e propri. Questi ultimi erano costituiti da speciali carri con protezioni supplementari e condotti da personale dell’US Army a velocita’ fino a 30 miglia orarie. I collaudi a Knox, i primi svolti seguendo autentici principi tattici, si svolsero nell’Ottobre 1973.
Dei 213 lanci effettuati, 154 colpirono il bersaglio: un hit rate pari al 72%. Fra le cause dei mancati centri (54) si segnalavano:
+ impiego del sistema d’arma oltre le capacita’ (15)
+ errori dell’operatore TOW (13)
+ malfunzionamenti del missile o del lanciatore (12)
+ difetti imputabili a errori di progettazione (7).
Deficienze e problemi tecnici emersi durante i collaudi vennero in seguito corretti dalla Bell e dalla Hughes.
La produzione delll’AH-1Q e del sottosistema XM65 ricevette l’approvazione ufficiale nel Gennaio 1974. Il contratto iniziale, stipulato con la Bell il 31 Gennaio, prevedeva la conversione di 101 AH-1G US Army allo standard AH-1Q (ICAP), con un opzione per ulteriori 189 “G” da portare in seguito alla configurazione “S” (anche nota come “S Mod”, che comprendeva le modifiche ICAP e ICAM) entro il FY1975. Gli eventuali ordini avrebbero invece riguardato AH-1S di nuova produzione
Le consegne dei 101 AH-1Q si sarebbero svolte fra Giugno 1975 e Giugno 1976.
Mentre i primi 20 AH-1Q erano sostanzialmente AH-1G con modifiche ridotte all’essenziale, i restanti 72 AH-1Q incorporavano le modifiche strutturali che in un periodo successivo avrebbero permesso all’esercito di portarli allo standard “S” (ICAM).
Nel frattempo le campagne di tiro dei TOW continuavano nell’ambito dei programma di collaudo dei prototipi YAH-1Q R&D. La verifica delle correzioni apportate a sottosistemi e missili si svolsero a Yuma e Fort Hood, Texas. A Hood in particolare si registrarono un totale di 118 lanci fra Maggio e Giugno 1974. Di questi, 92 centrarono il bersaglio (HR 77%).
Da segnalare che due dei TOW lanciati a Hood appartenevano alla versione a gittata estesa (BGM-71B). Entrambi colpirono bersagli posti rispettivamente a 3600 e 3700 metri.
I test in climi freddi vennero organizzati a Fort Drum (New York). Dei cinque missili lanciati fra il 22 e il 28 Gennaio 1975, tre colpirono il bersaglio, mentre gli altri due lo mancarono per un malfunzionamento al missile e per un lancio fuori portata massima.
ANSBACH E REFORGER ’74
Mentre l’US Army e la Bell entravano nella fase finale dello sviluppo dell’AH-1Q, in Germania Occidentale i reparti di aviazione dell’esercito equipaggiati con gli AH-1G iniziavano a condurre le prime realistiche esercitazioni controcarro. Gia’ nel 1972 alcuni AH-1G inviati presso Ansbach (Bavaria) dimostrarono la validita’ del concetto di cacciacarri ad ala rotante, ma fu solo durante le piu’ complesse manovre REFORGER ’74 (Ottobre 1974) che si registrarono i risultati di maggior rilievo. I protagonisti furono ancora una volta i team Hunter-Killer, nuovamente dislocati in terra bavarese.
Ciascun Team H/K prevedeva l’impiego di tre o quattro macchine: due o tre AH-1, piu’ un singolo OH-58 in funzione scout e acquisizione bersagli. La composizione piu’ frequente si basava comunque su due attack e un scout. Basilarmente si trattava del concetto Pink Team ampiamente collaudato in Vietnam, ma con una piccola ma significante differenza: il Europa Centrale il volo NOE fu imposto anche agli equipaggi degli elicotteri d’attacco.
Per gli uomini dei team H/K furono giorni terribili ma al tempo stesso indimenticabili.
Terribili perche’, oltre a patire i rigori legati al profilo NOE, gli aviatori dell’esercito dovettero operare in condizioni meteo pessime, caratterizzate da tempeste di neve, pioggie, nubi basse e banchi di nebbia. Un vero e proprio incubo che mise a dura prova l’addestramento condotto sino ad allora.
Indimenticabili per il fatto che durante le esercitazioni gli equipaggi dei Cobra della ORANGE FORCE (che simulava il nemico) fecero letteralmente vedere i sorci verdi ai reparti della BLUE FORCE (forze amiche). Ad esempio il 13 Ottobre un HK Team in appoggio alla prima brigata della 1st Armored Division (ORANGE FORCE), riusci’ a colpire ben 23 carri della BLUE FORCE, piu’ altri 23 il giorno successivo. A questo bottino andavano aggiunti tre Cobra e alcuni Huey “caduti” sotto i colpi degli HK avversari.
A dispetto delle condimeteo inclementi e le restrizioni in termini di combustibile imbarcato (vedi sotto), dopo quattro giorni e mezzo di esercitazioni i Cobra della ORANGE FORCE accumularono un bottino pari a 200 carri, tre Cobra, alcuni Huey e Kiowa, due Fast Movers del TAC piu’ una serie assortita di veicoli leggeri. Le “perdite” della componente ad ala rotante ORANGE FORCE ammontavano invece a quattro elicotteri: due AH-1 e altrettanti OH-58.
I risultati furono abbastanza sorprendenti non solo tenendo conto dei problemi gia’ menzionati, ma anche per il fatto che gli elicotteri erano privi di qualunque capacita’ ognitempo. Oltre a questo, lo stage field degli elicotteri della ORANGE FORCE si trovava piuttosto distante dalla “linea del fronte (conosciuta FEBA o Forward Edge of Battle Area) e per tal ragione si dovette ricorrere all’allestimento di un apposita FARRP (Forward Arming and Refueling Point) per allievare i disagi legati ad eventuali episodi di bingo fuel.
Per i sostenitori degli elicotteri d’attacco specializzati le REFORGER ’74 furono un’occasione per dimostrare ai vertici piu’ scettici che c’era spazio per queste macchine in conflitti ad alta densita’ e in scenari mid/high threat. Il CW3 Michael Lopez, che partecipo’ alle succitate esercitazioni, in un articolo pubblicato da Army Aviation Digest disse a tal proposito:
“e’ necessario istituire un programma di addestramento per informare e dimostrare ai comandanti di terra cosa l’aviazione dell’esercito e’ in grado di fare, incluse le potenzialita’ del volo NOE”.
A questo proposito va segnalato che nel 1974 il TRADOC (TRaining And DOctrine Command) dell’US Army elaboro’ il primo manuale dottrinale dedicato all’impiego dell’aviazione dell’esercito in scenari high threat.
Allora le priorita’ addestrative stabilite per gli aviatori impegnati in scenari Mid-Threat erano le seguenti:
Sopravvivenza (intesa come volo)
Volo notturno
Addestramento strumentale
Guerra Elettronica
Addestramento al tiro
Addestramento al simulatore (detto anche Syntethic Flight Training)
Ho citato il Mid-Threat perche’ in quel periodo il breve ma intenso conflitto dello Yom Kippur (Ottobre 1973) dominava i dibattiti nei circoli militari e fu attentamente analizzato dall’US Army in quanto considerato un valido esempio di moderno conflitto a mid threat con largo impiego di avanzati sistemi contraerei e missili terra-aria e controcarro.
In breve era necessario lasciarsi velocemente il Vietnam alle spalle, e per fare cio’ si doveva giocoforza attuare anche una revisione dottrinale sull’impiego dell’elicottero.
Ad esempio nel 1974, il Maggiore Generale William Maddox, allora a capo dell’US Army Aviation Center di Fort Rucker, disse senza mezzi termini:
The first major deficiency is doctrinal. We must revise our concept of fighting to include operating against armor supported by sophisticated air defense weapons. As an army we seem to have been doctrinally marking time until the Cobra/TOW [AH-1Q] appears. We will begin receiving the Cobra/TOW in tactical units next year. But how will attack helicopter units be employed against tanks and on a battlefield with heat-seeking missiles and radar-controlled antiaircraft guns?
Most people think of attack helicopters in terms of air cavalry, which translates into light combat, avoid decisive engagement. Also, most people think in terms of fighting light fire teams-that is, two attack helicopters pitted against an enemy target, perhaps with the help of aerial scouts. Instead we must think of employing attack helicopters as we employ tanks-in mass-by platoon, company and battalion. And they must be integrated with other ground elements and support by suppressive fire from artillery and tactical air.
La copertina del numero di Novembre 1974 di Army Aviation Digest era piuttosto eloquente in merito al futuro ruolo dei Cobra dell’Esercito USA.
AH-1Q & M65: LA PRODUZIONE IN SERIE
La produzione delle prime unita’ di serie del sottosistema XM65 prese il via preso gli impianti della Hughes Aircraft Company attorno alla fine del 1974, mentre la consegna alla Bell Helicopter avvenne nel Febbraio 1975. Da quel momento in poi il compito della Bell fu quello di integrare lanciatori, TSU e le restanti componenti dell’XM65 alle cellule di AH-1 gia’ predisposte.
Il primo AH-1Q di produzione venne preso in consegna dall’US Army il 10 Giugno 1975. L’esercito spese i successivi otto mesi nella cosidetta fase IPT (Initial Production Test), che altro non erano che i collaudi di valutazione operativa che venivano effettuati prima di procedere con la produzione di massa vera e propria. La fase IPT ebbe termine il 19 Febbraio 1976 e comprendeva anche 91 lanci di TOW, di cui 59 negli Stati Uniti Continentali (CONUS) e i restanti 32 in poligoni e strutture della Repubblica Federale Tedesca.
I lanci nelle strutture Statunitensi (Yuma PG, Fort Hood e Fort Rucker) registrarono un hit rate pari all’83% (49 centri su 59), mentre nella Germania Occidentale questa cifra scese al 68% (22 centri su 32). Nel complesso, la percentuale del successo raggiunse un piu’ che soddisfacente 78%.
Per venire incontro alle pressanti richieste di Cobra armati di TOW, l’US Army programmo’ la costruzione di 439 AH-1S di nuova produzione durante il periodo 1977-80.
In totale erano previste 795 macchine che comprendevano i 92 AH-1G modificati in AH-1Q (FY1974) e i 198 AH-1G modificati in AH-1S (FY1974/75). I restanti Cobra, ossia quelli approvati a partire dal FY1976, sarebbero stati unicamente esemplari di nuova costruzione. L’esercito aveva inoltre in programma di portare allo standard “S” i primi 92 AH-1Q entro l’Aprile 1979.
ICAP e ICAM
Ricapitolando: il programma ICAP (Improved Cobra Armament Program) verteva essenzialmente sull’integrazione del sistema XM/M65 nella piattaforma AH-1G. Fu una sorta di manovra stop-gap nata per dare all’originale Cobra credibili capacita’ controcarro, nel minor tempo possibile e a costi accettabili. Il risultato fu l’AH-1Q, costruito in 92 esemplari.
Questa macchina si era rivelata tuttavia sottopotenziata, poco agile, scarsamente manovrabile e di conseguenza inadatta ai rigori del volo NOE e a lunghi periodi di hovering. Per questa ragione a partire dal 21esimo esemplare, gli AH-1Q vennero predisposti dalla Bell per accogliere le modifiche relative al successivo programma di migliorie previsto, ovvero l’ICAM.
ICAM stava per Improved Cobra Agility and Maneuverability. Fra le modifiche proincipali previste figuravano un mozzo del rotore principale modificato, un nuovo rotore di coda, trasmissione e, last but not least, un turboalbero potenziato T53-L-703 da 1,800 shp (400 in piu’ rispetto agli AH-1G/Q). Queste macchine, designate AH-1S, erano note anche come AH-1S Modified o AH-1S (MOD). I collaudi da parte dell’esercito della versione basica si svolsero fra la fine di aprile e la fine di maggio del 1975.
Vista laterale di un AH-1S (MOD). Notare l’assenza dell’armamento nella torretta Emerson M28. Benche adeguate a scenari come quello del Vietnam, la Minigun da 7,62 e il lanciagranate da 40mm erano di scarsa utilita’ in operazioni controcarro o contro forze pesanti. Per questa ragione i reparti erano tendenzialmente portati a smontarle per risparmiare peso e imbarcare piu’ carburante o armamento di lancio.
LE CONSEGNE DELL’AH-1Q IN USA ED IL DISPIEGAMENTO IN EUROPA
Ma torniamo a quel mezzo “lemon” dell‘AH-1Q, che e’ poi il vero protagonista di questo post.
Le prime consegne si materializzarono nel Novembre 1975. Enti e reparti addestrativi ebbero naturalmente la priorita’ su tutto e tutti.
Dopo aver costituito il NETT (New Equipment Training Team), l’esercito consegno’ le prime 8 macchine ad elementi del TRADOC (TRAining and DOctrine Command), ossia:
Scuola di volo di Fort Rucker (Alabama): 4 esemplari
Aberdeen Proving Ground (Maryland): 3 esemplari
Army Transportation di Fort Eustis (Virginia): 1 esemplare
Per quanto riguarda invece le unita’ tattiche, la situazione era la seguente:
6th Cavalry Brigade (Air Combat) di Fort Hood (Texas): 8 esemplari
Reparti dell’US Army Europe in Germania Occidentale: 17 esemplari
In totale 25 macchine consegnate entro il Febbraio 1976 unitamente ai necessari equipaggiamenti di supporto per i missili TOW. La IOC venne raggiunta nel Marzo successivo (con un anno di ritardo rispetto alle previsioni), mentre le consegne dei 59 rimanenti Cobra si conclusero nel Giugno 1976.
Per quella data l’US Army disponeva complessivamente di 92 AH-1Q TOW/Cobra cosi’ ripartiti:
N° 8 esemplari ad elementi del TRADOC
N° 21 esemplari alla 6th Cavalry Brigade di Fort Hood (Texas)
N° 63 ad elementi dell’US Army Europe (USAEUR)
THE FIRST LINE OF THE DEFENSE
Il primo reparto di volo combat dell’US Army Europe a ricevere gli AH-1Q in Europa fu l’Air Cavalry Troop del 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), stanziata a Feucht Army Airfield (AAF), nei pressi di Norimberga. I TOW Cobra del 2nd ACR posarono per la prima volta i pattini sul tarmac di Feucht nel Gennaio 1976.
Nel Maggio 1976 tocco’ invece all’Air Cavalry Troop dell’11th ACR. Operante da Sickels Army Airfield (AAF), nella bollente Fulda, questa fu la seconda unita’ a volare con l’AH-1Q.
Nella seconda meta’ degli anni Settanta la Troop di Cobra dell’11th ACR era conosciuta come Anti-Armor Helicopter Troop (AAHT).
I reparti di volo ACR disponevano di 21 AH-1Q, piu’ un’aliquota di UH-1H e OH-58 Kiowa inquadrati in troop di supporto e C2. Il compito principale delle unita’ ACR era il pattugliamento e la sorveglianza di una parte del confine (385 km) di Germania Occidentale e Cecoslovacchia di competenza del V Corps.
Il terzo reparto ad ottenere il TOW/Cobra fu la 235th Aviation Company, che giunse a Giebelstadt AAF (Wurzburg) nel Giugno 1976. Nota per essersi fatta le ossa in Vietnam quale unica compagnia interamente equipaggiata con elicotteri d’attacco, la 235th fu assegnata al 3rd Combat Aviation Battalion (CAB) della 3rd Infantry Division e in seguito ridesignata Company “B”, 3rd Aviation Battalion.
La Company “B” apparteneva a uno dei quattro battaglioni d’aviazione divisionale dislocati in Germania Occidentale fra gli anni Settanta e i primi anni Ottanta.
Ogni divisione di fanteria disponeva di una compagnia elicotteri d’attacco su TOW/Cobra (generalmente la Bravo), mentre le divisioni corazzate ne schiaravano due (Bravo e Charlie). In basso l’hangar di Giebelstadt AAF, sede del 3d Combat Aviation Battalion.
Le Troop dei due ACR e la B Company del 3d CAB formarono le fondamenta della prima flotta di elicotteri d’attacco controcarro schierata dalla NATO in Europa. Un anno dopo le prime consegne (1977) la forza di TOW/Cobra assegnata all’USAEUR crebbe fino a contare 230 esemplari.
In basso: AH-1S del 2nd ACR fotografati durante le manovre REFORGER ’80 in una zona imprecisata della Bavaria. L’esemplare in primo piano ha il deviatore di scarico “Toilet Bowl” montato. Photo Credit: Mark Carlisle via Airliners.net
B Company, 503rd Aviation Battalion (Combat) schierata ad Armstrong Army Airfield, a Buedingen nel Maggio 1980. Questa unita’ supportava la 3rd Armored Division a Hanau (V Corps). La 3rd AD disponeva di altre tre compagnie di aviazione, anch’esse ubicate ad Hanau.
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Le operazioni di dispiegamento degli AH-1Q in Europa proseguirono in modo fluido e senza particolari intoppi grazie ad un programma chiamato Hand-Off, istituito per rendere piu’ efficiente il dispiegamento di nuovi materiali e al tempo stesso migliorare le relazioni fra il DARCOM (Development and Readiness Command, ossia la nuova denominazione del precedente Army Materiel Command) e le unita’ dell’esercito. In base a questo concetto, gli uomini del DARCOM o i rappresentanti dei contractor erano obbligati ad assistere i reparti che avevano ricevuto i nuovi sistemi fino a che questi ultimi non fossero stati giudicati efficienti e con un elevato grado di prontezza operativa. Questo personale extra assegnato in servizio temporaneo era incaricato di risolvere tutti quei problemi e rogne che in precedenza erano lasciati ai soli reparti militari (dalla sostituzione di componenti difettose per un periodo di 60 giorni, alle riparazioni dovute ad eventuali danni avvenuti durante le spedizioni).
Negli anni successivi numerosi altri reparti ottennero i TOW/Cobra, sebbene nella versione “S”. Quest’ultima venne sottoposta a una serie di aggiornamenti fino agli anni Ottanta. Dopo la costruzione dei 92 AH-1S(MOD) del programma ICAM, l’US Army varo’ infatti un ulteriore programma di update per l’AH-1S imperniato su tre fasi, cosi’ denominate:
STEP 1 – AH-1S(PROD) – Marzo 1977 /Settembre 1978
STEP 2 – AH-1S(ECAS) – Settembre 1978/Ottobre 1979
STEP 3 – AH-1S(MC) – Novembre 1979/Giugno 1981
STEP 1
AH-1S(PROD)
Marzo 1977/Settembre 1978
Esemplari costruiti: 100
Fra il 1977 e il 1978 vennero consegnati 100 AH-1S(PROD). Questa variante manteneva lo stesso apparato propulsivo, componenti dinamiche e armamento in torretta dell’AH-1S(MOD), ma incorporava una nuova capottina a superfici piatte, pannello strumenti ottimizzato per il volo NOE, radar altimetro, Radar Warning Receiver (RWR), apparati radio migliorati e, dal 67° esemplare, un nuovo rotore bipala composito Kaman K-747 in luogo del tradizionale Bell 540 (concepito in origine per la gunship UH-1C ed “ereditato” dall’AH-1G/Q/S(MOD)).
Il K-747, prodotto dalla Kaman Corporation, porto’ ad una riduzione del rumore dovuto ai vortici generati dalle estremità delle pale e un lieve incremento della portanza, senza contare che questo modello vantava una tolleranza balistica ai colpi da 23mm. Di contro, le nuove pale non sembravano particolarmente gradite durante l’autorotazione. Nella foto in alto un AH-1S(MOD) con il vecchio rotore Bell 540. In basso vista dall’alto del rotore Kaman K-747.
NOTE: Nel 1988 l’AH-1S(PROD) venne ridisegnato AH-1P.
STEP 2
AH-1S(ECAS)
Settembre 1978/Ottobre 1979
Esemplari costruiti: 98
Una delle limitazioni principali nel Cobra riguardava l’armamento in torretta. Come rimarcato in precedenza, Minigun e lanciagranate in teatri a media e alta densita’ erano considerati inadeguati per un elicottero d’attacco. Per ovviare a cio’, a meta’ degli anni settanta venne varato il cosiddetto progamma ECAS, o Enhanced Cobra Armament System. Lo scopo era dotare questo elicottero di un’ cannoncino da 20 o 30mm in sostituzione delle precedenti armi. Furono valutati tre sistemi: due da 30mm (GE XM188 e Hughes M230) e un terzo da 20mm (GE M197). Quest’ultimo, sviluppato negli anni ’60 e ampiamente collaudato dall’US Army a bordo degli Huey, era gia’ stato adottato dall’US Marine Corps per la flotta di AH-1J biturbina. Anche in virtu’ di cio’ l’esercito decise di optare per l’arma da 2omm.
Il cannoncino M197 apparve a partire dalla variante AH-1S(ECAS), nota anche come Up-Gun AH-1S. Introdotto nel 1978, l’AH-1S(ECAS) disponeva di un sottosistema d’armi M97A1 basato sul cannoncino General Electric M197 a tre canne rotanti calibro 20×102 montato in una torretta universale che poteva accettare anche armi da 30mm.
L’arma, del tipo gatling, disponeva di un sistema automatico di compensazione per il tiro fuori asse e vantava una cadenza di fuoco fino a 1500 colpi al minuto e una gittata massima fra i 1500 e i 2000 metri. La dotazione munizioni era pari a 750 colpi. In basso: la torretta da 20mm M97 dell’ECAS e la M28 con Minigun e lanciagranate automatico.
Detto cio’, l’AH-1S(ECAS) o Enhanced Cobra, era fondamentalmente un AH-1S(PROD) con torretta da 20mm, un generatore elettrico potenziato e le modifiche necessarie per poter installare e impiegare il lanciatore di flare M130 a 30 cartucce. Altra curiosita’ riguarda la possibilita’ o meno di lanciare razzi da 70mm. Questo modello avrebbe dovuto montare sin dal principio il sistema di gestione del razzi (Rocket Management System o RMS) modello M138. Questo utile apparato consentiva al pilota di selezionare il tipo di razzo, regolare la spoletta e infine determinare la quantita’ di razzi da lanciare. Sfortunatamente, a seguito del fallimento della ditta che costruiva l’M138, ovvero la Baldwin Electronics di Little Rock (Arkansas), i nuovi AH-1S(ECAS) vennero consegnati all’esercito privi di tale sottosistema. L’M138 fu aggiunto in un secondo momento grazie ad un programma di retrofitting iniziato nel Marzo 1980 e terminato nel Settembre 1981.
NOTE: Nel 1988 l’AH-1S(ECAS) venne ridesignato AH-1E
STEP 3
AH-1S(MC)
Novembre 1979/Giugno 1981
Esemplari costruiti o convertiti: 530
La MC o Modernized Cobra, fu l’ultima e piu’ avanzata variante degli AH-1 monoturbina. Dei 530 esemplari ordinati, 387 erano stati ottenuti convertendo AH-1G, mentre i restanti 143 erano macchine di nuova produzione.
Fra le modifiche introdotte con l’AH-1S(MC) si segnalano:
– Computer balistico (Fire Control Computer o FCC) M26 collegato all’M134 ADS (Air Data Subsystem), ovvera una sonda esterna posizionata nel lato destro della capottina. Quest’ultimo apparato analizzava con precisione e in condizioni di velocita’ zero direzione del vento, velocita’ e temperatura dell’aria. I dati raccolti venivano poi inviati al calcolatore M26.
– Head-Up Display (HUD) M76 per il pilota
– Helmet Sight Subsystem (HSS) tipo M136 in sostituzione del precedente M128
– Telemetro e inseguitore laser
– Sistema di raffreddamento dello scarico della turbina per ridurre la traccia IR
– Dispenser per chaff M130
– Jammer IR ALQ-144
La turbina era la solita T53-L-703 da 1,800 shp, cosi’ come la trasmissione ed il rotore principale K-747. Da segnalare che una cinquantina di esemplari ebbero l’avanzato apparato FLIR Hughes C-NITE (Cobra Night-Integrated Target Enhancement) che, accoppiato all’M65, consentiva di designare ed acquisire bersagli di notte e in condizioni meteo avverse. I lavori di modifica vennero effettuati negli impianti Hughes Aircraft di El Segundo (California).
Nel 1988 l’AH-1S(MC) venne finalmente ridesignato AH-1F.
Questa variante prese parte a numerose operazioni militari e di peacekeeping. Fra queste ricordiamo Grenada (1983), Panama (1986), Desert Shield/Storm (Kuwait e Iraq 1990-91), Restore Hope (Somalia, 1992-94) e Joint Endeavor/IFOR (Bosnia, 1995-96).
Con l’introduzione dell’AH-64 Apache (1986), il Cobra venne gradualmente ritirato dal servizio attivo e quindi relegato a reparti di volo dell’Army National Guard, che sara’ poi l’ultima a radiarlo nel 2001.
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Pattugliare il confine fra le due Germanie permetteva ai piloti di Cobra degli ACR di incontrare regolarmente il possente Mi-24 Hind Gli elicotteri Sovietici schierati a ridosso del confine (come quelli della base di Nohra, presso Weimar), avevano fra le altre cose il compito di intercettare gli aeromobili piu’ piccoli e lenti (altri elicotteri, alianti, aerei da turismo ecc) e, piu’ in generale, gli aeromobili che volavano che procedevano a bassa quota. Prima dell’arrivo dell’Hind (meta’ anni ’70), questi ruoli erano ricoperti dai Mi-4 e Mi-8.
AH-1F in azione a Grenada nel 1983. All’epoca questa variante era ancora nota come AH-1S(MC) o Modernized Cobra.
Photo: US Army
L’AH-1F “Sand Shark” e’ senza dubbio uno dei “Foxtrot” piu’ celebri in circolazione. Questo esemplare era in dotazione al 2nd ACR che lo impiego’ durante l’Operazione Desert Storm.
Le missioni nei Balcani (Bosnia-Herzegovina) furono le ultime compiute dai Cobra dell’US Army, almeno da un punto di vista strettamente operativo. In queste due immagini vediamo un paio di AH-1F con le insegne IFOR (Implementation Force) ben visibili in fusoliera e coda. Queste macchine volarono con il 1st Cavalry Regiment della 1st Cavalry Division nel 1995-96.
a434477.pdf (dtic.mil)
HISTORY OF THE TOW MISSILE SYSTEM
U.S. ARMY AIR-TO-GROUND (ATG) MISSILES IN VIETNAM | Article | The United States Army
In 1995 the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission recommended that the U.S. Army Missile Command (MICOM) and U.S. Army Aviation and Troop Command (ATCOM) be combined into a new U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC) major subordinate command at Redstone Arsenal to be known as the U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command (AMCOM). The new organization stood up provisionally almost 20 years ago, on Jul. 17, 1997.
Decades before this decision, however, ATCOM, MICOM and their predecessor commands had joined forces to accomplish higher headquarters guidance on the arming of certain rotary wing aircraft assets deployed during the Vietnam War.
One of the earliest examples of the new firepower envisioned for Army helicopters in the years after the Korean War ceasefire was the Aircraft Weaponization Program, which consisted of 2.75-inch rockets divided evenly between two rocket launchers mounted on either side of the helicopter. Originally developed for the U.S. Navy (USN), the folding fin aerial rocket (FFAR) was used to arm the Army's UH-1A/1B/1C/1M Iroquois ("Huey") and AH-1G Hueycobra helicopters in Vietnam.
The Army's effort to adapt the widely used rocket, originally designed to be launched from a high-performance fixed wing airplane traveling at a higher speed unmatched by helicopters in the early 1960s, first required researchers "to modify the rocket to obtain a spin in order to achieve stability upon launch by averaging thrust misalignment." In Apr.1961, the Army Aviation Board, in conjunction with the Ballistics Research Laboratories (BRL) at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, evaluated 200 modified 2.75-inch rockets using the H-21 Sioux helicopter as the weapons platform.
After determining that the rocket was suitable as a rotary wing armament, one of AMCOM's predecessors, the U.S. Army Ordnance Missile Command (AOMC) at Redstone Arsenal, Ala., developed and fabricated a 2.75-inch rocket subsystem for use on an H-34 Choctaw helicopter assigned to the Aviation Board. About a month after receiving the equipment on Aug. 28, 1961, the board initiated testing on the 2.75-Inch (Modified) Aerial Rocket Weapons System.
During the four-month evaluation conducted from Sept. 21, 1961 to Jan. 21, 1962 at Fort Rucker, Ala. and Fort Sill, Okla., AOMC furnished technical assistance such as fully instrumenting systems being tested as well as fabricating replacement items to eliminate identified problems. The Missile Command's research and development laboratory also studied shortcomings such as launch pod corrosion after firing and provided recommendations on preventive measures.
Although the Army never deployed Choctaw helicopters to Southeast Asia for use in combat by its own aviators, the CH-34, originally designed by Sikorsky for the USN as an antisubmarine warfare (ASW) platform, the helicopter served in Vietnam with the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) from 1962 to 1969, while the Army supplied about 100 of the aircraft to the South Vietnamese air force.
However, it did begin arming its first Huey gunships with the aerial rocket system in mid-1962. Combined with machine guns to supply suppression fire, the 2.75-inch rockets delivered what USN Cmdr. David G. Tyler described in his 2003 article, "The Leverage of Technology: The Evolution of Armed Helicopters in Vietnam," as "a potent knockout punch."
The rocket's ten-pound High Explosive (HE) warhead's impact was similar to a 75-mm howitzer, while the 17-pound HE warhead introduced in 1968 was as effective as a 105-mm howitzer. Additional warheads such as the antitank (AT), white phosphorus (WP) used for marking targets, and ten-pound fletchette (WDU) which released over 1,000 small, arrow-shaped projectiles on impact, further enhanced the Army aerial gunships' battlefield presence. On Oct. 31 1962, the newly-established MICOM assumed industrial and field service responsibilities for the 2.75-inch missiles used by the Army in Vietnam.
Another ATG airborne missile system first deployed by the Army to Vietnam was the airborne M22 antitank missile subsystem. The Ordnance Guided Missile Center (OGMC) at Redstone Arsenal, another AMCOM predecessor, began following the development of the ground version of the French antitank missile system in Apr. 1952 in preparation for the possible assumption of technical supervisiory responsibilities if the Army decided to acquire the weapon.
Subsequently, on Feb. 16, 1959, the U.S. Army Rocket and Guided Missile Agency (ARGMA) at Redstone assumed management responsibility for the French designated SS-10 as an interim ground-launched antitank missile system. The SS-11, an ATG modification of the SS-10, was the first helicopter-mounted antitank missile in the world. Purchased in 1961, the armament subsystem was known as the M22 in U.S. Army nomenclature when the entire complement of six SS-11B missiles was installed on the UH-1B Huey helicopter.
The first MICOM managed M22 armament subsystems deployed to Vietnam in 1966 for use by the Army's first airmobile 1st Calvary Division, which had become fully operational in-theater in Sept. 1965. Army aviators successfully used the missile in combat on Oct. 9, 1966 during the campaign to pacify the Binh Dinh Province. The 2d Battalion, 20th Artillery (Aerial Rocket Artillery) of the 1st Calvary Division fired M22 missiles to destroy bunkers on the peninsula, resulting in the capture of 55 Viet Cong with no further fighting.
Missile operator difficulty in visually tracking a flare on the missile's tail and manually guiding it using a small control stick and an unspooling wire that transmitted commands was further complicated by the turbulence of actual air battle conditions. Despite these challenges, the Army deployed the M22 subsystem to Europe as well as made additional deployments to Southeast Asia in 1967 and 1972. After successfully being used against tanks and other targets, the subsystem returned to the United States in 1973. Eventually replaced by the airborne tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided (TOW) missile system, the Army phased out the M22 subsystem from its regular inventory in May 1984.
The most significant Army Missile Command contribution to Army Aviation during the Vietnam War occurred in May 1972 when airborne TOW antitank missiles mounted on a UH-1B Huey helicopter destroyed four captured American M41 tanks, an artillery gun, and a truck.
Studies leading to the development of the XM65 TOW armament subsystem for the AH-1 series Cobra helicopter had started in 1970. Although the XM26 prototypes had undergone considerable engineering testing by the Hughes Aircraft Company and Bell Helicopter, they had never been given to the U.S. Army for service tests because the main attack helicopter developmental effort directed by the U.S. Army Aviation Systems Command (AVSCOM), an AMCOM predecessor organization, had shifted to the more advanced AH-56 Cheyenne weapons system.
In 1971, though, representatives from MICOM, Hughes Aircraft and Bell Helicopter assisted the German Army Aviation School in its evaluation of the TOW missile's suitability for use in an airborne role, thereby making the German military the first to test the XM26. Fired from various distances and under changing flight conditions against actual tank hulks positioned on the test range, the final shots using live warheads effectively demonstrated the potency of the airborne TOW.
The Improved Cobra Armament Program, which started in March 1972, involved the functional upgrade of the XM26 TOW/UH-1B Huey to the XM65 TOW/Cobra ATG weapon system. The launch of the "Easter Offensive" on Mar. 30, however, gave MICOM an opportunity to prove that the airborne TOW missile could be used as an effective weapon against the Soviet armor that supported the North Vietnamese Army's (NVA's) massive offensive across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Included in the onslaught were several captured American tanks. This action generated an urgent but unprogrammed combat requirement for the TOW antitank weapon system. Both missile and aviation senior leaders understood an impressive showing would help secure the funding needed for the advanced attack helicopter (AAH) program.
On Apr. 14, 1972, the Department of the Army (DA) directed MICOM to remove the XM26 subsystem from storage and rush it and a load of TOW missiles to the battlefront in Vietnam. One week after receiving the order to deploy, three C-141 aircraft flew to Vietnam carrying two Huey gunships, two XM26 subsystems, missile crews and other equipment.
The TOW Project Manager, Col. Robert W. Huntzinger, headed the team effort and handpicked the MICOM technical support team that accompanied the equipment in-theater. Included in the support team were an expert on the UH-1B from Bell Helicopter as well as two engineers and two technicians from Hughes Aircraft, each an expert on the TOW and its airborne guidance and control equipment. A last-minute replacement pilot/gunner was obtained from AVSCOM's AAH program in St. Louis, Mo. On Apr. 22, 1972, the 1st Combat Aerial TOW Team, Vietnam (also known as "Hawk's Claw") was designated and deployed to Vietnam. The team's name reflected the first-time use of the airborne TOW missile system in combat against an armored enemy.
The "Hawk's Claw" team went into combat for the first time on May 2. Chief Warrant Officer (CWO) Carroll W. Lain made history on that morning when he fired a TOW missile which struck a tank. This was the first American-made guided missile to be fired in combat by a U.S. Soldier.
On Jun. 8, 1972, the 2d Combat Aerial TOW Team was formed after Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Jr. decided to keep the XM26 aerial TOW in Vietnam as insurance against any future NVA armor penetration. The second team assumed the combat mission begun in May, while the first team returned to the United States.
The airborne TOW missile system proved to be very adaptable to combat operations, and the XM26 performed very well while in Vietnam. Hughes Aircraft Company technicians were able to handle the minor problems that occurred. Because the airborne TOW system was actually a test bed that had not been designed to be maintained in the field, it required the support of highly trained engineers and technicians as well as extensive laboratory test equipment to keep it operational. Despite the challenges, the airborne TOW achieved a 90 percent reliability rating for the entire period it was deployed in Vietnam. The lack of a limited visibility/night vision capability was the single largest impediment to XM26 system effectiveness during that time.
Between Apr. 30, 1972 and Jan. 11, 1973, the two HUEY gunships fired a total of 199 TOW missiles: 37 in training and 162 in combat. Of the missiles fired in combat, 151 (93 percent) were reliable and 124 (82 percent) scored hits on a variety of targets. These included: 27 tanks, 21 trucks, 5 armored personnel carriers, 3 artillery pieces, 1 antiaircraft gun, 1 122-mm rocket launcher, 5 machine guns, 2 57-mm guns, 5 caves, 8 bunkers, 2 bridges, 2 mortars, 2 ammunition storage dumps, 2 TOW jeeps (1 with launcher and 1 with missiles), and 1 house. There were 11 malfunctions and 4 misses. The latter occurred when the gunner fired the missile at a range in excess of 3,000 meters and lost it when the guidance wire ran out. Although the HUEYs encountered considerable machine gun fire, neither gunship was hit by enemy fire because they stayed high.
With the cease fire on Jan. 28, 1973, the mission of the 2d Combat Aerial TOW Team ended in Vietnam. The UH-1B HUEY helicopters and XM26 TOW systems were retrograded to the United States. With the success of the original airborne TOW team and the continued success of the replacement team trained in-country, funding for the next generation M65 TOW/Cobra was secured.
paper-2020-05-smith-westland-attack-helicopters.pdf (aerosociety.com)
Before discussing the various projects examined by the Advanced Engineering Team within Westland Helicopters, it is worth summarising the position facing the operational user in the early 1980s. Lynx AH.1 was in service, primarily as a utility helicopter, but with an important secondary anti-armour role. In this role, it was armed with eight Hughes TOW wire-guided missiles, supported by a roofmounted Hughes optical sight (manufactured under licence by British Aerospace) for target acquisition and missile guidance. The TOW missile system could engage targets out to 3,750 m (12,303 ft) with flight times of up to 20 seconds using a semi-active command to line-of-sight (SACLOS) system which assured ease of use but accuracy came at the expense of having to maintain continuous view to the target. Use of the system from behind cover was only partially successful at masking the helicopter from view: vulnerability to the Warsaw Pact ZSU 23/4 radar guided air defence weapon system was a recurring concern. Elsewhere, the 1970s had seen the US Army launch an Armed Attack Helicopter competition, which resulted in the 1976 selection of the Hughes (subsequently McDonnell Douglas Helicopters and then Boeing) AH-64A Apache as the winner, with approval for full production following in 1982 (Figure 21)
Lynx Mk7 / Mk9 Multirole Helicopter - Army Technology (army-technology.com)
The UK Army Air Corps operates the Lynx army helicopter (Lynx AH) mk7 and mk9, and the export version of the Army Lynx, known as the Battlefield Lynx. Around 77 AH mk7 versions and 22 AH mk9 helicopters are in service with the UK Army.
The Army Lynx first flew in 1977. The initial role as a utility helicopter, a tactical troop and stores carrier, airborne command, and for casualty evacuation was expanded with the addition of air-to-ground missiles, cannon and rockets for armed reconnaissance, armed escort, anti-tank and air-to-surface strike roles.
In Operation Telic in Iraq, the Joint Helicopter Force Iraq (JHF(I)), a joint unit based in Basra and manned by members of the navy, army and air force, deployed Sea King mk4 and Lynx mk7 helicopters from the commando helicopter force (CHF), and also Merlin helicopters from RAF Benson.
The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) has a £1bn programme for the AW159 Lynx Wildcat, which is based on an upgraded version of the Lynx helicopter.
Lynx helicopter development and upgradesIn December 2008, the UK MoD signed a contract with AgustaWestland for the upgrade of 12 Lynx AH mk9 aircraft. The upgraded aircraft are fitted with CTS800-4N engines.
In September 2009, the first upgraded aircraft successfully completed its maiden flight. The remaining twelve aircraft were delivered in 2010.
“The Lynx helicopters operated in Iraq were modified with the installation of sand filters and improved communications.”The Lynx helicopters operated in Iraq were modified with the installation of sand filters, new communications, night vision-compatible cockpit lighting, and a new defensive aids suite, a helicopter DAS, which included directed infrared countermeasures.
Super Lynx, Battlefield Lynx and AH mk9 Lynx helicopter variantsThe Super Lynx helicopter is of conventional semi-monocoque pod and boom design. There is a jettisonable cockpit door and large sliding cabin door with jettisonable windows on each side of the fuselage.
The large cabin doors allow rapid emplane and deplane. The cabin provides internal access to the cockpit.
The Battlefield Lynx and the AH mk9 are fitted with non-retractable tricycle-type landing gear with twin nosewheels. The AH mk7 has a skid type undercarriage which can be fitted with snow skis for Arctic operations. The aircraft is fitted with a wire-strike protection system.
Lynx multirole helicopter cockpitThe cockpit accommodates the pilot and co-pilot but can be flown by a single pilot. A night vision-compatible cockpit allows the helicopter to be used for covert operations.
The navigation systems include a Racal Doppler 91 and RNS252, Honeywell AN/APN-198 radar altimeter, Rockwell Collins 206A automatic direction finder, BAE GMM9 Gyrosyn compass, distance measuring equipment (DME), Rockwell Collins VIR 31A VHF omni-directional ranger and instrument landing system (VOR/ILS), Rockwell Collins AN/ARN-118 tactical air navigation system (TACAN).
The avionics system includes a BAE Systems mk34 automatic flight control system and a BAE Systems automatic stabiliser.
Lynx cabinThe helicopter can carry up to nine armed troops. The cabin seats can be quickly removed for freight transport. The maximum internal freight load is 910kg.
For casualty evacuation, the helicopter carries the pilot and co-pilot, up to six stretcher patients and a medical attendant. Underslung loads up to 1,360kg (3,000lb) can be carried. The aircraft has the capacity for up to four ropes for fast roping or rappelling. A rescue hoist can be deployed to recover personnel from confined spaces.
Helicopter weapons“The Lynx multirole helicopter can carry up to nine armed troops.”The army version helicopter has a pintle-mounted 7.62mm machine gun installed inside the cabin and two 20mm cannon can be mounted externally. External weapons pylons can carry two miniguns, gun pods, rocket pods, or up to eight air-to-surface missiles such as HOT, Hellfire or TOW. Up to eight missiles can be carried in the cabin ready for reloading.
CountermeasuresA BAE Systems information & electronic warfare systems (IEWS) AN/ALQ-144 infrared jamming system is installed under the tailboom. The helicopter is equipped with the BAE AWARE-3 ARI 23491 radar warning receiver and the Sky Guardian mk15 electronic warfare system.
Lynx helicopter sensorsA roof-mounted sight manufactured by BAE Systems under licence from Raytheon (formerly Hughes) is installed on the Lynx helicopters armed with TOW missiles. Optical sighting systems include lightweight targeting sights, vertical cameras, oblique cameras, low-light television, infrared line scanners and night-vision goggles.
EnginesThe helicopters are powered by two Rolls-Royce Gem mk42 turboshaft engines, rated at 835kW. The exhaust is fitted with diffusers to reduce the infrared signature. The four-blade semi-rigid main rotor and a four bladed flapping tail rotor are powered by main rotor gearbox.
There are five internal fuel tanks of capacity 985l. The 150kt transit speed gives a good tactical speed of response. The Super Lynx has exceptional agility allowing tactical nap-of-the-earth flight.
Lynx.pdf (multiscreensite.com)
AAC upgrades Like the navy, the Army Air Corps was soon looking for an upgrade for its Lynx fleet, and an initial order for nine AH.Mk 5s was placed to evaluate several improvements such as Gem 41-1 engines. The first to fly was ZD282 on 21 November 1984, which was later brought up to full AH.Mk 7 standard as a result of the evaluation. The second one, Mk 5X ZD559, flew on 11 February 1985. After the third Mk 5 was completed, the rest of the order was changed into AH.Mk 7s, of which an eventual 13 new-built helicopters were delivered. Main feature of this variant was the change of rotation direction of the tail rotor to improve its yaw control authority, especially at higher weights, and also reduce noise. Furthermore, large heat-shroud boxes were placed over the engine exhausts to diffuse the hot gases for better protection against heat-seeking missiles, which were removed later. Some AH.Mk 1s were partly modified (engine and tail rotor only) and designated AH.Mk 1GT, but eventually all 107 remaining AH.Mk 1/AH.Mk 1GTs were converted to AH.Mk 7 at RNAY Fleetlands, also incorporating improved avionics such as the BAe Systems Mk 34 automatic flight control system, Racal Doppler 91 and RNS252 tactical air navigation system. To demonstrate a battlefield variant showing the growth potential for the Lynx, Westland developed the Lynx 3. It had a wheeled undercarriage and was powered by two Gem 60-3/1 engines (rated at 1,260 shp/940 kW). The prototype, serialled ZE477, first flew on 14 June 1984 and was then used mainly for trials and demos. No orders for the Lynx 3 were taken, and after its last flight in 1987, the project was cancelled in 1988. In that same year, however, Westland introduced another army version, again with wheeled landing gear. This time, the battlefield support helicopter concept was demonstrated on company aircraft GLYNX. As a result, the AAC bought 24 Lynx AH.Mk 9s in April 1987, incorporating the AH.Mk 7 improvements and powered by Gem 205 engines (a Gem 42 variant rated at 1,120 shp/835 kW), which also is the current standard for the AH.Mk 7. In addition, an uprated main rotor gearbox was used to raise the maximum take-off weight to 11,300 lb (5,126 kg). This enables the Mk 9 to carry up to nine troops and supplies, both internal (max weight 2,000 lb/910 kg) and external as an underslung load (maximum weight 3,000 lb/1,360 kg). An avionic upgrade included improved IFF, GPS, ARN-118 TACAN and secure radios. The TOW-system was not added due to budgetary limitations. The AH.Mk 9 also has an engine failure indicator that earlier versions lack. The first of 16 new-built AH.Mk 9s, serialled ZG884, flew on 20 July 1990, while 8 AH.Mk 7s were converted during the early 1990s. First squadron to receive the AH.Mk 9 in April 1992 was 672 Squadron at Dishforth. During 1993, the AH.Mk 7 and AH.Mk 9 received a GEC-Marconi ARI 23491 AWARE-3 radar warning receiver, replacing the Sky Guardian Mk 15 electronic warfare system. A pintlemounted 7.62-mm machine-gun can be fitted into both side door openings. BERP blades From the start, the AH.Mk 9 was fitted with British Experimental Rotor Programme (BERP) carbon and glass fibre rotor blades. These blades, distinguished by their paddle tips, provide a lift increase of 37 percent, reduce vibration and give the aircraft greater performance in terms of speed and hover. They also require less maintenance, are easier to repair and have an increased lifespan. The first Lynx to be equipped with BERP blades was G-LYNX. With this modification and Gem 60 engines, it set the world speed record for helicopters on 11 August 1986 at 249.1 mph (400.87 km/h), manned by pilot Trevor Eggington and flight engineer Derek Clews. Lynx AH.Mk 9 of 1 Regt AAC with tricycle landing gear 9 Regt AAC Lynx AH.Mk 7s bank over the Yorkshire Moors All existing AAC and FAA helicopters were subsequently retrofitted with the new blades, although it must be noted that the production blades were slightly different to the ones used for development, having anhedral tips to improver hover performance. Other operators also acquired them in their various upgrade programmes, especially since the old steel ones became increasingly unavailable. Lynx in Gulf War Following Iraq’s invasion in Kuwait in August 1990, Lynx helicopters played a major role in the ensuing conflict. Firstly, the Royal Navy’s HAS.Mk 3 became one of the coalition’s main anti-ship assets as part of Operation Granby. In the years prior to the Gulf War, some Lynxes had been adapted for the local hot and dusty environment as HAS.Mk 3GMs. Before the war to regain Kuwait started, these Lynxes had flown missions over the northern Persian Gulf to enforce a maritime blockade. To jam the feared Iraqi AM39 Exocet missiles, a Whittaker ALQ-167 Yellow Veil ECM pod was carried on the port outer torpedo pylon. Real action followed in January and February 1991, when several of the deployed helicopters attacked Iraqi boats. Most attacks were undertaken in cooperation with coalition aircraft such as US Navy A-6E Intruders. Some 15 Sea Skuas were fired, of which all but one hit their target, sinking or damaging 11 enemy ships. During the conflict, Lynx HAS.Mk 3GM flights from 815 and 829 NAS operated from HMS Battleaxe, Brazen, Brilliant, Cardiff, Gloucester, Jupiter, London, Manchester and York. In addition, French Lynxes were on board the destroyers FS Dupleix and FS Montcalm as part of Operation Artimon. The AAC was very active in the theatre as well, as elements from 654, 659 and 661 squadrons deployed 24 AH.Mk 7s, which received a desert ‘pink’ camouflage scheme and were equipped with Sky Guardian 200-13 radar warning receivers. These operated from Al Jubail, Saudi Arabia, as well as several dispersed bases, supporting the 1st (British) Armoured Division. An infra-red sight was installed, and together with the use of night vision goggles, night operations became possible. During the short ground war, a large number of Iraqi tanks and armoured vehicles was destroyed by TOW missiles. After the war, 3 CBAS of the Royal Marines flew close air support sorties with its Lynx AH.Mk 7s from Sirsenk in Iraq.
Lynx: The British tank's killer | ELISA (electroluminescent-provider.com)
It is only a very recent time that appeared heavily armed and rotary wing shield able to conduct attack missions. So far, most of the combat helicopters built in Europe benefited from transport capacity, and they would be gone unnoticed on commercial machines. Some of this aircraft can operate over both the land from the sea. This and the case of Westland WG.13 Lynx.
Having the same cell and the same dynamic systems that the infantry Lynx, the navalized Lynx has a different avionics and armament. Its origins date back to a specification of the British Army, which included 135 of the 364 Lynx ordered as of 1 January 1994. The main factors contributing to the lynxes its final configuration, we find the wish of the British military that such a device can be transported aboard a Hercules after being partially dismantled. Lynx presents itself as a small-sized machine unsightly, the engines are mounted above the cabin and back to the rotor shaft. During the sixties, while the design of the unit was well advanced, the first lessons of the Viet-Nam war confirmed that the use of two engines was an essential element of survivability above the field battle. In case of destruction of one of these engines, allowed a aircraft in difficulty to regain its base.
The GSOR 3335 specification
The Lynx was to be equipped departing two Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A operating a main rotor 13.41 m in diameter, but the agreement France-British concluded in 1967 changed all that. France has agreed to buy was Lynx on behalf of its navy, provided, however, that the diameter of the main rotor does not exceed 13 meters, and to allow the storage of aircrafts in hangars boats.
The PT6A not covenant this new technical guidance, Rolls-Royce proposed his Turbomoteur BS.360, which developed an output of 900 hp. Later known under the name of Gem, this engine was combined with a rigid rotor and a new gearbox. The result was reflected in a compact propulsion system, simplified maintenance, and subject to low power losses.
As such, the helicopter was responding perfectly Ground staff operational requirement (GSOR) 3335, published in June 1966 and on an aircraft capable of carrying 12 troops wounded lying or 3 and 3 others sitting. Another version was planned which was to answer a request on France-UK armed helicopter two-seater with two 20 mm guns in the nose turret and other weapons on the wing stumps.
his variant, however, was never realized, and armament consists of machine guns or 20mm cannon was assigned to a machine where it was to be placed in the recesses of the cabin doors. We had to wait a decade for the increased firepower.
The Lynx prototype took the air March 21, 1971 and was followed by a copy of development-oriented utility for the Army. After some modifications appeared Lynx AH Mk1, whose exemplary pemier flew 11 February 1977. The main feature of the ground Lynx is its lander with tubular runners, while the naval version has a gear train less adapted to methods of pretty brutal tactical landing of the army.
It is provided with the same very precise tactical navigation system that consists of a Decca TANS associated with Decca 71 Dopler and Sperry gyrocompass GM9. The pilot, who was seated in the right seat, benefited from a system of automatic stabilization on three axes, and the unit can receive optional automatic GEC Avionics flight control system. Thanks to these facilities, the Lynx has fairly good capacity anytime.
AN ADVANCED ROTORThe four-bladed rotor Lynx presents an aerodynamic curved section. Blades, interchangeable, have a spar and a leading edge of stainless steel, and a body Nomex. On August 11, 1986, the helicopter used by Westland for the purposes of demonstration (G-LYNX) with a BERP rotor (British Experimental Rotor Program), an injection system water-methanol and tail Westland 30, establishes a record the flying world speed 400.86 km / h, the last dated record having been assigned to a Mil amended on September 28, 1978, with 368.36 km / h.
The main rotor of the Lynx can be manually folded for ease of storage in tight spaces. Below the head of the rotor, titanium is the main gear. The latter consists of two floors, with spiral bevel gear teeth and a conventional gear that makes it robust. The engine of the regime, which is 6150 rev / min, is reduced to 326 rev / min at the principal rotor thanks to this high-tech reducer. Each Turbomotor has a control system which can control the speed of the rotor. The driver is thus able to select the speeds during the different phases of flight, without having to constantly use the throttles.
In case of a fault with an engine, the other automatically takes a regime corresponding to maximum power. The two engines are mounted Lynx side by side above the bunker equipment, and are powered by crashworthy fuel tanks. The power of the aircraft, powered initially by Gem Mk 2 was increased to 1120 hp with the Gem Mk 41, which has a compressor modified to increase the 10% air flow and can operate at higher temperatures. In 1983 appeared the Gem Mk 43, whose power is 1135 hp and benefited from a system electronic fuel supply.
Since the Lynx AH Mk1 is grafted on, the maximum mass of aircraft has been increased from 4310 to 4350 kg. The Lynx AH Mk 5, which is equipped Gem 41 engines and a reducer three gables, has a maximum weight of 4350 kg and the Lynx AH Mk 7, do, t the development has been undertaken as part of the specification GSOR 3947, has an upper mass of 4800 kg. This version has a tail rotor rotating in the opposite direction to that of a rotor rotors of previous versions. This allows you to reduce the noise level and facilitates hover with heavy loads, two very useful features for the antitank.
In terms of structure, all Lynx are alike. The fuselage and tail boom are semi-monocabine construction and are made of light alloys. Access doors, however, are fiberglass, which is also the case of the leading edge of the vertical stabilizer and reducer fairing tail rotor.In the inside of the main cabin were set up seats on which can sit ten armed soldiers; otherwise, the aircraft can carry a freight load of 900 kg. The volume is available at the rear of 5.21 m3 and loading is done by large sliding doors on each side of the cabin. Lynx can carry a load of about 1350 kg suspended at the extremity of a sling.
Operating in Germany
When it entered service with the British forces in Germany, in August 1978, the Lynx helicopter was to be used as a utility. Set up in squadrons equiped Westland AH Mk 1 Scout armed with anti-tank missiles Aerospatiale SS11, Lynx should support rather than replace these machines. The UK provoked many reactions among its European partners in mid-1977 by pronouncing in favor of anti-tank missile Hughes BGM-71A Tow instead of HOT regard to the main armament of the Lynx. Delivery of Tow began in 1980 and the first shots took place February 20 of the same year, in the Salisbury Plain.
According to an agreement with the United States, a consortium under the aegis of BAe acquired the license to manufacture a version of the Hughes roof viewfinder used under the name M65 by the US Army . This viewfinder bears no British label precise, Hughes refused to consider that the proposed BAe. In April 1981, the 654 Squadron, based in Germany Federal, took delivery of the first Lynx / Tow and at the end of the same year, five anti-tank units (squadrons 661, 662, 663, 664 and 669) Scout had exchanged against new helicopters, 60 aircrafts with the Hughes roof viewfinder. A total of 130 copies were to be produced for the Army Air Corps.
The Tow is a heavy anti-tank missile that benefited from a range of 3700 m and displays a speed of 1000 km / h. The machines of this type are installed in sets of four units in tubes attached to the lateral towers. In addition, the Lynx can carry eight cabin spare missiles, so he can leave the combat zone and earn a sector to recharge its missile tubes.
Westland "Lynx" helicopter - development history, photos, technical data (aviastar.org)
Westland "Lynx"
1971
For a number of years, Westland manufactured anglicized Sikorsky-designed helicopters under license, usually with substantial modifications, but it was not until after the amalgamation of the British helicopter industry in 1959-61 that any original projects reached the hardware stage. In 1964, the Yeovil division began designing a family of military helicopters using the WG prefix, and the 13th model was based on the need to replace the Scout and Wasp used by the British forces, and to offer an alternative to the American Bell Huey, with more advanced technology.
Many components were clearly inspired by the success of the Scout and Wasp but the rotor, for example, was completely new, being of the semi-rigid type with blades of constant chord and cambered section. With these characteristics, it was possible to achieve very high tip speeds, as well as enhancing lift and reducing drag. The construction of the rotor blades was also technologically advanced, in that they had a honeycomb core and made extensive use of modern materials. The result was an aircraft which was up-to-date in terms of design and easier to maintain than comparable American aircraft. Thus it was Westland's strongest proposal for an agreement signed with Sud-Aviation in 1968.
The first Westland WG.13 was ready for flight testing on 21 March 1971 — rather later than foreseen. It was followed by four more aircraft in two basic configurations: the AH Mk.1 for the Army and the HAS Mk.2 for the Navy.
The Lynx demonstrated its capabilities by the records achieved in the summer of 1972. Piloted by Westland's chief test pilot Roy Moxam, it broke the world record over 15/25km by flying at 321.74km/h, also setting a new 100km closed circuit record shortly afterwards by flying at 318.504km/h.
The British Army ordered over 100 Lynx AH.1 for a variety of roles, from tactical transport to armed escort, antitank warfare (with eight TOW missiles), reconnaissance and casualty evacuation. A Marconi Elliott AFCS system is fitted to the Army's version of the Lynx, which gives automatic stabilization on three axes and can also be used as an autopilot during extended flights. The naval version, unlike the ground-based version with skid landing gear, has a non-retractable quadricycle landing gear with oleopneumatic shock absorbers. The initial HAS Mk.2 version was ordered by both the Royal Navy and the French Aeronavale, although they differed in their avionics, ASW equipment, and their armament (the former has four Sea Skua anti-ship missiles and the latter AS.12 missiles). Uprating and other changes subsequently resulted in two distinct new variants, the HAS Mk.3 for the Royal Navy and the Mk.4 for the Aeronavale. Similar uprating for the British Army version has resulted in the AH Mk.5.
The Lynx has also met with considerable export success. After careful evaluation, it was chosen by the German Navy (12 ordered in 1981) for use on their new frigates, and six SAR and 18 ASW models have been ordered by the Royal Netherlands Navy. Other operators of the Lynx include Argentina, Brazil, Denmark, Norway, Nigeria and Qatar.
G.Apostolo "The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Helicopters", 1984
One of the three helicopters included in the Aerospatiale/Westland co-production agreement of 1968, the Westland Lynx was designed initially for naval and civil roles, but early appreciation of its suitability for a wide range of military operations has led to an expanded development programme under the titles Army and Navy Lynx. Production was shared 70% by Westland and 30% by Aerospatiale. The first of six prototypes was flown on 21 March 1971, being followed by seven pre-production prototypes to speed development. Service trials began first in 1976 with No. 700L Naval Air Squadron at RNAS Yeovilton, Somerset, this being a joint Royal Navy and Royal Netherlands navy operational evaluation unit; similarly, an Army Aviation trials unit was established at Middle Wallop, Hampshire, in mid-1977. Deliveries of production aircraft to operational units began following completion of the latter trials in December 1977, the Lynx entering service first with Army Aviation squadrons in West Germany. The first Royal Navy unit (No. 702 Sqn) became operational in December 1977. Westland's current production aircraft are improved versions of the Army and Navy Lynx known as the Battlefield Lynx and Super Lynx, respectively, with all versions detailed more closely below. By 1993, 380 Army and Navy versions had been completed for customers in 17 nations.
VARIANTS
Lynx AH.Mk 1: general-purpose/ utility version for the British army with skid landing gear, able to operate in roles that include anti-tank, strike, armed escort, casualty evacuation, command post, logistic support, reconnaissance, tactical transport and SAR; 113 built;
AH.Mk 1GT is interim version before AH.Mk 7 conversion
Lynx HAS.Mk 2: Royal Navy general-purpose version with non-retractable tricycle landing gear and foldable tail rotor pylon, suitable for roles that include ASV, search and strike, ASW classification and strike communications, fire support, liaison, reconnaissance, SAR, troop transport and vertical replenishment
Lynx Mk 2 (FN): version for French navy, generally similar to HAS.Mk 2
Lynx HAS.Mk 3: second antisubmarine version for Royal Navy with uprated powerplant and transmission; equipped with two 835kW Rolls-Royce Gem 41-1 turboshaft engines, and GEC-Marconi Seaspray radar in modified nose; 23 delivered between March 1982 to April 1985; 53 surviving HAS.Mk 2s converted to HAS Mk 3 standard by 1989; further improved version designated HAS.Mk 3S
Lynx HAS.Mk 3 ICE: two aircraft converted for Arctic use by Royal Navy
Lynx HAS.Mk 3 GM: unofficial designation for 19 Gulf Modification aircraft originally delivered for use by Armada patrol, involving secure comms, tactical navigation and ESM fit
Lynx HAS.Mk ACTS: phase two of current upgrade programme featuring addition of RAMS 4000 central tactical system
Lynx HAS.Mk 4 (FN): version for French navy with powerplant of Lynx HAS.Mk 3
Lynx AH.Mk 5: version similar to Lynx AH.Mk 1, three for MoD (PE) with uprated Gem engines
Lynx AH.Mk 7: currently in service; improved British Army version featuring box-like exhaust shrouds, composite main rotor and reversed tail rotors; all surviving AH. Mk 1s converted to AH.Mk 7 standard by RN at Fleetlands from March 1988
Lynx HAS.Mk 8: latest version for Royal Navy featuring 15 new-build and 45 converted airframes featuring increased weights, internal MAD, improved rotors, avionics and ESM systems; Seaspray radar relocated to chin position and GEC-Marconi Sea Owl thermal imager fitted to nose instead; initial deliveries scheduled for early 1994; export version designated
Super Lynx Lynx AH.Mk 9: latest battlefield version for British army; fitted with tricycle undercarriage which precludes carriage of TOW missiles; 16 new aircraft on order plus eight AH.Mk 7 conversions; export version designated Battlefield Lynx
Lynx Mk 21: version for Brazilian navy similar to Lynx HAS.Mk 2
Lynx Mk 22: unbuilt version for Egyptian navy
Lynx Mk 23: version for Argentine navy similar to Lynx HAS.Mk 2
Lynx Mk 24: unbuilt version for Iraqi army
Lynx Mk 25: version for Royal Netherlands navy, which designated them UH-14A; similar to Lynx HAS.Mk 2
Lynx Mk 26: unbuilt, unarmed version for Iraqi army
Lynx Mk 27: version for Royal Netherlands navy which designated them SH-14B; uprated Gem engines and equipped for ASW role with sonar; nine delivered
Lynx Mk 28: version for State of Qatar police; generally as Lynx AH.Mk 1 but with uprated Gem 47-1 turboshafts and special equipment, including flotation gear
Lynx Mk 80: version for Royal Danish navy, similar to Lynx HAS.Mk 2; eight built
Lynx Mk 81: version for Royal Netherlands navy which designated them SH-14C; uprated Gem engines and magnetic anomaly detection (MAD) gear, some converted to SH-14B standard through deletion of MAD and addition of sonar; eight built
SH-14D: conversion of five Dutch navy UH-14As and eight SH-14Cs with Alcatel dipping sonar, UHF radios, RWR, FLIR, GPS, radar altimeter, composite blades and Gem Mk 42 engines
Lynx Mk 82: unbuilt version for Egyptian army
Lynx Mk 83: unbuilt version for Saudi army
Lynx Mk 84: unbuilt version for Qatari army
Lynx Mk 85: unbuilt version for UAE army
Lynx Mk 86: version for Royal Norwegian air force coast guard; similar to Lynx HAS.Mk 2, but with uprated Gem engines and non-folding tail rotor pylon; six built
Lynx Mk 87: embargoed version for Argentine navy, similar to Lynx Mk 23 but with uprated engines
Lynx Mk 88: version for the Federal German navy similar to Lynx Mk 86; equipped with sonar; 19 built
Lynx Mk 89: version for Nigerian navy; equipped for ASW/SAR roles; three built
Lynx Mk 90: single follow-on aircraft for Danish navy assembled in Denmark; delivered in 1988
Super Lynx Mk 95: five aircraft for Portuguese navy; equivalent to HAS. Mk 8; deliveries commenced in 1993
Super Lynx Mk 99: 12 aircraft for South Korean navy; delivered between 1989 and 1991; equivalent to HAS.Mk8
Battlefield Lynx 800: AH Mk 9 re-engined with LHTEC T800 turboshafts; development project terminated in 1992
D.Donald "The Complete Encyclopedia of World Aircraft", 1997
Developed within Anglo-French helicopter agreement confirmed 2 April 1968; Westland given design leadership; first flight of first of 13 prototypes (XW835) 21 March 1971; first flight of fourth prototype (XW838) 9 March 1972, featuring production type monobloc rotor head; first flights of British Army Lynx prototype (XX153) 12 April 1972, French Navy prototype (XX904) 6 July 1973, production Lynx (RN HAS. Mk 2 XZ229) 20 February 1976; first Royal Navy operational unit (No. 702 Squadron) formed on completion of intensive flight trials December 1977; AH. Mk 5 first flew (ZE375) 23 February 1985. Production shared 70% Westland, 30% Aerospatiale.
Battlefield Lynx mockup displayed at 1988 Farnborough Air Show (converted demonstrator G-LYNX), featuring wheeled landing gear, exhaust diffusers and provision for anti-helicopter missiles each side of fuselage; first flight of wheeled prototype (converted trials AH. Mk 7 XZ170) 29 November 1989; first flight of South Korean Super Lynx 16 November 1989 (also first Lynx with Sea Spray Mk 3).
VERSIONS
Lynx AH. Mk 1: British Army general purpose and utility version; 113 built and most converted to Mk 7.
Lynx HAS. Mk 2: Version for Royal Navy, for advanced shipborne anti-submarine and other duties. Gem 2 engines. Ferranti Sea Spray search and tracking radar in modified nose. Total of 60 delivered, plus 26 to French Navy, designated HAS. Mk 2(FN). First production aircraft (XZ227) flown on 20 February 1976. By 1989, all 53 active Royal Navy first-series Lynx had been modified to Mk 3 or later standards.
Lynx HAS. Mk 3: Second Royal Navy version for advanced shipborne anti-submarine and other duties; similar to Mk 2, with GEC-Marconi Sea Spray search and tracking radar in modified nose; can carry Sea Skua. Mk 2's Gem 2 engines replaced by two 835kW Gem 41-1 engines; 23 delivered; seven more in HAS. Mk 3S configuration; first flight, ZF557, 12 October 1987. This version has two GEC-Marconi AD3400 UHF radios with secure speech facility; additionally, ZD560 built in approximately Mk 7 configuration, delivered to Empire Test Pilots' School. Further 53 obtained through modification of all existing HAS. Mk 2s. Lynx HAS. Mk 3ICE is Mk 3 lacking some operational equipment for general duties aboard Antarctic survey vessel, HMS Endurance; three converted, of which two to Mk 3SICE.
Those used by Armilla Patrol in Arabian Gulf modified to HAS. Mk 3GM (Gulf Mod), with better cooling, or HAS. Mk 3S/GM, also with Mk 3S modifications (to which standard all 3GMs converted). Augmenting new-build Mk 3Ss, 36 modified by Royal Navy Aircraft Yard at Fleetlands from April 1989; Mk 3S is Phase 1 of Mk 8 conversion programme, involving GEC-Marconi AD 3400 secure speech radios (blade aerial beneath mid-point of tailboom) and upgraded ESM; programme continues, including Mk 3S/GM. Phase 2 is Lynx HAS. Mk 3CTS, adding RAMS 4000 central tactical system; prototype (XZ236 ex-Mk 3) flew 25 January 1989; further six for Royal Navy trials (one ex-Mk 3; five ex-Mk 3S); deliveries to Operational Flight Trials Unit, Portland, from April 1989. CTS service clearance granted August 1991; Mk 3CTS has flotation bag each side of nose.
Lynx Mk 4: Second batch of 14 aircraft ordered for French Navy in May 1980 with Gem 41-1 engines and uprated transmission to permit an increase in AUW to 4,763kg. All supplied 'green' for equipment installation by Aerospatiale and subsidiaries.
Lynx AH. Mk 5: Similar to AH. Mk 1. Two trials aircraft ZD285 and ZD559. Nine AH. Mk 5s ordered for Army Air Corps. Initial example (ZE375) flew on 23 February 1985 and was used for engine trials. Remainder transferred to AH. Mk 7 contract, although ZE376 flew initially as Mk 5.
Lynx AH. Mk 7: Uprated British Army version, with improved systems, reversed-direction tail rotor with improved composite blades to reduce noise and enhance extended period hover at high weights; 13 ordered, eight from Mk 5 contract (two cancelled); first flight (ZE376) 7 November 1985; seven converted to Mk 9. Royal Navy workshops at Fleetlands converted Mk 1s to Mk 7s; first (XZ641) redelivered 30 March 1988; box-type exhaust diffusers added from early 1989; last conversion mid-1994. Interim version was Lynx AH. Mk 1GT with uprated engines and rotors, but lacking Mk 7's improved electronic systems; first conversion (XZ195) 1991. GEC-Marconi AWARE-3 radar warning receiver selected 1989 for retrofit, designated ARI23491 Rewarder; Mk 1 XZ668 to Westland for trial installation 22 November 1991. (GEC-Marconi Sky Guardian Mk 13 installed in some Lynx AH. Mk 7s for Gulf War, 1990-91; later uprated to Mk 15.) BERP (extended tip chord) blades retrofitted to Mk 7 from 1993.
Subject to results of study contract awarded to GKN Westland on 1 December 1998, Army Air Corps Mks 7 and 9 will be modified to a common equipment standard (wheeled landing gear, MIL-STD-1553B databus; avionics management system; GPS/INS/Doppler navigation; improved communications; civil navigation equipment; improved defensive aids); Mk 7 will replace Gazelles and be designated LUH (Light Utility Helicopter); Mk 9 role to be unchanged.
Lynx Mk 8 HMA (formerly known as HAS. Mk 8): Entered service with Royal Navy 1995. Equivalent to export Super Lynx; passive identification system; 5,125kg maximum T-O weight; improved (reversed-direction) tail rotor control; BERP composite main rotor blades; Racal RAMS 4000 central tactical system (CTS eases crew's workload by centrally processing sensor data and presents mission information on multifunction CRT display; 15 systems ordered 1987, 106 September 1989); original Sea Spray Mk 1 radar repositioned in new chin radome; GEC-Marconi Sea Owl thermal imager (x5 or x30 magnifying system on gimballed mount, with elevation +20 to -30° and azimuth +120 to -120°; ordered October 1989) in former radar position; MIR-2 ESM updated; three Mk 3s used in development programme as tactical system (XZ236), dummy Sea Owl/chin radome (ZD267) and avionics (ZD266) testbeds.
Definitive Mk 8 (Phase 3) conversions begun 1992 with addition of Sea Owl, further radar and navigation upgrades, (including RACAL RNS252 'Super TANS'), composites BERP main rotor blades and reversed-direction tail rotor. Conversion programme covers 44 aircraft in two phases. All conversions due to be completed by the year 2003.
Lynx AH. Mk 9: UK Army Air Corps equivalent of export Battlefield Lynx; tricycle wheel landing gear; maximum T-O weight 5,125kg; advanced technology composites main rotor blades; exhaust diffusers; no TOW capability; first flight of prototype (converted company demonstrator XZ170) 29 November 1989; 16 new aircraft (beginning ZG884, flown 20 July 1990) ordered for delivery from 1991, plus eight Mk 7 conversions (contract awarded November 1991); some outfitted as advanced command posts, remainder for tactical transport role. Deliveries from 22 May 1991.
Battlefield Lynx: Upgraded export army Lynx; approximately equivalent to Lynx AH. Mk 9. Demonstrator G-LYNX fitted with two 1,007kW LHTEC T800 turboshafts as Battlefield Lynx 800 private venture (LHTEC funding power plants and gearboxes, Westland providing airframe for full flight demonstration programme); first flight 25 September 1991; programme terminated early 1992 after 17 hours.
Super Lynx: Export model approximately equivalent to Mk 8 HMA. Lynx Mk 21A: Five remaining Brazilian Navy Lynx Mk 21 upgraded to Super Lynx Mk 21A standard. Contract placed in February 1994 includes nine new-build aircraft.
Other versions and operators where orders completed: Royal Netherlands Navy upgraded five UH-14As and eight SH-14Cs to SH-14D standard, with Alcatel dipping sonar, UHF radios, RWR, FLIR Systems Inc 2000HP FLIR, Trimble Type 2200 GPS, new radar altimeter, composites rotor blades and Mk 42 Gem power plants. Nine SH-14Bs, already with sonar, raised to SH-14D standards, but in interim SH-14Cs upgraded to SH-14B through deletion of MAD and addition of sonar. UH-14As are first full SH-14D conversions, from 1990; programme designated STAMOL (Standaardisatie en Modernisering Lynx); standard fleet comprising 16 with sonar and six with provisions for sonar installation. Completed early 1993.
Denmark upgrading its eight Mk 80A and Mk 90A Lynx to Super Lynx standard; includes building of replacement airframes for integration with existing fleet's engines, transmission, rotor system, flying controls, hydraulic systems, avionics and electrical systems, upgrade and modifications of main rotor blades, tail rotor and fuel systems. Completion due in 2004. Will be known as Mk 90B when upgraded.
GBP80 million contract awarded in June 1998 for upgrading 17 German Navy Mk.88 Sea Lynx to Super Lynx standard, following on from a GBP100 million order for seven new Super Lynx Series 100s. The modification includes fitting the Marconi Sea Spray 3000 radar, Racal Doppler 91, RNS 252 and Rockwell Collins GPS. It will be fitted to accommodate the FLIR system fitted to the new aircraft and will also be capable of deploying the Sea Skua air-to-surface missile. GKN Westland will carry out the first trial installation, with Eurocopter Deutschland subcontracted to modify the remaining 16 aircraft. Trial installation is scheduled for mid-2001.
CURRENT VERSIONS
Super Lynx Series 100: Upgraded export naval Lynx introduced in September 1996, powered by Rolls-Royce Gem 42-1 turboshaft engines, approximately equivalent to Lynx. Mk 8 HMA; operated by South Korean, Portuguese and Brazilian navies and applied to new Mk 88As sold to Germany.
Super Lynx Series 200: More powerful alternative option with 1,007kW LHTEC CTS800 engine with dual-channel Full Authority Digital Electronic Control (FADEC), LCD flat panel electronic power system displays, but otherwise conventional cockpit of Series 100.
Super Lynx Series 300: Also powered by the LHTEC CTS800, but with full 'glass' cockpit with six LCD colour flat panel displays, night vision goggle-compatible, and digital core avionics based around dual-redundant MIL-STD-1553B and ARINC 429 databuses; includes new navigation system, attitude and heading reference system and communications suite. Mission sensors and systems can be integrated into the avionics system and controlled via control and display units. South Africa, which announced intention to purchase on 18 November 1998, has deferred its four aircraft. Launch customer, the Royal Malaysian Navy will take delivery of the first of its six aircraft in 2003. The Royal Thai Navy has approved funding for two.
Demonstrator made its first flight with CTS800-4N turboshaft engines at Yeovil on 12 June 2001.
Lynx ACH: Advanced Compound Helicopter. Technology demonstrator project, publicly announced 22 May 1998 and due to begin in 1999, partly funded by UK MoD. Target is 50% speed increase by means of wings attached at cabin roof level and variable area exhaust nozzles; additional thrust derived from RTM322 turboshafts in place of Gems (uprated gearbox taken from W30-200); BERP rotor blades; flaps on wing trailing-edges, with pitching moment neutralised by all-moving tailplane; and trimming rudder to reduce tail rotor loads.
Performance will include maximum level speed of 463km/h; ceiling of 6,100m; 20% additional payload/range; 50% more propulsive efficiency; and between 25 and 50% improvement in lift/drag ratio.
Following description refers to military general purpose and naval versions with Gem 2 engines, except where indicated:
DESIGN FEATURES: Compact design suited to hunter-killer ASW and missile-armed anti-ship naval roles from frigates or larger ships (superseding ship-guided helicopters), armed/unarmed land roles with cabin large enough for squad, or other tasks; manually folding tail pylon on naval versions; single four-blade semi-rigid main rotor (foldable), each blade attached to main rotor hub by titanium root plates and flexible arm; rotor drives taken from front of engines into main gearbox mounted above cabin ahead of engines; in flight, accessory gears (at front of main gearbox) driven by one of two through shafts from first stage reduction gears; four-blade tail rotor, drive taken from main ring gear; single large window in each main cabin sliding door; provision for internally mounted armament, and for exterior universal flange mounting each side for other weapons/stores.
Super Lynx has increased take-off weight; all-weather day/night capability; extended payload range; swept-tip BERP composites main rotor blades offering improved speed and reduced vibration; and reversed direction tail rotor for improved control.
FLYING CONTROLS: Rotor head controls actuated by three identical tandem servojacks and powered by two independent hydraulic systems; control system incorporates simple stability augmentation system; each engine embodies independent control system providing full-authority rotor speed governing, pilot control being limited to selection of desired rotor speed range; in event of one engine failure, system restores power up to single-engine maximum contingency rating; main rotor can provide negative thrust to increase stability on deck after touchdown on naval versions; hydraulically operated rotor brake mounted on main gearbox; sweptback fin/tail rotor pylon, with starboard half-tailplane.
STRUCTURE: Conventional semi-monocoque pod and boom, mainly light alloy; glass fibre access panels, doors, fairings, pylon leading/trailing-edges, and bullet fairing over tail rotor gearbox; composites main rotor blades; main rotor hub and inboard flexible arm portions built as complete unit, as titanium monobloc forging; tail rotor blades have light-alloy spar, stainless steel leading-edge sheath and rear section as for main blades.
LANDING GEAR: (General purpose military version): Non-retractable tubular skid type. Provision for a pair of adjustable ground handling wheels on each skid. Flotation gear optional. Battlefield Lynx and AH.Mk 9 equivalent have non-retractable tricycle gear with twin nosewheels.
(Naval versions): Non-retractable oleo-pneumatic tricycle type. Single-wheel main units, carried on sponsons, fixed at 27° toe-out for deck landing; can be manually turned into line and locked fore and aft for movement of aircraft into and out of ship's hangar. Twin-wheel nose unit steered hydraulically through 90° by the pilot to facilitate independent take-off into wind. Sprag brakes (wheel locks) fitted to each wheel prevent rotation on landing or inadvertent deck roll. These locks disengage hydraulically and re-engage automatically in event of hydraulic failure. Maximum vertical descent 2.29m/s; with lateral drift 0.91m/s for deck landing. Flotation gear, and hydraulically actuated harpoon deck lock securing system, optional.
POWER PLANT: Currently available options include two Rolls-Royce Gem 42-1 turboshafts, each rated at 835kW, or two LHTEC CTS800-4N, each rated at 995kW. Transmission rating 1,372kW. Exhaust diffusers for IR suppression optional on Battlefield Lynx.
Two Rolls-Royce Gem 2 turboshafts, each with maximum contingency rating of 671kW in original Lynx AH. 1, HAS. 2 and early export variants. Later versions have Gem 41-1, 41-2, or 42-1 engines, all with maximum contingency rating of 835kW. Transmission rating 1,372kW. Engines of British and French Lynx in service converted to Mk 42 standard during regular overhauls from 1987 onwards. Danish, Netherlands and Norwegian Lynx similarly retrofitted. Fuel in five internal tanks; usable capacity 957 litres when gravity-refuelled; 985 litres when pressure-refuelled. For ferrying, two tanks each of 441 litres in cabin, replacing bench tank. Maximum usable fuel 1,867 litres. Engine oil tank capacity 6.8 litres. Main rotor gearbox oil capacity 28 litres.
ACCOMMODATION: Pilot and co-pilot or observer on side-by- side seats. Dual controls optional. Individual forward-hinged cockpit door and large rearward-sliding cabin door on each side; cockpit doors jettisonable; windows of cabin doors also jettisonable. Cockpit accessible from cabin area. Maximum high-density layout (military version) for one pilot and 10 armed troops or paratroops, on lightweight bench seats in soundproofed cabin. Alternative VIP layouts for four to seven passengers, with additional cabin soundproofing. Seats can be removed quickly to permit carriage of up to 907kg of freight internally. Tiedown rings provided. In casualty evacuation role, with a crew of two, Lynx can accommodate up to six Alphin stretchers and a medical attendant. Both basic versions have secondary capability for search and rescue (up to nine survivors) and other roles.
SYSTEMS: Two independent hydraulic systems, pressure 141 bars. Third hydraulic system provided in naval version when sonar equipment, MAD or hydraulic winch system installed. No pneumatic system. 28V DC electrical power supplied by two 6kW engine-driven starter/generators and an alternator. External power sockets. 24V 23Ah (optionally 40Ah) Ni/Cd battery fitted for essential services and emergency engine starting. 200V three-phase AC power available at 400Hz from two 15kVA transmission-driven alternators. Cabin heating and ventilation system. Optional supplementary cockpit heating system. Electric anti-icing and demisting of windscreen, and electrically operated windscreen wipers, standard; windscreen washing system.
AVIONICS: (General): Avionics common to all roles (general purpose and naval versions).
Comms: Collins VOR/ILS; DME; Collins AN/ARN-118 Tacan; I-band transponder (naval version only); GEC-Plessey PTR 446, Collins APX-72, Siemens STR 700/375 or Italtel APX-77 IFF.
Flight: Marconi duplex three-axis automatic stabilisation equipment; BAe GM9 Gyrosyn compass system; Decca Tactical Air Navigation System (TANS); Decca 71 Doppler, E2C standby compass. Marconi Mk 34 AFCS. Additional units fitted in naval version, when sonar is installed, to provide automatic transition to hover and automatic Doppler hold in hover.
(Army): Flight: Decca Doppler 91 and RSN252 navigation; Honeywell/Smiths AN/APN-198 radar altimeter; Rockwell Collins 206A ADF and VIR 31A VOR/ILS on latest versions.
Mission: British Army Lynx equipped with TOW missiles have roof-mounted Hughes sight manufactured under licence by British Aerospace. Roof sight upgraded with night vision capability in far infra-red waveband; first test firing of TOW with added Marconi thermal imager took place in October 1988. Optional equipment, according to role, can include lightweight sighting system with alternative target magnification, vertical and/or oblique cameras, flares for night operation, low-light level TV, infra-red linescan, searchlight, and specialised communications equipment. Some have infra-red formation flying lights and provision for crew's NVGs. For surveillance, some AAC Lynx carry Chancellor Helitele in external (port) ball housing, complete with datalink.
Self-defence: Sanders AN/ALQ-144 infra-red jammer installed beneath tailboom of some British Army Lynx from 1987; later augmented by exhaust diffusers. Requirement for RWR satisfied by 1989 selection of Marconi AWARE-3 (ARI23491) system; Marconi Sky Guardian Mk 13 (later Mk 15) on some aircraft from 1990.
(Navy): Comms: Rotal Navy helicopters have two GEC-Marconi AD 3400 VHF/UHF transceivers, Dowty D403M standby UHF radio, Collins 718U-5 HF transceiver, Plessey PTR446 D-band transponder and Pilkington ARI 5983 I-band transponder.
Radar: Marconi ARI5979 Sea Spray Mk 1 lightweight search and tracking radar, for detecting small surface targets in low-visibility/high-sea conditions in original versions. Super Lynx has Sea Spray Mk 3000 or AlliedSignal RDR 1500 360° scan radar in chin fairing. UK Mk 8 upgraded with Sea Spray Mk 3000 below fuselage.
Flight: GPS on Royal Navy and Netherlands Lynx from 1997.
Mission: Optional AlliedSignal AN/AQS-18 or Thomson Sintra HS-312 sonars. Detection of submarines by dipping sonars or magnetic anomaly detector. Dipping sonars operated by hydraulically powered winch and cable hover mode facilities within the AFCS. Racal MIR-2 Orange Crop passive radar detection system in Royal Navy Lynx; similar Racal Kestrel retrofitted to Danish Mk 90. Matra AF 530 or APX-334 stabilised sight in French naval Lynx. Optional GEC Sandpiper FLIR on Royal Navy Lynx; FLIR Systems 2000HP specified for Netherlands SH-14D upgrade; FLIR Systems Safire optional for Danish Lynx. Vinten Vipa 1 reconnaissance pod, or Agiflite reconnaissance camera system.
Self-defence: Tracor M-130 chaff/flare dispensers and Ericsson Radar Electronics AN/ALQ-167(V) D- to J-band anti-ship missile jamming pods installed on Royal Navy Lynx patrolling Arabian Gulf, 1987. Two Loral Challenger IR jammers above cockpit of Royal Navy Lynx during 1990-91 Gulf War. RWR in Netherlands SH-14Ds from 1996.
EQUIPMENT: All versions equipped as standard with navigation, cabin and cockpit lights; adjustable landing light under nose; and anti-collision beacon. For search and rescue, with three crew, both versions can have a waterproof floor and a 272kg capacity clip-on hydraulic hoist on starboard side of cabin. Cable length 30m. Electric hoist on CTS800-powered aircraft.
ARMAMENT: For armed escort, anti-tank or air-to-surface strike missions, army version can be equipped with two 20mm cannon mounted externally so as to permit carriage also of anti-tank missiles or pintle-mounted 7.62mm machine gun inside cabin. External pylon can be fitted on each side of cabin for variety of stores, including two Minigun or other self-contained gun pods; two rocket pods; or up to eight HOT, Hellfire, TOW, or similar air-to-surface missiles. Additional six or eight missiles carried in cabin. For ASW role, armament includes two Mk 44, Mk 46, A244S or Sting Ray homing torpedoes, one each on an external pylon on each side of fuselage, and six marine markers; or two Mk 11 depth charges. Alternatively, up to four Sea Skua semi-active homing missiles; on French Navy Lynx, four AS.12 or similar wire-guided missiles. Self-protection FN HMP 12.7mm machine gun pod optional on Royal Navy Lynx.
Super Lynx as standard naval Lynx, including four Sea Skua or two Penguin, or Marte Mk.2/s anti-ship missiles.
Jane's Helicopter Markets and Systems
* * *
FACTS AND FIGURES- The first Lynx prototype made its initial flight on 21 March 1971.
- Westland planned to build 16 WG.13 prototypes because it considered the programme so technically demanding.
- Modified Scout helicopters were used to test the Lynx's main rotor system.
- An Army Lynx was rolled out publicly for the first time at Farnborough in 1972.
- During 1977 the Army Air Corps received its first production Lynx; the aircraft became operational in 1978.
- Lynx AH.Mk 1s were converted to AH.Mk 7 standard by the Royal Navy.
- Several features of the Lynx 3 were incorporated into the AH.Mk 9.
- The naval Lynx made its maiden flight on 10 February 1976.
- Most export Lynxes, like the nine used by the Brazilian navy, are based on Britain's HAS.Mk 2.
- Britain's first naval Lynx unit was No. 702 Squadron, Royal Navy, at Yeovilton, formed in December 1977.
- The Norwegian air force uses the naval Lynx for unarmed rescue missions.
- A modified Lynx holds the helicopter world speed record.
Westland Lynx - Wikipedia
The Westland Lynx is a British multi-purpose twin-engined military helicopter designed and built by Westland Helicopters at its factory in Yeovil. Originally intended as a utility craft for both civil and naval usage, military interest led to the development of both battlefield and naval variants. The Lynx went into operational usage in 1977 and was later adopted by the armed forces of over a dozen nations, primarily serving in the battlefield utility, anti-armour, search and rescue and anti-submarine warfare roles.
The Lynx is a fully aerobatic helicopter with the ability to perform loops and rolls.[2] In 1986, a specially modified Lynx set the current Fédération Aéronautique Internationale's official airspeed record for helicopters (category excludes compound helicopters) at 400.87 km/h (249.09 mph),[3][4] which remains unbroken as of 2020.[5]
Several land and naval variants of the Lynx have been produced along with some major derivatives. The Westland 30 was produced as a civil utility helicopter; it was not a commercial success and only a small number were built during the 1980s. In the 21st century, a modernised variant of the Lynx was designed as a multi-role combat helicopter, designated as the AgustaWestland AW159 Wildcat; the Wildcat is intended to replace existing Lynx helicopters. The Lynx remains in production by AgustaWestland, the successor to Westland Helicopters.
Typical combat equipment includes stabilised roof-mounted sensors, onboard countermeasures and door guns; when being used in the anti-tank role, the Lynx is typically armed with BGM-71 TOW missiles; missiles such as the Sea Skua have been used in the maritime anti-surface role.[26] Additional armaments that have been interchangeably used include rockets, 20 mm cannons, torpedoes, and depth charges.[43] Those Lynx built for export have been typically outfitted with armaments and equipment customised for the end-user, such as the Mokopa air-to-surface missile used on Algeria's Lynx fleet, eight of which can be carried;[44] studies into equipping the AGM-114 Hellfire have been performed, and air-to-air missiles could also reportedly be adopted if the capability is sought by operators.[45] Equipped armaments can be managed and controlled inflight through the onboard stores management system.[40] In order to counteract battlefield threats such as infrared-guided missiles, various defensive aid subsystems can be optionally installed, including warning receivers and countermeasures.[45]
Many of the Lynx's components had been derived from earlier Westland helicopters such as the Scout and Wasp.[17] The Lynx has been substantially upgraded since entering service in the 1970s; improvements made to in-service aircraft have typically included strengthened airframes, new avionics and engines, improved rotor blades, and additional surveillance and communications systems.[24][43] Various subsystems from overseas suppliers have been incorporated into some Lynx variants; during a South Korean procurement, hulls produced in the United Kingdom were equipped with Korean-built systems, such as ISTAR, electro-optical, electronic warfare, fire-control systems,[46][47] flight control actuators,[48] and undercarriages.[49] A glass cockpit was adopted on the Super Lynx 300, featuring fully integrated flight and mission display systems, a variety of integrated display units including head-up displays, and dual controls; AgustaWestland has commented that the new cockpit reduces aircrew workload and increases aircraft effectiveness.[36][38] The head-up display installed could be replaced by a helmet-mounted sight system on customer demand.[45]
The British Army also deployed 24 TOW-armed Lynxes alongside an equal number of Westland Gazelle helicopters during the Gulf War. They were assigned the mission of locating and attacking Iraqi tank concentrations, and to support the advance of coalition ground forces into Kuwait and Southern Iraq during the 100 hours war phase of the conflict. On 26 February 1991, a Lynx of 654 Squadron AAC destroyed two MTLB armoured personnel carriers (APCs) and four T-55 tanks using TOW missiles: the engagement was the first recorded use of the missile from a British helicopter.[60]
Land-based variants[edit]Westland WG.13
Prototype, first flight 21 March 1971. Thirteen prototypes built.[114]
Lynx AH.1
Initial production version for the British Army Air Corps, powered by 671 kW (900 hp) Gem 2 engines,[115] with first production example flying 11 February 1977, and deliveries continuing until February 1984, with 113 built.[116] Used for a variety of tasks, including tactical transport, armed escort, anti-tank warfare (60 were equipped with eight TOW missiles as Lynx AH.1 (TOW) from 1981),[117] reconnaissance and casualty evacuation.[118]
Lynx AH.1GT
Interim conversion of the AH.1 to partial AH.7 standard for the Army Air Corps with uprated engines and revised tail rotor.[119]
Lynx HT.1
Planned training version for Royal Air Force to replace the Westland Whirlwind, cancelled.[119][120]
Lynx AH.5
Upgraded version for the Army Air Corps, with 835 kW (1,120 shp) Gem 41-1 engines and uprated gearbox.[121] Three built as AH.5 (Interim) as trials aircraft for MoD. Eight ordered as AH.5s for the Army Air Corps, of which only two were built as AH.5s, the remaining six were completed as AH.7s.[122] Four were later upgraded to AH.7 standard and one was retained for trials work as an AH.5X.
Lynx AH.6
Proposed version for the Royal Marines with undercarriage, folding tail and deck lock[123] of Naval Lynx. Not built.[122]
Two British Army AH.9As in 2015
Lynx AH.7
Further upgraded version for the Army Air Corps, with Gem 41-1 engines and uprated gearbox of the AH.5 and new, larger, composite material tail rotor. Later refitted with BERP type rotor blades. Twelve new builds and 107 Lynx AH.1s converted.[124] A small number also used by the Fleet Air Arm in support of the Royal Marines.[125] The Lynx AH.7 can also be outfitted for the anti-armour role, with the attachment of two pylons, each carrying four TOW anti-tank guided missiles. In the light-lift role, it can carry an aircrew member armed with a cabin door mounted L7 General Purpose Machine Gun (GPMG), as well as troops for fast-rope or abseiling insertions, or regular landings. It can also transport cargo. Now replaced in the attack role by the AgustaWestland Apache attack helicopter.
Lynx AH.7(DAS)
AH.7 with Defensive Aids Subsystem.
Lynx AH.9 ("Battlefield Lynx")
Utility version for Army Air Corps, based on AH.7, but with wheeled undercarriage and further upgraded gearbox. Sixteen new-built plus eight converted from AH.7s.[126]
Firing a .50-inch heavy machine gun from a British Army AH.9A on exercise in BATUS, Canada
Lynx AH.9A
AH.9 with more powerful LHTEC CTS800-4N 1,015 kW (1,362 shp) engines,[127] which allowed the door-mounted GPMG of the AH.7 to be replaced with a .50 inch (12.7 mm) heavy machine gun (HMG) as well as flight in hotter conditions.[128] All 22 AH.9 were upgraded.[129] A small number also used by the Fleet Air Arm in support of the Royal Marines.
British Aerospace Nimrod AEW3 - Wikipedia
British Aerospace Nimrod AEW3From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
First flight16 July 1980[1]
Introduction1984
Retired1986
Produced11
Number built3 prototype
8 production
(all converted from MR1)
The British Aerospace Nimrod AEW3 was a proposed airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft which was to provide airborne radar cover for the air defence of the United Kingdom by the Royal Air Force (RAF). The project was designed to use the existing Nimrod airframe, in use with the RAF as a maritime patrol aircraft, combined with a new radar system and avionics package developed by Marconi Avionics.
The Nimrod AEW project proved to be hugely complex and expensive as a result of the difficulties of producing new radar and computer systems and integrating them successfully into the Nimrod airframe. The project was eventually cancelled, with the RAF instead purchasing new build Boeing E-3 Sentry aircraft to fulfil the AEW requirement.[2]
DevelopmentAs an interim measure during the development of the Nimrod AEW, surplus Shackletons were fitted with equipment from ex-Royal Navy Gannets.Background[In the mid 1960s, following the development of the Grumman E-2 Hawkeye carrier-borne AEW aircraft and its associated systems, the British government began looking for a radar system that could provide airborne early warning for the United Kingdom. At the time, the only recognised AEW aircraft in British service was the Fairey Gannet aircraft used by the Fleet Air Arm on board Royal Navy aircraft carriers. These were fitted with the AN/APS-20 Radar, which had been developed during World War II and was rapidly becoming obsolete.[3] Work had been started in the early 1960s on a brand new AEW platform for the Royal Navy to replace the Gannet that would encompass both a new type of radar system mounted on a new aircraft, the P.139. While the defence cuts of the mid-1960s led to the cancellation of the P.139, work continued on a British designed radar system. Meanwhile, it was decided that the RAF needed an AEW aircraft to operate as part of the national air defence strategy.[4]
To fulfill the planned requirements for a new AEW aircraft, the government had a number of factors to consider:
In the interim, to provide a land based AEW aircraft, radar systems from withdrawn Royal Navy Gannets were installed in similarly surplus Avro Shackleton maritime patrol aircraft and entered service from 1972.[5] Around the same time, it was decided not to proceed with FMICW technology as the basis of an AEW system, as research from the United States Air Force (USAF) had shown that pulse-Doppler radar was superior and would be used in the Boeing E-3 Sentry then under development. As a consequence, the idea of a new land-based AEW aircraft for the RAF was re-examined, and again it was decided that the Nimrod met the requirements.[4]
Manufacturer's model of Nimrod AEWThe decision was taken to procure the aircraft fitted with a pulse-Doppler radar system, which then proceeded to a range of options:[1]
Development issues[edit]
A Comet 4 was fitted with a nose radome for initial aerodynamic flight testingThe complexity of the AEW requirement proved too much for British industry to overcome by itself. A major project management issue was the appointment of British Aerospace (BAe) and GEC Marconi as joint programme leaders. This meant in practice that as development issues arose, the companies had a distressing tendency to blame each other for the problem rather than try to resolve it; while BAe was able to fulfil its part of the contract by delivering the aircraft on time (the first was due to be delivered in 1982, with full delivery by 1984), GEC was unable to solve the difficulties in developing the avionics.[8]
In 1977 an RAF Comet 4 was modified for flight testing with the nose radome and conducted a series of trials, the results of which proved promising enough for an order for three prototype Nimrods to be built using redundant MR1 airframes.[9] The first of these was rolled out in March 1980 and flew for the first time in July, and was intended to test the flight characteristics, with the second airframe planned to carry out trials of the Mission Systems Avionics (MSA) package.[1]
Nimrod AEW.3 at RAF Finningley in 1985Despite the problems, the project continued, and 8 production aircraft were ordered (which would also come from spare MR1 airframes). The first of these flew in March 1982.[9] Even while the technical problems were being worked on, the aircraft was delivered to the RAF's No 8 Squadron in 1984 to begin crew training.[9] The technical problems proved insurmountable for the Nimrod AEW to be deployed in the Falklands War.[10] To provide some degree of cover, several Nimrod MR.2 were quickly modified to undertake the airborne surveillance role for the task force however.[11]
Aircraft[edit]The choice of the Nimrod airframe proved to be the wrong one, as it was too small to accommodate the radar, electronics, power generation and cooling systems needed for a system as complex as the one required[12] – at just over 38.5 m (126 ft), the Nimrod was close to 8 m (26 ft) shorter than the Boeing 707 aircraft that formed the basis of the E-3 Sentry, with the planned all-up weight around half that of the American aircraft, but was expected to accommodate sufficient crew and equipment to perform a similar function.[1] Nimrod was designed to have a total of six operator consoles (4 for the radar, one for ESM and one for communications), which was less than the nine stations fitted aboard the E-3A. The size of the Sentry also meant there was room to increase the number of operators.[1] Having the Sentry's radar in the rotodome above the aircraft allowed for cooling to be undertaken directly by the airflow, with cooling doors mounted in the installation, while the transmitter had a separate liquid cooling system, and the avionics in the main section were sufficiently cooled by a conventional air cycle environmental system.[13] This was in contrast to the Nimrod's "heat sink" design that dispersed the heat through the fuel system, and which needed the fuel tanks to be at least half-full to work efficiently when the aircraft's system operated at full power.[1]
Avionics[edit]
Even getting the radar scanners mounted on the Nimrod's nose and tail to synchronise proved problematicThe MSA was based around a GEC 4080M computer, which was required to process data from the two radar scanners, the ESM system, IFF and inertial navigation systems. The integration of all of these systems into a single package proved too difficult for the underpowered computer, which had an ultimate data storage capacity of 2.4 MB.[1] By the time of the project's cancellation, the mission system mean time between failure was around two hours, yet it took around two and a half hours to load all the mission data via a tape system.
What mission performance there was largely due to the Cossor IFF interrogator which complemented the radar system: with the addition of IFF data, the system could successfully track aircraft carrying IFF transponders, but when the IFF was switched off, radar tracks would rapidly be lost. This meant that the system would successfully track civil and 'friendly' military aircraft, but would not reliably detect Warsaw Pact aircraft which did not carry a compatible IFF system – detection of which was the whole point of the project.
The mission system electronic racks were earthed to different points on the airframe, which led to differences in earth potential and the introduction of short-lived, random track information which added to the computer overload. Finally, the advanced design of the radar proved difficult – the FASS method to gain full 360° radar coverage was problematic, involving as it did the scanner in the nose making a left to right sweep, with the signal then immediately passed to the scanner in the tail, which would sweep right to left.[14] However, getting the two scanners to synchronise proved difficult, resulting in poor all-round surveillance capability.[1] The system also split incoming raw radar information into upper and lower beams, each of which was then further split into in-phase and quadrature-phase channels. Each of these 4 channels contained identical individual elements (such as a spectrum analyser), which in theory should have been entirely interchangeable between locations.
Joint Trials Unit (JTU) testing showed that in fact the system would only work with a particular device in a particular place in the system: putting the same device in one of the other 3 channels would not give a serviceable system. The consequence of this was that the JTU trials aircraft would fly loaded with spare electronic devices so that when system failure occurred, there was a better chance of finding a particular combination of system elements which would work. This would not have been a sustainable practice had the aircraft entered service. The reason for this issue was never resolved: the JTU suspicion was that tolerances in transmitting information through each channel were too loose, so that as the processed information emerged from each channel to be correlated back into a coherent picture, such correlation was in fact impossible since each channel was offering up a different 'time slot' to the others.
Cancellation"...The choice of national procurement rather than the available US alternative, involved not only higher costs for Britain but also the lack of an adequate system in-service when needed... It appears that buying British was given a high priority than having a system available to meet the assessed Soviet threat"Historians Ron Smith and Jacques Fontanel, discussing the procurement process.[7]
At the time that the first production Nimrods were being delivered to the RAF, the MoD decided to conduct a complete review of the AEW programme. The result of this was the start of a bid process to supply AEW aircraft for the RAF that began in 1986, with a number of different options put forward, including the E-2C Hawkeye, E-3 Sentry, P-3AEW&C Orion, a proposal from Airship Industries, and the Nimrod.[6] Eventually, the Best and Final Offers were sought from GEC Marconi with the Nimrod, and Boeing with its Sentry. In December 1986, the Sentry was finally chosen and the Nimrod AEW programme was cancelled.[9][8] In spite of the project's difficulties, India expressed interest in procuring the Nimrod AEW3; these investigations continued even after the British government's eventual cancellation of the project.[15]
The E-2 Hawkeye, P-3 Orion AEW&C and E-3 Sentry were all considered as alternatives to the Nimrod
The MoD's review of the AEW programme eventually led to Boeing's E-3 Sentry being chosen instead of the Nimrod.The Nimrod programme had cost in the region of £1 billion up to its cancellation, contrasting with manufacturer claims in 1977 that the total cost of the project would be between £200–300 million.[7][16] The unused airframes were eventually stored and used as a source of spares for the Nimrod R1 and MR2 fleets, while the elderly Shackleton aircraft that had been commissioned in 1971 as a "stop-gap" measure for AEW cover until the planned entry of the Nimrod were forced to soldier on until 1991 when they were replaced by the Sentry. The scandal over the collapse of the Nimrod AEW project was a major factor in Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's stance to open up the UK defence market to competition.[17]
Potential future useFollowing the cancellation of the Nimrod AEW programme, BAe began looking at ways that the now redundant airframes could be re-used, and commenced studies looking at the potential use of the Nimrod as a missile carrying strike aircraft. This would have seen the AEW modifications, primarily the FASS scanners, and the fuel and cooling systems installed in the weapons bay, removed. The Searchwater radar, at the time fitted to the Nimrod MR.2, would have been installed in a nose installation, and the weapons bay outfitted to accommodate up to six Sea Eagle anti-ship missiles.[18] However, this did not go beyond the study phase, and the airframes were eventually scrapped during the 1990s.[19]
Avro Shackleton - Wikipedia
The Avro Shackleton is a British long-range maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) which was used by the Royal Air Force (RAF) and the South African Air Force (SAAF). It was developed by Avro from the Avro Lincoln bomber, which itself had been a development of the famous wartime Avro Lancaster bomber.
The Shackleton was developed during the late 1940s as part of Britain's military response to the rapid expansion of the Soviet Navy, in particular its submarine force. Produced as the primary type equipping RAF Coastal Command, the Type 696, as it was initially designated, incorporated major elements of the Lincoln, as well as the Avro Tudor passenger aircraft, and was furnished with extensive electronics suites in order to perform the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) mission along with a much-improved crew environment to accommodate the long mission times involved in patrol work. Being known for a short time as the Lincoln ASR.3, it was decided that the Type 696 would be named Shackleton in service, after the polar explorer Sir Ernest Shackleton.[N 1]
It entered operational service with the RAF in April 1951. The Shackleton was used primarily in the ASW and MPA roles, but it was also frequently deployed as an aerial search and rescue (SAR) platform and for performing several other secondary roles such as mail delivery and as a crude troop-transport aircraft. In addition to its service with the RAF, South Africa also elected to procure the Shackleton to equip the SAAF. In South African service, the type was operated in the maritime patrol capacity between 1957 and 1984. During March 1971, a number of SAAF Shackletons were used during the SS Wafra oil spill, intentionally sinking the stricken oil tanker using depth charges to prevent further ecological contamination.
During the 1970s, the Shackleton was replaced in the maritime patrol role by the jet-powered Hawker Siddeley Nimrod. During its later life, a small number of the RAF's existing Shackletons received extensive modifications in order to adapt them to perform the airborne early warning (AEW) role. The type continued to be used in this support capacity until 1991, when it was replaced by the Boeing E-3 Sentry AEW aircraft. These were the last examples of the type remaining in active service.
OriginsThe Battle of the Atlantic was a crucial element of the Second World War, in which Britain sought to protect its shipping from the German U-boat threat. The development of increasingly capable diesel-electric submarines had been rapid, in particular the snorkel virtually eliminated the need for submarines to surface while on patrol. Aircraft that had once been highly effective submarine-killers had very quickly become incapable in the face of these advances.[3] In addition, lend-leased aircraft such as the Consolidated B-24 Liberator had been returned following the end of hostilities. Several Avro Lancasters had undergone rapid conversion – designated as Maritime Reconnaissance Mk 3 (MR3) – as a stopgap measure for maritime search and rescue and general reconnaissance duties;[4] however, RAF Coastal Command had diminished to only a third of its size immediately after the Second World War.[5]
In the emerging climate of the Cold War and the potential requirement to guard the North Atlantic from an anticipated rapid expansion of the Soviet Navy's submarine force, a new aerial platform to perform the anti-submarine mission was required.[5][6] Work had begun on the requirement for a new maritime patrol aircraft in 1944, at which point there had been an emphasis for long-range platforms for Far East operations; however, with the early end of the war in the Pacific, the requirement was refined considerably. In late 1945, the Air Staff had expressed interest in a conversion of the Avro Lincoln as general reconnaissance and air/sea rescue aircraft; they formalised their requirements for such an aircraft under Air Ministry specification R.5/46. Avro's Chief Designer Roy Chadwick initially led the effort to build an aircraft to this requirement, designated as the Avro Type 696.[2][7]
Interior of a Shackleton MR.3The Type 696 was a significant development upon the Lincoln. Elements of the Avro Tudor airliner were also reused in the design; Lincoln and Tudor had been derivatives of the successful wartime Avro Lancaster bomber.[8][9] Crucially, the new aircraft was to be capable of a 3,000-nautical-mile (3,500 mi; 5,600 km) range while carrying up to 6,000 pounds (2,700 kg) of weapons and equipment. In addition to featuring a large amount of electronic equipment, the Type 696 had a much-improved crew environment over other aircraft types to allow them to be more effective during the lengthy mission times anticipated.[10][11] During development the Type 696 was provisionally referred to as the Lincoln ASR.3 before the officially allocated name 'Shackleton' was selected.
The first test flight of the prototype Shackleton GR.1, serial VW135, was made on 9 March 1949 from the manufacturer's airfield at Woodford, Cheshire in the hands of Avro's Chief Test Pilot J.H. "Jimmy" Orrell.[12] The GR.1 was later redesignated "Maritime Reconnaissance Mark I" (MR 1). The prototype differed from subsequent production Shackletons in a number of areas; it featured a number of turrets and was equipped for air-to-air refuelling using the looped-line method. These did not feature on production aircraft due to judgments of ineffectiveness or performance difficulties incurred.[13] However, the performance of the prototype had been such that, in addition to the go-ahead for the MR1's production, a specification for improved variant was issued in December 1949, before the first production Shackleton had even flown.[14] By 1951, the MR1 had become officially considered as an interim type due to several shortcomings.[15]
The Merlin engines were replaced with the larger, more powerful and slower-revving Rolls-Royce Griffons with 13-foot-diameter (4.0 m) contra-rotating propellers. This engine's distinctive noise often caused crew members to develop high-tone deafness. The Griffon was needed because the Shackleton was heavier and had more drag than the Lincoln.[31][32] The Griffon provided equivalent power to the Merlin but at lower engine speed, which led to reduced fuel consumption in the denser air at low altitudes; the Shackleton would often loiter for several hours at roughly 500 ft (150 m) or lower when searching for submarines. Lower-revving Griffons, compared to Merlins, reduced engine stress which improved their reliability. Using conventional propellers would have needed an increase in propeller diameter to absorb the engine's power and torque, this not being possible due to space limitations imposed by the undercarriage length and engine nacelle positioning; the contra-rotating propellers gave greater blade area within the same propeller diameter.
Numerous problems were encountered during the Shackleton's operational service. In practice, the diesel fume detection system was prone to false alarms and thus received little operational use. The engines, hydraulics, and elements of the avionics were known for their unreliability, and the aircraft proved to be fairly maintenance-intensive. The prototype MR 3 was lost due to poor stalling characteristics; this was rectified prior to production, although a satisfactory stall-warning device was not installed until 1969. The Shackleton is often incorrectly assigned the unfortunate distinction of holding the record for the highest number of aircrew killed in one type in peacetime in the RAF.[33] The true figures suggest rather differently in that some of its contemporaries fared far worse, such as the Gloster Meteor with over 430 fatal losses of aircrew[34] against the Shackleton's 156. Several programs to support and extend the fatigue life limits of the Shackleton's airframe were required; the fatigue life problems ultimately necessitated the rapid introduction of a whole new maritime patrol aircraft in the form of the Hawker Siddeley Nimrod, which began being introduced to RAF service in 1969.[35]
The Shackleton would often be used to perform search and rescue missions, at all times one crew being kept on standby somewhere across the UK for this role. The Shackleton had also replaced the Avro Lincoln in the colonial policing mission, aircraft often being stationed in the Aden Protectorate and Oman to carry out various support missions, including convoy escorting, supply dropping, photo reconnaissance, communication relaying, and ground-attack missions; the Shackleton was also employed in several short-term bombing operations.[46] Other roles included weather reconnaissance and transport duties, in the latter role each Shackleton could carry freight panniers in the bomb bay or up to 16 fully equipped soldiers.[47]
In 1969, a jet-powered replacement patrol aircraft, the Hawker Siddeley Nimrod, began to enter RAF service, which was to spell the end for the Shackleton in most roles. While radically differing in external appearance, the Shackleton and the initial version of the Nimrod shared many sensor systems and onboard equipment.[48]
AN/APS-20 radar scannerThe intention to retire the Shackleton was thwarted by the need to provide AEW coverage in the North Sea and northern Atlantic following the withdrawal of the Fleet Air Arm's Fairey Gannet aircraft used in the AEW role in the 1970s. As an interim replacement, the existing AN/APS-20 radar was installed in modified Shackleton MR 2s, redesignated the AEW 2, as an interim measure from 1972. These were operated by No. 8 Sqn, based at RAF Lossiemouth. All 12 AEW aircraft were given names from The Magic Roundabout and The Herbs TV series.[16] The intended replacement, the British Aerospace Nimrod AEW3, suffered considerable development difficulties which culminated in the Nimrod AEW 3 being cancelled in favour of an off-the-shelf purchase of the Boeing E-3 Sentry, which allowed the last Shackletons to be retired in 1991.[49]
BAE Systems Nimrod – Aeroflight
Development
Named after the ‘mighty hunter’ described in the Bible (Genesis X, 8-12) the Nimrod has successfully patrolled the seas around the British Isles for more than three decades. Successive updates have maintained the pre-eminence of the Nimrod in its primary role of hunting and killing enemy submarines, and a new upgraded version is now under development.
After an abortive attempt at finding a NATO-standard Maritime Patrol Aircraft had failed in 1959, a renewed attempt to replace the Avro Shackleton in the maritime patrol role began in July 1963 when Air Staff Target (AST) 357 was issued. This called for a sophisticated medium-sized jet-powered aircraft. Proposals submitted included the HS.800, a tri-jet design based on the Hawker Siddeley Trident, but the estimated costs involved in developing such an aircraft proved much too high. This became clear in June 1964 when Air Staff Requirement (ASR) 381 was issued, calling for a much less capable aircraft which could match or exceed the performance of the French Breguet Atlantic.
In an attempt to prevent the French aircraft from winning the contest, engineers at Hawker Siddeley (formerly Avro) at Chadderton came up with the idea of mating the proven Comet airframe with an under fuselage pannier similar to the one developed for the HS.800 proposal. In a very short space of time, the design office developed an unpressurised lower fuselage fairing which snugly fitted over the lower portion of the Comet fuselage, giving it a distinctive ‘double-bubble’ shape. Extending from the nose to the rear fuselage the pannier brought a dramatic increase in useable space for operational equipment and weapons while minimising additional drag. By replacing the existing Rolls-Royce Avon engines with new, less-thirsty, Spey turbofan engines a very acceptable endurance could be achieved. To keep costs down, much of the mission avionics would be similar to that already used in the Shackleton. Designated HS.801, the Comet derivative was offered to meet ASR 381 in July 1964.
In February 1965 it was announced in Parliament that the HS.801 had been selected to replace the Shackleton. A fixed price contract for thirty eight production aircraft was agreed in January 1966, at which time the name Nimrod was selected. In the meantime the conversion of two unsold Comet 4C airframes to act as prototypes had begun. The first to fly, XV148, took the role of aerodynamic test vehicle. It was fitted with a early version of the fuselage fairing and also served to flight test the Spey engine installation. The second prototype, XV147, retained its original Avon engines to reduce risk and timescales, and assumed the role of avionics testbed. Less than a year later, on 28 June 1968, the first new-build production Nimrod MR.Mk 1 took to the air. The flight test programme was remarkably trouble free and on 2 October 1969 the RAF took delivery of its first aircraft, the Maritime Operational Conversion Unit (MOCU – later 236 OCU) at St Mawgan in Cornwall being the first to operate the type. Production aircraft were soon being delivered to operational units at RAF Kinloss, Morayshire, and at RAF St Mawgan, Cornwall. The last unit to begin re-equipping was 203 Sqn at Luqa on Malta, which received its first aircraft in October 1971.
While production was getting underway, it was realised that the Nimrod airframe would make an ideal replacement for the ageing Comet 4Cs still used by the RAF for Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) duties. The Comet offered ample internal space for electronic equipment and excellent cruise performance. Accordingly, three additional airframes were ordered under the designation Nimrod R.Mk 1, with the first being delivered to 51 Squadron at RAF Wyton as virtually an empty shell in July 1971. Over the next three years a complex array of sophisticated electronic eavesdropping equipment was fitted to the three aircraft, resulting in a large number of antennae appearing on the fuselage. The aircraft initially only differed externally in having the MAD probe in the tail deleted and dieletric radomes in the nose of each external wing tank and in the tailcone.
Over the years, the R.Mk 1 aircraft have undergone numerous equipment upgrades as electronic surveillance becomes ever more sophisticated. Some of the cabin windows have been blocked up to allow installation of more equipment, and the fuselage antennae have exhibited several changes. Around 1982 the three R.Mk 1s gained wing tip ESM (Electronic Sensing Measures) pods of a design later fitted to the AEW.Mk 3. and MR.Mk 2 variants. In 1995 R. 1 XW666 was lost in an accident after an engine fire. To replace it, MR.1 XV249 was converted to R.1 standard. The R.1 has played a low profile but key role in many conflicts, from the Falklands War to the 2003 Second Gulf War, identifying and classifying enemy air defence systems and gathering information on enemy activities.
Meanwhile, an order for a second batch of eight MR.1s (bringing the total to 46) was announced in January 1972 to bring the existing Nimrod squadrons up to full strength. The 1974 defence cuts resulted in 203 Sqn being disbanded in 1977. It’s Nimrods were flown back to the UK and placed in storage. In 1975 work began on a comprehensive avionics upgrade for the MR.1. The new equipment suite included a Thorn EMI Searchwater radar in place of the aging ASV-21D unit, a new GEC Central Tactical System and the AQS-901 acoustics system compatible with the latest ‘Barra’ sonobuoys. Thirty-five MR.1 were upgraded to the new MR.2 standard, with the first aircraft being redelivered to 201 Sqn on 23 August 1979.
The invasion of the Falkland Islands in 1982 brought the Nimrod to public attention. Eight MR.2s were fitted with ex-Vulcan in-flight refuelling probes on the fuselage and small swept finlets on the tailplane in the space of just 18 days under the designation MR.2P. The previously unused underwing hardpoints were adapted to carry Sidewinder missiles, allowing the MR.2P to be described in the popular press as the world’s largest fighter. Patrols were flown over the south Atlantic looking for Argentine submarines and surface vessels, and also in support of British operations from Ascension Island. In the late 1980s, all MR.2s were fitted with new BAe designed in-flight refuelling probes. From 1985 the MR.2s began to be fitted with wingtip ESM pods, as developed for the R.1, to enhance their surveillance capability. In late 1990 several Nimrod MR.2s were fitted with an underwing FLIR turret under the starboard wing, BOZ pod under the port wing and a Towed Radar Decoy, under the unofficial designation MR.2(GM) – where GM stood for Gulf Mod. Nimrods helped to secure the Arabian Gulf sea lanes during the 1991 Gulf War and returned in 2003 to take part in the liberation of Iraq.
A much less successful variant of the Nimrod was the AEW.3 In 1973 the RAF had begun to examine the options for replacing the Airborne Early Warning (AEW) variant of the Shackleton operated by No.8 Squadron. Boeing offered a variant of the successful E-3A, but the over water performance of its radar was judged to be poor and in March 1977 it was announced that a specialised version of the Nimrod, the AEW. Mk3 would be procured instead. This would be based on the Nimrod airframe but featured a large bulbous radome in the nose and a similar radome in the tail, providing 360 degree radar coverage. A weather radar was located in the starboard external fuel tank and ESM pods fitted on the wing tips. On 28 June 1977 a Comet 4C (XW626) converted to carry the nose radar unit made the first of a series of flight trials. Initial results were promising, and so 3 AEW.3 development aircraft were produced by converting redundant MR.1 airframes to carry the prototype radar equipment. The first flew on 16 July 1980.
While development of the radar electronics, (and the software that controlled it), was proceeding, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) chose to impose a new and more stringent specification on the radar system. Meeting the new requirement meant a lot of redesign and retesting for British Aerospace and GEC, which inevitably delayed the planned in-service date for the aircraft. Nevertheless, in anticipation of a successful outcome of the revised system, a production batch of 8 aircraft was laid down down, using further redundant MR.1 airframes. The first example flew on 9 March 1982. By now the MoD had changed the technical specification several more times. The increased workload of trying to meet a constantly changing requirement with an extremely advanced electronics system which depended on sophisticated hardware and software was now proving to be extremely taxing task, and forecast timescales extended even further into the future. The first interim standard AEW aircraft was delivered to No.8 Sqn in 1984 to allow crew training to commence. At the same time a thorough review of the whole AEW programme was launched to determine whether a reliable and effective system could be produced and put into service. In September 1986 the AEW requirement was reopened to competing bidders and in December of that year the Boeing E-3 Sentry was declared the winner. The Nimrod AEW was immediately cancelled. Unusable AEW airframes were stored at RAF Abingdon until they were scrapped in the 1990s. Poor management by the MoD had doomed a promising programme, despite the best efforts of the systems developers.
In 1993 ASR420 was issued calling for a Replacement Maritime Patrol Aircraft (RPMA) for the RAF. Bids were submitted in 1995 and included a new-build version of the P-3 Orion, upgraded second-hand Orions and from BAe an upgraded version of the Nimrod MR.2 called Nimrod 2000. At the time BAe was rather short of work, and its bid was seen as a relatively low risk update which would be able to use much of the existing Nimrod training and support infrastructure. On 25 July 1996 the RMPA contract was awarded to BAe for the Nimrod 2000. Unfortunately, by this time BAe had also won several other important contracts and the staff and resources available to work on this particular project had become rather limited. With MoD agreement, the necessary work was therefore parcelled up into a number of work packages and subcontracted a number of different partner companies and also split between several different BAe sites including Woodford, Brough and Filton.
The Nimrod 2000 proposal comprised a complete strip-down and zero-life programme for the airframe, new larger wings housing Rolls-Royce BMW BR.710 engines, new radar and sensor systems and new tactical computer system. Boeing was contracted as the avionics systems integrator. In February 1997 the first three stripped-down Nimrod fuselages were delivered to FR Aviation in Bournemouth. Due to the lack of resources at BAe and poor management oversight of the many geographically dispersed work packages, the programme soon began to run late and over budget. In 1999 Rolls-Royce were ready to deliver the first engines, but BAe had no airframes ready to accept them. A programme review in 1999 revealed that work was already running 3 years behind schedule. BAe was forced to renegotiate the contract, incurring a substantial financial penalty in the process. By now, the Nimrod 2000 name had been quietly dropped. The first reburbished airframe was returned to Woodford in January 2000. Incredibly, it took until 2003 for assembly of the first prototype MRA.4 (ZJ516) to be carried out. Unfortunately, when the second set of Airbus-build wings were offered up to the second prototype fuselage, it was found that they didn’t fit. Build tolerances acceptable in the 1960s for the fuselage were too great for the laser-precise tolerances used in the new wing. This problem highlighted BAe management’s fundamental lack of understanding of what it was they were actually trying to achieve. After an interminable amount of time performing system checks, the first prototype MRA.4 took to the air on 26 August 2004 – more than four years late. In September 2004 a round of politically inspired defence cuts resulted in the planned order for MRA.4 being reduced from 18 to ‘about 12’. Delivery of the sixth aircraft is now planned for 2009, with all aircraft likely to be based at RAF Kinloss initially.
The Nimrod MRA.4 is but a crude charicature of the MR.2 that it is intended to replace, exhibiting a complete absence of the elegant blending of form and function which characterised the original 1960s design. In the same vein, the MR.2, which in 1981 was described as the most complex airborne system ever to enter service with the RAF, serves as a model of efficient project managment compared to the inept bungling exhibited by the present generation of project managers. However, despite it’s ugly appearance and late delivery, the updated Nimrod should reclaim it’s crown as the world’s leading maritime patrol aircraft.
MR.1 XV233 shows the original grey-white
colour scheme. (photo, Keith McKenzie)MR.1 XV245 in a classic pose
(photo, Crown Copyright)
VariantsRequirement Specification: ASR381 – MR.Mk 1, ASR389 – R.Mk 1, ASR420 – MRA.Mk 4
Manufacturers Designation: HS.801
Development History:
HS.801 prototypesTwo Comet 4Cs converted to act as Nimrod prototypes. Ventral weapons pannier under cabin, search radar in nose, MAD stinger in tail, fin-tip radome, dorsal fin added. 1st prototype (aerodynamic testbed) with RB.163-20 Spey engines, 2nd prototype (electronic testbed) with Avon engines.
Nimrod MR.Mk 1Initial production version (38 aircraft). ASV-21D search radar, Marconi Elliott 920B central computer.
Nimrod MR.Mk 1Last 8 production aircraft (second batch) delivered with updated communications system – as later used on MR.Mk 2. Strengthened structure for gross weights of 192,000 lb (87090 kg).
Nimrod R.Mk 1Specialised ELINT version of MR.Mk 1 with completely new avionics fit. No MAD tailboom, no searchlight. Dielectric radomes in each external wing tank nose, numerous antenna above and below fuselage. Auxiliary fuel tanks in weapons bay. Later fitted with wingtip ESM pods and some cabin windows deleted as additional equipment fitted.
Nimrod R.Mk 1PDesignation applied to R.Mk 1 when fitted with in-flight refuelling probe in 1982. Small swept finlets added to tailplane. ‘P’ suffix later dropped.
Nimrod MR.Mk 2Upgraded Maritime Reconnaissance version. New avionics fit with Thorn EMI Searchwater radar, new GEC central tactical system, new AQS-901 acoustics system, new communications suite. Air scoop on port rear fuselage close to dorsal fin, for avionics cooling system.
Export NimrodVersion of MR.Mk 2 offered to Canada and Australia. Strengthened structure for gross weights of 192,000 lb (87090 kg). Additional fuel tanks in weapons bay. New APU. Provision for Flight Refuelling drogue pod under each wing. Not built.
Nimrod MR.Mk 2PDesignation applied to MR.Mk 2 when fitted with in-flight refuelling probe in 1982. Small swept finlets added to tailplane. Wingtip ESM pods subsequently fitted and tailplane finlets enlarged. ‘P’ suffix dropped in late 1990s.
Nimrod MR.Mk 2P(GM)‘Gulf Mod’ version tailored for use in 1991 Gulf War. Underwing FLIR turret on starboard wing, BOZ pods, Towed Radar Decoy.
Nimrod AEW.Mk 3Specialised Airborne Early Warning (AEW) version. Conversion of MR.Mk 1 with bulbous radome in nose and tailcone. Weather radar in starboard external fuel tank. ESM pods on wing tips.
Nimrod AEW.Mk 3PDesignation applied to AEW.Mk 3 XV263 when fitted with in-flight refuelling probe.
Nimrod MRA.4Significantly upgraded Maritime Reconnaissance Attack version with new larger wing, larger engine air intakes, BR710 engines, new stronger wider-track undercarriage, large tailplane finlets. Completely new mission system: Searchwater 2000MR radar, UXS503/AQS970 acoustic processor, Nighthunter IR/TV electro-optical turret under nose, EL/L-8300UK ESM suite, DASS self-protection system, advanced communication system. 2-man Airbus-style ‘glass’ cockpit.
MR.1 (note lack of cooling air scoop) XV251
in ‘Hemp’ colours. (photo, Keith McKenzie)R.1 XW664 of 51 Sqn in 1988 – note ‘hockey
stick’ aerials. (photo, Keith McKenzie)
HistoryKey Dates:
July 1963 AST 357 issued, calling for a sophisticated jet aircraft to replace the Shackleton by 1972.
October 1963 Hawker Siddeley submits MR aircraft feasibility study.
April 1964 Hawker Siddeley submits proposal based on HS.800 version of Trident airliner.
4 June 1964 ASR 381 issued, calling for cheaper and more rapid Shackleton replacement.
June 1964 Design of HS.801 based on Comet 4 airliner begins.
July 1964 HS.801 offered to meet ASR 381.
February 1965 Decision to order HS.801 announced.
June 1965 Hawker Siddeley receives Instruction to Proceed (ITP).
January 1966 Fixed price contract placed for 38 Nimrod MR.Mk 1s.
23 May 1967 First flight of Spey-engined prototype (XV148).
31 July 1967 First flight of Avon-engined prototype (XV147).
28 June 1968 Maiden flight of first production Nimrod MR.Mk 1 (XV226).
2 October 1969 First production MR.Mk1 (XV230) delivered to RAF – 236 OCU at St Mawgan.
October 1969 Order placed for 3 R.Mk 1 ELINT versions.
27 Nov 1969 RAF Strike Command absorbs Coastal Command.
October 1970 RAF Kinloss (201 Sqn) begins conversion to Nimrod
7 July 1971 First R.Mk 1 (XW664) delivered to 51 Sqn as an ’empty shell’.
January 1972 Second batch of 8 MR.Mk 1s announced.
1973 Project definition for Nimrod AEW version carried out.
21 October 1973 Flight trials begin of mission-equipped R.Mk 1s.
10 May 1974 51 Sqn formally commissioned with Nimrod R.Mk.1.
1975 Work starts on MR.Mk 2 upgrade
31 March 1977 Nimrod AEW chosen to meet British AEW requirement.
28 June 1977 Converted Comet 4C (XW626) begins AEW radar trials.
13 February 1979 First MR.Mk 2 production conversion first flight (XV236).
23 August 1979 Redelivery of first upgraded MR.Mk 2 to RAF.
1980 Major avionics update for R.Mk 1s carried out.
16 July 1980 First flight of first development AEW.Mk 3 (XZ286).
9 March 1982 First production AEW.Mk 3 first flight.
14 April 1982 Work starts on in-flight refuelling probe installation design for MR.Mk 2.
27 April 1982 First probe equipped MR.Mk 2P flies (XV229).
29 May 1982 First carriage of AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles (XV229).
early 1982 Initial planned Nimrod AEW service entry date.
Spring 1985 ESM wingtip pods introduced to MR.Mk 2.
1985 Upgrade of 35 MR.1 aircraft to MR.2 standard completed.
1984 First AEW aircraft delivered to 8 Sqn for crew training
September 1986 AEW competition reopened by MoD.
December 1986 E-3 Sentry selected as winner, Nimrod AEW.Mk 3 cancelled.
15 May 1995 R.Mk 1 XW666 ditches after catastrophic engine fire.
1993 Request for information for Replacement Maritime Patrol Aircraft (RMPA) to meet ASR 420
April 1994 Installation of ‘Starwindow’ avionics update for R.Mk 1 commences.
1995 Bids submitted for RMPA
25 July 1996 Nimrod 2000 wins RMPA competition
2 December 1996 Fixed price contract awarded to BAE SYSTEMS for Nimrod 2000 development
14 February 1997 First of 3 Nimrod fuselages delivered to FR Aviation at Bournemouth
early 1998 Nimrod 2000 renamed Nimrod MRA.4
late 1998 Nimrod MRA.4 programme reviewed due to poor progress.
1999 Nimrod MRA.4 contract re-negotiated – 3 years slip in delivery to service.
1999 First BR.710-48 engine deliveries for Nimrod MRA.4.
January 2000 First fuselage returned to Woodford.
19 December 2001 Electrical ‘power on’ for first MRA.4.
2002 Initial planned delivery date for MRA.4.
March 2002 Engines installed in first MRA.4.
February 2003 Programe restructured again – further delay to in-service date.
21 July 2004 MRA.4 order reduced to ‘about 12’.
26 August 2004 First flight of MRA.4 first prototype (ZJ516).
15 December 2004 Second prototype (ZJ518) first flight
2009 Current forecast for MRA.4 in-service date.
Nimrod AEW3 (globalsecurity.org)
Nimrod AEW3The Navy's decision to phase out fixed wing operations during the early 1970s led to the task of providing Airborne Early Warning [AEW] cover to the fleet being transferred to the Royal Air Force. It was decided that twelve low hour Shackleton MR Mk 2s would be converted as an "interim solution" until a new purpose built aircraft could be procured. Again, the same podded AN/APS 20 radar sets were fitted to the Avro designed airframes and No. 8 Sqn was declared operational with the Shackleton AEW2 at Lossiemouth in 1972.
Throughout the 1970s the need to replace the ageing Shackletons gathered pace. In August 1972, the RAF issued an AST to replace its Airborne Early Warning (AEW) variant of the Shackleton operated by No. 8 Squadron. This airborne early warning aircraft was developed from the Nimrod MR2 which was developed from the Comet airliner. All three of which can be similarly recognized, although the AEW has the bulbous nose and tail boom that houses radar equipment. Manufacturing AEW aircraft is extremely challenging.
Boeing was offering the Boeing 707 based E-3A to all NATO countries interested in providing its own AWACs / AEW. It was soon realised that the cost of the E-3 was way beyond the budgets of most member nations so Boeing then offered the aircraft to NATO. However, the inability of the member nations to come to an agreement on how and when this fleet of aircraft would be operated led to the British Government to go it alone in 1977.
In March 1977, the procurement was announced of a specialised version of the Nimrod. This variant would have a large bulbous radome in the nose and tail to house Marconi scanners providing 360º radar coverage. Unlike the American solution of a single radar antenna mounted in a rotating radome high above a Boeing 707 fuselage (which resulted in small "blind spots" directly below the aircraft), Hawker Siddeley decided to have a GEC Avionics two-antenna system mounted in the nose and tail of a Nimrod airframe. The scanners would work together each providing 180 degrees of uninterrupted coverage of the surrounding airspace. Initial tests of the system were carried out aboard a converted Comet 4 airliner. This aircraft was only fitted with the forward scanner and following its first flight in 1977 with its new bulbous nose profile, development work began on the new system.
Three AEW3 development aircraft were manufactured and the first of the eleven Nimrod AEW-3s to be completed made its maiden flight from Woodford on 16 July 1980. A production batch of eight Nimrod AEW3 aircraft was then laid down using a further eight redundant Nimrod MR1 airframes. The first flew on 9 March 1982 and by late 1984 the first 'interim standard' Nimrod AEW3 aircraft was delivered by British Aerospace to No. 8 Squadron to allow crew training to commence.
The original Nimrod air-to-air refueling [AAR] installation was fitted during the Falklands conflict in 1982. Subsequently, the MOD decided to upgrade the AAR system and move the refuelling pipes, for the most part, out of the cabin and into the bomb bay. In 1985, in the course of the AEW3 program, which was also required to have an AAR capability, the AAR system design was refined, to enable its incorporation as a formal modification to the aircraft design. During the initial incorporation of AAR into the AEW3, one of the fuel system design features which was considered by British Aerospace was the effect of the fuel tank blow-off valves. These valves are fitted to all, bar two, of the aircraft's fuel tanks and operate as pressure relief valves: should the pressure in a fuel tank exceed a prescribed limit, fuel is ejected from the tank through the valves to the atmosphere. The blow-off outlet for the No. 5 tank is situated forward of the port engine intakes and there was concern that, should fuel be ejected during AAR, it might enter these intakes. Therefore, the No. 5 tank blow-off valve was disabled to prevent this occurring. Nonetheless, the AEW3 flight trials team noted that there was a potential risk from other blow-off valves, including that of No. 1 tank, and recommended investigation to determine the effect should blow-off occur from these tanks. Unfortunately, it appears that the subsequent demise of the AEW3 project led to these recommendations remaining on the shelf, and potential sources of fuel blow-off and overflow during AAR remained unremedied.
It was also decided that the Nimrod would be made available for sale to NATO to fulfil their requirement once development was complete. (Subsequently NATO decided to order the American solution and deliveries of the ten E-3A aircraft began at Geilenkirchen, Germany in 1982). What followed has filled many volumes. The Nimrod was to have provided for Britain's early warning needs, and would have been compatible with the NATO AWACS. However, the Nimrod suffered from serious technical ?awsand major cost overruns.
In the summer of 1986, the British Government opened a competition for a system to fulfill its early warning needs. Seven companies submitted bids to the Ministry of Defence: Boeing (AWACS), Grumman (E-2 Hawkeye and Nimrod fitted with U.S. avionics), Lockheed (P-3 Orion), Airship Industries, Pilatus Britten-Norman, MEL (a subsidiary of Philips Electronics), and GEC Avionics (Nimrod AEW.3). It is important to note that had the British been successful in developing their own early warning system, the Nimrod AEW.3, the radar for which has been under development at GEC since 1977, there probably never would have been any competition at all. When the U.K. opened its airline early warning competition, Boeing submitted a preliminary offset bid of 35 percent of the "contract value. But in July, 1986 this offer was increased to 100 percent of the contract value, which is the normal minimum acceptable to the British Government.
In September, 1986, the Ministry selected two of the seven bidders as semi-finalists, the GEC Nimrod and the Boeing AWACS, stressing that only these two had the potential to meet all of the Royal Air Force's requirements. According to Lord Trefgarne, British Minister of Defence for Acquisition, the selection of the two finalists was based on demonstrated capabilities, the amountof risk foreseen in completing development, cost, and the amount of time needed for completion. At this time, France, which was also considering an early warning purchase, joined Britain in theevaluation of the two early warning systems.
In November, 1986 Boeing and its subcontractors (including Westinghouse, G.E. and SNECMA) again upped the offset offer to 130 percent of the contract value over eight years if AWACS were selected. This figure was the highest ever made by Boeing in an international competition. By this time, Boeing had already negotiated participation agreements with three British avionics companies -- Plessey, Ferranti, and Racal -- and these firms publicly supported AWACS over the Nimrod. These firms were not participants in the Nimrod program. The "agreements" were vague, simply stating the intent to cooperate in any offsets that may result if the AWACS were eventually selected by the UK. However, the fact that three of Britain's largest aerospace-related firms favored the AWACS played the important role of making an American buy seem less onerous. The Risk Assessment Group of the British Ministry of Defence, an internal committee which studies technical risks in new programs, also came out in favor of the AWACS.
After years of rising costs and delays due to the inability of the radar to work to specification the decision was made by the Government to cancel the order for the Nimrod solution. On 18 December 1986 the ill-fated Nimrod Airborne Early Warning project was finally cancelled after numerous delays and setbacks. It was also announced at the same time that Britain was procuring the Boeing E-3D Sentry as the Shackleton replacement - 6 (later changed to 7) Boeing E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft were ordered.
This came despite the fact that over $1.37 billion had already been spent by the Government to research and develop the Nimrod. The Nimrod AEW3 airframes were stored at RAF Abingdon until they were scrapped in the 1990s.
According to the British Govemment, the decision was made solely on the system's proven ability to meet the country's defense requirement. This decision resulted in public outrage, especially by GEC, that the negative implications were "tremendous" for the British electronics industry, including loss of over 2,500 prime and subcontractor jobs and a substantial future export market for early waming devices. But the British Minister of Defence, George Younger, in announcing the AWACS decision to the House of Commons, held that the gains for other British firms will equal or even exceed losses to GEC.
Lord Levene of Portsoken, who was then the Chief of Defence Procurement and also the National Armaments Director, later recelled the Government " ... had got to the stage where we had written off £500 million. "We cannot stop now. We have written off £600 million. We cannot stop now. We have written off £700 million. We cannot stop now." I then walked in and we had to decide that that project unfortunately was not going to work. We were forced to buy in the United States. It is a very difficult issue."
Richard D. Fisher, Jr., Senior Fellow, International Assessment and Strategy Center, stated in 2010 that "Britain's Marconi apparently sold at least one example of its Argus radar from the cancelled Nimrod AEW program, which China placed on a modified Russian Ilyushin Il-76 transport. Then in the mid-1990s Britain's Racal Co. sold six of its Skymaster lightweight naval airborne early warning (AEW) radar, which still fly on the PLA Navy Air Force's Y-8J aircraft. Ostensibly sold to help China "combat piracy," by 1999 the Y-8J was observed in exercises providing long-distance cuing for ship-launched anti-ship missiles."
Cancelled | The Spyflight Website V2
BAe Nimrod AEW 3The unmitigated disaster of the Nimrod AEW 3 programme probably stands comparison with any of the other 'great' shambolic defence procurement fiascos, that have caused such embarrassment to the MOD and various governments over the years. It was certainly one of the most expensive and the final bill has probably never been accurately calculated, but even the most conservative estimate of £1 billion takes little account of the damage caused to the reputations of the companies involved. This overview will briefly describe the lengthy gestation of the project, some of the main problems that were encountered and why the whole sorry shambles was finally brought to an end.
Nimrod AEW 3
The Falklands War of 1982 came virtually out of the blue and the eventual success of the Task Force was, as usual, based on the ability of British servicemen and women to 'make do' with many items of inferior, outdated equipment, such as one of the flagships, HMS Hermes, even down to basic items such as boots that leaked and fell apart. The defence review of 1965 had started the process of ending the era of the RN's large aircraft carriers, each capable of operating a fixed-wing AEW aircraft, such as the Fairey Gannet AEW3. Consequently, by 1982 the RN lacked any intrinsic AEW capability to send with the Falklands Task Force - in theory it should have been provided by the RAF with the Nimrod AEW 3, but this programme was in an almost total shambles. The net result was the loss of a number of ships to air attack and the death of many brave men whose lives might well have been saved if an AEW aircraft had been available. Quite how it would have been possible to sustain a land-based AEW aircraft in orbit over the Task Force during daylight hours, when it took virtually the whole of the AAR resources of the RAF to get one Vulcan there and back is another matter, either way it certainly proves the need for the RN to have a carrier based AEW capability, if they are expected to conduct blue-water operations.
Nimrod AEW 3
When Grumman and General Electric began development of the E-2 Hawkeye in the early 1960's, the capability of this carrier based AEW radar, operating at UHF wavelengths with an Airborne Moving Target Indicator (ATMI), was set to revolutionise AEW development. British industry and the MOD watched the development in the USA with some trepidation, realising that unless they set about defining a replacement for the antiquated Gannet, they would be out of the AEW market forever. Various design ideas were considered, including a Buccaneer with two sideways facing antennas in the bomb-bay and an HS-125 with a mushroom radome mounted above the fuselage - however, this is where the problems began. The E-2 Hawkeye is a very clever design, which compresses 2 crew, 3 systems operators and a considerable amount of electronic equipment into an airframe small enough to operate from a carrier whilst carrying a rotordome - an achievement no other country has been able to match. Size became a crucial factor in the British design proposals when it was decided that a rotordome mounted radar which met the design specification, could not be carried on an HS-125 sized aircraft and attention switched to a new design with a Fore and Aft Scanner System (FASS).
Nimrod AEW 3
By 1965 British industry was keen to develop a Frequency-Modulated Intermittent Continuous-Wave (FMICW) radar using elliptical or circular inverted-cassegrain antennas. The properties of these types of radar do not allow them to operate effectively near propellers, so the proposed AEW aircraft had to be jet powered. Again size became a factor and it was soon apparent that the large antennas necessary to meet the range criteria, together the associated equipment and crew, could only be carried by a fairly large aircraft - certainly one too big to fit on a carrier, which was fortuitous as the Labour government had by then decided to get rid of them. Various options were considered for a FASS installation including a jet-powered version of the HS 748 Andover and the BAC 111, before engineers finally settled on an adaptation of the proposed HS.801 anti-submarine version of the Comet - the Nimrod.
Nimrod AEW 3
Eventually, UK scientists deciding to ditch the FMICW radar in favour of the pulse-Doppler radar and funding for the system was finally approved in 1972. Various options for the Nimrod airframe were considered; the first option involved mounting the E-2C AN/APS-125 radar and associated avionics above and inside the airframe. The second option was to use the AN/APS-125 radar with British avionics. The third option was to mount the AN/APA-171 radome and antenna on the Nimrod, with Britain supplying the radar transmitter, receiver and avionics. The fourth option was an all British radar and avionics system, with some American components, and a FASS with pulse-Dopper processing operating in the S-band. Although this option provided the greatest input from British industry, it also carried the greatest technical risk and the alarm bells should already have been ringing. But, as in so many UK defence fiasco's over the years, political decisions, namely keeping BAe & GEC workers employed and retaining AEW radar technical expertise in the UK, overcame the many doubters and outweighed common sense.
Nimrod AEW 3
By the end of 1974, instead of purchasing an off-the-shelf system with a proven track record, the Labour government predictably decided on the fourth option, the Nimrod AEW 3, accepting whatever extra cost and technical risk that involved. At the time the Labour government also considered that joining a possible NATO purchase of the Boeing E-3A was just too politically complicated, expensive and subject to unknown delay - which is rather ironic considering how things eventually turned out. At this point it was widely reported that the RAF was in favour of a dedicated UK purchase of the E-3A, rather than the Nimrod, but the cost, together with the potential loss of jobs in some marginal Labour seats, was always going to mitigate against this option.
Comet 4 with AWACS nose
A modified Comet 4 fitted with a forward scanner was used for a series of trials to prove the basic concept of the system. Then on 31 Mar 77, the government gave the go ahead for Hawker Siddeley (soon to be merged with the British Aircraft Corporation to form British Aerospace - BAe) who would supply the airframe and Marconi-Elliot, (soon to be renamed Marconi Avionics) who would supply the mission avionics, to build and deliver 11 Nimrod AEW 3 aircraft. The airframes comprised 8 that were built, but never delivered to the RAF and 3 that became available when 203 Sqn was disbanded after the RAF withdrew from Malta.
Nimrod AEW 3 interior
The 1976 operating specification of the planned Nimrod AEW 3, ASR 400, was to say the least very demanding. It called for exceptional detection capabilities of both sea vessels and aircraft over land and sea, far in excess of the E-2C and with the ability to automatically initiate and track up to 400 targets. Six operators consoles (four radar, one communications and one for ESM) were planned and, although this is double the number of the E-2C, it is much less than 9 originally planned for the E-3A, which also had considerable empty space for additional consoles. The Nimrod AEW 3 was planned to carry a comprehensive communications fit, which would also allow combined operations with NATO E-3A's. However, space was always at a premium - the Nimrod was planned to be about half the weight of an E-3A, but three times that of the E-2C and this sheer lack of space eventually became one of the major problems. In 1977 ASR 400 was re-drafted to ASR 400 Revision 1, yet it was never clearly established to which standard the production aircraft were to be produced to - a classic example of shifting goalposts and lack of communication between the contractor and the customer.
Nimrod AEW 3
Despite the chaotic project management of the earlier TSR-2, which contributed considerably to its eventual cancellation, similar problems occurred in the project management of the Nimrod AEW 3. The normal procedure for a project of this size was for the RAF Operational Requirements (OR) branch to lead the project through the feasibility stage, with the operational aspects stated by the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (ACAS) and financial input from the Air Plans branch. The Ministry of Defence (Procurement Executive) Controller of Aircraft (MOD(PE) CA) had responsibility for project definition and development, usually under as assistant director. Reporting to the MOD(PE) CA was the Director of Military Aircraft Projects, who had a Nimrod Director and an assistant Nimrod director, and it was this individual was actually responsible for the AEW 3. Generally, the individual in this appointment was a wg cdr, considerably down the 'food chain' in the MOD and with little real clout.
Nimrod AEW 3
However, responsibility for the electronic system in the AEW 3 lay elsewhere, namely with the Director of Air Weapons and Electronic Systems, whose Assistant Director Electronics, Radar (Airborne) was actually responsible for this vital equipment. Ultimate financial authority rested with the Minister of State for Defence, and although representatives of the various parties with a 'finger in the AEW 3 pie' met as necessary, only at the quarterly review boards Nimrod AEW 3 nose radar was an overall view of the entire project undertaken. Essentially, the prime contractors were left to sort out the physical integration of the various systems, with minimal input from the MOD or RAF. As usual, service personnel remained in their appointments for around 2 years and were then posted, just as they had developed a sound grasp of the technicalities of the task. MOD civil servants involved in the project usually had considerable technical expertise in specific areas, but lacked much understanding of the operational aspects and some displayed poor management skills. This muddled project management system was in stark contrast to that employed by the USAF, who usually appointed a high ranking, ambitious officer, as the Project Manager and this individual then had ultimate responsibility for over-seeing every aspect of a project and remained in post until entry into service.
Nimrod AEW 3
The first structurally complete aircraft was rolled-out on 30 Mar 80 and flew on 16 Jul - this was followed in Jan 81 by the second production aircraft, which was planned to develop the and the radar. A Joint Trials Unit (JTU) was established at RAF Waddington to help develop the Mission System Avionics (MSA) and in no time at all serious problems with the MSA were identified. The heart of the MSA was the GEC 4080M computer that received data from the radar scanners, the Loral ARI-18240/1 ESM system, the Cossor Jubilee Guardsman IFF equipment and the two Ferranti FIN 1012 inertial navigation systems. The computer processed this mass of data and then displayed it on the multi function display and control consoles (MDCC) where the operators communicated to the various command organisations and operational units through the Automatic Management of Radio and Intercom Systems (AMRICS). Independently, these systems worked correctly, but after they were integrated in 1980 serious problems emerged. The fundamental problem was that the computer simply was not powerful enough. The GEC 4080M computer had a storage capacity of 1 megabyte (Yes ONE!), which could be augmented via a data-bus with an additional 1.4 megabytes, giving a grand total of just 2.4 megabytes total storage capacity, small even by the standards of the time and particularly so given the task it had to perform. The computer quickly showed it was too slow for the task and soon became overloaded, at which point track continuity suffered, this then led to track duplication, which slowly increased and further overloaded the system.
Nimrod AEW 3
Another major problem was the sheer amount of heat generated by all the electronic systems when operating the radar and other systems at full power. This was a real problem, because the fuel system was used as a 'heat-sink' and to be able to dissipate the heat generated when the MSA and radar operated at full power, the fuel tanks needed to be at least half full. Essentially, like so many other MOD procurement disasters, the Nimrod AEW 3 suffered from requirements that changed, inadequate project management and, in an attempt to save money, the 'bodged' adaptation of an elderly airframe, rather than shelling out on a new airframe designed exactly for the purpose.
Nimrod AEW 3
Although the Nimrod AEW project struggled on, the MSA could rarely be made to work consistently. Under test by the MOD(PE) in 1984 the MSA, whilst falling short of the ASR 400 requirements, worked well and showed promise, but it was very unreliable and its performance changed from sortie to sortie. During the first 8 sorties only 3 hours of full system operation was achieved. Detection range was 30% below the specified distance, tracking continuity was erratic with numerous false plots, all-round surveillance was poor and did not provide the anticipated twin hemispheric coverage and last, but not least, maritime detection resolution was poor.
Nimrod AEW 3
All the time the costs mounted, with little sign that this grotesque white elephant would ever work as designed. Finally, common sense prevailed and in 1986 the axe finally fell, bringing the curtain down on the entire farce which ended up costing the taxpayer somewhere in the region of £1 billion. In 1988 a Boeing proposal for the supply of 7 E-3D Sentry's was accepted and the aircraft eventually entered service in 1991.
Nimrod AEW 3
To fill in the 'AEW gap' after the Gannet retired and before the Nimrod AEW 3 entered service, in 1971, the RAF was forced to convert 12 obsolete Shackleton MR2 aircraft to carry the obsolescent TPS-20 radar removed from the Gannets. Entering service with 8 Sqn at RAF Lossiemouth in 1972, the Shackleton was cold, incredibly noisy and thoroughly uncomfortable for the unfortunate crew - high-tone deafness after a couple of tours was routine. It was often said that one of the nicest sounds in the world was a Shackleton getting airborne, because that meant you weren't on board. Unpressurised, the Shackleton was limited to around 10,000ft and usually operated much lower. The TPS-20 radar had a range of only 150km and had no height finding capability, so in reality there was little point in flying high anyway. However, because of the Nimrod AEW 3 fiasco, five of these obsolete, antiquated, uncomfortable aircraft had to soldier on for 20 years until the E-3D entered service in 1991 - such is the price of political interference, poor planning and inept project management.
Nimrod AEW 3
Despite all the problems with the Nimrod AEW 3, GEC Marconi continued development of the radar system, now named ARGUS, and the Chinese expressed an interest in mounting it on an Il-76 Candid. However, it appears the Chinese saw sense, as they eventually tried to purchase the Phalcon phased array AEW system from Israel, until this was blocked by the USA. The Chinese are now believed to be developing an AEW system using an electronically scanned phased array radar mounted above the fuselage of the Y-8X Cub. The system the Chinese are developing appears very similar to the Swedish SAAB 340 Argus, which given the Chinese track record of stealing Western technology, may be more than just a coincidence.So what can be learnt from the Nimrod AEW fiasco? Well, firstly an AEW airframe needs to be large enough to carry the equipment and crew, ideally with something in reserve - attempting to squeeze everything into what was essentially an airframe designed in the 1940's, was bound to lead to problems. Secondly, effective long range AEW radar technology is highly complex, difficult to develop and needs to be updated on a regular basis to remain effective. Unless you have bottomless pockets, it's safer and less expensive in the long run to buy proven American equipment off the shelf.
Amazingly, the collective memory of the Nimrod AEW farce seems to have been completely ignored when it was decided to replace the Nimrod MR2 with the Nimrod MRA4. Astonishingly many of the same mistakes of attempting to once again adapt an airframe designed in the 1940's, have been repeated for the second time - but more on the MRA4 farce at a later date and I only hope the final bill this time around is less than £1 billion squandered on the Nimrod AEW 3.
Da Alternatehistory.org:
The P139B was proposed in 1963 as a replacement for the Gannet AEW3, featuring Fore-Aft-Scanning-System and Frequency Modulated Interrupted Continuous Wave (FMICW). P139B development was cancelled in 1964 but work on the FASS and FMICW radar was continued.
A set of proposals came from BAC for an updated Gannet -two spearate schemes:
Interest in FMICW radar waned during the 60s and in 1972 the funding was approved for the development of a Pulse Doppler radar for AEW.
At the time of the 1974 Defence Review there was the equivalent of 6 Nimrod MR Mk 1 squadrons and the OCU. These were Nos. 42, 120, 201 and 206 Squadrons in No. 18 Group of Strike Command and No. 203 Squadron in Malta plus detachments at Gibraltar and Singapore which were equivalent to a sixth squadron. The 1974 Defence Review cut the squadron at Malta (disbanded in December 1977) and the Singapore detachment, and some 8 Nimrods were ordered in 1973, so 8 brand new Nimrod airframes available with others no more than 5 years old.
In 1974 There were 4 options for the Nimrod AEW3.
Reggieperrin
Riain said:
If Britain had chosen any other option than the one they did it's likely that the Nimrod AEW3 would have seen service. However it would not have looked like the bneast we know and loathe, it would likely have the flying-saucer rotodome of the E2 Hawkeye and E3 Sentry.
I think even option 4 might have been made to work eventually if it hadn’t had to squeeze into a Nimrod airframe. If the MR4 saga is anything to go by there were some issues with those aircraft beyond the lack of volume, and it’s not immediately obvious why the Nimrod airframe was the go-to choice rather than a VC10 or something similar from the inventory.
A nice modern airbus would be an even better choice but seems to go against the MoD tradition of being penny wise and pound foolish.
Crowbar Six
The computers were too slow and old to handle overland clutter such as Germany which is one of the places the RAF was intending to use them, the computers were the old Argus mini-computer which had been around since the mid 1960's and were not really powerful enough for the job. The system worked OK over water but once they were over land they had issues.
hugh lupus
I helped build Nimrods and worked on a major rebuild of one. I've even been close up to the AEW version before it was scrapped. Back in the 80's I did maintenance work on the Dan Air Comet 4's.
Yes I'm old.
But a more labour intensive to build, poorly conceived, maintenance unfriendly aircraft you would be unlikely to find.
I remember being told that as the fuel tanks were used as heat sinks there was a prohibition on flying beyond a certain fuel level.
As others have said, dump a 1940's design and go for the A300 and equip it with inflight refueling
Like most British aircraft of the time the most important thing was not the drawings or the build parameters or anything like that.What was important, vital even was 'Institutional knowledge'
You knew that part 'A' needed a few thou shaved off in order that it fit part 'B' even though the drawing did not show this. Production plan says to drill this hole now? If you do then when Fred comes to do his work then it won't line up with his parts.Far better to let Fred drill the hole.
British aircraft of that ERA were hand built and hand built by craftsmen (not me obviously, but everyone else) and as you point out each one was different.
As a young lad I built the fuel baffles for 125's . Each one despite every attempt at interchangeability was different.
It was impossible to take a part that had been drilled off on one aircraft and fit it to another.
It was only with the advent of the Airbus line in the late 70's that this began to change.
So yes you are right....I was that man with the hammer!
Edit.
Not lasers. Lasers produce heat and destroy the temper of the metal but early forms of CNC probably.
Crowbar Six
Dorknought said:
It's interesting that as AWAC was showing itself as not just a force multiplier but without it - you lose, why'd you'd skimp on it is unfathomable.
The Russians were gone, we were not going to fight anyone without the US backing us up and anyone we did was unlikely to have the best or latest tech. The same rational is why we have been enjoying "capability holidays" and didn't buy a Nimrod replacement for years, why the RAF did not have any replacements for the Sea Eagle anti-shipping or ALARM missiles. The Sea Eagle were scrapped as they were due for deep maintenance to the turbines which would have cost a total of £4 million for the entire fleet.
The UK treasury just would not pay for even basic upgrade to the UK military.
Mike D
mtpalmer1 said:
Essentially this. The MRA.4 was a casualty of the War on Terror. The latter was a rather expensive venture and the MRA.4 was an especially easy project to place on the chopping block with Haddon-Cave fulminating. Pity as the Nimrod MRA.4 promised to finally be a mightily capable platform. I'm still not sold on medium-altitude ASW, sorry Boeing fans.
Oh well, not the first goat to befall the political T-Rex and certainly not the last.
The electronic fit was, apparently, a world leading game changer. Unfortunately the aircraft was a death trap with over 200 safety faults identified.
We're probably lucky we only had one XV230 over Afghanistan.
Have the BAe Nimrod AEW be more successful and enter service | alternatehistory.com
Have the BAe Nimrod AEW be more successful and enter service | Page 2 | alternatehistory.com
DATO che molti siti internet vengono rimaneggiati o scompaiono più o meno totalmente, meglio lasciare un pò di appunti per chi volesse cercarli...
Appena oggi, per esempio, è scomparso www.airport-data.com, molto utile per localizzare le varie matricole degli aerei e tracciarne l'esistenza (per quanto possibile).
Purtroppo, almeno per ora non c'é modo di ritrovarlo. Speriamo in seguito.
The United States Army | Redstone Arsenal Historical Information
During World War II several countries had studied the use of guided weapons in which wires were used to carry a steering signal from a controller at a launch site to a missile in flight. After the war, this work was continued, notably in France and Australia. By the early 1950s, the work in France had resulted in the SS 10 wire guided missile. The U.S. Army tested the SS 10 during 1953 and found it unsatisfactory for Army use. Shortly thereafter, the U.S. Army initiated development of a wire command link antitank missile system called DART. By the summer of 1958, it was clear that DART would be less satisfactory than anticipated so its development was terminated, and the U.S. Army procured limited quantities of an improved version of the French SS 10, and later ENTAC and SS 11, were acquired for use as interim antitank systems.
In the fall of 1958, at the direction of Office, Ordnance Research and Development (R&D), an Ad Hoc Working Group was established at the Ballistic Research Laboratories (BRL) to study the Long Range Time Period Heavy Assault Weapon (HAW) problem and to recommend a program of work leading to system availability by 1965-70. The Ad Hoc Working Group (chaired by a BRL weapons analyst with representative members from Ordnance development organizations located at Picatinny Arsenal, Frankford Arsenal, Redstone Arsenal, Watervliet Arsenal, Detroit Arsenal and Harry Diamond Laboratories) recommended that initiation of development of a specific system be deferred for approximately 2 years and during that time the program consisted of: a) vigorous supporting research efforts to characterize alternate guidance schemes (leading ultimately to homing systems), and b) field test programs to investigate performance of foreign produced antitank guided missile systems. That recommendation was approved and implemented.
The resulting supporting research efforts were supervised by the Special Projects Group of the Ballistics Research Laboratories. That small group was headed at the time by Charles L. Poor III; his able assistant was Harry Reed.
See more TOW photos
In the early summer of 1961, the Office, Chief of Ordnance (OCO) requested the Ballistic Research Laboratories to take account of all that had been learned from the tests and analyses of foreign antitank missile systems and the multiple elements of the supporting research program, most of which had been carried out in cooperation with other U.S. Army Ordnance agencies and non-government industrial advocates. OCO also asked BRL to propose a program for acquisition of a Heavy Assault Weapon for the Long Range Time Period (i.e. initial operational capability [IOC] 1965-70.)
Response was assigned to the Armored Systems Evaluation Branch of the Weapon Systems Laboratory where David Hardison, Branch Chief, undertook the task of producing a merit assessment of the technical readiness, projected performance at operational tasks, and system burden of candidate approaches. His assessment in hand, Hardison reconvened the earlier Ad Hoc Working Group, with a few changes in personnel, for critical review by persons whose parent organizations advocated a variety of candidate systems.
Obviously, there were two main options: a) acquire one of the existing systems, or b) develop a new system. By this time, market prospects had resulted in the generation of a large number(1) of candidate proposals each strongly advocated by its would-be vendor.
The BRL evaluation(2) of the 27 candidates concluded centrally that every one of the 27 system concepts was seriously flawed in one or more ways which would result in it being ultimately unsatisfactory. Needless to say, the proponents of each system/ concept evaluated were not pleased, at least initially, by this conclusion. Extended technical discussions among Working Group members, however, eventually led to its acceptance.
That conclusion had, prior to convening the Ad Hoc Working Group, prompted Hardison in a thought experiment to create a new system concept which would be responsive to the operational needs assessed to be most critical (i.e., not the same as then existing Military Requirements), would not share the flaws of other concepts, and based on demonstrated technologies, apparently could be confidently realized. Heavy considerations included system dependability, ease of operation, responsiveness, high accuracy against stationary and moving targets at all useful engagement ranges, lethality against existing and projected targets, crew “tailgate” transportability, and system costs.
What Hardison had conceived was a new system having key features that were more or less proven in other applications. It would be a rocket propelled guided missile tube launched (as with the earlier SHILLELAGH) to ensure that during its early trajectory the missile would remain ever close to line-of-sight thus greatly simplifying aerodynamic and control issues. The proposed system would use optical (modulated infrared) flare tracking with automatic command control (as demonstrated earlier in SHILLELAGH and, at Redstone Arsenal, in the SS 11/ICU) thus maximizing ease of training and operation. In addition, the system would use a wire data link for cost effectiveness and, especially, for robustness to countermeasure and environmental degradation. Of course, appropriate values for other system parameters such as minimum and maximum range, warhead type and size, chance-of hit, system weight, costs, velocity profile, etc. were called out, but the sine qua non of the concept would be the Tube launched, Optically tracked, Wire data link auto-guided missile. Upon hearing the concept, Harry Reed suggested that it be called TOW so as to forever capture the main defining features of the concept. At the time, it seemed like a good suggestion and the name has lasted.
Two other points bear mentioning: a) the initial notion of an unguided round was never supported, and b) the User’s Requirement from the outset envisaged that the HAW system would be useable from helicopters as well as from ground and ground vehicle mounts. At the time, a sight suitable stable for use with clear line of sight (CLOS) systems such as TOW had not been demonstrated. Rather than dismiss the CLOS approach which appeared superior in the ground applications, the helicopter application simply was set side. Later, of course, suitable sights were developed and air vehicle launch application occurred.
After marathon sessions ending shortly after midnight on the final day of discussing issues ranging from central to minor, members of the Ad Hoc Working Group reached unanimous agreement and supported the BRL recommendation to proceed with the TOW concept.
When the results of the analysis and the BRL-conceived TOW system concept were briefed to Pentagon officials, they correctly pointed out that no prospective hardware development firm had proposed such a concept and that no all-up design had been made. The Department of the Army (DA) tasked BRL representatives to share the concept with industry and, for a period not to exceed 6 months, obtain industry input as to how such a concept would best be packaged. Broadly, the aim was to gain additional information leading to a more confident judgment as to whether the system concept being called TOW could in fact be practically realized. As far as is now recalled, there was no directive that the "studies" should result in demonstration hardware; neither was it discouraged.
On a highly compressed schedule, in an effort led by Harry Reed, BRL obtained and evaluated solicitations from industry. BRL selected three firms—Hughes Aircraft Company, Martin Marietta, and McDonnell Douglas Aircraft—to study the TOW concept in a competitive “skunk work” approach. During the study period, BRL had minimal contact with the study teams, and was limited mostly to getting data to be used in computer simulations and in range facility needs should hardware demonstration firings be offered.(3)
Each of the three contractors delivered paper and hardware products which led to the finding that a system along the lines called TOW could indeed be developed successfully. From the engineering analyses and hardware demonstrations, feasibility was judged to have been demonstrated. The Hughes approach was assessed the best overall but certain of its subsystems were not as good as proposed by others. Shortly after BRL completed the feasibility evaluation, a development program was approved and acquisition responsibility was assigned properly to the U.S. Army Missile Command (MICOM).
(1) A total of 27 specific system concepts were being advocated: 8 manually guided missiles, 3 beam riding missiles, 4 semi-active homing rockets and shells, 4 open-loop systems, 2 (LOBL) guided missiles, and 6 (CLOS) guided missiles.
(2) BRL Memorandum (BRLM) Report 1365, A Study of HAW, David C. Hardison, September 1961. The response initially was in the form of a long briefing which upon request was documented as BRL Technical Note 1417, dated July 1961, which was superseded by the BRLM 1365 cited here.
(3) Competitive pressures caused the selected study firms to deliver both paper and missiles for demonstration firings.
Project Management
As one of his last official acts (1), the Chief of Ordnance on 12 January 1962 designated the MICOM Commander as the weapon system manager for the TOW/Heavy Antitank Weapon. The Missile Command established the Antitank/Aircraft Weapons Commodity Office on 19 November 1962 to manage the TOW weapon system. After higher headquarters approved the TOW development program in January 1963, MICOM established the TOW Project Office on 1 October 1964. Studies leading to the development of the XM65 TOW armament subsystem for the AH-1 series COBRA helicopter started in 1970, and on 5 April 1970 the airborne TOW program transitioned from the Aircraft Weapons Commodity Office to the TOW Project Office.
In 1969, the U.S. Congress House Authorization Subcommittee (HASC) considered replacing the TOW with the SHILLELAGH missile. Extensive studies, presentations, and demonstrations were made to the Department of Defense (DOD) and HASC by DA, the U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC), and MICOM supporting both TOW and SHILLELAGH in their respective operational roles and missions. The TOW/SHILLELAGH controversy was resolved when the joint session of Congress voted in September 1970 to continue the TOW in the heavy antitank weapon role.
In the early days of TOW development and up to first production, the TOW missile reliability was significantly below expectations and requirements. Missile reliability was a measure of the total missile performance from trigger pull to target impact. The first major subsystem problem was the launch motor. The pre-development demonstration missile and the first few development rounds included a launch motor that was 6 inches in diameter (full missile diameter), about 6 inches long, and placed just behind the missile center of gravity. A “blast tube” about 8 inches long and 1½ inches in diameter with a nozzle at the aft end was attached to the motor. The propellant was multi-perforated single base grains, each about a ½ -inch diameter and a ½-inch long, which were “poured” into the motor and trapped during burning. This propellant’s advantages were low cost and a very short burning time. It’s disadvantage was that it was not controllable and resulted in potential gunner hazards. Fortunately the MICOM Propulsion Laboratory had considerable experience in head end suspended double base (M-7) propellant (3.5-inch bazooka and light antitank weapon). The laboratory was given responsibility and authority to direct the prime contractor’s propulsion efforts. The rocket motor design and the propellant were both changed to accommodate double base head end suspended propellant. The launch motor was the only missile subassembly that required a total design change. All of the other subassemblies were at one time or another significant reliability issues.
Possibly the most intractable was the IR lamp. Functioning of the lamp required establishing an arc between the electrodes of a xenon-filled glass lamp. The IR lamp was not turned on until after the launch acceleration was complete. A bridge wire between the electrodes was the means by which the arc was established. The problems included the integrity of the bridge wire during launch and maintaining the arc throughout flight. The wire command link breakage was a problem throughout development and periodically recurred during early production.
The last significant problem before engineering and service testing and production release was the launch container. The launch container was sealed at both ends. When the missile was fired, the launch motor blast ruptured the rear seal and overpressure from the missile gyro stored gas bottle ruptured the front. The shock wave associated with the rear seal caused component failures, while the front seal broke the wire command link. Early in the development program, a decision was made to design the missile for no testing (except flight tests) after the missile was placed in the launch container at the factory. Moreover, during missile assembly the missile skin was permanently joined to each section (except for the warhead) such that missile disassembly would require destroying skin sections. The notion of a non-testable, non-provisioned missile caused some concern both from technical and logistical standpoints. The technical argument was to include test capability and eliminate if not needed; the logistics concern was that once incorporated, it would be difficult to eliminate, especially if provisioning had been initiated.
The TOW production contract was awarded in 1968, and the first TOW production milestone was met in August 1969 with the delivery of the first TOW missiles in accordance with the contract schedule. By September 1970, three TOW training battalions were operational. TOW replaced the M140 106mm recoilless rifle and the French ENTAC missile system. The Army completed the phase out of the latter weapon system by 30 September 1970, after TOW was standardized.
There were two unique features of this production contract: flight acceptance tests on missile lots offered for delivery, referred to as fly-to-buy (FTB), and an award fee for reliability improvement above a specified threshold for all delivered missile lots.
The FTB was new to missile production programs. It had been incorporated in the SHILLELAGH production contract, but at the time of the TOW award, SHILLELAGH deliveries had not begun. FTB was routine in ammunition production, but had not been applied to complex missile systems. The FTB feature provided for the test firing of a random sample from an offered lot. If a specified number hit the target the lot was bought. If not, that lot was the contractor’s responsibility. Various options were provided, e.g., for rework, retest, etc. The FTB feature has remained for subsequent production contracts, and MICOM subsequently used similar features on other missile systems.
The award fee provision was likely a major factor in the TOW reliability growth. At the time of the production contract award, reliability was significantly less than desired. A prior cost effectiveness analysis with reliability as a variable provided a way to estimate the dollar value of incremental reliability growth. Using that analysis as a base, an award fee was established for each fractional reliability improvement demonstrated with FTB test results of all of the acceptance tests for the first 2 years of production—approximately 20,000 missiles delivered. There were no lots rejected. The fee awarded was nearly the maximum, corresponding to more than a 10 percent increase in missile reliability.
After the production contract was awarded all TOW activities were segregated, new vinyl floors replaced oil soaked factory floors, all machines were painted with TOW unique colors, and the TOW area became the premier work assignment. The cleanliness of the TOW production facility and the motivation of Hughes management and production workers were certainly important in achieving the attained reliability. While the award fee provision was certainly a motivator, it is also probable that Hughes Aircraft wanted to demonstrate that the successful completion of their first Army production contract would lead to more orders. Prior to the TOW production contract, Hughes was primarily a U.S. Air Force (USAF) supplier. The plant itself was an Air Force facility—USAF Plant #44.
Significant management actions that had a direct, positive effect on the TOW program included the project manager’s tenure, competitive contracting, strong configuration management with an effective Value Engineering (VE) program, award fee engineering support contracts, and extensive foreign military sales (FMS) activity.
In the 1960s and early 1970s, Army project managers served only 2 or 3 years in their assignment due to selection for Senior Service schools, assignment to Vietnam, or retirement. The first two TOW project managers (PMs) served only 2 years each. When Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Huntzinger was assigned as TOW PM in June 1968, his tour was expected to be 3 years. In 1970-71, the Congress and DOD recognized that PM tours were too short for good management. As a result, Colonel Huntzinger’s assignment was extended year by year until he retired in November 1976. This 8-year, 5-month continuous tour as TOW PM provided continuous and consistent leadership and direction from the negotiation of the TOW production contract through the TOW Vietnam experience, development and fielding of airborne TOW, development of the TOW night sight and other system improvements to complete fielding in U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR) and Korea, and foreign military sales to 22 countries. Colonel Huntzinger, who served under four AMC and 4 MICOM commanders, holds the record tenure for Army PM.
The TOW missile, launcher, and other system components were competitively procured and even a second source was established to ensure competitive pricing and continuous production in case one producer experienced production difficulties.
Starting with the development program, the project office required all contractors to document fully and to provide detailed costing for all proposed configuration changes. These were reviewed by the Configuration Management Board and approved, modified, or disapproved personally by the project manager. To strongly encourage TOW contractors to aggressively look for system improvements in producibility, reliability, performance, or cost reduction, contracts included VE provisions that returned 50 to 90 percent of the initial government cost savings to the contractor. This allowed the contractors to spend their funds on expensive preparation of changes in anticipation of a financial return. The normal VE payment at that time was 10 to 20 percent.
Engineering Support contracts with the prime contractor provide valuable support to the project office. To ensure thorough and responsive support, each task manager’s performance was reviewed quarterly and an award fee of minimum to 100 percent of the available award fee was assigned. In initiation of this type of contract, dramatic improvements in task support were obtained; the contractor posted and tracked closely each manager’s performance, and several task managers were relieved.
In the pricing for foreign military sales a part of the U.S. development costs were included. Due to the extensive TOW FMS program, a substantial amount of TOW development costs were recouped.
On 2 May 1972, the TOW missile made military history by becoming the first American-made guided missile to be fired in combat by U.S. soldiers. During the fighting at Kontum in South Vietnam on that date, the 1st Combat Aerial TOW Team, equipped with the XM26 TOW subsystem mounted on a UH-1B HUEY helicopter, destroyed a total of four M-41 tanks, one 2½ -ton truck, and a 105mm howitzer.
The involvement of the airborne TOW in Vietnam is particularly interesting regarding the speed of its deployment and its efficiency as a tank killer in a combat situation. It is best told by Hugh McInnish, who was the airborne TOW engineer in the TOW Project Office at the time of the system’s deployment. As he recalls,
I was at work one day in April 1972 when the phone rang and an officer up at the Pentagon was on the other end of the line. “I have been reading your article in Aviation Digest,” he said, “and I was wondering if you could put together the same ‘package’ that you had in Germany and send it in the other direction to test it against some real targets.”
The previous spring I had been in Germany as the leader of a Government-Contractor team sent to support the Germans in a lengthy firing test of the airborne TOW. We had two XM26 airborne TOW prototypes mounted on two UH-1B helicopters. These were the only two such systems in existence at that time. After the test I published the article mentioned by my caller. This was at the time of the Easter Offensive, and tanks had just appeared for the first time in Vietnam, so I needed no cryptographer to decode the message: Could we go to war with our two prototypes?
We could, and two weeks later I landed at Saigon, having crossed the Pacific via Hawaii, Guam, and Wake Island in a C-141, catching catnaps on an air mattress atop crates of TOW ammunition in the cargo hold.
In the meantime we had succeeded in finding the pieces of the “package” we had used in Germany: men, helicopters, black boxes, and all. From Saigon we move to Camp Holloway, near Pleiku in the Central Highlands, refitted the helicopters with their XM26 systems, and went into combat.
At that point the airborne TOW was the most novel weapon in the war, and it was a dazzling success. The team never failed to destroy a target once seen. Tanks were the primary target, but also on our list were armored personnel carriers, trucks, and machine gun positions. One of the latter I remember especially. The enemy had a penchant for mounting a machine gun on the pinnacle of a water tower in Kontum. We would shoot it down, he would replace it, and we would shoot it down again. One day someone spotted a small, suspicious looking island in the middle of a river. On a hunch one of our crews shot at the foliage—and sure enough a tank exploded when the missile hit. This led to a suspicion of another island so it too was shot. But this island—was just an island. Only leaves and dirt rose into the air.
When this mission was completed I continued my journey westward and reached Germany via Bangkok, Delhi, and Madrid. I spent some time giving a series of briefings in Europe, then went even further west, finally proving the roundness of the world by reaching Huntsville and home again.
After I returned I received a letter from LTC Thomas P. McKenna, whom I did not know. He had been on the ground during the battle for Kontum when our TOW helicopters were overhead attacking enemy tanks. He wrote, “I may well owe my life to the TOW missiles that broke the back of the enemy assaults.
The Daedalian Society awarded its Wolfe Memorial Trophy to the TOW weapon system in May 1974. Presented annually, the award recognized the individual or group responsible for developing an outstanding military weapon system. Additionally, more foreign nations were using the TOW missile by 31 December 1976 than any other MICOM missile involved in foreign military sales at that time. In November 1977, the TOW became the most heavily produced Army guided missile.
Despite these accomplishments, on 15 April 1977, the U.S. Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command (DARCOM), as the Army Materiel Command was then known, established a provisional Advanced Heavy Antitank Missile System (AHAMS) Project Office to develop a replacement for the TOW. This effort was later cancelled in favor of TOW 2. Later that year, on 29 September 1977, MICOM combined the TOW and DRAGON project offices. Less than three years later, though, the TOW/DRAGON Project Office was redesignated the TOW Project Office, following termination of project management for the DRAGON weapon system. In April 1980, the DRAGON was relegated to Level II management in the MICOM Weapon Systems Management Directorate (WSMD). The TOW missile program, on the other hand, expanded to include five missile variations by 1992, while there were two variations of the TOW subsystem. Effort on a next-generation TOW Fire and Forget missile was under way by FY 2000.
The FY 1987 Defense Authorization Act designated TOW as a Defense Enterprise Program (DEP). The DEP was an initiative designed to increase the efficiency of a defense acquisition program’s management structure as well as enhance program stability through the use of milestone authorization. The TOW was one of two programs managed at Redstone Arsenal nominated to participate in the FY 1988 DEP. Subsequently, Hughes Aircraft Company representatives and various Army and DOD officials marked the production of 500,000 TOW missiles at a ceremony held in November 1989 at the contractor’s Tucson, Arizona, facility.
On 8 January 1990, the MICOM WSMD assumed operational control of the TOW M65 subsystem (COBRA). Four years later, on 2 March 1994, responsibility for the ground TOW weapon system transitioned to WSMD after the TOW Project Office was disestablished on that date. Included in the transfer were the Ground TOW launcher, night sight, M70 trainer, and ancillary equipment. That same day, the Close Combat Anti-Armor Weapon Systems (CCAWS) Project Office was established. The new organization’s management responsibilities included the Improved Target Acquisition System (ITAS), the Improved Bradley Acquisition Subsystem (IBAS), TOW missile production, Bradley/TOW 2 subsystem production, and future CCAWS programs.
As noted in the chronology, TOW studies began some 40 years ago, and the first experimental firings were in the summer of 1962. From that start there has been steady progress in development and deployment of TOW variants to meet the challenges of ever increasing threats. More TOW missiles have been produced than any other Army guided missile. TOW met a vital need of the U.S. Army and has played a critical role in combat operations. Moreover TOW’s capabilities were such that it became the principal heavy antitank weapon for many countries that shared U.S. interests.
The TOW Project Office has also been a rewarding place to work as attested by the extended tenure of many of the project office personnel. Ms. Evelyn Hunter joined the project as a secretary in November 1962. She remained as the secretary in the Engineering Division until her retirement in 1993. Ms. Judy Polly came aboard in October 1964, and she remained associated with the program as of June 2001. She is planning to retire in October 2001, having spent 36 of her 37 years of civil service with the TOW project. Mr. John Wlodarski was involved with TOW from the summer of 1961 until he retired in 1980. John was involved in the study phase and was the configuration manager until his retirement.
Mr. Robert Q. Taylor worked on TOW beginning in early 1962. Mr. Taylor was chief of the Engineering Division until June 1971 when he became the Deputy Project Manager until he retired in 1977.
Mr. Robert P. Whitley, Mr. Taylor, Mr. Ray Turner, Mr. James Alden, and Ms. Hunter formed the TOW Project Office in November 1962 in the Development Division of the Research and Development Directorate. Mr. Whitley was designated as the Deputy Project Manager of the Tow Project Management Office when it was established in October 1964. He held that post until he was reassigned to another MICOM management position in June 1971. Mr. Alden and Mr. Turner remained in TOW until they retired.
Mr. Coy Jackson joined the TOW engineering staff in 1963, and when he retired in 1988 he was chief of the Engineering Division. Mr. Jackson continues to be called on to provide advice and consultation on TOW related matters. As a point of interest, Mr. Jackson spent his entire civil service career in the TOW office.
The first two project managers, LTC Ballard B. Small, Jr. and COL James N. Lothrop, Jr. each served 2 years. By contrast, the third PM, COL Robert W. Huntzinger, served 8½ years, which covered the most critical period of TOW initial and rate production, deployment, and support. Moreover, it was during this period that foreign military sales were initiated and expanded. His leadership also covered TOW’s Vietnam experience.
TOW’s long history has provided an opportunity for several officers to serve two tours of duty in the TOW Project Office. COL Thomas M. Devanney served in the project office as a junior officer and returned in 1987 as the PM. COL Jack Conway retired as the TOW PM in 1993, but had served an earlier tour in the project office. BG William B. Nance’s last position at MICOM was as the Program Executive Officer for Fire Support, to which the TOW PM reported, having served earlier as the manager of TOW’s application to the Bradley Fighting Vehicle.
Many other individuals have given a significant portion of their career to TOW—project office, laboratory, other AMC, and contractor personnel. All have played a vital role in TOW’s success.
This history has focused on the TOW Project Office. However, the reader should recognize that TOW was designed and initially produced by the Hughes Aircraft Company. While the Hughes corporate identity has changed over the years, the people involved and the workplace retained substantial continuity. Although periodic differences regarding the short-term objectives of each occurred between the project office, Hughes, and other contractors involved, the long-term goal was to provide a superior fighting capability to U.S. servicemen and women. It has been and continues to be a highly successful team effort.
(1) From 1962 to 1982, the Office of the Chief of Ordnance was abolished and other Army agencies performed all ordnance-related administrative functions. The position was reestablished in 1983 as a proponent agency for all ordnance-related occupational specialties and career management fields. On 9 May 1986, the Ordnance Corps officially joined the Army’s regimental system, and the Office of the Chief of Ordnance was reestablished as the head of the Ordnance Corps.
System Description
The tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided (TOW) missile system is a crew portable, vehicle-mounted, heavy anti-armor weapon system. It consists of a launcher and a missile that can be effectively employed in all weather conditions to engage tanks; other armored vehicles; and various point targets such as bunkers, crew-served weapons and launchers, and non-armored vehicles. It also has a limited self-defense capability against threat helicopters. The launcher consists of a launch tube, traversing unit, missile guidance set (MGS), night sight, battery assembly, optical sight, tripod, overpack, shroud, and carrying strap. The all-up round missile is encased in a disposable launch container. The TOW can be operated from the ground, vehicles, or helicopters. It is mounted on the Improved TOW Vehicle (ITV), the Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV), the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), and the COBRA helicopter. A total of 46 allied nations use the TOW, and it is co-produced in Switzerland.
There are six versions of the TOW missile. The original missile—the BGM-71A Basic TOW—was fielded in 1970. It had a 3000-meter range and was 6 inches in diameter except for the warhead which was 5 inches. The second missile to be built, the Extended Range TOW, was delivered in 1978. Delivered in 1981, the BGM-71C Improved TOW (ITOW) warhead included an extended probe for greater standoff and penetration. The BGM-71D TOW 2 weapon system, a product improvement program (PIP) initiated in 1979, incorporated a full caliber (6-inch) warhead with extendable probe on the missile. To compensate for the added weight of the warhead, the missile flight motor was redesigned with 30 percent more total impulse. Improved guidance link capability to enhance performance in a degraded environment and guidance link hardening against electro-optical countermeasures were added to the existing launcher.
In December 1984, a further enhancement to the TOW 2 was started to counter the appliqué armor threat. Hughes Aircraft developed the TOW 2A missile for the U.S. Army to defeat advances in the armor threat caused by the advent of first and second generation Explosive Reactive Armor (ERA). The BGM-71E TOW 2A incorporated a tandem warhead armament system to achieve increased lethality against tanks configured with ERA. The newest version of the TOW missile is the BGM-71F TOW 2B, which started production as an engineering change proposal to the FY 1990 production contract. The TOW 2B is a “flyover shootdown” missile with two explosively formed penetrator (EFP) warheads. Designed to defeat the next generation advanced armor threat well into the 21st century, the TOW 2B features a dual-mode sensor and a new armament section equipped with two warheads substantially different from those used in earlier TOW versions. Because the TOW 2B is designed to attack targets from the top, the trajectory places the missile slightly above the target when its two warheads explode downward. The TOW 2B was not designed to replace the TOW 2A, and the U.S. Army concurrently fielded both missile versions. The last TOW missiles for U.S. forces were produced in May 1997.
The TOW Sight Improvement Program (TSIP) effort was started in 1990 to significantly enhance the TOW system’s current capabilities and ensure its effectiveness into the next decade. However, the Secretary of the Army cancelled the TSIP on 15 October 1991 because of declining budget and funding issues. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development and Acquisition directed the PEO, Tactical Missiles to coordinate the development of an affordable alternative. The latter effort subsequently became known as the Improved Target Acquisition System (ITAS) being developed for the Army's light forces. The ITAS was a material change to the Ground TOW 2 weapon system for first-to-deploy light forces. It improved the TOW’s target detection recognition and engagement capability by incorporating a second generation forward looking infrared (FLIR), a laser range finder, and automatic tracking features. All missile configurations can still be fired, allowing room for growth for follow-on missiles. The ITAS is being fielded at battalion level, replacing TOW 2 in light infantry units. The modification kit consists of an integrated (Day/Night Sight with Laser Rangefinder) Target Acquisition Subsystem (TAS), Fire Control Subsystem (FCS), Battery Power Source (BPS), and Modified Traversing Unit (TU). The ITAS operates from the HMMWV and associated dismount platforms. In September 1998, the first unit equipped with the ITAS was A Troop, 1/17th Cavalry, 82nd Airborne Division. On 27 July 1993, the PEO, Tactical Missiles approved the Acquisition Plan for the Improved Bradley Acquisition Subsystem (IBAS), an improvement of the current Bradley TOW acquisition and fire control subsystem. This effort was an extension of the TOW ITAS.
In FY 1998, the U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC) released a request for information on the next generation heavy antitank missile, the TOW Fire and Forget (F&F) which is supposed to replace the current series of TOW missiles. Employed either mounted or dismounted from the TOW launcher, the TOW F&F will have a secondary mode of attack that together with the primary F&F mode will enable the operator to hit any target acquired within the missile’s range. The TOW F&F will integrate an advanced focal plane array and imaging infrared (FPA/IIR) seeker. The IIR seeker and software will provide automatic target tracking and eliminate the TOW wire, significantly increasing soldier survivability and overall system lethality. Designed to engage any target that the gunner can see, day or night, even when faced with battlefield contaminants or countermeasures, the TOW F&F missile will also defeat threat tanks equipped with advanced armor and active protection systems. The system will include the encased TOW F&F missile, the shipping and storage container, and the ITAS platform applique kits. It will also have increased range, lethality, and platform survivability; be able to counter active protection system threats; and have a modular design for future growth and shelf life extension. On 9 September 2000, the Army awarded a $125.9 million TOW F&F missile EMD contract to Raytheon’s Missile Systems business unit in Tucson, Arizona
System Chronology
January 1957 An in-house research effort was started at Redstone Arsenal from which evolved the automatic infrared (IR) command guidance concept on which the tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided (TOW)/Heavy Antitank Weapon (HAW) system was based.
16 October 1961 The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research and Development) and the Secretary of Defense approved a plan which called for in-house and contractor studies to prove the feasibility of the TOW antitank missile system before the start of a large and costly development program.
10 January 1962 Three companies—Hughes Aircraft Company, Martin Marietta, and McDonnell Aircraft Corporation—were awarded 6-month contracts to design and fabricate prototype hardware adequate for a flight demonstration of the technical feasibility of the proposed TOW missile concept.
12 July 1962 As one of his last official acts, the Chief of Ordnance designated the U.S. Army Missile Command (MICOM) Commander as the weapon system manager for the TOW/Heavy Antitank Weapon (HAW).
(Note: From 1962 to 1983 the Office of the Chief of Ordnance was abolished and other Army agencies performed all ordnance-related administrative functions. In 1983, the position was reestablished as a proponent agency for all ordnance-related occupational specialties and career management fields. On 9 May 1986 the Ordnance Corps officially joined the Army's regimental system; and the Office of the Chief of Ordnance was re-established as the head of the Ordnance Corps.)
December 1962 A letter contract was awarded to Hughes Aircraft to continue the TOW effort pending negotiation of a definitive development contract.
January 1963 The TOW missile system development program was approved.
3 May 1963 TOW was the first 100 percent cost-plus-incentive-fee (CPIF) contract negotiated and signed by MICOM.
December 1963 Research leading to the airborne TOW began when MICOM awarded contracts to Hughes Aircraft Company and the Philco Ford Corporation to design, fabricate, and install a stabilized sight on the UH-1B HUEY helicopter that would solve the problem of firing a TOW or SHILLELAGH missile from the air. These contracts called for the preliminary design of a complete tactical missile system (XM26) which would replace the M22 subsystem.
1 October 1964 The TOW Missile System became project managed at MICOM. The system had previously been managed by the Antitank/Aircraft Weapons Commodity Office at MICOM, which had been established on 19 November 1962.
1 October 1964 LTC Ballard B. Small, Jr., was the first TOW Project Manager (PM).
1965 After the Hughes Aircraft Company stabilized sight was selected, MICOM was authorized to develop the XM26 airborne subsystem using the TOW missile.
June 1966 Hughes Aircraft Company received the initial research and development contract for the XM26.
30 June 1966 LTC Ballard B. Small, Jr., the first TOW PM, retired.
26 September 1966 COL James N. Lothrop, Jr., became the TOW PM.
1967 Five prototype XM26 TOW airborne launching systems were built for testing on the UH-1B. The XM26 used three of the same missiles developed for the infantry, mounted in each of two launch pods on either side of the helicopter. The aircraft’s left nose was modified to accommodate an inertially stabilized telescope sight operated by the copilot/gunner in the left seat.
March 1968 The TOW/HUEY (XM26) program was terminated and the effort was redirected to the TOW/CHEYENNE (AH-56A) program.
22 April 1968 The Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development approved the limited production type classification for the TOW.
30 May 1968 COL James N. Lothrop, Jr., TOW PM, retired.
25 June 1968 LTC Robert W. Huntzinger became the new TOW PM. He was promoted to colonel on 22 October 1971.
28 June 1968 The initial TOW production letter contract was awarded to Hughes Aircraft Company.
29 November 1968 The definitized production contract for the TOW was awarded to Hughes Aircraft.
1969 MICOM learned that higher headquarters was again considering replacing the TOW with the SHILLELAGH.
10 June 1969 MICOM awarded a contract to the Chrysler Corporation Huntsville Division as the alternate TOW producer.
August 1969 The first production milestone was met when Hughes Aircraft delivered the first TOW missiles in accordance with the contract schedule.
1970 Studies leading to the development of the XM65 TOW armament subsystem for the AH-1 series COBRA helicopter were started this year.
5 April 1970 The airborne TOW was transferred from the Aircraft Weapons Commodity Office to the TOW Project Office.
September 1970 Three TOW training battalions became operational, replacing the M140 106mm recoilless rifle and French ENTAC system. By 30 September, the Army had completed phase-out of the ENTAC after the TOW missile was standardized.
September 1970 The distribution of TOW launchers to U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR) began.
September 1970 The TOW/SHILLELAGH controversy was partially settled when the Joint Session of Congress voted to continue the TOW in the heavy antitank weapon role.
30 September 1970 A major portion of the TOW system was adopted as standard A.
November 1970 The first tactical Basic TOW missiles were deployed. The first USAREUR TOW unit was equipped on 13 November.
1971 Representatives from MICOM, Hughes Aircraft Company, and Bell Helicopter Company assisted the German Army Aviation School in its evaluation of the TOW missile’s suitability for use in an airborne role. Although the XM26 prototypes used in the tests had undergone considerable engineering testing, they had never been given to the U.S. Army for service tests because the main developmental effort shifted to the more advanced AH-56 CHEYENNE weapons system. The German military, therefore, was the first to test the XM26. Despite adverse spring weather conditions in northern Germany, where the evaluation was conducted, the test program was successful. It concluded with the firing of six TOW missiles with live warheads. Fired from various ranges and flight conditions against actual tank hulks positioned on the range, the final shots effectively demonstrated the potency of the airborne TOW. (See related article... hyperlink opens a .PDF document)
1972 The requirement for an extended range TOW missile for the airborne role materialized.
March 1972 The Army began the Improved COBRA Armament Program. The XM65 TOW/ COBRA development program was a functional upgrade of the XM26 TOW/UH-1B HUEY armament subsystem. The COBRA was the first helicopter designed expressly as a weapons carrier.
30 March 1972 The North Vietnamese Army (NVA) swept across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) on this date in a massive offensive against the south. The NVA was supported by numerous heavily armored Russian and captured American tanks. This action generated an urgent but unprogrammed combat requirement for the TOW antitank weapon system. The NVA “Easter Offensive,” however, gave the Army an opportunity to prove that the airborne TOW missile subsystem could be used as an effective weapon against Soviet armor. An impressive showing would help secure the funding needed for the advanced attack helicopter (AAH) program.
14 April 1972 The Department of the Army (DA) directed MICOM to remove the XM26 subsystem from storage and deploy it to Vietnam on the UH-1B HUEY gunship. The command was ordered to rush the subsystem and a load of TOW missiles to the battlefront. That same day, the TOW contingent at Fort Lewis, Washington, received a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Warning Order to prepare for deployment to Southeast Asia (SEA). The group had originally been organized to participate in the U.S. Army Combat Development Experimentation Command (USACDEC) Experiment 43.6 (Attack Helicopter, Daylight Defense).
21 April 1972 One week after receiving the order to deploy, three C-141 aircraft flew to Vietnam carrying two HUEY gunships, two XM26 subsystems, missile crews, and other equipment. The order to have the experimental airborne TOW system on the way to Vietnam, ready to fight, in 7 days generated one of the most unique deployments ever accomplished by the Army. COL Robert W. Huntzinger, TOW PM, headed the team effort that coordinated the monumental task and completed it in record time. Colonel Huntzinger handpicked the technical support team that accompanied the equipment to Vietnam. Heading the team was Hugh J. McInnish, who had spearheaded the development of the airborne TOW system at Redstone Arsenal. Included on the support team were an expert on the UH-1B helicopter from Bell Aircraft as well as two engineers and two technicians from Hughes Aircraft, each an expert on the TOW and its airborne guidance and control equipment. A last-minute replacement pilot/ gunner was obtained from the AAH program at the U.S. Army Aviation Systems Command (AVSCOM), St. Louis, Missouri.
22 April 1972 The 1st Combat Aerial TOW Team, Vietnam (also known as “Hawk’s Claw”), was designated and deployed to the Republic of Vietnam. The team’s name reflected the first-time use of the airborne TOW missile system in combat against an armored enemy.
24 April 1972 The TOW equipment and personnel arrived at Tan Son Nhut Air Force Base (AFB) outside Saigon. Because none of the Army aviators had ever fired a TOW missile from the UH-1B HUEY helicopter, the support team gave them a condensed course on the XM26 system. As part of their graduation exercise, the crews fired two missiles each from airborne helicopters.
28 April 1972 The NVA overran Tan Canh, northwest of Kontum (a provincial capital north of Pleiku) and began bringing in heavy armor to use against the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) units falling back to the city. U.S. Army leaders ordered the XM26 TOW/HUEY helicopter crews and support team north to Camp Holloway near Pleiku in the Central Highlands.
29 April 1972 The entire TOW team was considered combat ready after undergoing additional gunner tracking training from 26 to 29 April, continuing system checkouts, and installing an armored seat modification.
30 April 1972 Beginning this date and continuing through 2 May, the 1st Combat Aerial TOW Team conducted their first live-fire training in the Pleiku area. The team had never fired a live TOW missile before being deployed to Vietnam.
30 April 1972 DA ordered the deployment of the ground-based TOW system with instructors to train U.S. and South Vietnamese crews to operate the weapon.
May 1972 An 82nd Airborne antitank task force was airlifted to Vietnam with 24 jeep-mounted launchers, 500 missiles, and two ¾-ton trucks from the maintenance contact team. The task force consisted of a 48-man crew plus a maintenance contact team of 10 personnel from the 763rd Ordnance Company. In Vietnam, units of the task force were attached to the 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (CD), whose personnel were trained to operate the TOW weapon system
May 1972 The decision to deploy the 1st Combat Aerial TOW Team to the Pleiku/Kontum area near the Dak Poko River was based on two main considerations. The first was the 2nd Corps Tactical Zone’s (CTZ’s) critical need for an antitank system to counter the high probability of a large number of NVA armored vehicles in that sector. Another reason was the need to protect the XM26 TOW/HUEY helicopter assets from the SA-7 Grail antiaircraft missile system which the enemy had deployed in the 1st and 3rd CTZs.
2 May 1972 The 1st Combat Aerial TOW Team, equipped with the XM26 TOW subsystem, went into combat for the first time. CWO Carroll W. Lain made history on this morning when he fired a TOW missile which struck a tank. This was the first American-made guided missile to be fired in combat by U.S. soldiers. During this day’s fighting, the team destroyed a total of four M-41 tanks, one 2½ -ton truck, and one artillery gun (a 105mm howitzer). Fired from a range of 2700 meters, the TOW missiles hit directly on the tanks and howitzer, and caused secondary explosions a few seconds after impact because of ammunition rounds inside the targeted items.
5 May 1972 Just 5 days after MICOM received movement orders, the first aircraft carrying ground-based TOW equipment landed in Vietnam. This deployment operation, much larger than the first movement of the airborne TOW, involved 87 TOW launcher systems, about 2500 missiles, maintenance support personnel and equipment, repair parts, trainers, and instructors. MAJ Dale F. Norton of the TOW Project Management Office (PMO) was named logistics officer for the ground system. He and Jesse Rich, a civilian missile maintenance technician from the MICOM Directorate for Maintenance, deployed with the system.
9 May 1972 The Army used TOW missiles to destroy three PT-76 tanks from ranges of 2000 to 3000 meters, with first round hits resulting in secondary explosions.
10 May 1972 TOW training for South Vietnamese Marine Corps personnel began on this date and continued through 22 July. They fired a total of 163 TOW missiles. During the course of this training program, the first ground-based TOW was fired in actual combat.
14 May 1972 At 0600, a UH-1B HUEY helicopter equipped with the XM26 TOW subsystem arrived over Kontum after responding to the tactical emergency declared by the Second Regional Assistance Group (SRAG) advisors. Before two of the reported T-54 tanks could cross the river and reach the cover of the thick undergrowth along Route QL-14, TOW missiles fired at a range of 2500 meters stopped the tanks “dead in their tracks.” Flames spouted 30-feet high from the burning armor because of secondary ammunition explosions.
15 May 1972 The 1st Combat Aerial TOW Team continued to seek out the enemy, destroying an ammunition truck and a large bunker in the area northeast of Kontum.
16 May 1972 The first attempt to use the XM26 subsystem at night was a failure. At 0200, an XM26 TOW/HUEY helicopter, along with COBRA gunships from the 361st Aerial Weapons Company, was tasked to engage and destroy T-54 tanks firing 100mm rounds at Kontum City. Initially, the aircrew had extreme difficulty acquiring the tank silhouette. Once adequate flare illumination was obtained, the aircrew fired one TOW missile at the target. However, the missile infrared source blinded the gunner and he was unable to track the missile. The TOW’s impact was not seen. The mission was terminated because of a flare shortage.
Later that same day, the 1st Combat Aerial TOW Team destroyed a truck and a 130mm howitzer from a range of 2500 meters. The first missile fired at the howitzer’s breech narrowly missed, but the second missile hit the target and caused a secondary explosion. The TOW team also destroyed two NVA armored personnel carriers west of Kontum on the same sortie. The second TOW was fired 5 seconds after impact of the first missile, unexpectedly demonstrating to the aircrew that multiple targets could be engaged on the same firing run.
18 May 1972 A forward air controller (FAC) at the Kontum airfield spotted two tanks about 2 miles out from the defenders, indicating the NVA’s reluctance to expose their armor to accurate antitank fire. The FAC also noticed an “island” on the river just north of the Kontum City perimeter that had not been there the day before. The “island” turned out to be a camouflaged T-54 tank that had stalled crossing the river. The 1st Combat Aerial TOW Team succeeded in destroying the tank from a range of 2500 meters. The same controller also spotted two 23mm antiaircraft guns firing on the city from the vicinity of Polei Kleng. The team fired the first TOW at the guns from out of range, so the missile fell short of the target. The second missile, launched from about 2800 meters, destroyed one of the guns.
20 May 1972 To force the withdrawal of enemy forces who had tunneled very close to the positions of the 53rd Regiment—too close for the use of tactical air support—the Kontum defenders used direct fire from nine M-41 tanks, supported by a gunship from the 361st Aerial Weapons Company, and the XM26 TOW/HUEY weapon system.
21 May 1972 By this date, 28 missiles had been expended in training personnel of the 82nd Airborne Division and the 3rd Brigade/1st CD on the ground-based TOW weapon system. Gunners of the 82nd Airborne task force fired 12 training rounds against an artillery bunker at a range of about 2800 meters and scored 12 direct hits. Gunners of the 3rd Brigade/1st CD fired 16 training rounds, with 1 missile malfunction, 9 target hits, and 6 misses due to poor lighting conditions.
21 May 1972 During a 10-day visit to Vietnam, BG William J. Maddox, Jr., the Director of Army Aviation, fired a TOW training round on this date and scored a hit on a previously destroyed M-41 tank.
22 May 1972 The first tank kill by the ground-based TOW deployed with the South Vietnamese Marine Corps occurred when an NVA combined tank-infantry force with 9 tanks and about 200 troops attacked the 369th Brigade command post (CP). When the battle ended 2 hours later, all 9 tanks had been destroyed and 117 enemy were confirmed dead.
26 May 1972 The 82nd Airborne Division task force, previously moved from Bien Hoa to Pleiku, was rushed to positions around Kontum to help counter the NVA tank assault launched on this date. PFC Angel Figueroa scored the division’s first tank kill with the ground-based TOW during the main battle for Kontum that raged until 31 May. About a week later, the 48-man task force turned over their TOW equipment to the 3rd Brigade/1st CD, then returned to the United States.
26 May 1972 The NVA launched its expected attack on Kontum before dawn on this date. Committed to battle at first light (0640), the two 1st Combat Aerial TOW Teams relieved each other throughout the morning, and constantly pressured the attacking NVA armor. Tactical air strikes hit enemy forces within 1 mile of the city, but they were hampered by the closeness of the NVA troops to the city’s defenders in the house-to-house battle under way inside Kontum. The TOW teams fired 21 missiles during several hours of continuous operation and destroyed 10 tanks, an ammunition truck, and a machine gun emplacement established on top of a water tower.
27 May 1972 The 1st Combat Aerial TOW Team returned to battle at the first report of tanks and NVA infantry in the wire near the ARVN 44th Regiment. By 0600 the helicopters were over the northern battlefront at Kontum. The open terrain north of the city provided no cover for the attacking armor, making it easier for the teams to destroy the last two T-54 tanks known to be in the area. Tactical aircraft, the TOW-equipped HUEY helicopters, and the efforts of the frontline soldiers stemmed the enemy advance by 1000.
28 May 1972 An NVA machine gun crew on a water tower overlooking the northern sections of Kontum halted the ARVN counterattack in the hospital compound by keeping the infantry pinned down. This was the same water tower at which the 1st Combat Aerial TOW Team had fired a missile on 26 May to take out an earlier enemy machine gun emplacement. The TOW team was ordered to destroy the machine gun position and the water tower. The team silenced the gun and attempted to topple the tower by firing missiles at the structure’s legs. Two of the three missiles launched hit two of the tower legs, but the multiple supporting cross members of the empty tower kept the structure from collapsing.
31 May 1972 By this date, the main battle for Kontum was believed to be over, although pockets of resistance continued. The ARVN suffered heavy losses, but held the field with the assistance of U.S. advisors, tactical air strikes, COBRA gunships, and the XM26 TOW/HUEY weapon system. Effective enemy resistance in Kontum City ended by 10 June.
8 June 1972 Beginning this date and continuing through 14 June, the 2nd Combat Aerial TOW Team was formed after General Creighton W. Abrams, Jr. decided to keep the XM26 aerial TOW in Vietnam as insurance against any future NVA armor penetration. Replacement members selected from the 17th Aviation Group’s COBRA gunship units were trained by the 1st Combat Aerial TOW Team in the Pleiku area. The second team assumed the combat mission in the 2nd CTZ, while the first team returned to the United States between 18 and 22 June 72.
12 June 1972 Between 26 May and this date, the 1st Combat Aerial TOW Team was never hit by enemy air defenses. The system’s long standoff range and the altitude maintained by the helicopters were two important reasons for this achievement. Additional factors were the disciplined training and experience gained by the crews during the USACDEC 43.6 trials as well as the very close operational procedures and teamwork developed with other airborne elements in Vietnam.
Also by this time, the 1st Combat Aerial TOW Team had recorded a total of 47 kills. These included: 24 tanks, 4 armored personnel carriers, 2 artillery pieces, 7 trucks, 1 antiaircraft position, 2 machine gun positions, 1 wooden bridge, 1 hut with small arms ammunition, 1 small arms ammunition dump at an abandoned fire base, 1 122mm rocket launching position, and 3 bunkers. With the success of the original airborne TOW team and the continued success of the replacement team trained in-country, funding for the next generation M65 TOW/COBRA was secured.
25 June 1972 A limited number of U.S. ground-based TOW missile systems saw combat in Vietnam. These systems destroyed 12 tanks, including 9 in a single action northwest of Hue on this date.
June-July 1972 Between 18 June and 18 July, the 2nd Combat Aerial TOW Team flew few combat missions because enemy action in the 2nd CTZ had subsided and the monsoon season had started. The team’s major assignment in June was to provide aerial coverage in support of the 14 maneuver battalions engaged in the Highway QL-14 road opening operation. Their only combat mission was the destruction of two 2½ -ton ammunition trucks on 20 June.
July 1972 While at Lane Army Airfield in An Son, the 2nd Combat Aerial TOW Team conducted a successful night firing against an abandoned armored personnel carrier. The controlled test showed the system’s night capability using a spectral eyepiece developed in-country by Hughes engineers and 2.75-inch flare rockets fired from AH-1G COBRAs.
4 July 1972 The 2nd Combat Aerial TOW Team used four TOW missiles to destroy a T-54 tank from a range of 2000 meters. Highway QL-14 opened to civilian traffic on 6 July. The team remained in the Pleiku-Kontum area until 18 July.
12 July 1972 Enemy fire at Phu Bai destroyed 78 TOW missiles. Another 16 missiles were destroyed at Fire Support Base Ross on 19 August. Virtually all of the TOW equipment furnished South Vietnam was eventually captured or destroyed.
1 August 1972 The maintenance contact team which had accompanied the 82nd Airborne Division task force to Vietnam remained in-country until this date.
9 August 1972 The Army terminated the CHEYENNE (AH-56A) program. The experiences of the airborne TOW teams in Vietnam played a role in this decision. With a combat-proven point weapon system, the Army was able to convince Congress to support the AAH program.
19 August 1972 By this time, a total of 23 ground-based TOW missiles had been fired in combat engagements, destroying 11 tanks and 6 bunkers.
August-November 1972 The 2nd Combat Aerial TOW Team was moved several times during this period to counter enemy moves and to make better use of the antitank system’s combat capabilities. From An Son the team moved to Danang, then to Saigon.
November 1972 The source selection board convened this month to select the airframe for the advanced attack helicopter. Initial production began in 1973. With the demonstrated combat effectiveness of the TOW antitank missile system, the Army accelerated the production of the XM65 TOW/COBRA to counter the rapidly-growing Soviet tank threat in Europe.
1 November 1972 The 2nd Combat Aerial TOW Team began working with the 12th Combat Aviation Group to help counter a significant armor threat which had developed in the 3rd CTZ. Attached to F Troop, 9th Cavalry, the XM26 TOW/HUEY helicopters were used daily to engage point targets. They also served in a reconnaissance role to further enhance the air cavalry mission. Although the anticipated NVA armor threat never materialized in the 3rd CTZ, the TOW team did destroy one T-54 tank, two armored personnel carriers, and eight ammunition trucks.
1972-1973 The airborne TOW missile system proved to be very adaptable to combat operations, and the XM26 performed very well while in Vietnam. Hughes Aircraft Company technicians were able to handle the minor problems that occurred. Because the airborne TOW system was actually a test bed that had not been designed to be maintained in the field, it required the support of highly trained engineers and technicians as well as extensive laboratory test equipment to keep it operational. Despite the challenges, the airborne TOW achieved a 90 percent reliability rating for the entire period it was deployed in Vietnam. The lack of a limited visibility/night vision capability was the single largest impediment to XM26 system effectiveness during that time.
1973 The TOW thermal night sight (AN/TAS-4) program began. Problems encountered in Vietnam with night firings also affected this program. The TOW system’s daylight combat operations in 1972 were a dramatic success, but the airborne XM26 TOW had limited usefulness at night. The first night firings in combat failed because the gunners were blinded first by the bright infrared source, then by flares. A filter allowed night firings without blinding the gunner, but it was still almost impossible for even experienced gunners to locate a target range at night. Several misses also occurred because the gunner was unable to see the target while guiding the missile. Night combat experience in Vietnam showed the need for a passive night vision system for target detection and tracking before the airborne TOW system had an effective night capability.
11 January 1973 The XM26 airborne TOW system remained in Vietnam until late this month. Between 30 April 72 and this date, the two HUEY gunships fired a total of 199 TOW missiles: 37 in training and 162 in combat. The training firings began on 30 April and continued through 7 August. Of the 162 airborne TOW missiles fired in combat, 151 (93 percent) were reliable and 124 (82 percent) scored hits on a variety of targets. These included: 27 tanks, 21 trucks, 5 armored personnel carriers, 3 artillery pieces, 1 antiaircraft gun, 1 122mm rocket launcher, 5 machine guns, 2 57mm guns, 5 caves, 8 bunkers, 2 bridges, 2 mortars, 2 ammunition storage dumps, 2 TOW jeeps (1 with launcher and 1 with missiles), and 1 house. There were 11 malfunctions and 4 misses. The latter occurred when the gunner fired the missile at a range in excess of 3000 meters and lost it when the guidance wire ran out. Although the HUEYs encountered considerable machine gun fire, neither of the gunships was hit by enemy fire because they stayed high.
28 January 1973 With the cease fire on this date, the mission of the 2nd Combat Aerial TOW Team ended in Vietnam. The UH-1B HUEY helicopters and XM26 TOW systems were retrograded to the United States.
October 1973 A total of 81 TOW launchers and 2,010 missiles were rushed to Israel under Project 9DD for use in the Yom Kippur War. Israeli commandos flew to Fort Benning, Georgia, that same month to train with the system. They returned home in time for a decisive battle in the Golan Heights.
1974 MICOM recommended that the range of the airborne TOW be extended to 3750 meters to improve the survivability of the helicopter against the threat posed by the battlefield of that time.
May 1974 The TOW Weapon System received the Wolfe Memorial Trophy, an award given annually by the Daedalian Society to the individual or group responsible for developing an outstanding military weapon system.
December 1974 The first Army foreign military sales (FMS) case for the XM65 airborne TOW was signed when Italy bought two systems to be delivered in FY 76.
March 1975 Deployment of the Basic TOW to Korea began.
9 June 1975 The engineering change proposal (ECP) to extend the range of the TOW to 3750 meters was approved.
September 1975 Texas Instruments received a contract for development test/operational test II hardware and follow-on full-scale development of the Manportable Common Thermal Night Sight (MCTNS).
November 1975 Deployment of the M65 TOW/COBRA began with the first fieldings to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) during this month.
1976 The first deployment to continental United States (CONUS) and USAREUR units of the XM65 TOW missile system, mounted on the AH-IQ/S COBRA helicopter, began this year.
January 1976 The Extended Range TOW missile went into production.
February 1976 Fielding of the Basic TOW to USAREUR was completed during this month.
March 1976 The M65 TOW/COBRA was deployed to USAREUR under Project Hand-off, thereby meeting the system’s initial operating capability (IOC) date.
June 1976 Beginning this month, all TOW missiles produced were of the extended range design.
30 November 1976 The TOW PM, COL Robert W. Huntzinger, retired. He served for 8 years and 5 months, the longest that a project manager has served in the history of AMC. Colonel Huntzinger served during the most active period of TOW’s history. When he arrived in 1968, the initial production effort had been authorized with a letter contract which was later negotiated and definitized after Colonel Huntzinger’s arrival. Shortly thereafter a competitive solicitation for a second missile production source was released for the purpose of educating a second missile producer to be a competitor to Hughes after qualification. That solicitation resulted in an award to the Chrysler Huntsville Plant. Hughes subsequently won the Chrysler-Hughes competition, resulting in a substantial savings. A different approach was taken with the launcher procurement. Emerson Electric was awarded a contract in a later competition which did not involve an educational procurement. It too resulted in substantial savings.
A major accomplishment during Colonel Huntzinger’s tenure was the development and deployment of a thermal night sight that gave TOW a day/night capability which at the time was the highest infantry priority. During this period TOW deployed in all CONUS and OCONUS theaters including Vietnam. Those fieldings included the M-65 airborne TOW/COBRA. In addition to U.S. Army deployments, by the time Colonel Huntzinger retired, TOW had been adopted by 21 countries.
31 December 1976 Of all the MICOM missile systems involved in FMS at this time, the TOW missile was used by the most foreign nations.
1977 Deployment of the M65 airborne TOW was completed to Europe during the year.
3 January 1977 COL James H. Brill assumed the position of TOW PM.
April 1977 The Army established a new unit known as a TOW light antitank battalion. The Oklahoma Army National Guard (ARNG), selected as the test unit, received its TOW equipment during this month.
15 April 1977 The U.S. Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command (DARCOM) established a provisional Advanced Heavy Antitank Missile System (AHAMS) Project Office to develop a replacement for the TOW.
1 July 1977 COL Arthur L. Goodall became the Acting TOW PM, replacing COL James H. Brill, who retired. Colonel Goodall was permanently assigned to the position on 29 September 77.
August 1977 The TOW night sight was type classified standard. Texas Instruments received the initial production contract.
29 September 1977 The TOW and DRAGON Project Offices were combined.
November 1977 With deliveries for this year, the TOW missile became the most heavily produced Army guided missile.
1978 Deployment of the Basic TOW to all active Army units was completed during this year.
10 July 1978 COL Neil S. Williamson, III, replaced COL Arthur L. Goodall as TOW/DRAGON PM. Colonel Goodall transferred to the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive Materiel Readiness Command (TARCOM) on 7 July.
November 1978 Texas Instruments delivered the first AN/TAS-4 TOW production night sight.
November 1978 The M65 TOW missile subsystem contract was awarded to Hughes Aircraft.
1979 The first M901 Improved TOW Vehicle (ITV) entered the Army inventory. This was the first Army antiarmor system that allowed operators to use the weapon system totally protected by armor.
September 1979 Deployment of the AN/TAS-4 TOW production night sight began with fieldings to training bases in CONUS and USAREUR.
1980 Deployment of the AH-1S modernized COBRA helicopter to U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) units began.
1980 Hughes Aircraft Company began the design of the TOW 2 missile.
January 1980 The AN/TAS-4 TOW night sight achieved IOC.
April 1980 The TOW/DRAGON Project Office was redesignated the TOW Project Office, following the termination of project management for the DRAGON weapon system. The DRAGON was relegated to Level II management in the Weapon Systems Management Directorate (WSMD).
September 1980 The first FORSCOM units received the TOW night sight.
September 1980 The Improved TOW (ITOW) program, started in August 78, was redefined to include both the ITOW and TOW 2 missiles.
30 March 1981 The MICOM Commander approved a full release for the ITOW. The initial operational capability for the ITOW was met after the first deployment to USAREUR.
June 1981 The M65 TOW/COBRA was first fielded to the U.S. Army National Guard.
17 June 1981 COL Neil S. Williamson, III, retired from his position as TOW PM. He was replaced by COL Byron L. Powers on this same date.
9 October 1981 DA approved the type classification of standard for the TOW 2, full production of the TOW 2 missile, retrofit of the existing Basic TOW stocks, and modification of the Basic TOW launchers.
March 1982 MICOM awarded Hughes Aircraft a contract for the full-scale engineering development effort to integrate the TOW 2 with the Bradley Fighting Vehicle System (BFVS).
28 March 1983 The BFVS achieved IOC with the first deployment to Fort Hood, Texas.
5 May 1983 The Hughes Aircraft Company delivered the first TOW 2 missile to the Army at a ceremony held at the company’s plant in Tucson, Arizona.
July 1983 The TOW 2 was first deployed to the U.S. Army Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia.
September 1983 The first BFVS was deployed to USAREUR.
9 September 1983 The MICOM Commander approved a full release for the TOW 2.
October 1983 The IOC date was met with the first deployment of the TOW 2 to USAREUR.
January 1984 DA tasked the COBRA Project Manager to acquire a night vision system for the AH-1S modernized helicopter. Consequently, the COBRA night sight (C-NITE) program was established.
21 April 1984 Hughes Aircraft received a contract for very high speed integrated circuit (VHSIC) exploratory development leading to the insertion of a wireless command link (WCL) in the TOW system.
30 April 1984 COL James B. Lincoln, formerly the Joint Tactical Missile System (JTACMS) PM, was reassigned as the TOW PM. He replaced COL Byron L. Powers, who retired.
1985 The 193d Infantry Brigade, Panama, was the first FORSCOM unit to receive the TOW 2 system.
March 1985 The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA) approved development of the TOW Lethality Improvement Program as an interim capability against the evolving threat of the 1990s. This improvement program encompassed the development and qualification of two different warhead configurations. One was known as fly-over-shoot-down (TOP ATTACK), while the other was called direct attack.
27 September 1985 Fielding of the TOW weapon system to Round-Out/Round-Up National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve units concurrently with TOW 2 deployments to the active Army units to which the National Guard/Reserve units were aligned was completed ahead of schedule.
1 November 1985 The Secretary of Defense approved Canada's purchase of TOW 2 missiles directly from Hughes Aircraft Company. This was the first time that the U.S. government allowed any other country to buy TOW missiles directly from the contractor.
5 November 1985 The first U.S. Army light division—the 4th Battalion/17th Infantry of the 7th Infantry Division (Light)—underwent TOW 2 modification.
December 1985 DA approved the redesignation of the TOW Lethality Improvement Program as TOW 2B, which was to be accomplished as a product improvement program (PIP).
1986 The last buy of M65 TOW missiles to complete fielding of the COBRA helicopter to the U.S. Army National Guard was awarded to Hughes Aircraft.
1986 During the second quarter, MICOM terminated the TOW 2 WCL contracts with Hughes Aircraft for convenience to the government. The command took this action because of the uncertain delivery of two required VHSIC chips to be used in the missile receiver electronics unit.
1986 After reviews with the AMC Deputy Commanding General (DCG) for Research, Development, and Acquisition (RDA), the TOW Project Office implemented a new TOW 2B program strategy in the second and third quarters of this year. Under the revised plan, the project office would pursue only one technological approach based on an analytical down select from the alternative approaches of TOP ATTACK or direct attack.
May 1986 Ballistic Research Laboratories (BRL) conducted the TOW 2B down select analysis this month. The technology chosen was TOP ATTACK.
29 August 86 A new research, development, test and evaluation (RDTE) contract was awarded to Hughes Aircraft to complete the WCL guidance system for TOW.
September 1986 Fielding of the TOW 2 to the U.S. Army Western Command (WESTCOM) was completed on schedule.
September 1986 The Swiss Parliament approved a TOW 2 co-production program with an estimated value of over $500 million.
3 November 1986 Information about the clandestine arms dealings between the United States and Iran became public knowledge. Both TOW and HAWK missiles were involved in the Reagan administration’s “arms-for-hostages” deal. Proceeds from the missile sales to Iran were diverted to support the contras in Nicaragua.
1987 This year was the first time the major components of the M65 TOW system were broken out for competition. This year was also the last buy of the M65 TOW to complete fielding of the M65 COBRA helicopter to the U.S. Army National Guard, which had received its first system in June 81.
1987 The FY 1987 Defense Authorization Act designated TOW as a Defense Enterprise Program (DEP), an initiative designed to increase the efficiency of the management structure of a defense acquisition program. It also enhanced program stability through the use of milestone authorization. In addition, the DEP reduced the number of officials through whom the PM reported as well as decreased the number of regulations, policies, directives, and administrative rules and guidelines relating to acquisition activities to which the system was subject. The act required that DOD nominate at least nine acquisition programs (three per service) to participate in the DEP in FY 1988. Two of the programs designated for the Army were managed at Redstone Arsenal.
15 April 1987 The TOW Project Office approved the TOW 2A Missile Integration Implementation ECP, thereby establishing a new missile configuration for the U.S. Army. Production of the TOW 2A began this same month. This variation of the TOW missile was developed to counter Soviet reactive armor.
June 1987 The BFVS/TOW 2 subsystem (T2SS) and TOW 2 subsystem support equipment (T2SS-SE) were approved for release to TRADOC.
1 July 1987 COL Thomas M. Devanney assumed the position of TOW PM, after COL James B. Lincoln transferred to U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC) Headquarters on 12 June 87.
17 September 1987 The AMC Commander approved the conditional release of the TOW 2A missile.
24 September 1987 The TOW 2B development contract was awarded to Hughes Aircraft Company.
28 September 1987 The first shipment of TOW 2A missiles arrived in USAREUR.
29 January 1988 The first TOW 2 WCL missile was fired at MICOM Test Area I.
30 April 1988 Despite the success of the initial test firings of the TOW 2 WCL guidance system missiles, the contract for this effort expired due to insufficient funding for additional testing.
September 1988 The first fielding of the Bradley A1 vehicles with TOW 2 subsystems was completed.
1989 Despite the need demonstrated in Vietnam for a passive night vision system for target detection and tracking, the C-NITE telescopic sight was not delivered to the Army until this year.
23 March 1989 The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) held a public hearing in Reno, Nevada, on the site characterization plan for the possible construction of a geologic repository for commercial and defense spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. Attendees were part of the most detailed discussion of potential terrorist use of antitank missiles against nuclear waste repository shipments. Testimony at the hearing identified the U.S. TOW and the French/NATO Milan wire-guided missiles as terrorist weapons of choice because of their armor penetration, effective range, and proven battlefield performance.
9 June 1989 A 33-month Alternate TOW 2B development contract was awarded to Hughes Aircraft Company.
12 July 1989 McDonnell Douglas Missile Systems Company (MDMSC) received a $5.4 million contract as the second source for TOW missiles.
November 1989 A TOW Joint Program Review was held at Hughes Aircraft Company in Tucson, Arizona, from 28 to 30 November. During that period, Army and DOD officials, along with contractor representatives and various dignitaries from support organizations worldwide, attended a ceremony marking the production of 500,000 missiles at the company’s Tucson facilities.
1990 The Army approved production of the TOW 2B, the latest version of the TOW antitank missile.
1990 The TOW Sight Improvement Program (TSIP) effort began. The improvement program would significantly enhance the TOW system’s current capabilities and ensure its effectiveness into the next decade.
8 January 1990 The MICOM WSMD assumed operational control of the TOW M65 Subsystem (COBRA) on this date.
26 April 1990 COL Thomas M. Devanney, TOW PM, was temporarily assigned as the Acting Deputy, Program Executive Officer (PEO), Fire Support. Gerald Smith, TOW Deputy PM, served as Acting PM until 21 January 1991.
27 June 1990 Because of budget constraints, the DOD Under Secretary for Acquisition instructed the Army to proceed with termination of the missile second source contract with MDMSC.
2 August 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait and captured U.S.-made HAWK and TOW missiles owned by the latter nation. United Nations (U.N.) Security Council Resolution 660 condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
6 August 1990 U.N. Security Council Resolution 661 imposed economic sanctions against Iraq. Saudi Arabia requested U.S. assistance in its defense.
7 August 1990 Operation Desert Shield (ODS) began (C-Day). The first U.S. forces arrived in Saudi Arabia the following day (8 August).
9 August 1990 The TOW Project Office received word that the 82nd, 101st, and 24th Divisions would deploy immediately to Southwest Asia (SWA). The 1st CD, elements of the 2nd Armored Division, and the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment would follow shortly. Analysis showed that only the 82nd had the latest version of the TOW 2 missile guidance set with new software for improved tracking in a desert environment.
10 August 1990 DA Headquarters directed the TOW Project Office to immediately apply the latest software modification to the TOW 2 launchers and the ITV launch rail modification on TOW 2 systems before units deployed to SWA. The rail modification allowed TOW 2A missiles to load into ITV turrets without binding despite missile cases that were at the maximum width tolerance.
17 August 1990 After the TOW modification team completed its mission at Fort Hood, Texas, deploying units had the most up-to-date TOW 2 equipment available.
29 August 1990 The 82nd Airborne Division arrived in Saudi Arabia.
12 September 1990 Major combat elements of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) arrived in theater.
6 October 1990 The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) arrived in Saudi Arabia.
25 October 1990 Modification of the BFV/T2SS missile guidance set began at Hughes Aircraft Company. This effort was pushed to provide additional capability for deployment in support of ODS.
November 1990 Two Hughes field service representatives were deployed to SWA to support the BFVS materiel fielding team in deprocessing and handoff. They provided in-country troubleshooting and repair of critical TOW subsystem components. One remained in country until January 91 while the other stayed on until March 1991.
November 1990 The Saudi Arabia National Guard was provided TOW night sights, giving them night fighting capability used effectively during Desert Storm.
18 November 1990 The PEO Fire Support sent a team to SWA to support the TOW weapon system. The team remained in theater until 13 March 1991.
29 November 1990 U.N. Security Council Resolution 678 authorized the use of force to uphold its resolutions unless Iraq withdrew from Kuwait by the 15 January 1991 deadline.
30 November 1990 By this date, the TOW 2 optical protection sight exchange program was completed in SWA. During ODS, the TOW Project Office received intelligence assessments that identified the presence of laser range-finders on Iraqi tanks that posed an eye damage threat to gunners looking through optical telescopes like those on the TOW 2 optical sight. Logisticians for the system developed a plan to apply the first deliveries of optical sight objective lenses with laser protective coating to units that had just deployed to Saudi Arabia. MICOM Logistic Assistance Representatives (LARs) exchanged the new items with unmodified sights, then shipped the latter back to Anniston Army Depot, Alabama, for modification. The modified sights were returned to SWA for use by other units deployed in the theater of operations.
21 December 1990 The TOW 2B engineering change proposal was incorporated into part of the FY 90 TOW 2A missile production.
FY 91 Bradley A2 vehicles were deployed in support of Operation Desert Storm (ODS) to the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, 1st CD, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, and the 1st Infantry Division (ID).
FY 91 FMS support to allied forces during ODS consisted of the delivery of 150 TOW 2 launchers to Saudi Arabia, 67 launchers to Egypt, and 8 launchers to Oman. The launchers were directed from U.S. inventory, with a payback from customer procurements.
January 1991 The Alternate TOW 2B program was terminated due to lack of funding.
15 January 1991 COL Jack D. Conway was named TOW PM.
15 January 1991 The United Nations set this date as the deadline for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait.
17 January 1991 The ODS air war began (D-Day). U.S. Marine Corps AH-1T COBRA helicopter gunships destroyed an Iraqi command post with TOW missiles following Iraq’s sporadic shelling of the Khafji area near the Saudi-Kuwaiti border.
27 January 1991 COL Thomas M. Devanney, formerly the TOW PM, was permanently reassigned as the Deputy PEO, Fire Support.
29 January 1991 After AMC tasked MICOM to manage the M901 ITV, a WSMD team began to identify problems and their solutions that helped raise the vehicle’s readiness rates from 80 percent to 95 percent. The initial assessment of the system’s performance during the “100 Hour War” showed that the ITVs had at least 14 confirmed kills.
29 January 1991 Iraqi troops attacked Khafji, Saudi Arabia. Saudi-led coalition forces, which included U.S. Marine Corps units, stormed the town the following day (30 January), but were forced to retreat. The second Saudi-led attack on 31 January successfully retook Khafji. During the series of fire fights constituting the first major ground battle of Operation Desert Storm, TOW antitank missiles immobilized many Iraqi tanks and armored cars.
February 1991 MICOM workers and an employee of the Huntsville Division of the Army Corps of Engineers developed a new internal blast shield for the TOW that would help the missile defeat tank reactive armor.
23 February 1991 The deadline for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait before the beginning of the ground war was set for 12 Noon (8 p.m. in Baghdad). Coalition forces began the ground phase of the campaign (G-Day) on 24 February.
27 February 1991 A MICOM Quality Assurance Technician completed the task of handing off TOW 2 equipment to the Royal Saudi Land Forces.
28 February 1991 President George H.W. Bush ordered the cessation of offensive operations. The following day, cease fire terms were negotiated in Safwan, Iraq.
3 April 1991 U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 set forth a permanent cease fire, the terms of which were officially accepted by Iraq on 6 April. The cease fire took effect on 11 April 1991.
15 October 1991 The Secretary of the Army cancelled the TSIP because of declining budget and funding issues. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development and Acquisition directed the PEO, Fire Support to coordinate the development of an affordable alternative. The latter effort subsequently became known as the Improved Target Acquisition System (ITAS) being developed for the Army's light forces.
(After the Air Defense PEO was deactivated on 29 July 1992, several of the systems formerly assigned to the organization were assigned to the newly created PEO, Tactical Missiles, which replaced the PEO, Fire Support.)
1992 During the second quarter of this fiscal year, the TOW 2B replaced the TOW 2A as the standard production missile.
January 1992 The Army Acquisition Executive (AAE) designated the TOW ITAS program as Acquisition Category (ACAT) III. The ITAS was a material change to the Ground TOW 2 weapon system for first-to-deploy light forces. It would improve the TOW’s target detection recognition and engagement capability by incorporating a second generation forward looking infrared (FLIR), a laser range finder, and automatic tracking features. All missile configurations could still be fired, allowing room for growth for follow-on missiles. The ITAS would be fielded at battalion level, replacing TOW 2 in light infantry units. The modification kit consisted of an integrated Target Acquisition Subsystem (TAS), Fire Control Subsystem (FCS), Battery Power Source (BPS), and Modified Traversing Unit (TU). The ITAS would operate from the highly mobile, multipurpose, wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) and associated dismount platforms.
30 March 1992 Redstone Arsenal was the first U.S. site for a semiannual meeting of 10 international customers for the TOW missile system. The TOW Weapon System Partnership Committee, part of the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA), began its semiannual meeting at the arsenal on this date. Usually held at the depot facility at Capellan in Luxembourg, the one-time invitation gave members an opportunity to see where the TOW system was managed. The meeting ended on 2 April 1992.
30 April 1993 The TOW ITAS Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) contract was awarded to Texas Instruments, Inc.
June 1993 In support of U.N. operations in Somalia, U.S. Army troops fired TOW 2 and TOW 2A missiles from AH-1F/M65 COBRA aircraft. By 30 September 1993, Task Force Safari soldiers had launched a total of 124 TOW 2 and TOW 2A missiles. That same month, a technical team from the TOW Project Office deployed to Somalia to provide assistance and technical advice to U.S. Army units in country.
17 June 1993 COL Robert E. Armbruster, Jr. was assigned as TOW PM. He replaced COL Jack D. Conway, who retired.
27 July 1993 The PEO, Tactical Missiles approved the Acquisition Plan for the Improved Bradley Acquisition Subsystem (IBAS), an improvement of the current Bradley TOW acquisition and fire control subsystem. This effort was an extension of the TOW ITAS.
5 October 1993 Approval of an ECP incorporating changes to the TOW 2A missile generated the TOW 2A Air missile. Production implementation of this unique Navy missile occurred in FY 94.
18 February 1994 The IBAS EMD effort was awarded to Texas Instruments, Inc., as a letter contract modification to the TOW ITAS EMD contract.
2 March 1994 The TOW Project Management Office was disestablished. Ground TOW weapon system responsibility transitioned to the MICOM WSMD. Included in the transfer were the Ground TOW launcher, night sight, M70 Trainer, and ancillary equipment. That same day, the Close Combat Anti-Armor Weapon Systems (CCAWS) Project Office was established. The new organization’s management responsibilities included the ITAS, IBAS, TOW missile production (and TOW missile production close-out), the Bradley/T2SS production, and future CCAWS programs.
August 1994 TOW/COBRA provided a team to support verification and checkout of TOW subsystems scheduled for deployment to Haiti with the 10th Mountain Division.
1 August 1994 Gary L. Lawson assumed the Assistant PM position for the TOW missile production program.
September 1994 The TOW BFVS provided a team to support the 24th Infantry Division at Fort Stewart, Georgia, for deployment to Haiti. The team helped prepare about 60 vehicles by providing a complete checkout of the Bradley/T2SS.
19 April 1995 A massive explosion destroyed the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Two bomb scares occurred shortly after the initial blast. The first scare caused rescuers to be evacuated when an investigator discovered a TOW missile in the rubble about 20 to 30 feet above ground level. The inert missile belonged to the U.S. Customs Service, which had an office on the fifth floor of the building. The missile was reportedly being used in an undercover operation. News reports about the evacuation of rescuers from the bombing site after the TOW missile was found helped fuel conspiracy theorists’ belief in a government cover-up of the true cause of the Oklahoma bombing which killed 168 people and injured 467.
December 1995 The TOW weapon system deployed to Bosnia with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Partnership for Peace forces as part of a peacekeeping mission.
FY 96 Texas Instruments, Inc. delivered the first four IBAS prototypes.
May 1996 Military gunners at Fort Lewis, Washington, test fired the new target acquisition system for the TOW missile. The flight tests with the ITAS were conducted throughout this month, with 42 missiles fired by month’s end.
August 1996 The TOW ITAS completed the original 40-month EMD contract.
30 September 1996 A Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) contract was awarded to Texas Instruments, Inc., for 25 ITAS systems.
October 1996 The TOW production line transitioned to Hughes Aircraft, the prime contractor.
November 1996 COL Roger L. Carter became the new CCAWS Project Manager, replacing COL Robert E. Armbruster, Jr., who was promoted to brigadier general and selected as the Deputy Commanding General at the Space and Strategic Defense Command.
May 1997 The last TOW missile for the United States was produced.
December 1997 By this month, a U.S. District Court judge had imposed prison sentences and restitution terms on five men involved in the theft of military vehicles from Fort McCoy, Wisconsin. Two of those sentenced to terms of imprisonment had been Army employees, one a former range maintenance officer. About 153 vehicles, once valued at $13 million and still conservatively estimated at the time of sentencing to be worth $1.5 million to $2.5 million, were taken from the post between September 1994 and June 1996. Among the stolen vehicles were M901 TOW missile launchers, a Sheridan tank, a howitzer, and other types of trucks. Although no missiles were taken and none of the equipment ended up in the hands of terrorists, the conspirators sold a TOW missile launcher to an individual in Oklahoma, and an undercover agent bought a M901 missile launcher and a jeep. However, the planned sale of a missile launcher and other equipment to Fox Studios for the movie Courage Under Fire fell through. Authorities eventually recovered many of the stolen vehicles. The charges and convictions against the men followed an intensive 13-month investigation by the Defense Criminal Investigation Service and the FBI, with help from Fort McCoy’s senior leadership.
1998 About 2200 TOW 2 missiles were deployed to Bosnia in support of Operation Joint Endeavor.
1998 Release of the formal request for proposal for the Follow-on to TOW (FOTT) Missile System occurred in the first quarter of this fiscal year. The FOTT would have been organic to and provided improved long-range, lethal, antitank capability for light and mechanized infantry forces currently equipped with the TOW missile system. Key FOTT missile system requirements included compatibility with all TOW launch platforms; fire-and-forget primary mode of operation with an alternative mode for backup; increased range, lethality, and platform survivability; and modular design for future growth and shelf-life extension. Although projected to enter EMD in FY 98 and transition to LRIP in FY 04, the termination of funding for the FOTT led to a new search for other options to maintain the viability of the Army’s antiarmor missile capability.
1998 Late in this year, AMC released a formal request for information (RFI) which solicited new technology concepts for a program identified as the TOW Fire-and-Forget (F&F) Missile System. The TOW F&F RFI sought “a low cost near term solution to the FOTT requirement, which [had been] determined to be unaffordable.
January 1998 The ITAS customer test was initiated.
March 1998 The Army awarded LRIP II for 75 ITAS for the first brigade fielding in the fourth quarter of 1999.
September 1998 The first unit equipped with the ITAS was A Troop, 1/17th Cavalry, 82nd Airborne Division. The new system would be fielded over 10 years to all active Army TOW users and selected National Guard units.
1999 The ITAS Limited User Test II was successfully conducted during the second quarter.
1999 The Army awarded the ITAS full-rate production contract for 102 systems, with priced annual options for FY 00-03.
June 1999 The TOW weapon system was deployed to support troops sent to serve in Kosovo as part of Operation Joint Guardian.
2000 The first two ITAS foreign military sales cases were approved for NAMSA and Canada.
During the first quarter of this fiscal year, the Army released the TOW F&F request for proposal. The TOW F&F mission was to provide the next-generation missile for light, early entry contingency forces equipped with TOW ITAS platforms. The system would include the encased TOW F&F missile, the shipping and storage container, and ITAS platform applique kits. In addition to its compatibility with the ITAS ground platform, the TOW F&F missile would not only operate in a fire-and-forget capability but would have an alternate command guidance mode as backup. It would also have increased range, lethality, and platform survivability; be able to counter active protection system threats; and have a modular design for future growth and shelf life extension.
4-5 April 2000 The TOW Weapon System Partnership Committee met in Huntsville for the second time. Usually held in Luxembourg each April and October, the United States agreed to sponsor this month’s meeting, which was hosted by the CCAWS Project Office and the U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command (AMCOM) Deputy for Systems Acquisition (DSA). This meeting also marked the committee’s 25th anniversary. Although several systems had weapon systems partnerships, TOW had the longest running committee. Member nations included Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. The United States was not a committee member, but it did serve as an advisor to the group.
July 2000 From 9 to 29 July, the 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, conducted live fire exercises with TOW missiles at Redstone Arsenal. The unit was invited to shoot the missiles, which had already been scheduled for destruction
9 September 2000 The Army awarded a $125.9 million TOW F&F missile EMD contract to Raytheon’s Missile Systems business unit in Tucson, Arizona. The TOW F&F would integrate an advanced focal plane array and imaging infrared (FPA/IIR) seeker. The IIR seeker and software would provide automatic target tracking, and eliminate the TOW wire, significantly increasing soldier survivability and overall system lethality. Designed to engage any target that the gunner could see, day or night, even when faced with battlefield contaminants or countermeasures, the TOW F&F missile would also defeat threat tanks equipped with advanced armor and active protection systems.
The Road To M65 TOW: i primi elicotteri d’attacco controcarro NATO in Europa | SOBCHAK SECURITY - est. 2005 (wordpress.com)
The Road To M65 TOW: i primi elicotteri d’attacco controcarro NATO in Europa
Nell’ambito del progetto storico dedicato alla US Army Aviation, questa volta vi parlero’ dello schieramento dei primi elicotteri d’attacco controcarro NATO in Europa Centrale.
Sono passati oramai 40 anni dalla consegna degli AH-1Q Cobra/TOW ai reparti addestrativi e operativi dell’US Army, e per questo motivo mi sembrava interessante ripercorrere la storia dietro a questa macchina e al suo particolare sistema d’arma: l’M65. Oltre a cio’, ho deciso di spendere due parole sia sul ruolo ricoperto da queste macchine, sia sulle revisioni addestrative e dottrinali attuate dall’aviazione dell’esercito nel corso dei cruciali anni Settanta.
Ovviamente non potevo tralasciare il debutto dell’Airborne TOW in Vietnam, dove vi furono i primi casi di carri di fabbricazione Sovietica distrutti da elicotteri occidentali.
La chiusura di questo special e’ invece dedicata ad una sintesi sulle differenze che intercorrono tra le numerose varianti dei Cobra monoturbina adottate dall’US Army.
Che altro dire? Buona lettura e Buone Feste!
Gia’ dalle prime fasi del conflitto in Vietnam, l’US Army aspirava a dotarsi di un elicottero d’attacco con autentiche capacita’ controcarro. A seguito della cancellazione dei programmi AAFSS/Cheyenne (1965-72) e il disimpegno dal Sud Est Asiatico, l’esercito statunitense inizio’ a dedicare sempre piu’ tempo, risorse ed energie al Patto di Varsavia e al teatro dell’Europa Centrale (con gran sollievo dei paesi dell’Alleanza Atlantica).
Nel 1972, subito dopo la cancellazione dell’AH-56 Cheyenne, l’US Army avvio’ formalmente il programma Advanced Attack Helicopter (AAH), che avrebbe dovuto fornire all’esercito una sofisticata macchina biturbina specificatamente concepita per la lotta controcarri. In poche parole un sostituto “agli steroidi” del Cobra. Fu pero’ chiaro sin dal principio che il processo di selezione, sviluppo, collaudo e consegna avrebbe richiesto tempi tutt’altro che brevi. L’esercito necessitava, dunque, di una efficace e al tempo stesso rapida soluzione fino all’entrata in servizio del vincitore della gia’ detta specifica AAH.
Tale soluzione era rappresentata dall’AH-1G Cobra della Bell Helicopter. Nato essenzialmente come piattaforma interim per la scorta di elicotteri da trasporto e il supporto di fuoco generico, il Cobra era pero’ sprovvisto di adeguato armamento controcarro. Esistevano, invero, razzi da 70mm dotati di testata HEAT compatibili con le razziere standard M158 e M200, ma queste munizioni non solo erano prive di qualsivoglia sistema di guida, ma si rivelarono inadeguate in termini di gittata e penetrazione, specialmente dopo l’introduzione di carri moderni come il T-64 e il T-72.
IL MICIDIALE AIRBORNE TOW: dall’XM26 all’XM65
A dispetto di cio’, non si puo’ dire che l’US Army partisse svantaggiato, e questo grazie all’allora nuovo missile controcarro filoguidato SACLOS BGM-71 TOW, sviluppato nel periodo 1963-68 dalla Hughes e il Redstone Arsenal (Alabama), ed entrato in servizio nel corso del 1970 (entro quell’anno non meno di 24 battaglioni divisionali stanziati in USA ed Europa ricevettero la versione terrestre).
Non furono pero’ solo rosa e fiori, visto che il TOW andava prima integrato in un elicottero che non era predisposto per ospitare tale sistema d’arma. La buona notizia era che l’esercito aveva precedentemente accumulato una certa esperienza con la versione airborne di questo missile grazie ad una serie di test in patria effettuati negli anni ’60 con l’NUH-1B, che era in buona sostanza uno Huey Bravo (UH-1B) standard equipaggiato con sottosistema XM26 composto da due lanciatori trinati e un visore di puntamento stabilizzato nella parte sinistra del muso.
Il primo XM26 in configurazione ADM (Advanced Development Model) venne installato a bordo di un Bell UH-1B nel 1967. Dal 5 ottobre 1966 al 28 febbraio 1968 vennero lanciati un totale di 30 missili in ogni condizione possibile: in movimento, hovering e attraverso i piu’ disparati percorsi irregolari. Il sistema XM26 ottenne un buon risultato, tanto che dei 30 missili lanciati, ben 22 centrarono il bersaglio. Oltre alle prove condotte in patria, l’US Army porto’ l’XM26 anche in Germania Occidentale, dove venne mostrato anche alle locali forze armate.
Fra la fine del 1968 e la prima meta’ del 1971 si registrarono 62 lanci dagli Huey, di cui ben 57 coronati da successo: un hit rate pari al 92%.
Hughie McInnish, uno dei tecnici civili responsabili del programma TOW elilanciato all’arsenale di Redstone (Alabama), scrisse in seguito un articolo entusiastico su alcune dimostrazioni avvenute in Germania, tant’e’ che venne contattato telefonicamente da un alto ufficiale del Pentagono per discutere di una proposta… impossibile da rifiutare 🙂
IL 1ST AERIAL COMBAT TOW TEAM E I PRIMI LANCI IN VIETNAM
Il 1st Aerial Combat TOW Team venne inizialmente costituito per prendere parte ad un esperimento organizzato dal United States Army Combat Developments Experimentation Command (USACDEC). Tale Esperimento, burocraticamente noto come 43.6 (Attack Helicopter, Daylight Defense), Phase 111.2, aveva lo scopo di valutare e comparare tre sistemi di puntamento e acquisizione per l’Airborne TOW, compreso l’originale XM26 della Hughes. L’addestramento degli equipaggi e le successive prove di valutazione (comprensive di campagne di tiro) si svolsero in due distinte fasi fra l’autunno del 1971 e l’aprile del 1972 presso la riserva militare di Fort Hunter Liggett (California) e la base di Fort Lewis (Washington).
Il 14 Aprile 1972 il 1st Aerial Combat TOW Team ricevette ufficialmente l’ordine di partenza per il Vietnam, fissato per il giorno 22 di aprile.
Sotto la direzione dell’energico Colonnello Robert W. Huntzinger (Project Manager del programma TOW al Redstone Arsenal dal 1968 al 1976), venne pianificato e organizzato a tempo di record l’invio di una di mini-task force composta da aviatori dell’esercito, personale militare di supporto e tecnici della Hughes e della Bell Helicopter.
Fu un compito tutt’altro che semplice in quanto uomini, elicotteri e componenti dell’XM26 erano sparsi per tutti gli Stati Uniti occidentali (ricordo ai lettori che il programma XM26 venne congelato diverso tempo prima a causa dell’AH-56). Ad esempio, i due NUH-1B utilizzati nell’esperimento 43.6 si trovavano a Fort Lewis, mentre alcune componenti dell’XM26 giacevano imballate presso gli stabilimenti della Hughes a Culver City, California. I militari di Fort Lewis dovettero dunque smontare i componenti dagli UH-1B e spedirli a Culver City, dove il personale della Hughes avrebbe provveduto ad assemblare e revisionare il sistema XM26 completo e rispedirlo agli impianti della Hughes Aircraft a El Segundo, California. Come se non bastasse, i missili TOW dovevano essere prelevati dallo stabilimento di produzione della Hughes di Tucson, Arizona.
Il 21 aprile uomini, mezzi ed equipaggiamenti furono riuniti presso la base aerea di McChord (Washington) pronti per essere imbarcati a bordo di due aerei da trasporto C-141 Starlifter.
Dire che il team arrivo’ al posto giusto e al momento giusto e’ puro eufemismo. Quando i due NUH-1B giunsero a Saigon, da piu’ di un mese in Vietnam stava impazzando l’Offensiva di Pasqua.
Contrariamente alle previsioni di molti comandanti Alleati, l’Esercito Nordvietnamita (PAVN) riusci’ ad attuare un massiccio attacco su ben tre direttrici e con l’appoggio di forze corazzate e d’artiglieria. Per gli Alleati fu un completo shock, sia da un punto di vista militare che psicologico.
In totale il PAVN mobilito’ un dispositivo di circa 200 mila uomini, mentre le forze USA disponevano in loco poche decine di migliaia di effettivi, in gran parte assegnati a compiti di supporto e consulenza. Era dunque chiaro che sarebbe stato l’ARVN a dover sostenere il peso dei combattimenti terrestri (d’altro canto la “vietnamizzazione” procedeva, con alterni successi, gia’ da qualche tempo).
Dopo alcuni giorni dedicati all’ambientamento e all’addestramento, il 1st Aerial Combat TOW Team venne dichiarato Combat Ready il giorno 29 di Aprile. Il Team in seguito si diresse da Long Binh verso l’area di Pleiku, dove fra il 30 Aprile e il 2 Maggio effettuo’ una breve campagna di tiro con i missili TOW. Quest’ultima fase fu necessaria in quanto il team sino ad allora non aveva mai sparato un solo TOW che non fosse di tipo inerte (noto come BTM-71A).
Quando il 1st Aerial Combat TOW Team giunse in quel di Pleiku, le forze Nordvietnamite avevano ormai preso possesso della Prima Regione Militare (MR-I) e si stavano dirigendo a “rullo compressore” verso Kontum, posizionata, guardacaso, a poche decine di chilometri a Nord della gia’ detta Pleiku.
Il battesimo di fuoco risale al 2 maggio, quando il team riusci’ a mettere fuori combattimento quattro carri M41, un autocarro da 2 1/2 ton e un obice da 105mm. Da notare che l’equipaggiamento finito sotto i colpi degli Huey era stato precedentemente catturato dai Nordvietnamiti presso la FSB Lima, base che l’ARVN aveva precipitosamente abbandonato il primo di maggio. I missili TOW furono lanciati da una distanza di circa 2700 metri e provocarono esplosioni secondarie dovute alla detonazione delle munizioni stivate a bordo del carro e nei pressi dell’obice.
La singola azione di maggior rilievo riguardo’ la strenua battaglia per la citta’ di Kontum, attaccata da forze meccanizzate Nordvietnamite e difesa da reparti di fanteria del Sud e da piccole aliquote di consiglieri statunitensi. Il 26 Maggio 1972 gli americani lanciarono numerosi atttacchi aerei a supporto dei reparti ARVN, ma l’eccessiva vicinanza del nemico a questi ultimi impedi’ in talune occasioni l’intervento dell’aviazione tattica. L’entrata in scena dei due NUH-1 armati di TOW (in congiunzione con Cobra equipaggiati con lanciarazzi) consenti’ di colpire con elevata precisione i corazzati Nordvietnamiti che stavano impunemente avanzando nel centro di Kontum. Quel giorno le due macchine lanciarono 21 missili che centrarono numerosi bersagli, inclusi nove carri T-54 e PT-76.
L’impatto dell’Airborne TOW nel teatro di operazioni nel quale opero’ fu notevole se si tiene conto del numero di macchine schierate, la natura squisitamente sperimentale di tutta l’operazione e le limitazioni legate all’impiego di una piattaforma anziana e sottopotenziata quale era appunto l’UH-1B.
In effetti, il bilancio dei circa 30 giorni di attivita’ del team in Temporary Duty fu piu’ che positivo. I lanci effettuati furono 94, mentre i bersagli colpiti 81.
Fra questi si segnalavano:
24 carri armati
9 autocarri
4 APC
3 bunker
2 pezzi d’artiglieria
2 postazioni di mitragliatrici pesanti
2 depositi di munizioni
1 ponte
1 un sistema di artiglieria lanciarazzi.
Prima di lasciare il Vietnam, l’originale TOW Team (foto in alto) istrui’ i rimpiazzi, per l’occasione prelevati da candidati selezionati da personale della 1st Aviation Brigade. Quest’ultima continuo’ ad impiegare gli Huey tank-killer fino all’11 Gennaio 1973.
Per quella data risultavano all’attivo 199 lanci, di cui 37 in addestramento e 162 in combattimento. Il rateo di affidabilita’ operativo fu del 93% (151 missili), mentre nell’82% dei lanci i missili colpirono i bersagli acquisiti (121).
In totale i due NUH-1B furono responsabili della distruzione di 27 tank, 21 autocarri, 5 APC, 3 pezzi d’artiglieria, 1 cannone contraereo, 1 lanciarazzi da 122mm, 5 postazioni di mitragliatrici pesanti, 2 pezzi contraerei da 57mm, 8 bunker, 2 ponti, 2 postazioni di mortaio, 2 depositi di munizioni, 2 M151 armate di TOW catturate dal nemico e un singolo edificio.
Di contro si verificarono 11 malfunzionamenti del missile e in almeno quattro occasioni l’equipaggio manco’ il bersaglio perche’ esegui’ i lanci oltre la gittata massima consentita (3000 metri). E a proposito di gittata, le esperienze accumulate in Vietnam evidenziarono che la portata massima del TOW non era sufficiente a tenere l’elicottero al riparo da nuove minacce come il semovente contraereo ZSU-23-4 e il missile spalleggiabile SA-7. Fu cosi’ che al Redstone Arsenal decisero di portare la gittata a 3750 metri semplicemente incrementando la lunghezza dei cavi di guida. Fra maggio e giugno 1973 l’US Army collaudo’ il nuovo TOW a gittata estesa avvalendosi ancora volta di uno Huey (questa volta “Mike”).
In basso: filmato declassificato e rilasciato dai National Archives in cui vengono mostrati alcuni dei bersagli colpiti con il TOW dagli Huey:
Nonostante l’esperienza positiva in Vietnam, lo Huey armato di missili TOW non entro’ mai a far parte dell’arsenale statunitense, anche se questa variante continuo’ a servire in patria nelle attivita’ di collaudo di armamenti.
IL COBRA CACCIATORE DI CARRI
Come accennato all’inizio del post, l’esercito statunitense aveva urgentemente bisogno di un elicottero d’attacco armato di missili guidati. L’AH-1G si era rivelata una buona piattaforma, affidabile, bene armata e poco dispendiosa dal punto di vista della manutenzione. Tuttavia l’attraente Cobra non mancava di difetti. La potenza del turboalbero fu senza dubbio uno dei principali talloni d’achille, e in ambienti Hot&High (come negli altopiani centrali) la pur valida T53-L13 da 1400 shp mostrava tutti i suoi limiti. Sostanzialmente i shaft horsepower disponibili non erano mai abbastanza, tanto che il personale di terra doveva sapientemente bilanciare carburante e armamento installato per consentire all’aeromobile di ottenere prestazioni ed autonomia soddisfacenti.
Ma ad influire negativamente sulle prestazioni e capacita’ della macchina fu soprattutto il cambio del profilo di volo.
Quando l’AH-1G venne concepito, la minaccia del fuoco di terra in Vietnam era per lo piu’ rappresentata da armi leggere portatili e – piu’ raramente – mitragliatrici pesanti (le peraltro temute DShK di fabbricazione sovietica). In questo contesto gli equipaggi dei Cobra procedevano tipicamente a quote attorno ai 1200/2000 piedi sopra la target area, per poi picchiare verso il bersaglio lanciando salve di razzi da 2,75 pollici o, in alternativa, effettuando passaggi con la Minigun e il lanciagranate da 40mm. Tale modus operandi non richiedeva grandi sforzi a turbina, trasmissione e cellula (e, in una certa misura, nemmeno al pilota).
Tuttavia, negli ultimi anni del conflitto il livello di minaccia cambio’ in modo drastico. L’apparizione dei moderni ed efficaci sistemi contraerei semoventi dotati di radar (ZSU-23-4) e dei missili terra-aria a corto raggio (SA-7 e SA-8) costrinsero l’US Army a rivedere la dottrina d’impiego dei Cobra, anche in vista dell’imminente schieramento di questi ultimi in Europa Centrale. Fu proprio in quei frangenti che venne adottato (e rielaborato) il cosiddetto profilo di volo Nap-of-the-Earth (NOE), che consisteva nel volare a quote e velocita’ estremamente basse, utilizzando il terreno e la vegetazione come mascheramento. Tale profilo prevedeva, fra le altre cose, cambi repentini di posizione e quota, nonche’ il frequente ricorso al volo stazionario (hovering). La navigazione vera e propria avveniva invece attraverso l’ausilio di dettagliate mappe tattiche (scala 1:50.000), affiancate da altre in scala minore (1:250.000). Il Nap-of-the-Earth era una tecnica che rientrava in quello che era definito come “Terrain Flight” e che comprendeva, oltre appunto al NOE, anche anche i voli definiti “Low Level”, “Contour” e “Treetop”.
Il primo corso di Terrain Flight fu istituito alla scuola di volo dell’US Army di Fort Rucker nell’Aprile 1973 ed era destinato agli studenti dei corsi Initial Entry Rotary Wing (IERW). Nel contempo l’US Army si interesso’ anche all’addestramento notturno con visori NVG (Night Vision Goggles) e a questo proposito va segnalato l’avviamento dei corsi specifici nell’estate 1975.
Sebbene fosse chiaro che prima o poi ci si sarebbe dovuto occupare del potenziamento della turbina, era innanzitutto necessario risolvere il problema dell’armamento. La decisione di armare il Cobra con i TOW venne presa formalmente nel 1970. Dopo una serie di controversie burocratiche e organizzative sul chi avrebbe dovuto dirigere il programma, il 6 Novembre l’Army Materiel Command (AMC) assegno’ finalmente l’incarico all’Army Aviation System Command (AVSCOM). L’intero progetto, noto come Improved COBRA Armament Program (ICAP), fu dato in appalto alla Bell Helicopter di Fort Worth (Texas) il 3 Marzo 1972. Quest’ultima avrebbe dovuto progettare, sviluppare, costruire, integrare e infine collaudare (in collaborazione con l’esercito) il nuovo sistema d’arma, cosi’ come l’inedito casco di volo con sistema di mira integrato. La Hughes Aircraft venne invece scelta quale subcontractor per il sistema di puntamento e acquisizione (XM65 TSU).
Il contratto prevedeva la costruzione di nove sottosistemi completi, di cui otto da integrare in altrettanti Cobra. A tale scopo l’US Army forni’ alla Bell otto AH-1G, i missili TOW, un chase plane per i test in volo, le parti di ricambio e un certo numero di apparecchiature e strumenti speciali necessari alle modifiche delle macchine. Per contro, la Bell avrebbe dovuto soddisfare i requisiti e le prestazioni minime del committente.
Secondo i piani del Department of the Army la nuova macchina avrebbe dovuto entrare in servizio in configurazione IOC entro il Marzo 1975.
L’US Army assegno’ al nuovo Cobra la sigla YAH-1Q. Quest’ultimo era nella sostanza un AH-1G equipaggiato con i sottosistemi TOW Hughes XM65 e XM128 (noto come HSS o Helmet Sight Subsystem). L’AH-1Q avrebbe dovuto sostituire la modesta flotta di UH-1B armata di sottosistema M22 con 6 missili controcarro MCLOS tipo AGM-22 (SS.11 francesi su licenza). Sia l’esercito che la Bell speravano di semplificare e velocizzare il lavoro di ricerca e sviluppo dell’XM65 partendo dal vecchio XM26 dello Huey. Gli studi preliminari furono pero’ molto deludenti visto che dei 1200 disegni che facevano parte del progetto XM26, solo 50 si rivelarono utili nel programma XM65. Venne inoltre fatto presente che sebbene l’XM26 si comporto’ bene, esso fu giudicato troppo pesante, costoso, complicato e difficile da manutenere.
L’XM65 dovette dunque essere progettato partendo praticamente da zero. I lanciatori, dal design razionale ed essenziale, vennero progettati basandosi sul principio della modularita’. Il lanciatore base, binato, poteva diventare quadrinato semplicemente aggiungendo una seconda unita’ gemella.
Nelle immagini in basso potete osservare meglio le componenti principali dell’XM65, ossia i lanciatori M56, il sistema di puntamento stabilizzato Bell-Hughes noto come TSU (Telescopic Sight Unit), piu’ le black boxes, il pannello di controllo con il joystick e la strumentazione da integrare nel cockpit. Notare l’estrema semplicita’ dei lanciatori, assai diversi dagli ingombranti sistemi trinati dell’XM26.
In termini di peso, affidabilita’ e prestazioni l’XM65 fu un netto passo avanti rispetto al precedente XM26.
Realizzati in alluminio, i due lanciatori quadrinati carichi dell’XM65 pesavano nel complesso appena 412 kg, contro i 571 dell’XM26 in magnesio con 6 soli missili. L’affidabilita dichiarata in termini di MBTF passo’ dalle 113 alle 318 ore. Parlando inveece di prestazioni, il nuovo visore dell’XM65 disponeva di un angolo di visuale in azimut di 110° (dx e sx), laddove l’XM26 si fermava a 90°. Oltre a questo, l’XM65 nacque per poter eseguire lanci fino ad una velocita’ di 190 nodi.
La semplicita’ del progetto, unita alla modularita’ e al vasto ricorso alla microelettronica e ai circuiti stampati permise d’incrementare l’affidabilita’ e al tempo stesso di ridurre la manutenzione. Tutto cio’ porto’ indiscutibili benefici in termini di costi. Una stima del 1974 evidenzio’ che un sottosistema XM65 completo costava all’esercito 100 mila dollari in meno rispetto al precedente XM26.
Altra novita’ riguardava il sottosistema HSS comprensivo di casco di volo, simile ai tradizionali Gentex, ma con alcune peculiari caratteristiche che lo rendevano di fatto unico. Realizzato dalla celeberrima Sperry Univac sotto contratto Bell, l’HSS permetteva di ingaggiare, inseguire e colpire il bersaglio con l’armamento in torretta ma al tempo stesso garantiva all’equipaggio di mantenere la completa visibilita’ dell’area circostante e il controllo dell’aeromobile. Cio’ fu possibile grazie ad un sistema di puntamento a reticolo posizionato sopra l’occhio e a un meccanismo che asserviva l’elmetto alla torretta. In pratica quest’ultima si muoveva in direzione dello sguardo del cannoniere e dava la possibilita’ di identificare il bersaglio e di acqisirlo senza dover obbligatoriamente ricorrere alla TSU. Tale sistema poteva anche essere impiegato per l’acquisizione con i TOW, ma per la guida era ovviamente necessaria la gia’ citata TSU.
In questo breve video potete vedere come funzionava il tutto:
In totale l’US Army ordino’ alla Bell otto esemplari R&D YAH-1Q. Le consegne iniziarono nel Marzo 1973, proprio nel mese in cui si stava completando il ritiro del contingente USA in Vietnam. Nel dettaglio, il programma di sviluppo e test parti’ ufficialmente il 16 Marzo 1973 e si concluse nel Gennaio dell’anno successivo. Per quella data gli YAH-1Q avevano totalizzato 213 lanci di TOW fino a distanze di 3000 metri.
Le campagne di tiro avvennero presso i poligoni di Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona (161 missili) e Fort Knox, Kentucky (52 missili).
I bersagli utilizzati a Yuma erano di due tipi: stazionari e in movimento. I primi avevano una dimensione pari a 2.3 x 2.3 metri, mentre i secondi 2.3 x 4,6 metri. A Fort Knox vennero invece effettuati i lanci contro corazzati veri e propri. Questi ultimi erano costituiti da speciali carri con protezioni supplementari e condotti da personale dell’US Army a velocita’ fino a 30 miglia orarie. I collaudi a Knox, i primi svolti seguendo autentici principi tattici, si svolsero nell’Ottobre 1973.
Dei 213 lanci effettuati, 154 colpirono il bersaglio: un hit rate pari al 72%. Fra le cause dei mancati centri (54) si segnalavano:
+ impiego del sistema d’arma oltre le capacita’ (15)
+ errori dell’operatore TOW (13)
+ malfunzionamenti del missile o del lanciatore (12)
+ difetti imputabili a errori di progettazione (7).
Deficienze e problemi tecnici emersi durante i collaudi vennero in seguito corretti dalla Bell e dalla Hughes.
La produzione delll’AH-1Q e del sottosistema XM65 ricevette l’approvazione ufficiale nel Gennaio 1974. Il contratto iniziale, stipulato con la Bell il 31 Gennaio, prevedeva la conversione di 101 AH-1G US Army allo standard AH-1Q (ICAP), con un opzione per ulteriori 189 “G” da portare in seguito alla configurazione “S” (anche nota come “S Mod”, che comprendeva le modifiche ICAP e ICAM) entro il FY1975. Gli eventuali ordini avrebbero invece riguardato AH-1S di nuova produzione
Le consegne dei 101 AH-1Q si sarebbero svolte fra Giugno 1975 e Giugno 1976.
Mentre i primi 20 AH-1Q erano sostanzialmente AH-1G con modifiche ridotte all’essenziale, i restanti 72 AH-1Q incorporavano le modifiche strutturali che in un periodo successivo avrebbero permesso all’esercito di portarli allo standard “S” (ICAM).
Nel frattempo le campagne di tiro dei TOW continuavano nell’ambito dei programma di collaudo dei prototipi YAH-1Q R&D. La verifica delle correzioni apportate a sottosistemi e missili si svolsero a Yuma e Fort Hood, Texas. A Hood in particolare si registrarono un totale di 118 lanci fra Maggio e Giugno 1974. Di questi, 92 centrarono il bersaglio (HR 77%).
Da segnalare che due dei TOW lanciati a Hood appartenevano alla versione a gittata estesa (BGM-71B). Entrambi colpirono bersagli posti rispettivamente a 3600 e 3700 metri.
I test in climi freddi vennero organizzati a Fort Drum (New York). Dei cinque missili lanciati fra il 22 e il 28 Gennaio 1975, tre colpirono il bersaglio, mentre gli altri due lo mancarono per un malfunzionamento al missile e per un lancio fuori portata massima.
ANSBACH E REFORGER ’74
Mentre l’US Army e la Bell entravano nella fase finale dello sviluppo dell’AH-1Q, in Germania Occidentale i reparti di aviazione dell’esercito equipaggiati con gli AH-1G iniziavano a condurre le prime realistiche esercitazioni controcarro. Gia’ nel 1972 alcuni AH-1G inviati presso Ansbach (Bavaria) dimostrarono la validita’ del concetto di cacciacarri ad ala rotante, ma fu solo durante le piu’ complesse manovre REFORGER ’74 (Ottobre 1974) che si registrarono i risultati di maggior rilievo. I protagonisti furono ancora una volta i team Hunter-Killer, nuovamente dislocati in terra bavarese.
Ciascun Team H/K prevedeva l’impiego di tre o quattro macchine: due o tre AH-1, piu’ un singolo OH-58 in funzione scout e acquisizione bersagli. La composizione piu’ frequente si basava comunque su due attack e un scout. Basilarmente si trattava del concetto Pink Team ampiamente collaudato in Vietnam, ma con una piccola ma significante differenza: il Europa Centrale il volo NOE fu imposto anche agli equipaggi degli elicotteri d’attacco.
Per gli uomini dei team H/K furono giorni terribili ma al tempo stesso indimenticabili.
Terribili perche’, oltre a patire i rigori legati al profilo NOE, gli aviatori dell’esercito dovettero operare in condizioni meteo pessime, caratterizzate da tempeste di neve, pioggie, nubi basse e banchi di nebbia. Un vero e proprio incubo che mise a dura prova l’addestramento condotto sino ad allora.
Indimenticabili per il fatto che durante le esercitazioni gli equipaggi dei Cobra della ORANGE FORCE (che simulava il nemico) fecero letteralmente vedere i sorci verdi ai reparti della BLUE FORCE (forze amiche). Ad esempio il 13 Ottobre un HK Team in appoggio alla prima brigata della 1st Armored Division (ORANGE FORCE), riusci’ a colpire ben 23 carri della BLUE FORCE, piu’ altri 23 il giorno successivo. A questo bottino andavano aggiunti tre Cobra e alcuni Huey “caduti” sotto i colpi degli HK avversari.
A dispetto delle condimeteo inclementi e le restrizioni in termini di combustibile imbarcato (vedi sotto), dopo quattro giorni e mezzo di esercitazioni i Cobra della ORANGE FORCE accumularono un bottino pari a 200 carri, tre Cobra, alcuni Huey e Kiowa, due Fast Movers del TAC piu’ una serie assortita di veicoli leggeri. Le “perdite” della componente ad ala rotante ORANGE FORCE ammontavano invece a quattro elicotteri: due AH-1 e altrettanti OH-58.
I risultati furono abbastanza sorprendenti non solo tenendo conto dei problemi gia’ menzionati, ma anche per il fatto che gli elicotteri erano privi di qualunque capacita’ ognitempo. Oltre a questo, lo stage field degli elicotteri della ORANGE FORCE si trovava piuttosto distante dalla “linea del fronte (conosciuta FEBA o Forward Edge of Battle Area) e per tal ragione si dovette ricorrere all’allestimento di un apposita FARRP (Forward Arming and Refueling Point) per allievare i disagi legati ad eventuali episodi di bingo fuel.
Per i sostenitori degli elicotteri d’attacco specializzati le REFORGER ’74 furono un’occasione per dimostrare ai vertici piu’ scettici che c’era spazio per queste macchine in conflitti ad alta densita’ e in scenari mid/high threat. Il CW3 Michael Lopez, che partecipo’ alle succitate esercitazioni, in un articolo pubblicato da Army Aviation Digest disse a tal proposito:
“e’ necessario istituire un programma di addestramento per informare e dimostrare ai comandanti di terra cosa l’aviazione dell’esercito e’ in grado di fare, incluse le potenzialita’ del volo NOE”.
A questo proposito va segnalato che nel 1974 il TRADOC (TRaining And DOctrine Command) dell’US Army elaboro’ il primo manuale dottrinale dedicato all’impiego dell’aviazione dell’esercito in scenari high threat.
Allora le priorita’ addestrative stabilite per gli aviatori impegnati in scenari Mid-Threat erano le seguenti:
Sopravvivenza (intesa come volo)
Volo notturno
Addestramento strumentale
Guerra Elettronica
Addestramento al tiro
Addestramento al simulatore (detto anche Syntethic Flight Training)
Ho citato il Mid-Threat perche’ in quel periodo il breve ma intenso conflitto dello Yom Kippur (Ottobre 1973) dominava i dibattiti nei circoli militari e fu attentamente analizzato dall’US Army in quanto considerato un valido esempio di moderno conflitto a mid threat con largo impiego di avanzati sistemi contraerei e missili terra-aria e controcarro.
In breve era necessario lasciarsi velocemente il Vietnam alle spalle, e per fare cio’ si doveva giocoforza attuare anche una revisione dottrinale sull’impiego dell’elicottero.
Ad esempio nel 1974, il Maggiore Generale William Maddox, allora a capo dell’US Army Aviation Center di Fort Rucker, disse senza mezzi termini:
The first major deficiency is doctrinal. We must revise our concept of fighting to include operating against armor supported by sophisticated air defense weapons. As an army we seem to have been doctrinally marking time until the Cobra/TOW [AH-1Q] appears. We will begin receiving the Cobra/TOW in tactical units next year. But how will attack helicopter units be employed against tanks and on a battlefield with heat-seeking missiles and radar-controlled antiaircraft guns?
Most people think of attack helicopters in terms of air cavalry, which translates into light combat, avoid decisive engagement. Also, most people think in terms of fighting light fire teams-that is, two attack helicopters pitted against an enemy target, perhaps with the help of aerial scouts. Instead we must think of employing attack helicopters as we employ tanks-in mass-by platoon, company and battalion. And they must be integrated with other ground elements and support by suppressive fire from artillery and tactical air.
La copertina del numero di Novembre 1974 di Army Aviation Digest era piuttosto eloquente in merito al futuro ruolo dei Cobra dell’Esercito USA.
AH-1Q & M65: LA PRODUZIONE IN SERIE
La produzione delle prime unita’ di serie del sottosistema XM65 prese il via preso gli impianti della Hughes Aircraft Company attorno alla fine del 1974, mentre la consegna alla Bell Helicopter avvenne nel Febbraio 1975. Da quel momento in poi il compito della Bell fu quello di integrare lanciatori, TSU e le restanti componenti dell’XM65 alle cellule di AH-1 gia’ predisposte.
Il primo AH-1Q di produzione venne preso in consegna dall’US Army il 10 Giugno 1975. L’esercito spese i successivi otto mesi nella cosidetta fase IPT (Initial Production Test), che altro non erano che i collaudi di valutazione operativa che venivano effettuati prima di procedere con la produzione di massa vera e propria. La fase IPT ebbe termine il 19 Febbraio 1976 e comprendeva anche 91 lanci di TOW, di cui 59 negli Stati Uniti Continentali (CONUS) e i restanti 32 in poligoni e strutture della Repubblica Federale Tedesca.
I lanci nelle strutture Statunitensi (Yuma PG, Fort Hood e Fort Rucker) registrarono un hit rate pari all’83% (49 centri su 59), mentre nella Germania Occidentale questa cifra scese al 68% (22 centri su 32). Nel complesso, la percentuale del successo raggiunse un piu’ che soddisfacente 78%.
Per venire incontro alle pressanti richieste di Cobra armati di TOW, l’US Army programmo’ la costruzione di 439 AH-1S di nuova produzione durante il periodo 1977-80.
In totale erano previste 795 macchine che comprendevano i 92 AH-1G modificati in AH-1Q (FY1974) e i 198 AH-1G modificati in AH-1S (FY1974/75). I restanti Cobra, ossia quelli approvati a partire dal FY1976, sarebbero stati unicamente esemplari di nuova costruzione. L’esercito aveva inoltre in programma di portare allo standard “S” i primi 92 AH-1Q entro l’Aprile 1979.
ICAP e ICAM
Ricapitolando: il programma ICAP (Improved Cobra Armament Program) verteva essenzialmente sull’integrazione del sistema XM/M65 nella piattaforma AH-1G. Fu una sorta di manovra stop-gap nata per dare all’originale Cobra credibili capacita’ controcarro, nel minor tempo possibile e a costi accettabili. Il risultato fu l’AH-1Q, costruito in 92 esemplari.
Questa macchina si era rivelata tuttavia sottopotenziata, poco agile, scarsamente manovrabile e di conseguenza inadatta ai rigori del volo NOE e a lunghi periodi di hovering. Per questa ragione a partire dal 21esimo esemplare, gli AH-1Q vennero predisposti dalla Bell per accogliere le modifiche relative al successivo programma di migliorie previsto, ovvero l’ICAM.
ICAM stava per Improved Cobra Agility and Maneuverability. Fra le modifiche proincipali previste figuravano un mozzo del rotore principale modificato, un nuovo rotore di coda, trasmissione e, last but not least, un turboalbero potenziato T53-L-703 da 1,800 shp (400 in piu’ rispetto agli AH-1G/Q). Queste macchine, designate AH-1S, erano note anche come AH-1S Modified o AH-1S (MOD). I collaudi da parte dell’esercito della versione basica si svolsero fra la fine di aprile e la fine di maggio del 1975.
Vista laterale di un AH-1S (MOD). Notare l’assenza dell’armamento nella torretta Emerson M28. Benche adeguate a scenari come quello del Vietnam, la Minigun da 7,62 e il lanciagranate da 40mm erano di scarsa utilita’ in operazioni controcarro o contro forze pesanti. Per questa ragione i reparti erano tendenzialmente portati a smontarle per risparmiare peso e imbarcare piu’ carburante o armamento di lancio.
LE CONSEGNE DELL’AH-1Q IN USA ED IL DISPIEGAMENTO IN EUROPA
Ma torniamo a quel mezzo “lemon” dell‘AH-1Q, che e’ poi il vero protagonista di questo post.
Le prime consegne si materializzarono nel Novembre 1975. Enti e reparti addestrativi ebbero naturalmente la priorita’ su tutto e tutti.
Dopo aver costituito il NETT (New Equipment Training Team), l’esercito consegno’ le prime 8 macchine ad elementi del TRADOC (TRAining and DOctrine Command), ossia:
Scuola di volo di Fort Rucker (Alabama): 4 esemplari
Aberdeen Proving Ground (Maryland): 3 esemplari
Army Transportation di Fort Eustis (Virginia): 1 esemplare
Per quanto riguarda invece le unita’ tattiche, la situazione era la seguente:
6th Cavalry Brigade (Air Combat) di Fort Hood (Texas): 8 esemplari
Reparti dell’US Army Europe in Germania Occidentale: 17 esemplari
In totale 25 macchine consegnate entro il Febbraio 1976 unitamente ai necessari equipaggiamenti di supporto per i missili TOW. La IOC venne raggiunta nel Marzo successivo (con un anno di ritardo rispetto alle previsioni), mentre le consegne dei 59 rimanenti Cobra si conclusero nel Giugno 1976.
Per quella data l’US Army disponeva complessivamente di 92 AH-1Q TOW/Cobra cosi’ ripartiti:
N° 8 esemplari ad elementi del TRADOC
N° 21 esemplari alla 6th Cavalry Brigade di Fort Hood (Texas)
N° 63 ad elementi dell’US Army Europe (USAEUR)
THE FIRST LINE OF THE DEFENSE
Il primo reparto di volo combat dell’US Army Europe a ricevere gli AH-1Q in Europa fu l’Air Cavalry Troop del 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), stanziata a Feucht Army Airfield (AAF), nei pressi di Norimberga. I TOW Cobra del 2nd ACR posarono per la prima volta i pattini sul tarmac di Feucht nel Gennaio 1976.
Nel Maggio 1976 tocco’ invece all’Air Cavalry Troop dell’11th ACR. Operante da Sickels Army Airfield (AAF), nella bollente Fulda, questa fu la seconda unita’ a volare con l’AH-1Q.
Nella seconda meta’ degli anni Settanta la Troop di Cobra dell’11th ACR era conosciuta come Anti-Armor Helicopter Troop (AAHT).
I reparti di volo ACR disponevano di 21 AH-1Q, piu’ un’aliquota di UH-1H e OH-58 Kiowa inquadrati in troop di supporto e C2. Il compito principale delle unita’ ACR era il pattugliamento e la sorveglianza di una parte del confine (385 km) di Germania Occidentale e Cecoslovacchia di competenza del V Corps.
Il terzo reparto ad ottenere il TOW/Cobra fu la 235th Aviation Company, che giunse a Giebelstadt AAF (Wurzburg) nel Giugno 1976. Nota per essersi fatta le ossa in Vietnam quale unica compagnia interamente equipaggiata con elicotteri d’attacco, la 235th fu assegnata al 3rd Combat Aviation Battalion (CAB) della 3rd Infantry Division e in seguito ridesignata Company “B”, 3rd Aviation Battalion.
La Company “B” apparteneva a uno dei quattro battaglioni d’aviazione divisionale dislocati in Germania Occidentale fra gli anni Settanta e i primi anni Ottanta.
Ogni divisione di fanteria disponeva di una compagnia elicotteri d’attacco su TOW/Cobra (generalmente la Bravo), mentre le divisioni corazzate ne schiaravano due (Bravo e Charlie). In basso l’hangar di Giebelstadt AAF, sede del 3d Combat Aviation Battalion.
Le Troop dei due ACR e la B Company del 3d CAB formarono le fondamenta della prima flotta di elicotteri d’attacco controcarro schierata dalla NATO in Europa. Un anno dopo le prime consegne (1977) la forza di TOW/Cobra assegnata all’USAEUR crebbe fino a contare 230 esemplari.
In basso: AH-1S del 2nd ACR fotografati durante le manovre REFORGER ’80 in una zona imprecisata della Bavaria. L’esemplare in primo piano ha il deviatore di scarico “Toilet Bowl” montato. Photo Credit: Mark Carlisle via Airliners.net
B Company, 503rd Aviation Battalion (Combat) schierata ad Armstrong Army Airfield, a Buedingen nel Maggio 1980. Questa unita’ supportava la 3rd Armored Division a Hanau (V Corps). La 3rd AD disponeva di altre tre compagnie di aviazione, anch’esse ubicate ad Hanau.
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Le operazioni di dispiegamento degli AH-1Q in Europa proseguirono in modo fluido e senza particolari intoppi grazie ad un programma chiamato Hand-Off, istituito per rendere piu’ efficiente il dispiegamento di nuovi materiali e al tempo stesso migliorare le relazioni fra il DARCOM (Development and Readiness Command, ossia la nuova denominazione del precedente Army Materiel Command) e le unita’ dell’esercito. In base a questo concetto, gli uomini del DARCOM o i rappresentanti dei contractor erano obbligati ad assistere i reparti che avevano ricevuto i nuovi sistemi fino a che questi ultimi non fossero stati giudicati efficienti e con un elevato grado di prontezza operativa. Questo personale extra assegnato in servizio temporaneo era incaricato di risolvere tutti quei problemi e rogne che in precedenza erano lasciati ai soli reparti militari (dalla sostituzione di componenti difettose per un periodo di 60 giorni, alle riparazioni dovute ad eventuali danni avvenuti durante le spedizioni).
Negli anni successivi numerosi altri reparti ottennero i TOW/Cobra, sebbene nella versione “S”. Quest’ultima venne sottoposta a una serie di aggiornamenti fino agli anni Ottanta. Dopo la costruzione dei 92 AH-1S(MOD) del programma ICAM, l’US Army varo’ infatti un ulteriore programma di update per l’AH-1S imperniato su tre fasi, cosi’ denominate:
STEP 1 – AH-1S(PROD) – Marzo 1977 /Settembre 1978
STEP 2 – AH-1S(ECAS) – Settembre 1978/Ottobre 1979
STEP 3 – AH-1S(MC) – Novembre 1979/Giugno 1981
STEP 1
AH-1S(PROD)
Marzo 1977/Settembre 1978
Esemplari costruiti: 100
Fra il 1977 e il 1978 vennero consegnati 100 AH-1S(PROD). Questa variante manteneva lo stesso apparato propulsivo, componenti dinamiche e armamento in torretta dell’AH-1S(MOD), ma incorporava una nuova capottina a superfici piatte, pannello strumenti ottimizzato per il volo NOE, radar altimetro, Radar Warning Receiver (RWR), apparati radio migliorati e, dal 67° esemplare, un nuovo rotore bipala composito Kaman K-747 in luogo del tradizionale Bell 540 (concepito in origine per la gunship UH-1C ed “ereditato” dall’AH-1G/Q/S(MOD)).
Il K-747, prodotto dalla Kaman Corporation, porto’ ad una riduzione del rumore dovuto ai vortici generati dalle estremità delle pale e un lieve incremento della portanza, senza contare che questo modello vantava una tolleranza balistica ai colpi da 23mm. Di contro, le nuove pale non sembravano particolarmente gradite durante l’autorotazione. Nella foto in alto un AH-1S(MOD) con il vecchio rotore Bell 540. In basso vista dall’alto del rotore Kaman K-747.
NOTE: Nel 1988 l’AH-1S(PROD) venne ridisegnato AH-1P.
STEP 2
AH-1S(ECAS)
Settembre 1978/Ottobre 1979
Esemplari costruiti: 98
Una delle limitazioni principali nel Cobra riguardava l’armamento in torretta. Come rimarcato in precedenza, Minigun e lanciagranate in teatri a media e alta densita’ erano considerati inadeguati per un elicottero d’attacco. Per ovviare a cio’, a meta’ degli anni settanta venne varato il cosiddetto progamma ECAS, o Enhanced Cobra Armament System. Lo scopo era dotare questo elicottero di un’ cannoncino da 20 o 30mm in sostituzione delle precedenti armi. Furono valutati tre sistemi: due da 30mm (GE XM188 e Hughes M230) e un terzo da 20mm (GE M197). Quest’ultimo, sviluppato negli anni ’60 e ampiamente collaudato dall’US Army a bordo degli Huey, era gia’ stato adottato dall’US Marine Corps per la flotta di AH-1J biturbina. Anche in virtu’ di cio’ l’esercito decise di optare per l’arma da 2omm.
Il cannoncino M197 apparve a partire dalla variante AH-1S(ECAS), nota anche come Up-Gun AH-1S. Introdotto nel 1978, l’AH-1S(ECAS) disponeva di un sottosistema d’armi M97A1 basato sul cannoncino General Electric M197 a tre canne rotanti calibro 20×102 montato in una torretta universale che poteva accettare anche armi da 30mm.
L’arma, del tipo gatling, disponeva di un sistema automatico di compensazione per il tiro fuori asse e vantava una cadenza di fuoco fino a 1500 colpi al minuto e una gittata massima fra i 1500 e i 2000 metri. La dotazione munizioni era pari a 750 colpi. In basso: la torretta da 20mm M97 dell’ECAS e la M28 con Minigun e lanciagranate automatico.
Detto cio’, l’AH-1S(ECAS) o Enhanced Cobra, era fondamentalmente un AH-1S(PROD) con torretta da 20mm, un generatore elettrico potenziato e le modifiche necessarie per poter installare e impiegare il lanciatore di flare M130 a 30 cartucce. Altra curiosita’ riguarda la possibilita’ o meno di lanciare razzi da 70mm. Questo modello avrebbe dovuto montare sin dal principio il sistema di gestione del razzi (Rocket Management System o RMS) modello M138. Questo utile apparato consentiva al pilota di selezionare il tipo di razzo, regolare la spoletta e infine determinare la quantita’ di razzi da lanciare. Sfortunatamente, a seguito del fallimento della ditta che costruiva l’M138, ovvero la Baldwin Electronics di Little Rock (Arkansas), i nuovi AH-1S(ECAS) vennero consegnati all’esercito privi di tale sottosistema. L’M138 fu aggiunto in un secondo momento grazie ad un programma di retrofitting iniziato nel Marzo 1980 e terminato nel Settembre 1981.
NOTE: Nel 1988 l’AH-1S(ECAS) venne ridesignato AH-1E
STEP 3
AH-1S(MC)
Novembre 1979/Giugno 1981
Esemplari costruiti o convertiti: 530
La MC o Modernized Cobra, fu l’ultima e piu’ avanzata variante degli AH-1 monoturbina. Dei 530 esemplari ordinati, 387 erano stati ottenuti convertendo AH-1G, mentre i restanti 143 erano macchine di nuova produzione.
Fra le modifiche introdotte con l’AH-1S(MC) si segnalano:
– Computer balistico (Fire Control Computer o FCC) M26 collegato all’M134 ADS (Air Data Subsystem), ovvera una sonda esterna posizionata nel lato destro della capottina. Quest’ultimo apparato analizzava con precisione e in condizioni di velocita’ zero direzione del vento, velocita’ e temperatura dell’aria. I dati raccolti venivano poi inviati al calcolatore M26.
– Head-Up Display (HUD) M76 per il pilota
– Helmet Sight Subsystem (HSS) tipo M136 in sostituzione del precedente M128
– Telemetro e inseguitore laser
– Sistema di raffreddamento dello scarico della turbina per ridurre la traccia IR
– Dispenser per chaff M130
– Jammer IR ALQ-144
La turbina era la solita T53-L-703 da 1,800 shp, cosi’ come la trasmissione ed il rotore principale K-747. Da segnalare che una cinquantina di esemplari ebbero l’avanzato apparato FLIR Hughes C-NITE (Cobra Night-Integrated Target Enhancement) che, accoppiato all’M65, consentiva di designare ed acquisire bersagli di notte e in condizioni meteo avverse. I lavori di modifica vennero effettuati negli impianti Hughes Aircraft di El Segundo (California).
Nel 1988 l’AH-1S(MC) venne finalmente ridesignato AH-1F.
Questa variante prese parte a numerose operazioni militari e di peacekeeping. Fra queste ricordiamo Grenada (1983), Panama (1986), Desert Shield/Storm (Kuwait e Iraq 1990-91), Restore Hope (Somalia, 1992-94) e Joint Endeavor/IFOR (Bosnia, 1995-96).
Con l’introduzione dell’AH-64 Apache (1986), il Cobra venne gradualmente ritirato dal servizio attivo e quindi relegato a reparti di volo dell’Army National Guard, che sara’ poi l’ultima a radiarlo nel 2001.
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Pattugliare il confine fra le due Germanie permetteva ai piloti di Cobra degli ACR di incontrare regolarmente il possente Mi-24 Hind Gli elicotteri Sovietici schierati a ridosso del confine (come quelli della base di Nohra, presso Weimar), avevano fra le altre cose il compito di intercettare gli aeromobili piu’ piccoli e lenti (altri elicotteri, alianti, aerei da turismo ecc) e, piu’ in generale, gli aeromobili che volavano che procedevano a bassa quota. Prima dell’arrivo dell’Hind (meta’ anni ’70), questi ruoli erano ricoperti dai Mi-4 e Mi-8.
AH-1F in azione a Grenada nel 1983. All’epoca questa variante era ancora nota come AH-1S(MC) o Modernized Cobra.
Photo: US Army
L’AH-1F “Sand Shark” e’ senza dubbio uno dei “Foxtrot” piu’ celebri in circolazione. Questo esemplare era in dotazione al 2nd ACR che lo impiego’ durante l’Operazione Desert Storm.
Le missioni nei Balcani (Bosnia-Herzegovina) furono le ultime compiute dai Cobra dell’US Army, almeno da un punto di vista strettamente operativo. In queste due immagini vediamo un paio di AH-1F con le insegne IFOR (Implementation Force) ben visibili in fusoliera e coda. Queste macchine volarono con il 1st Cavalry Regiment della 1st Cavalry Division nel 1995-96.
a434477.pdf (dtic.mil)
HISTORY OF THE TOW MISSILE SYSTEM
U.S. ARMY AIR-TO-GROUND (ATG) MISSILES IN VIETNAM | Article | The United States Army
In 1995 the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission recommended that the U.S. Army Missile Command (MICOM) and U.S. Army Aviation and Troop Command (ATCOM) be combined into a new U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC) major subordinate command at Redstone Arsenal to be known as the U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command (AMCOM). The new organization stood up provisionally almost 20 years ago, on Jul. 17, 1997.
Decades before this decision, however, ATCOM, MICOM and their predecessor commands had joined forces to accomplish higher headquarters guidance on the arming of certain rotary wing aircraft assets deployed during the Vietnam War.
One of the earliest examples of the new firepower envisioned for Army helicopters in the years after the Korean War ceasefire was the Aircraft Weaponization Program, which consisted of 2.75-inch rockets divided evenly between two rocket launchers mounted on either side of the helicopter. Originally developed for the U.S. Navy (USN), the folding fin aerial rocket (FFAR) was used to arm the Army's UH-1A/1B/1C/1M Iroquois ("Huey") and AH-1G Hueycobra helicopters in Vietnam.
The Army's effort to adapt the widely used rocket, originally designed to be launched from a high-performance fixed wing airplane traveling at a higher speed unmatched by helicopters in the early 1960s, first required researchers "to modify the rocket to obtain a spin in order to achieve stability upon launch by averaging thrust misalignment." In Apr.1961, the Army Aviation Board, in conjunction with the Ballistics Research Laboratories (BRL) at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, evaluated 200 modified 2.75-inch rockets using the H-21 Sioux helicopter as the weapons platform.
After determining that the rocket was suitable as a rotary wing armament, one of AMCOM's predecessors, the U.S. Army Ordnance Missile Command (AOMC) at Redstone Arsenal, Ala., developed and fabricated a 2.75-inch rocket subsystem for use on an H-34 Choctaw helicopter assigned to the Aviation Board. About a month after receiving the equipment on Aug. 28, 1961, the board initiated testing on the 2.75-Inch (Modified) Aerial Rocket Weapons System.
During the four-month evaluation conducted from Sept. 21, 1961 to Jan. 21, 1962 at Fort Rucker, Ala. and Fort Sill, Okla., AOMC furnished technical assistance such as fully instrumenting systems being tested as well as fabricating replacement items to eliminate identified problems. The Missile Command's research and development laboratory also studied shortcomings such as launch pod corrosion after firing and provided recommendations on preventive measures.
Although the Army never deployed Choctaw helicopters to Southeast Asia for use in combat by its own aviators, the CH-34, originally designed by Sikorsky for the USN as an antisubmarine warfare (ASW) platform, the helicopter served in Vietnam with the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) from 1962 to 1969, while the Army supplied about 100 of the aircraft to the South Vietnamese air force.
However, it did begin arming its first Huey gunships with the aerial rocket system in mid-1962. Combined with machine guns to supply suppression fire, the 2.75-inch rockets delivered what USN Cmdr. David G. Tyler described in his 2003 article, "The Leverage of Technology: The Evolution of Armed Helicopters in Vietnam," as "a potent knockout punch."
The rocket's ten-pound High Explosive (HE) warhead's impact was similar to a 75-mm howitzer, while the 17-pound HE warhead introduced in 1968 was as effective as a 105-mm howitzer. Additional warheads such as the antitank (AT), white phosphorus (WP) used for marking targets, and ten-pound fletchette (WDU) which released over 1,000 small, arrow-shaped projectiles on impact, further enhanced the Army aerial gunships' battlefield presence. On Oct. 31 1962, the newly-established MICOM assumed industrial and field service responsibilities for the 2.75-inch missiles used by the Army in Vietnam.
Another ATG airborne missile system first deployed by the Army to Vietnam was the airborne M22 antitank missile subsystem. The Ordnance Guided Missile Center (OGMC) at Redstone Arsenal, another AMCOM predecessor, began following the development of the ground version of the French antitank missile system in Apr. 1952 in preparation for the possible assumption of technical supervisiory responsibilities if the Army decided to acquire the weapon.
Subsequently, on Feb. 16, 1959, the U.S. Army Rocket and Guided Missile Agency (ARGMA) at Redstone assumed management responsibility for the French designated SS-10 as an interim ground-launched antitank missile system. The SS-11, an ATG modification of the SS-10, was the first helicopter-mounted antitank missile in the world. Purchased in 1961, the armament subsystem was known as the M22 in U.S. Army nomenclature when the entire complement of six SS-11B missiles was installed on the UH-1B Huey helicopter.
The first MICOM managed M22 armament subsystems deployed to Vietnam in 1966 for use by the Army's first airmobile 1st Calvary Division, which had become fully operational in-theater in Sept. 1965. Army aviators successfully used the missile in combat on Oct. 9, 1966 during the campaign to pacify the Binh Dinh Province. The 2d Battalion, 20th Artillery (Aerial Rocket Artillery) of the 1st Calvary Division fired M22 missiles to destroy bunkers on the peninsula, resulting in the capture of 55 Viet Cong with no further fighting.
Missile operator difficulty in visually tracking a flare on the missile's tail and manually guiding it using a small control stick and an unspooling wire that transmitted commands was further complicated by the turbulence of actual air battle conditions. Despite these challenges, the Army deployed the M22 subsystem to Europe as well as made additional deployments to Southeast Asia in 1967 and 1972. After successfully being used against tanks and other targets, the subsystem returned to the United States in 1973. Eventually replaced by the airborne tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided (TOW) missile system, the Army phased out the M22 subsystem from its regular inventory in May 1984.
The most significant Army Missile Command contribution to Army Aviation during the Vietnam War occurred in May 1972 when airborne TOW antitank missiles mounted on a UH-1B Huey helicopter destroyed four captured American M41 tanks, an artillery gun, and a truck.
Studies leading to the development of the XM65 TOW armament subsystem for the AH-1 series Cobra helicopter had started in 1970. Although the XM26 prototypes had undergone considerable engineering testing by the Hughes Aircraft Company and Bell Helicopter, they had never been given to the U.S. Army for service tests because the main attack helicopter developmental effort directed by the U.S. Army Aviation Systems Command (AVSCOM), an AMCOM predecessor organization, had shifted to the more advanced AH-56 Cheyenne weapons system.
In 1971, though, representatives from MICOM, Hughes Aircraft and Bell Helicopter assisted the German Army Aviation School in its evaluation of the TOW missile's suitability for use in an airborne role, thereby making the German military the first to test the XM26. Fired from various distances and under changing flight conditions against actual tank hulks positioned on the test range, the final shots using live warheads effectively demonstrated the potency of the airborne TOW.
The Improved Cobra Armament Program, which started in March 1972, involved the functional upgrade of the XM26 TOW/UH-1B Huey to the XM65 TOW/Cobra ATG weapon system. The launch of the "Easter Offensive" on Mar. 30, however, gave MICOM an opportunity to prove that the airborne TOW missile could be used as an effective weapon against the Soviet armor that supported the North Vietnamese Army's (NVA's) massive offensive across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Included in the onslaught were several captured American tanks. This action generated an urgent but unprogrammed combat requirement for the TOW antitank weapon system. Both missile and aviation senior leaders understood an impressive showing would help secure the funding needed for the advanced attack helicopter (AAH) program.
On Apr. 14, 1972, the Department of the Army (DA) directed MICOM to remove the XM26 subsystem from storage and rush it and a load of TOW missiles to the battlefront in Vietnam. One week after receiving the order to deploy, three C-141 aircraft flew to Vietnam carrying two Huey gunships, two XM26 subsystems, missile crews and other equipment.
The TOW Project Manager, Col. Robert W. Huntzinger, headed the team effort and handpicked the MICOM technical support team that accompanied the equipment in-theater. Included in the support team were an expert on the UH-1B from Bell Helicopter as well as two engineers and two technicians from Hughes Aircraft, each an expert on the TOW and its airborne guidance and control equipment. A last-minute replacement pilot/gunner was obtained from AVSCOM's AAH program in St. Louis, Mo. On Apr. 22, 1972, the 1st Combat Aerial TOW Team, Vietnam (also known as "Hawk's Claw") was designated and deployed to Vietnam. The team's name reflected the first-time use of the airborne TOW missile system in combat against an armored enemy.
The "Hawk's Claw" team went into combat for the first time on May 2. Chief Warrant Officer (CWO) Carroll W. Lain made history on that morning when he fired a TOW missile which struck a tank. This was the first American-made guided missile to be fired in combat by a U.S. Soldier.
On Jun. 8, 1972, the 2d Combat Aerial TOW Team was formed after Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Jr. decided to keep the XM26 aerial TOW in Vietnam as insurance against any future NVA armor penetration. The second team assumed the combat mission begun in May, while the first team returned to the United States.
The airborne TOW missile system proved to be very adaptable to combat operations, and the XM26 performed very well while in Vietnam. Hughes Aircraft Company technicians were able to handle the minor problems that occurred. Because the airborne TOW system was actually a test bed that had not been designed to be maintained in the field, it required the support of highly trained engineers and technicians as well as extensive laboratory test equipment to keep it operational. Despite the challenges, the airborne TOW achieved a 90 percent reliability rating for the entire period it was deployed in Vietnam. The lack of a limited visibility/night vision capability was the single largest impediment to XM26 system effectiveness during that time.
Between Apr. 30, 1972 and Jan. 11, 1973, the two HUEY gunships fired a total of 199 TOW missiles: 37 in training and 162 in combat. Of the missiles fired in combat, 151 (93 percent) were reliable and 124 (82 percent) scored hits on a variety of targets. These included: 27 tanks, 21 trucks, 5 armored personnel carriers, 3 artillery pieces, 1 antiaircraft gun, 1 122-mm rocket launcher, 5 machine guns, 2 57-mm guns, 5 caves, 8 bunkers, 2 bridges, 2 mortars, 2 ammunition storage dumps, 2 TOW jeeps (1 with launcher and 1 with missiles), and 1 house. There were 11 malfunctions and 4 misses. The latter occurred when the gunner fired the missile at a range in excess of 3,000 meters and lost it when the guidance wire ran out. Although the HUEYs encountered considerable machine gun fire, neither gunship was hit by enemy fire because they stayed high.
With the cease fire on Jan. 28, 1973, the mission of the 2d Combat Aerial TOW Team ended in Vietnam. The UH-1B HUEY helicopters and XM26 TOW systems were retrograded to the United States. With the success of the original airborne TOW team and the continued success of the replacement team trained in-country, funding for the next generation M65 TOW/Cobra was secured.
paper-2020-05-smith-westland-attack-helicopters.pdf (aerosociety.com)
Before discussing the various projects examined by the Advanced Engineering Team within Westland Helicopters, it is worth summarising the position facing the operational user in the early 1980s. Lynx AH.1 was in service, primarily as a utility helicopter, but with an important secondary anti-armour role. In this role, it was armed with eight Hughes TOW wire-guided missiles, supported by a roofmounted Hughes optical sight (manufactured under licence by British Aerospace) for target acquisition and missile guidance. The TOW missile system could engage targets out to 3,750 m (12,303 ft) with flight times of up to 20 seconds using a semi-active command to line-of-sight (SACLOS) system which assured ease of use but accuracy came at the expense of having to maintain continuous view to the target. Use of the system from behind cover was only partially successful at masking the helicopter from view: vulnerability to the Warsaw Pact ZSU 23/4 radar guided air defence weapon system was a recurring concern. Elsewhere, the 1970s had seen the US Army launch an Armed Attack Helicopter competition, which resulted in the 1976 selection of the Hughes (subsequently McDonnell Douglas Helicopters and then Boeing) AH-64A Apache as the winner, with approval for full production following in 1982 (Figure 21)
Lynx Mk7 / Mk9 Multirole Helicopter - Army Technology (army-technology.com)
The UK Army Air Corps operates the Lynx army helicopter (Lynx AH) mk7 and mk9, and the export version of the Army Lynx, known as the Battlefield Lynx. Around 77 AH mk7 versions and 22 AH mk9 helicopters are in service with the UK Army.
The Army Lynx first flew in 1977. The initial role as a utility helicopter, a tactical troop and stores carrier, airborne command, and for casualty evacuation was expanded with the addition of air-to-ground missiles, cannon and rockets for armed reconnaissance, armed escort, anti-tank and air-to-surface strike roles.
In Operation Telic in Iraq, the Joint Helicopter Force Iraq (JHF(I)), a joint unit based in Basra and manned by members of the navy, army and air force, deployed Sea King mk4 and Lynx mk7 helicopters from the commando helicopter force (CHF), and also Merlin helicopters from RAF Benson.
The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) has a £1bn programme for the AW159 Lynx Wildcat, which is based on an upgraded version of the Lynx helicopter.
Lynx helicopter development and upgradesIn December 2008, the UK MoD signed a contract with AgustaWestland for the upgrade of 12 Lynx AH mk9 aircraft. The upgraded aircraft are fitted with CTS800-4N engines.
In September 2009, the first upgraded aircraft successfully completed its maiden flight. The remaining twelve aircraft were delivered in 2010.
“The Lynx helicopters operated in Iraq were modified with the installation of sand filters and improved communications.”The Lynx helicopters operated in Iraq were modified with the installation of sand filters, new communications, night vision-compatible cockpit lighting, and a new defensive aids suite, a helicopter DAS, which included directed infrared countermeasures.
Super Lynx, Battlefield Lynx and AH mk9 Lynx helicopter variantsThe Super Lynx helicopter is of conventional semi-monocoque pod and boom design. There is a jettisonable cockpit door and large sliding cabin door with jettisonable windows on each side of the fuselage.
The large cabin doors allow rapid emplane and deplane. The cabin provides internal access to the cockpit.
The Battlefield Lynx and the AH mk9 are fitted with non-retractable tricycle-type landing gear with twin nosewheels. The AH mk7 has a skid type undercarriage which can be fitted with snow skis for Arctic operations. The aircraft is fitted with a wire-strike protection system.
Lynx multirole helicopter cockpitThe cockpit accommodates the pilot and co-pilot but can be flown by a single pilot. A night vision-compatible cockpit allows the helicopter to be used for covert operations.
The navigation systems include a Racal Doppler 91 and RNS252, Honeywell AN/APN-198 radar altimeter, Rockwell Collins 206A automatic direction finder, BAE GMM9 Gyrosyn compass, distance measuring equipment (DME), Rockwell Collins VIR 31A VHF omni-directional ranger and instrument landing system (VOR/ILS), Rockwell Collins AN/ARN-118 tactical air navigation system (TACAN).
The avionics system includes a BAE Systems mk34 automatic flight control system and a BAE Systems automatic stabiliser.
Lynx cabinThe helicopter can carry up to nine armed troops. The cabin seats can be quickly removed for freight transport. The maximum internal freight load is 910kg.
For casualty evacuation, the helicopter carries the pilot and co-pilot, up to six stretcher patients and a medical attendant. Underslung loads up to 1,360kg (3,000lb) can be carried. The aircraft has the capacity for up to four ropes for fast roping or rappelling. A rescue hoist can be deployed to recover personnel from confined spaces.
Helicopter weapons“The Lynx multirole helicopter can carry up to nine armed troops.”The army version helicopter has a pintle-mounted 7.62mm machine gun installed inside the cabin and two 20mm cannon can be mounted externally. External weapons pylons can carry two miniguns, gun pods, rocket pods, or up to eight air-to-surface missiles such as HOT, Hellfire or TOW. Up to eight missiles can be carried in the cabin ready for reloading.
CountermeasuresA BAE Systems information & electronic warfare systems (IEWS) AN/ALQ-144 infrared jamming system is installed under the tailboom. The helicopter is equipped with the BAE AWARE-3 ARI 23491 radar warning receiver and the Sky Guardian mk15 electronic warfare system.
Lynx helicopter sensorsA roof-mounted sight manufactured by BAE Systems under licence from Raytheon (formerly Hughes) is installed on the Lynx helicopters armed with TOW missiles. Optical sighting systems include lightweight targeting sights, vertical cameras, oblique cameras, low-light television, infrared line scanners and night-vision goggles.
EnginesThe helicopters are powered by two Rolls-Royce Gem mk42 turboshaft engines, rated at 835kW. The exhaust is fitted with diffusers to reduce the infrared signature. The four-blade semi-rigid main rotor and a four bladed flapping tail rotor are powered by main rotor gearbox.
There are five internal fuel tanks of capacity 985l. The 150kt transit speed gives a good tactical speed of response. The Super Lynx has exceptional agility allowing tactical nap-of-the-earth flight.
Lynx.pdf (multiscreensite.com)
AAC upgrades Like the navy, the Army Air Corps was soon looking for an upgrade for its Lynx fleet, and an initial order for nine AH.Mk 5s was placed to evaluate several improvements such as Gem 41-1 engines. The first to fly was ZD282 on 21 November 1984, which was later brought up to full AH.Mk 7 standard as a result of the evaluation. The second one, Mk 5X ZD559, flew on 11 February 1985. After the third Mk 5 was completed, the rest of the order was changed into AH.Mk 7s, of which an eventual 13 new-built helicopters were delivered. Main feature of this variant was the change of rotation direction of the tail rotor to improve its yaw control authority, especially at higher weights, and also reduce noise. Furthermore, large heat-shroud boxes were placed over the engine exhausts to diffuse the hot gases for better protection against heat-seeking missiles, which were removed later. Some AH.Mk 1s were partly modified (engine and tail rotor only) and designated AH.Mk 1GT, but eventually all 107 remaining AH.Mk 1/AH.Mk 1GTs were converted to AH.Mk 7 at RNAY Fleetlands, also incorporating improved avionics such as the BAe Systems Mk 34 automatic flight control system, Racal Doppler 91 and RNS252 tactical air navigation system. To demonstrate a battlefield variant showing the growth potential for the Lynx, Westland developed the Lynx 3. It had a wheeled undercarriage and was powered by two Gem 60-3/1 engines (rated at 1,260 shp/940 kW). The prototype, serialled ZE477, first flew on 14 June 1984 and was then used mainly for trials and demos. No orders for the Lynx 3 were taken, and after its last flight in 1987, the project was cancelled in 1988. In that same year, however, Westland introduced another army version, again with wheeled landing gear. This time, the battlefield support helicopter concept was demonstrated on company aircraft GLYNX. As a result, the AAC bought 24 Lynx AH.Mk 9s in April 1987, incorporating the AH.Mk 7 improvements and powered by Gem 205 engines (a Gem 42 variant rated at 1,120 shp/835 kW), which also is the current standard for the AH.Mk 7. In addition, an uprated main rotor gearbox was used to raise the maximum take-off weight to 11,300 lb (5,126 kg). This enables the Mk 9 to carry up to nine troops and supplies, both internal (max weight 2,000 lb/910 kg) and external as an underslung load (maximum weight 3,000 lb/1,360 kg). An avionic upgrade included improved IFF, GPS, ARN-118 TACAN and secure radios. The TOW-system was not added due to budgetary limitations. The AH.Mk 9 also has an engine failure indicator that earlier versions lack. The first of 16 new-built AH.Mk 9s, serialled ZG884, flew on 20 July 1990, while 8 AH.Mk 7s were converted during the early 1990s. First squadron to receive the AH.Mk 9 in April 1992 was 672 Squadron at Dishforth. During 1993, the AH.Mk 7 and AH.Mk 9 received a GEC-Marconi ARI 23491 AWARE-3 radar warning receiver, replacing the Sky Guardian Mk 15 electronic warfare system. A pintlemounted 7.62-mm machine-gun can be fitted into both side door openings. BERP blades From the start, the AH.Mk 9 was fitted with British Experimental Rotor Programme (BERP) carbon and glass fibre rotor blades. These blades, distinguished by their paddle tips, provide a lift increase of 37 percent, reduce vibration and give the aircraft greater performance in terms of speed and hover. They also require less maintenance, are easier to repair and have an increased lifespan. The first Lynx to be equipped with BERP blades was G-LYNX. With this modification and Gem 60 engines, it set the world speed record for helicopters on 11 August 1986 at 249.1 mph (400.87 km/h), manned by pilot Trevor Eggington and flight engineer Derek Clews. Lynx AH.Mk 9 of 1 Regt AAC with tricycle landing gear 9 Regt AAC Lynx AH.Mk 7s bank over the Yorkshire Moors All existing AAC and FAA helicopters were subsequently retrofitted with the new blades, although it must be noted that the production blades were slightly different to the ones used for development, having anhedral tips to improver hover performance. Other operators also acquired them in their various upgrade programmes, especially since the old steel ones became increasingly unavailable. Lynx in Gulf War Following Iraq’s invasion in Kuwait in August 1990, Lynx helicopters played a major role in the ensuing conflict. Firstly, the Royal Navy’s HAS.Mk 3 became one of the coalition’s main anti-ship assets as part of Operation Granby. In the years prior to the Gulf War, some Lynxes had been adapted for the local hot and dusty environment as HAS.Mk 3GMs. Before the war to regain Kuwait started, these Lynxes had flown missions over the northern Persian Gulf to enforce a maritime blockade. To jam the feared Iraqi AM39 Exocet missiles, a Whittaker ALQ-167 Yellow Veil ECM pod was carried on the port outer torpedo pylon. Real action followed in January and February 1991, when several of the deployed helicopters attacked Iraqi boats. Most attacks were undertaken in cooperation with coalition aircraft such as US Navy A-6E Intruders. Some 15 Sea Skuas were fired, of which all but one hit their target, sinking or damaging 11 enemy ships. During the conflict, Lynx HAS.Mk 3GM flights from 815 and 829 NAS operated from HMS Battleaxe, Brazen, Brilliant, Cardiff, Gloucester, Jupiter, London, Manchester and York. In addition, French Lynxes were on board the destroyers FS Dupleix and FS Montcalm as part of Operation Artimon. The AAC was very active in the theatre as well, as elements from 654, 659 and 661 squadrons deployed 24 AH.Mk 7s, which received a desert ‘pink’ camouflage scheme and were equipped with Sky Guardian 200-13 radar warning receivers. These operated from Al Jubail, Saudi Arabia, as well as several dispersed bases, supporting the 1st (British) Armoured Division. An infra-red sight was installed, and together with the use of night vision goggles, night operations became possible. During the short ground war, a large number of Iraqi tanks and armoured vehicles was destroyed by TOW missiles. After the war, 3 CBAS of the Royal Marines flew close air support sorties with its Lynx AH.Mk 7s from Sirsenk in Iraq.
Lynx: The British tank's killer | ELISA (electroluminescent-provider.com)
It is only a very recent time that appeared heavily armed and rotary wing shield able to conduct attack missions. So far, most of the combat helicopters built in Europe benefited from transport capacity, and they would be gone unnoticed on commercial machines. Some of this aircraft can operate over both the land from the sea. This and the case of Westland WG.13 Lynx.
Having the same cell and the same dynamic systems that the infantry Lynx, the navalized Lynx has a different avionics and armament. Its origins date back to a specification of the British Army, which included 135 of the 364 Lynx ordered as of 1 January 1994. The main factors contributing to the lynxes its final configuration, we find the wish of the British military that such a device can be transported aboard a Hercules after being partially dismantled. Lynx presents itself as a small-sized machine unsightly, the engines are mounted above the cabin and back to the rotor shaft. During the sixties, while the design of the unit was well advanced, the first lessons of the Viet-Nam war confirmed that the use of two engines was an essential element of survivability above the field battle. In case of destruction of one of these engines, allowed a aircraft in difficulty to regain its base.
The GSOR 3335 specification
The Lynx was to be equipped departing two Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A operating a main rotor 13.41 m in diameter, but the agreement France-British concluded in 1967 changed all that. France has agreed to buy was Lynx on behalf of its navy, provided, however, that the diameter of the main rotor does not exceed 13 meters, and to allow the storage of aircrafts in hangars boats.
The PT6A not covenant this new technical guidance, Rolls-Royce proposed his Turbomoteur BS.360, which developed an output of 900 hp. Later known under the name of Gem, this engine was combined with a rigid rotor and a new gearbox. The result was reflected in a compact propulsion system, simplified maintenance, and subject to low power losses.
As such, the helicopter was responding perfectly Ground staff operational requirement (GSOR) 3335, published in June 1966 and on an aircraft capable of carrying 12 troops wounded lying or 3 and 3 others sitting. Another version was planned which was to answer a request on France-UK armed helicopter two-seater with two 20 mm guns in the nose turret and other weapons on the wing stumps.
his variant, however, was never realized, and armament consists of machine guns or 20mm cannon was assigned to a machine where it was to be placed in the recesses of the cabin doors. We had to wait a decade for the increased firepower.
The Lynx prototype took the air March 21, 1971 and was followed by a copy of development-oriented utility for the Army. After some modifications appeared Lynx AH Mk1, whose exemplary pemier flew 11 February 1977. The main feature of the ground Lynx is its lander with tubular runners, while the naval version has a gear train less adapted to methods of pretty brutal tactical landing of the army.
It is provided with the same very precise tactical navigation system that consists of a Decca TANS associated with Decca 71 Dopler and Sperry gyrocompass GM9. The pilot, who was seated in the right seat, benefited from a system of automatic stabilization on three axes, and the unit can receive optional automatic GEC Avionics flight control system. Thanks to these facilities, the Lynx has fairly good capacity anytime.
AN ADVANCED ROTORThe four-bladed rotor Lynx presents an aerodynamic curved section. Blades, interchangeable, have a spar and a leading edge of stainless steel, and a body Nomex. On August 11, 1986, the helicopter used by Westland for the purposes of demonstration (G-LYNX) with a BERP rotor (British Experimental Rotor Program), an injection system water-methanol and tail Westland 30, establishes a record the flying world speed 400.86 km / h, the last dated record having been assigned to a Mil amended on September 28, 1978, with 368.36 km / h.
The main rotor of the Lynx can be manually folded for ease of storage in tight spaces. Below the head of the rotor, titanium is the main gear. The latter consists of two floors, with spiral bevel gear teeth and a conventional gear that makes it robust. The engine of the regime, which is 6150 rev / min, is reduced to 326 rev / min at the principal rotor thanks to this high-tech reducer. Each Turbomotor has a control system which can control the speed of the rotor. The driver is thus able to select the speeds during the different phases of flight, without having to constantly use the throttles.
In case of a fault with an engine, the other automatically takes a regime corresponding to maximum power. The two engines are mounted Lynx side by side above the bunker equipment, and are powered by crashworthy fuel tanks. The power of the aircraft, powered initially by Gem Mk 2 was increased to 1120 hp with the Gem Mk 41, which has a compressor modified to increase the 10% air flow and can operate at higher temperatures. In 1983 appeared the Gem Mk 43, whose power is 1135 hp and benefited from a system electronic fuel supply.
Since the Lynx AH Mk1 is grafted on, the maximum mass of aircraft has been increased from 4310 to 4350 kg. The Lynx AH Mk 5, which is equipped Gem 41 engines and a reducer three gables, has a maximum weight of 4350 kg and the Lynx AH Mk 7, do, t the development has been undertaken as part of the specification GSOR 3947, has an upper mass of 4800 kg. This version has a tail rotor rotating in the opposite direction to that of a rotor rotors of previous versions. This allows you to reduce the noise level and facilitates hover with heavy loads, two very useful features for the antitank.
In terms of structure, all Lynx are alike. The fuselage and tail boom are semi-monocabine construction and are made of light alloys. Access doors, however, are fiberglass, which is also the case of the leading edge of the vertical stabilizer and reducer fairing tail rotor.In the inside of the main cabin were set up seats on which can sit ten armed soldiers; otherwise, the aircraft can carry a freight load of 900 kg. The volume is available at the rear of 5.21 m3 and loading is done by large sliding doors on each side of the cabin. Lynx can carry a load of about 1350 kg suspended at the extremity of a sling.
Operating in Germany
When it entered service with the British forces in Germany, in August 1978, the Lynx helicopter was to be used as a utility. Set up in squadrons equiped Westland AH Mk 1 Scout armed with anti-tank missiles Aerospatiale SS11, Lynx should support rather than replace these machines. The UK provoked many reactions among its European partners in mid-1977 by pronouncing in favor of anti-tank missile Hughes BGM-71A Tow instead of HOT regard to the main armament of the Lynx. Delivery of Tow began in 1980 and the first shots took place February 20 of the same year, in the Salisbury Plain.
According to an agreement with the United States, a consortium under the aegis of BAe acquired the license to manufacture a version of the Hughes roof viewfinder used under the name M65 by the US Army . This viewfinder bears no British label precise, Hughes refused to consider that the proposed BAe. In April 1981, the 654 Squadron, based in Germany Federal, took delivery of the first Lynx / Tow and at the end of the same year, five anti-tank units (squadrons 661, 662, 663, 664 and 669) Scout had exchanged against new helicopters, 60 aircrafts with the Hughes roof viewfinder. A total of 130 copies were to be produced for the Army Air Corps.
The Tow is a heavy anti-tank missile that benefited from a range of 3700 m and displays a speed of 1000 km / h. The machines of this type are installed in sets of four units in tubes attached to the lateral towers. In addition, the Lynx can carry eight cabin spare missiles, so he can leave the combat zone and earn a sector to recharge its missile tubes.
Westland "Lynx" helicopter - development history, photos, technical data (aviastar.org)
Westland "Lynx"
1971
For a number of years, Westland manufactured anglicized Sikorsky-designed helicopters under license, usually with substantial modifications, but it was not until after the amalgamation of the British helicopter industry in 1959-61 that any original projects reached the hardware stage. In 1964, the Yeovil division began designing a family of military helicopters using the WG prefix, and the 13th model was based on the need to replace the Scout and Wasp used by the British forces, and to offer an alternative to the American Bell Huey, with more advanced technology.
Many components were clearly inspired by the success of the Scout and Wasp but the rotor, for example, was completely new, being of the semi-rigid type with blades of constant chord and cambered section. With these characteristics, it was possible to achieve very high tip speeds, as well as enhancing lift and reducing drag. The construction of the rotor blades was also technologically advanced, in that they had a honeycomb core and made extensive use of modern materials. The result was an aircraft which was up-to-date in terms of design and easier to maintain than comparable American aircraft. Thus it was Westland's strongest proposal for an agreement signed with Sud-Aviation in 1968.
The first Westland WG.13 was ready for flight testing on 21 March 1971 — rather later than foreseen. It was followed by four more aircraft in two basic configurations: the AH Mk.1 for the Army and the HAS Mk.2 for the Navy.
The Lynx demonstrated its capabilities by the records achieved in the summer of 1972. Piloted by Westland's chief test pilot Roy Moxam, it broke the world record over 15/25km by flying at 321.74km/h, also setting a new 100km closed circuit record shortly afterwards by flying at 318.504km/h.
The British Army ordered over 100 Lynx AH.1 for a variety of roles, from tactical transport to armed escort, antitank warfare (with eight TOW missiles), reconnaissance and casualty evacuation. A Marconi Elliott AFCS system is fitted to the Army's version of the Lynx, which gives automatic stabilization on three axes and can also be used as an autopilot during extended flights. The naval version, unlike the ground-based version with skid landing gear, has a non-retractable quadricycle landing gear with oleopneumatic shock absorbers. The initial HAS Mk.2 version was ordered by both the Royal Navy and the French Aeronavale, although they differed in their avionics, ASW equipment, and their armament (the former has four Sea Skua anti-ship missiles and the latter AS.12 missiles). Uprating and other changes subsequently resulted in two distinct new variants, the HAS Mk.3 for the Royal Navy and the Mk.4 for the Aeronavale. Similar uprating for the British Army version has resulted in the AH Mk.5.
The Lynx has also met with considerable export success. After careful evaluation, it was chosen by the German Navy (12 ordered in 1981) for use on their new frigates, and six SAR and 18 ASW models have been ordered by the Royal Netherlands Navy. Other operators of the Lynx include Argentina, Brazil, Denmark, Norway, Nigeria and Qatar.
G.Apostolo "The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Helicopters", 1984
One of the three helicopters included in the Aerospatiale/Westland co-production agreement of 1968, the Westland Lynx was designed initially for naval and civil roles, but early appreciation of its suitability for a wide range of military operations has led to an expanded development programme under the titles Army and Navy Lynx. Production was shared 70% by Westland and 30% by Aerospatiale. The first of six prototypes was flown on 21 March 1971, being followed by seven pre-production prototypes to speed development. Service trials began first in 1976 with No. 700L Naval Air Squadron at RNAS Yeovilton, Somerset, this being a joint Royal Navy and Royal Netherlands navy operational evaluation unit; similarly, an Army Aviation trials unit was established at Middle Wallop, Hampshire, in mid-1977. Deliveries of production aircraft to operational units began following completion of the latter trials in December 1977, the Lynx entering service first with Army Aviation squadrons in West Germany. The first Royal Navy unit (No. 702 Sqn) became operational in December 1977. Westland's current production aircraft are improved versions of the Army and Navy Lynx known as the Battlefield Lynx and Super Lynx, respectively, with all versions detailed more closely below. By 1993, 380 Army and Navy versions had been completed for customers in 17 nations.
VARIANTS
Lynx AH.Mk 1: general-purpose/ utility version for the British army with skid landing gear, able to operate in roles that include anti-tank, strike, armed escort, casualty evacuation, command post, logistic support, reconnaissance, tactical transport and SAR; 113 built;
AH.Mk 1GT is interim version before AH.Mk 7 conversion
Lynx HAS.Mk 2: Royal Navy general-purpose version with non-retractable tricycle landing gear and foldable tail rotor pylon, suitable for roles that include ASV, search and strike, ASW classification and strike communications, fire support, liaison, reconnaissance, SAR, troop transport and vertical replenishment
Lynx Mk 2 (FN): version for French navy, generally similar to HAS.Mk 2
Lynx HAS.Mk 3: second antisubmarine version for Royal Navy with uprated powerplant and transmission; equipped with two 835kW Rolls-Royce Gem 41-1 turboshaft engines, and GEC-Marconi Seaspray radar in modified nose; 23 delivered between March 1982 to April 1985; 53 surviving HAS.Mk 2s converted to HAS Mk 3 standard by 1989; further improved version designated HAS.Mk 3S
Lynx HAS.Mk 3 ICE: two aircraft converted for Arctic use by Royal Navy
Lynx HAS.Mk 3 GM: unofficial designation for 19 Gulf Modification aircraft originally delivered for use by Armada patrol, involving secure comms, tactical navigation and ESM fit
Lynx HAS.Mk ACTS: phase two of current upgrade programme featuring addition of RAMS 4000 central tactical system
Lynx HAS.Mk 4 (FN): version for French navy with powerplant of Lynx HAS.Mk 3
Lynx AH.Mk 5: version similar to Lynx AH.Mk 1, three for MoD (PE) with uprated Gem engines
Lynx AH.Mk 7: currently in service; improved British Army version featuring box-like exhaust shrouds, composite main rotor and reversed tail rotors; all surviving AH. Mk 1s converted to AH.Mk 7 standard by RN at Fleetlands from March 1988
Lynx HAS.Mk 8: latest version for Royal Navy featuring 15 new-build and 45 converted airframes featuring increased weights, internal MAD, improved rotors, avionics and ESM systems; Seaspray radar relocated to chin position and GEC-Marconi Sea Owl thermal imager fitted to nose instead; initial deliveries scheduled for early 1994; export version designated
Super Lynx Lynx AH.Mk 9: latest battlefield version for British army; fitted with tricycle undercarriage which precludes carriage of TOW missiles; 16 new aircraft on order plus eight AH.Mk 7 conversions; export version designated Battlefield Lynx
Lynx Mk 21: version for Brazilian navy similar to Lynx HAS.Mk 2
Lynx Mk 22: unbuilt version for Egyptian navy
Lynx Mk 23: version for Argentine navy similar to Lynx HAS.Mk 2
Lynx Mk 24: unbuilt version for Iraqi army
Lynx Mk 25: version for Royal Netherlands navy, which designated them UH-14A; similar to Lynx HAS.Mk 2
Lynx Mk 26: unbuilt, unarmed version for Iraqi army
Lynx Mk 27: version for Royal Netherlands navy which designated them SH-14B; uprated Gem engines and equipped for ASW role with sonar; nine delivered
Lynx Mk 28: version for State of Qatar police; generally as Lynx AH.Mk 1 but with uprated Gem 47-1 turboshafts and special equipment, including flotation gear
Lynx Mk 80: version for Royal Danish navy, similar to Lynx HAS.Mk 2; eight built
Lynx Mk 81: version for Royal Netherlands navy which designated them SH-14C; uprated Gem engines and magnetic anomaly detection (MAD) gear, some converted to SH-14B standard through deletion of MAD and addition of sonar; eight built
SH-14D: conversion of five Dutch navy UH-14As and eight SH-14Cs with Alcatel dipping sonar, UHF radios, RWR, FLIR, GPS, radar altimeter, composite blades and Gem Mk 42 engines
Lynx Mk 82: unbuilt version for Egyptian army
Lynx Mk 83: unbuilt version for Saudi army
Lynx Mk 84: unbuilt version for Qatari army
Lynx Mk 85: unbuilt version for UAE army
Lynx Mk 86: version for Royal Norwegian air force coast guard; similar to Lynx HAS.Mk 2, but with uprated Gem engines and non-folding tail rotor pylon; six built
Lynx Mk 87: embargoed version for Argentine navy, similar to Lynx Mk 23 but with uprated engines
Lynx Mk 88: version for the Federal German navy similar to Lynx Mk 86; equipped with sonar; 19 built
Lynx Mk 89: version for Nigerian navy; equipped for ASW/SAR roles; three built
Lynx Mk 90: single follow-on aircraft for Danish navy assembled in Denmark; delivered in 1988
Super Lynx Mk 95: five aircraft for Portuguese navy; equivalent to HAS. Mk 8; deliveries commenced in 1993
Super Lynx Mk 99: 12 aircraft for South Korean navy; delivered between 1989 and 1991; equivalent to HAS.Mk8
Battlefield Lynx 800: AH Mk 9 re-engined with LHTEC T800 turboshafts; development project terminated in 1992
D.Donald "The Complete Encyclopedia of World Aircraft", 1997
Developed within Anglo-French helicopter agreement confirmed 2 April 1968; Westland given design leadership; first flight of first of 13 prototypes (XW835) 21 March 1971; first flight of fourth prototype (XW838) 9 March 1972, featuring production type monobloc rotor head; first flights of British Army Lynx prototype (XX153) 12 April 1972, French Navy prototype (XX904) 6 July 1973, production Lynx (RN HAS. Mk 2 XZ229) 20 February 1976; first Royal Navy operational unit (No. 702 Squadron) formed on completion of intensive flight trials December 1977; AH. Mk 5 first flew (ZE375) 23 February 1985. Production shared 70% Westland, 30% Aerospatiale.
Battlefield Lynx mockup displayed at 1988 Farnborough Air Show (converted demonstrator G-LYNX), featuring wheeled landing gear, exhaust diffusers and provision for anti-helicopter missiles each side of fuselage; first flight of wheeled prototype (converted trials AH. Mk 7 XZ170) 29 November 1989; first flight of South Korean Super Lynx 16 November 1989 (also first Lynx with Sea Spray Mk 3).
VERSIONS
Lynx AH. Mk 1: British Army general purpose and utility version; 113 built and most converted to Mk 7.
Lynx HAS. Mk 2: Version for Royal Navy, for advanced shipborne anti-submarine and other duties. Gem 2 engines. Ferranti Sea Spray search and tracking radar in modified nose. Total of 60 delivered, plus 26 to French Navy, designated HAS. Mk 2(FN). First production aircraft (XZ227) flown on 20 February 1976. By 1989, all 53 active Royal Navy first-series Lynx had been modified to Mk 3 or later standards.
Lynx HAS. Mk 3: Second Royal Navy version for advanced shipborne anti-submarine and other duties; similar to Mk 2, with GEC-Marconi Sea Spray search and tracking radar in modified nose; can carry Sea Skua. Mk 2's Gem 2 engines replaced by two 835kW Gem 41-1 engines; 23 delivered; seven more in HAS. Mk 3S configuration; first flight, ZF557, 12 October 1987. This version has two GEC-Marconi AD3400 UHF radios with secure speech facility; additionally, ZD560 built in approximately Mk 7 configuration, delivered to Empire Test Pilots' School. Further 53 obtained through modification of all existing HAS. Mk 2s. Lynx HAS. Mk 3ICE is Mk 3 lacking some operational equipment for general duties aboard Antarctic survey vessel, HMS Endurance; three converted, of which two to Mk 3SICE.
Those used by Armilla Patrol in Arabian Gulf modified to HAS. Mk 3GM (Gulf Mod), with better cooling, or HAS. Mk 3S/GM, also with Mk 3S modifications (to which standard all 3GMs converted). Augmenting new-build Mk 3Ss, 36 modified by Royal Navy Aircraft Yard at Fleetlands from April 1989; Mk 3S is Phase 1 of Mk 8 conversion programme, involving GEC-Marconi AD 3400 secure speech radios (blade aerial beneath mid-point of tailboom) and upgraded ESM; programme continues, including Mk 3S/GM. Phase 2 is Lynx HAS. Mk 3CTS, adding RAMS 4000 central tactical system; prototype (XZ236 ex-Mk 3) flew 25 January 1989; further six for Royal Navy trials (one ex-Mk 3; five ex-Mk 3S); deliveries to Operational Flight Trials Unit, Portland, from April 1989. CTS service clearance granted August 1991; Mk 3CTS has flotation bag each side of nose.
Lynx Mk 4: Second batch of 14 aircraft ordered for French Navy in May 1980 with Gem 41-1 engines and uprated transmission to permit an increase in AUW to 4,763kg. All supplied 'green' for equipment installation by Aerospatiale and subsidiaries.
Lynx AH. Mk 5: Similar to AH. Mk 1. Two trials aircraft ZD285 and ZD559. Nine AH. Mk 5s ordered for Army Air Corps. Initial example (ZE375) flew on 23 February 1985 and was used for engine trials. Remainder transferred to AH. Mk 7 contract, although ZE376 flew initially as Mk 5.
Lynx AH. Mk 7: Uprated British Army version, with improved systems, reversed-direction tail rotor with improved composite blades to reduce noise and enhance extended period hover at high weights; 13 ordered, eight from Mk 5 contract (two cancelled); first flight (ZE376) 7 November 1985; seven converted to Mk 9. Royal Navy workshops at Fleetlands converted Mk 1s to Mk 7s; first (XZ641) redelivered 30 March 1988; box-type exhaust diffusers added from early 1989; last conversion mid-1994. Interim version was Lynx AH. Mk 1GT with uprated engines and rotors, but lacking Mk 7's improved electronic systems; first conversion (XZ195) 1991. GEC-Marconi AWARE-3 radar warning receiver selected 1989 for retrofit, designated ARI23491 Rewarder; Mk 1 XZ668 to Westland for trial installation 22 November 1991. (GEC-Marconi Sky Guardian Mk 13 installed in some Lynx AH. Mk 7s for Gulf War, 1990-91; later uprated to Mk 15.) BERP (extended tip chord) blades retrofitted to Mk 7 from 1993.
Subject to results of study contract awarded to GKN Westland on 1 December 1998, Army Air Corps Mks 7 and 9 will be modified to a common equipment standard (wheeled landing gear, MIL-STD-1553B databus; avionics management system; GPS/INS/Doppler navigation; improved communications; civil navigation equipment; improved defensive aids); Mk 7 will replace Gazelles and be designated LUH (Light Utility Helicopter); Mk 9 role to be unchanged.
Lynx Mk 8 HMA (formerly known as HAS. Mk 8): Entered service with Royal Navy 1995. Equivalent to export Super Lynx; passive identification system; 5,125kg maximum T-O weight; improved (reversed-direction) tail rotor control; BERP composite main rotor blades; Racal RAMS 4000 central tactical system (CTS eases crew's workload by centrally processing sensor data and presents mission information on multifunction CRT display; 15 systems ordered 1987, 106 September 1989); original Sea Spray Mk 1 radar repositioned in new chin radome; GEC-Marconi Sea Owl thermal imager (x5 or x30 magnifying system on gimballed mount, with elevation +20 to -30° and azimuth +120 to -120°; ordered October 1989) in former radar position; MIR-2 ESM updated; three Mk 3s used in development programme as tactical system (XZ236), dummy Sea Owl/chin radome (ZD267) and avionics (ZD266) testbeds.
Definitive Mk 8 (Phase 3) conversions begun 1992 with addition of Sea Owl, further radar and navigation upgrades, (including RACAL RNS252 'Super TANS'), composites BERP main rotor blades and reversed-direction tail rotor. Conversion programme covers 44 aircraft in two phases. All conversions due to be completed by the year 2003.
Lynx AH. Mk 9: UK Army Air Corps equivalent of export Battlefield Lynx; tricycle wheel landing gear; maximum T-O weight 5,125kg; advanced technology composites main rotor blades; exhaust diffusers; no TOW capability; first flight of prototype (converted company demonstrator XZ170) 29 November 1989; 16 new aircraft (beginning ZG884, flown 20 July 1990) ordered for delivery from 1991, plus eight Mk 7 conversions (contract awarded November 1991); some outfitted as advanced command posts, remainder for tactical transport role. Deliveries from 22 May 1991.
Battlefield Lynx: Upgraded export army Lynx; approximately equivalent to Lynx AH. Mk 9. Demonstrator G-LYNX fitted with two 1,007kW LHTEC T800 turboshafts as Battlefield Lynx 800 private venture (LHTEC funding power plants and gearboxes, Westland providing airframe for full flight demonstration programme); first flight 25 September 1991; programme terminated early 1992 after 17 hours.
Super Lynx: Export model approximately equivalent to Mk 8 HMA. Lynx Mk 21A: Five remaining Brazilian Navy Lynx Mk 21 upgraded to Super Lynx Mk 21A standard. Contract placed in February 1994 includes nine new-build aircraft.
Other versions and operators where orders completed: Royal Netherlands Navy upgraded five UH-14As and eight SH-14Cs to SH-14D standard, with Alcatel dipping sonar, UHF radios, RWR, FLIR Systems Inc 2000HP FLIR, Trimble Type 2200 GPS, new radar altimeter, composites rotor blades and Mk 42 Gem power plants. Nine SH-14Bs, already with sonar, raised to SH-14D standards, but in interim SH-14Cs upgraded to SH-14B through deletion of MAD and addition of sonar. UH-14As are first full SH-14D conversions, from 1990; programme designated STAMOL (Standaardisatie en Modernisering Lynx); standard fleet comprising 16 with sonar and six with provisions for sonar installation. Completed early 1993.
Denmark upgrading its eight Mk 80A and Mk 90A Lynx to Super Lynx standard; includes building of replacement airframes for integration with existing fleet's engines, transmission, rotor system, flying controls, hydraulic systems, avionics and electrical systems, upgrade and modifications of main rotor blades, tail rotor and fuel systems. Completion due in 2004. Will be known as Mk 90B when upgraded.
GBP80 million contract awarded in June 1998 for upgrading 17 German Navy Mk.88 Sea Lynx to Super Lynx standard, following on from a GBP100 million order for seven new Super Lynx Series 100s. The modification includes fitting the Marconi Sea Spray 3000 radar, Racal Doppler 91, RNS 252 and Rockwell Collins GPS. It will be fitted to accommodate the FLIR system fitted to the new aircraft and will also be capable of deploying the Sea Skua air-to-surface missile. GKN Westland will carry out the first trial installation, with Eurocopter Deutschland subcontracted to modify the remaining 16 aircraft. Trial installation is scheduled for mid-2001.
CURRENT VERSIONS
Super Lynx Series 100: Upgraded export naval Lynx introduced in September 1996, powered by Rolls-Royce Gem 42-1 turboshaft engines, approximately equivalent to Lynx. Mk 8 HMA; operated by South Korean, Portuguese and Brazilian navies and applied to new Mk 88As sold to Germany.
Super Lynx Series 200: More powerful alternative option with 1,007kW LHTEC CTS800 engine with dual-channel Full Authority Digital Electronic Control (FADEC), LCD flat panel electronic power system displays, but otherwise conventional cockpit of Series 100.
Super Lynx Series 300: Also powered by the LHTEC CTS800, but with full 'glass' cockpit with six LCD colour flat panel displays, night vision goggle-compatible, and digital core avionics based around dual-redundant MIL-STD-1553B and ARINC 429 databuses; includes new navigation system, attitude and heading reference system and communications suite. Mission sensors and systems can be integrated into the avionics system and controlled via control and display units. South Africa, which announced intention to purchase on 18 November 1998, has deferred its four aircraft. Launch customer, the Royal Malaysian Navy will take delivery of the first of its six aircraft in 2003. The Royal Thai Navy has approved funding for two.
Demonstrator made its first flight with CTS800-4N turboshaft engines at Yeovil on 12 June 2001.
Lynx ACH: Advanced Compound Helicopter. Technology demonstrator project, publicly announced 22 May 1998 and due to begin in 1999, partly funded by UK MoD. Target is 50% speed increase by means of wings attached at cabin roof level and variable area exhaust nozzles; additional thrust derived from RTM322 turboshafts in place of Gems (uprated gearbox taken from W30-200); BERP rotor blades; flaps on wing trailing-edges, with pitching moment neutralised by all-moving tailplane; and trimming rudder to reduce tail rotor loads.
Performance will include maximum level speed of 463km/h; ceiling of 6,100m; 20% additional payload/range; 50% more propulsive efficiency; and between 25 and 50% improvement in lift/drag ratio.
Following description refers to military general purpose and naval versions with Gem 2 engines, except where indicated:
DESIGN FEATURES: Compact design suited to hunter-killer ASW and missile-armed anti-ship naval roles from frigates or larger ships (superseding ship-guided helicopters), armed/unarmed land roles with cabin large enough for squad, or other tasks; manually folding tail pylon on naval versions; single four-blade semi-rigid main rotor (foldable), each blade attached to main rotor hub by titanium root plates and flexible arm; rotor drives taken from front of engines into main gearbox mounted above cabin ahead of engines; in flight, accessory gears (at front of main gearbox) driven by one of two through shafts from first stage reduction gears; four-blade tail rotor, drive taken from main ring gear; single large window in each main cabin sliding door; provision for internally mounted armament, and for exterior universal flange mounting each side for other weapons/stores.
Super Lynx has increased take-off weight; all-weather day/night capability; extended payload range; swept-tip BERP composites main rotor blades offering improved speed and reduced vibration; and reversed direction tail rotor for improved control.
FLYING CONTROLS: Rotor head controls actuated by three identical tandem servojacks and powered by two independent hydraulic systems; control system incorporates simple stability augmentation system; each engine embodies independent control system providing full-authority rotor speed governing, pilot control being limited to selection of desired rotor speed range; in event of one engine failure, system restores power up to single-engine maximum contingency rating; main rotor can provide negative thrust to increase stability on deck after touchdown on naval versions; hydraulically operated rotor brake mounted on main gearbox; sweptback fin/tail rotor pylon, with starboard half-tailplane.
STRUCTURE: Conventional semi-monocoque pod and boom, mainly light alloy; glass fibre access panels, doors, fairings, pylon leading/trailing-edges, and bullet fairing over tail rotor gearbox; composites main rotor blades; main rotor hub and inboard flexible arm portions built as complete unit, as titanium monobloc forging; tail rotor blades have light-alloy spar, stainless steel leading-edge sheath and rear section as for main blades.
LANDING GEAR: (General purpose military version): Non-retractable tubular skid type. Provision for a pair of adjustable ground handling wheels on each skid. Flotation gear optional. Battlefield Lynx and AH.Mk 9 equivalent have non-retractable tricycle gear with twin nosewheels.
(Naval versions): Non-retractable oleo-pneumatic tricycle type. Single-wheel main units, carried on sponsons, fixed at 27° toe-out for deck landing; can be manually turned into line and locked fore and aft for movement of aircraft into and out of ship's hangar. Twin-wheel nose unit steered hydraulically through 90° by the pilot to facilitate independent take-off into wind. Sprag brakes (wheel locks) fitted to each wheel prevent rotation on landing or inadvertent deck roll. These locks disengage hydraulically and re-engage automatically in event of hydraulic failure. Maximum vertical descent 2.29m/s; with lateral drift 0.91m/s for deck landing. Flotation gear, and hydraulically actuated harpoon deck lock securing system, optional.
POWER PLANT: Currently available options include two Rolls-Royce Gem 42-1 turboshafts, each rated at 835kW, or two LHTEC CTS800-4N, each rated at 995kW. Transmission rating 1,372kW. Exhaust diffusers for IR suppression optional on Battlefield Lynx.
Two Rolls-Royce Gem 2 turboshafts, each with maximum contingency rating of 671kW in original Lynx AH. 1, HAS. 2 and early export variants. Later versions have Gem 41-1, 41-2, or 42-1 engines, all with maximum contingency rating of 835kW. Transmission rating 1,372kW. Engines of British and French Lynx in service converted to Mk 42 standard during regular overhauls from 1987 onwards. Danish, Netherlands and Norwegian Lynx similarly retrofitted. Fuel in five internal tanks; usable capacity 957 litres when gravity-refuelled; 985 litres when pressure-refuelled. For ferrying, two tanks each of 441 litres in cabin, replacing bench tank. Maximum usable fuel 1,867 litres. Engine oil tank capacity 6.8 litres. Main rotor gearbox oil capacity 28 litres.
ACCOMMODATION: Pilot and co-pilot or observer on side-by- side seats. Dual controls optional. Individual forward-hinged cockpit door and large rearward-sliding cabin door on each side; cockpit doors jettisonable; windows of cabin doors also jettisonable. Cockpit accessible from cabin area. Maximum high-density layout (military version) for one pilot and 10 armed troops or paratroops, on lightweight bench seats in soundproofed cabin. Alternative VIP layouts for four to seven passengers, with additional cabin soundproofing. Seats can be removed quickly to permit carriage of up to 907kg of freight internally. Tiedown rings provided. In casualty evacuation role, with a crew of two, Lynx can accommodate up to six Alphin stretchers and a medical attendant. Both basic versions have secondary capability for search and rescue (up to nine survivors) and other roles.
SYSTEMS: Two independent hydraulic systems, pressure 141 bars. Third hydraulic system provided in naval version when sonar equipment, MAD or hydraulic winch system installed. No pneumatic system. 28V DC electrical power supplied by two 6kW engine-driven starter/generators and an alternator. External power sockets. 24V 23Ah (optionally 40Ah) Ni/Cd battery fitted for essential services and emergency engine starting. 200V three-phase AC power available at 400Hz from two 15kVA transmission-driven alternators. Cabin heating and ventilation system. Optional supplementary cockpit heating system. Electric anti-icing and demisting of windscreen, and electrically operated windscreen wipers, standard; windscreen washing system.
AVIONICS: (General): Avionics common to all roles (general purpose and naval versions).
Comms: Collins VOR/ILS; DME; Collins AN/ARN-118 Tacan; I-band transponder (naval version only); GEC-Plessey PTR 446, Collins APX-72, Siemens STR 700/375 or Italtel APX-77 IFF.
Flight: Marconi duplex three-axis automatic stabilisation equipment; BAe GM9 Gyrosyn compass system; Decca Tactical Air Navigation System (TANS); Decca 71 Doppler, E2C standby compass. Marconi Mk 34 AFCS. Additional units fitted in naval version, when sonar is installed, to provide automatic transition to hover and automatic Doppler hold in hover.
(Army): Flight: Decca Doppler 91 and RSN252 navigation; Honeywell/Smiths AN/APN-198 radar altimeter; Rockwell Collins 206A ADF and VIR 31A VOR/ILS on latest versions.
Mission: British Army Lynx equipped with TOW missiles have roof-mounted Hughes sight manufactured under licence by British Aerospace. Roof sight upgraded with night vision capability in far infra-red waveband; first test firing of TOW with added Marconi thermal imager took place in October 1988. Optional equipment, according to role, can include lightweight sighting system with alternative target magnification, vertical and/or oblique cameras, flares for night operation, low-light level TV, infra-red linescan, searchlight, and specialised communications equipment. Some have infra-red formation flying lights and provision for crew's NVGs. For surveillance, some AAC Lynx carry Chancellor Helitele in external (port) ball housing, complete with datalink.
Self-defence: Sanders AN/ALQ-144 infra-red jammer installed beneath tailboom of some British Army Lynx from 1987; later augmented by exhaust diffusers. Requirement for RWR satisfied by 1989 selection of Marconi AWARE-3 (ARI23491) system; Marconi Sky Guardian Mk 13 (later Mk 15) on some aircraft from 1990.
(Navy): Comms: Rotal Navy helicopters have two GEC-Marconi AD 3400 VHF/UHF transceivers, Dowty D403M standby UHF radio, Collins 718U-5 HF transceiver, Plessey PTR446 D-band transponder and Pilkington ARI 5983 I-band transponder.
Radar: Marconi ARI5979 Sea Spray Mk 1 lightweight search and tracking radar, for detecting small surface targets in low-visibility/high-sea conditions in original versions. Super Lynx has Sea Spray Mk 3000 or AlliedSignal RDR 1500 360° scan radar in chin fairing. UK Mk 8 upgraded with Sea Spray Mk 3000 below fuselage.
Flight: GPS on Royal Navy and Netherlands Lynx from 1997.
Mission: Optional AlliedSignal AN/AQS-18 or Thomson Sintra HS-312 sonars. Detection of submarines by dipping sonars or magnetic anomaly detector. Dipping sonars operated by hydraulically powered winch and cable hover mode facilities within the AFCS. Racal MIR-2 Orange Crop passive radar detection system in Royal Navy Lynx; similar Racal Kestrel retrofitted to Danish Mk 90. Matra AF 530 or APX-334 stabilised sight in French naval Lynx. Optional GEC Sandpiper FLIR on Royal Navy Lynx; FLIR Systems 2000HP specified for Netherlands SH-14D upgrade; FLIR Systems Safire optional for Danish Lynx. Vinten Vipa 1 reconnaissance pod, or Agiflite reconnaissance camera system.
Self-defence: Tracor M-130 chaff/flare dispensers and Ericsson Radar Electronics AN/ALQ-167(V) D- to J-band anti-ship missile jamming pods installed on Royal Navy Lynx patrolling Arabian Gulf, 1987. Two Loral Challenger IR jammers above cockpit of Royal Navy Lynx during 1990-91 Gulf War. RWR in Netherlands SH-14Ds from 1996.
EQUIPMENT: All versions equipped as standard with navigation, cabin and cockpit lights; adjustable landing light under nose; and anti-collision beacon. For search and rescue, with three crew, both versions can have a waterproof floor and a 272kg capacity clip-on hydraulic hoist on starboard side of cabin. Cable length 30m. Electric hoist on CTS800-powered aircraft.
ARMAMENT: For armed escort, anti-tank or air-to-surface strike missions, army version can be equipped with two 20mm cannon mounted externally so as to permit carriage also of anti-tank missiles or pintle-mounted 7.62mm machine gun inside cabin. External pylon can be fitted on each side of cabin for variety of stores, including two Minigun or other self-contained gun pods; two rocket pods; or up to eight HOT, Hellfire, TOW, or similar air-to-surface missiles. Additional six or eight missiles carried in cabin. For ASW role, armament includes two Mk 44, Mk 46, A244S or Sting Ray homing torpedoes, one each on an external pylon on each side of fuselage, and six marine markers; or two Mk 11 depth charges. Alternatively, up to four Sea Skua semi-active homing missiles; on French Navy Lynx, four AS.12 or similar wire-guided missiles. Self-protection FN HMP 12.7mm machine gun pod optional on Royal Navy Lynx.
Super Lynx as standard naval Lynx, including four Sea Skua or two Penguin, or Marte Mk.2/s anti-ship missiles.
Jane's Helicopter Markets and Systems
* * *
FACTS AND FIGURES- The first Lynx prototype made its initial flight on 21 March 1971.
- Westland planned to build 16 WG.13 prototypes because it considered the programme so technically demanding.
- Modified Scout helicopters were used to test the Lynx's main rotor system.
- An Army Lynx was rolled out publicly for the first time at Farnborough in 1972.
- During 1977 the Army Air Corps received its first production Lynx; the aircraft became operational in 1978.
- Lynx AH.Mk 1s were converted to AH.Mk 7 standard by the Royal Navy.
- Several features of the Lynx 3 were incorporated into the AH.Mk 9.
- The naval Lynx made its maiden flight on 10 February 1976.
- Most export Lynxes, like the nine used by the Brazilian navy, are based on Britain's HAS.Mk 2.
- Britain's first naval Lynx unit was No. 702 Squadron, Royal Navy, at Yeovilton, formed in December 1977.
- The Norwegian air force uses the naval Lynx for unarmed rescue missions.
- A modified Lynx holds the helicopter world speed record.
Westland Lynx - Wikipedia
The Westland Lynx is a British multi-purpose twin-engined military helicopter designed and built by Westland Helicopters at its factory in Yeovil. Originally intended as a utility craft for both civil and naval usage, military interest led to the development of both battlefield and naval variants. The Lynx went into operational usage in 1977 and was later adopted by the armed forces of over a dozen nations, primarily serving in the battlefield utility, anti-armour, search and rescue and anti-submarine warfare roles.
The Lynx is a fully aerobatic helicopter with the ability to perform loops and rolls.[2] In 1986, a specially modified Lynx set the current Fédération Aéronautique Internationale's official airspeed record for helicopters (category excludes compound helicopters) at 400.87 km/h (249.09 mph),[3][4] which remains unbroken as of 2020.[5]
Several land and naval variants of the Lynx have been produced along with some major derivatives. The Westland 30 was produced as a civil utility helicopter; it was not a commercial success and only a small number were built during the 1980s. In the 21st century, a modernised variant of the Lynx was designed as a multi-role combat helicopter, designated as the AgustaWestland AW159 Wildcat; the Wildcat is intended to replace existing Lynx helicopters. The Lynx remains in production by AgustaWestland, the successor to Westland Helicopters.
Typical combat equipment includes stabilised roof-mounted sensors, onboard countermeasures and door guns; when being used in the anti-tank role, the Lynx is typically armed with BGM-71 TOW missiles; missiles such as the Sea Skua have been used in the maritime anti-surface role.[26] Additional armaments that have been interchangeably used include rockets, 20 mm cannons, torpedoes, and depth charges.[43] Those Lynx built for export have been typically outfitted with armaments and equipment customised for the end-user, such as the Mokopa air-to-surface missile used on Algeria's Lynx fleet, eight of which can be carried;[44] studies into equipping the AGM-114 Hellfire have been performed, and air-to-air missiles could also reportedly be adopted if the capability is sought by operators.[45] Equipped armaments can be managed and controlled inflight through the onboard stores management system.[40] In order to counteract battlefield threats such as infrared-guided missiles, various defensive aid subsystems can be optionally installed, including warning receivers and countermeasures.[45]
Many of the Lynx's components had been derived from earlier Westland helicopters such as the Scout and Wasp.[17] The Lynx has been substantially upgraded since entering service in the 1970s; improvements made to in-service aircraft have typically included strengthened airframes, new avionics and engines, improved rotor blades, and additional surveillance and communications systems.[24][43] Various subsystems from overseas suppliers have been incorporated into some Lynx variants; during a South Korean procurement, hulls produced in the United Kingdom were equipped with Korean-built systems, such as ISTAR, electro-optical, electronic warfare, fire-control systems,[46][47] flight control actuators,[48] and undercarriages.[49] A glass cockpit was adopted on the Super Lynx 300, featuring fully integrated flight and mission display systems, a variety of integrated display units including head-up displays, and dual controls; AgustaWestland has commented that the new cockpit reduces aircrew workload and increases aircraft effectiveness.[36][38] The head-up display installed could be replaced by a helmet-mounted sight system on customer demand.[45]
The British Army also deployed 24 TOW-armed Lynxes alongside an equal number of Westland Gazelle helicopters during the Gulf War. They were assigned the mission of locating and attacking Iraqi tank concentrations, and to support the advance of coalition ground forces into Kuwait and Southern Iraq during the 100 hours war phase of the conflict. On 26 February 1991, a Lynx of 654 Squadron AAC destroyed two MTLB armoured personnel carriers (APCs) and four T-55 tanks using TOW missiles: the engagement was the first recorded use of the missile from a British helicopter.[60]
Land-based variants[edit]Westland WG.13
Prototype, first flight 21 March 1971. Thirteen prototypes built.[114]
Lynx AH.1
Initial production version for the British Army Air Corps, powered by 671 kW (900 hp) Gem 2 engines,[115] with first production example flying 11 February 1977, and deliveries continuing until February 1984, with 113 built.[116] Used for a variety of tasks, including tactical transport, armed escort, anti-tank warfare (60 were equipped with eight TOW missiles as Lynx AH.1 (TOW) from 1981),[117] reconnaissance and casualty evacuation.[118]
Lynx AH.1GT
Interim conversion of the AH.1 to partial AH.7 standard for the Army Air Corps with uprated engines and revised tail rotor.[119]
Lynx HT.1
Planned training version for Royal Air Force to replace the Westland Whirlwind, cancelled.[119][120]
Lynx AH.5
Upgraded version for the Army Air Corps, with 835 kW (1,120 shp) Gem 41-1 engines and uprated gearbox.[121] Three built as AH.5 (Interim) as trials aircraft for MoD. Eight ordered as AH.5s for the Army Air Corps, of which only two were built as AH.5s, the remaining six were completed as AH.7s.[122] Four were later upgraded to AH.7 standard and one was retained for trials work as an AH.5X.
Lynx AH.6
Proposed version for the Royal Marines with undercarriage, folding tail and deck lock[123] of Naval Lynx. Not built.[122]
Two British Army AH.9As in 2015
Lynx AH.7
Further upgraded version for the Army Air Corps, with Gem 41-1 engines and uprated gearbox of the AH.5 and new, larger, composite material tail rotor. Later refitted with BERP type rotor blades. Twelve new builds and 107 Lynx AH.1s converted.[124] A small number also used by the Fleet Air Arm in support of the Royal Marines.[125] The Lynx AH.7 can also be outfitted for the anti-armour role, with the attachment of two pylons, each carrying four TOW anti-tank guided missiles. In the light-lift role, it can carry an aircrew member armed with a cabin door mounted L7 General Purpose Machine Gun (GPMG), as well as troops for fast-rope or abseiling insertions, or regular landings. It can also transport cargo. Now replaced in the attack role by the AgustaWestland Apache attack helicopter.
Lynx AH.7(DAS)
AH.7 with Defensive Aids Subsystem.
Lynx AH.9 ("Battlefield Lynx")
Utility version for Army Air Corps, based on AH.7, but with wheeled undercarriage and further upgraded gearbox. Sixteen new-built plus eight converted from AH.7s.[126]
Firing a .50-inch heavy machine gun from a British Army AH.9A on exercise in BATUS, Canada
Lynx AH.9A
AH.9 with more powerful LHTEC CTS800-4N 1,015 kW (1,362 shp) engines,[127] which allowed the door-mounted GPMG of the AH.7 to be replaced with a .50 inch (12.7 mm) heavy machine gun (HMG) as well as flight in hotter conditions.[128] All 22 AH.9 were upgraded.[129] A small number also used by the Fleet Air Arm in support of the Royal Marines.
British Aerospace Nimrod AEW3 - Wikipedia
British Aerospace Nimrod AEW3From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
First flight16 July 1980[1]
Introduction1984
Retired1986
Produced11
Number built3 prototype
8 production
(all converted from MR1)
The British Aerospace Nimrod AEW3 was a proposed airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft which was to provide airborne radar cover for the air defence of the United Kingdom by the Royal Air Force (RAF). The project was designed to use the existing Nimrod airframe, in use with the RAF as a maritime patrol aircraft, combined with a new radar system and avionics package developed by Marconi Avionics.
The Nimrod AEW project proved to be hugely complex and expensive as a result of the difficulties of producing new radar and computer systems and integrating them successfully into the Nimrod airframe. The project was eventually cancelled, with the RAF instead purchasing new build Boeing E-3 Sentry aircraft to fulfil the AEW requirement.[2]
DevelopmentAs an interim measure during the development of the Nimrod AEW, surplus Shackletons were fitted with equipment from ex-Royal Navy Gannets.Background[In the mid 1960s, following the development of the Grumman E-2 Hawkeye carrier-borne AEW aircraft and its associated systems, the British government began looking for a radar system that could provide airborne early warning for the United Kingdom. At the time, the only recognised AEW aircraft in British service was the Fairey Gannet aircraft used by the Fleet Air Arm on board Royal Navy aircraft carriers. These were fitted with the AN/APS-20 Radar, which had been developed during World War II and was rapidly becoming obsolete.[3] Work had been started in the early 1960s on a brand new AEW platform for the Royal Navy to replace the Gannet that would encompass both a new type of radar system mounted on a new aircraft, the P.139. While the defence cuts of the mid-1960s led to the cancellation of the P.139, work continued on a British designed radar system. Meanwhile, it was decided that the RAF needed an AEW aircraft to operate as part of the national air defence strategy.[4]
To fulfill the planned requirements for a new AEW aircraft, the government had a number of factors to consider:
- The Frequency Modulated Interrupted Continuous Wave (FMICW) radar initially proposed for the P.139 and intended for the RAF's new aircraft would not operate effectively near propellors, meaning a jet aircraft would be needed.
- The size of antennas needed for the required scanning range, together with the fairly large mission crew, meant that a large aircraft was required.
In the interim, to provide a land based AEW aircraft, radar systems from withdrawn Royal Navy Gannets were installed in similarly surplus Avro Shackleton maritime patrol aircraft and entered service from 1972.[5] Around the same time, it was decided not to proceed with FMICW technology as the basis of an AEW system, as research from the United States Air Force (USAF) had shown that pulse-Doppler radar was superior and would be used in the Boeing E-3 Sentry then under development. As a consequence, the idea of a new land-based AEW aircraft for the RAF was re-examined, and again it was decided that the Nimrod met the requirements.[4]
Manufacturer's model of Nimrod AEWThe decision was taken to procure the aircraft fitted with a pulse-Doppler radar system, which then proceeded to a range of options:[1]
- Purchase the AN/APS-125 pulse-Doppler radar system and its associated avionics, as fitted to the E-2 Hawkeye, and fit them into the Nimrod.
- Purchase the AN/APS-125 radar and combine it with a British avionics package.
- Purchase the rotodome and antenna from the E-2 and combine with a British radar transmitter, receiver and avionics package.
- Develop a wholly British radar system and avionics package using a Fore Aft Scanner System (FASS) rather than the E-2 radome.
Development issues[edit]
A Comet 4 was fitted with a nose radome for initial aerodynamic flight testingThe complexity of the AEW requirement proved too much for British industry to overcome by itself. A major project management issue was the appointment of British Aerospace (BAe) and GEC Marconi as joint programme leaders. This meant in practice that as development issues arose, the companies had a distressing tendency to blame each other for the problem rather than try to resolve it; while BAe was able to fulfil its part of the contract by delivering the aircraft on time (the first was due to be delivered in 1982, with full delivery by 1984), GEC was unable to solve the difficulties in developing the avionics.[8]
In 1977 an RAF Comet 4 was modified for flight testing with the nose radome and conducted a series of trials, the results of which proved promising enough for an order for three prototype Nimrods to be built using redundant MR1 airframes.[9] The first of these was rolled out in March 1980 and flew for the first time in July, and was intended to test the flight characteristics, with the second airframe planned to carry out trials of the Mission Systems Avionics (MSA) package.[1]
Nimrod AEW.3 at RAF Finningley in 1985Despite the problems, the project continued, and 8 production aircraft were ordered (which would also come from spare MR1 airframes). The first of these flew in March 1982.[9] Even while the technical problems were being worked on, the aircraft was delivered to the RAF's No 8 Squadron in 1984 to begin crew training.[9] The technical problems proved insurmountable for the Nimrod AEW to be deployed in the Falklands War.[10] To provide some degree of cover, several Nimrod MR.2 were quickly modified to undertake the airborne surveillance role for the task force however.[11]
Aircraft[edit]The choice of the Nimrod airframe proved to be the wrong one, as it was too small to accommodate the radar, electronics, power generation and cooling systems needed for a system as complex as the one required[12] – at just over 38.5 m (126 ft), the Nimrod was close to 8 m (26 ft) shorter than the Boeing 707 aircraft that formed the basis of the E-3 Sentry, with the planned all-up weight around half that of the American aircraft, but was expected to accommodate sufficient crew and equipment to perform a similar function.[1] Nimrod was designed to have a total of six operator consoles (4 for the radar, one for ESM and one for communications), which was less than the nine stations fitted aboard the E-3A. The size of the Sentry also meant there was room to increase the number of operators.[1] Having the Sentry's radar in the rotodome above the aircraft allowed for cooling to be undertaken directly by the airflow, with cooling doors mounted in the installation, while the transmitter had a separate liquid cooling system, and the avionics in the main section were sufficiently cooled by a conventional air cycle environmental system.[13] This was in contrast to the Nimrod's "heat sink" design that dispersed the heat through the fuel system, and which needed the fuel tanks to be at least half-full to work efficiently when the aircraft's system operated at full power.[1]
Avionics[edit]
Even getting the radar scanners mounted on the Nimrod's nose and tail to synchronise proved problematicThe MSA was based around a GEC 4080M computer, which was required to process data from the two radar scanners, the ESM system, IFF and inertial navigation systems. The integration of all of these systems into a single package proved too difficult for the underpowered computer, which had an ultimate data storage capacity of 2.4 MB.[1] By the time of the project's cancellation, the mission system mean time between failure was around two hours, yet it took around two and a half hours to load all the mission data via a tape system.
What mission performance there was largely due to the Cossor IFF interrogator which complemented the radar system: with the addition of IFF data, the system could successfully track aircraft carrying IFF transponders, but when the IFF was switched off, radar tracks would rapidly be lost. This meant that the system would successfully track civil and 'friendly' military aircraft, but would not reliably detect Warsaw Pact aircraft which did not carry a compatible IFF system – detection of which was the whole point of the project.
The mission system electronic racks were earthed to different points on the airframe, which led to differences in earth potential and the introduction of short-lived, random track information which added to the computer overload. Finally, the advanced design of the radar proved difficult – the FASS method to gain full 360° radar coverage was problematic, involving as it did the scanner in the nose making a left to right sweep, with the signal then immediately passed to the scanner in the tail, which would sweep right to left.[14] However, getting the two scanners to synchronise proved difficult, resulting in poor all-round surveillance capability.[1] The system also split incoming raw radar information into upper and lower beams, each of which was then further split into in-phase and quadrature-phase channels. Each of these 4 channels contained identical individual elements (such as a spectrum analyser), which in theory should have been entirely interchangeable between locations.
Joint Trials Unit (JTU) testing showed that in fact the system would only work with a particular device in a particular place in the system: putting the same device in one of the other 3 channels would not give a serviceable system. The consequence of this was that the JTU trials aircraft would fly loaded with spare electronic devices so that when system failure occurred, there was a better chance of finding a particular combination of system elements which would work. This would not have been a sustainable practice had the aircraft entered service. The reason for this issue was never resolved: the JTU suspicion was that tolerances in transmitting information through each channel were too loose, so that as the processed information emerged from each channel to be correlated back into a coherent picture, such correlation was in fact impossible since each channel was offering up a different 'time slot' to the others.
Cancellation"...The choice of national procurement rather than the available US alternative, involved not only higher costs for Britain but also the lack of an adequate system in-service when needed... It appears that buying British was given a high priority than having a system available to meet the assessed Soviet threat"Historians Ron Smith and Jacques Fontanel, discussing the procurement process.[7]
At the time that the first production Nimrods were being delivered to the RAF, the MoD decided to conduct a complete review of the AEW programme. The result of this was the start of a bid process to supply AEW aircraft for the RAF that began in 1986, with a number of different options put forward, including the E-2C Hawkeye, E-3 Sentry, P-3AEW&C Orion, a proposal from Airship Industries, and the Nimrod.[6] Eventually, the Best and Final Offers were sought from GEC Marconi with the Nimrod, and Boeing with its Sentry. In December 1986, the Sentry was finally chosen and the Nimrod AEW programme was cancelled.[9][8] In spite of the project's difficulties, India expressed interest in procuring the Nimrod AEW3; these investigations continued even after the British government's eventual cancellation of the project.[15]
The E-2 Hawkeye, P-3 Orion AEW&C and E-3 Sentry were all considered as alternatives to the Nimrod
The MoD's review of the AEW programme eventually led to Boeing's E-3 Sentry being chosen instead of the Nimrod.The Nimrod programme had cost in the region of £1 billion up to its cancellation, contrasting with manufacturer claims in 1977 that the total cost of the project would be between £200–300 million.[7][16] The unused airframes were eventually stored and used as a source of spares for the Nimrod R1 and MR2 fleets, while the elderly Shackleton aircraft that had been commissioned in 1971 as a "stop-gap" measure for AEW cover until the planned entry of the Nimrod were forced to soldier on until 1991 when they were replaced by the Sentry. The scandal over the collapse of the Nimrod AEW project was a major factor in Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's stance to open up the UK defence market to competition.[17]
Potential future useFollowing the cancellation of the Nimrod AEW programme, BAe began looking at ways that the now redundant airframes could be re-used, and commenced studies looking at the potential use of the Nimrod as a missile carrying strike aircraft. This would have seen the AEW modifications, primarily the FASS scanners, and the fuel and cooling systems installed in the weapons bay, removed. The Searchwater radar, at the time fitted to the Nimrod MR.2, would have been installed in a nose installation, and the weapons bay outfitted to accommodate up to six Sea Eagle anti-ship missiles.[18] However, this did not go beyond the study phase, and the airframes were eventually scrapped during the 1990s.[19]
Avro Shackleton - Wikipedia
The Avro Shackleton is a British long-range maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) which was used by the Royal Air Force (RAF) and the South African Air Force (SAAF). It was developed by Avro from the Avro Lincoln bomber, which itself had been a development of the famous wartime Avro Lancaster bomber.
The Shackleton was developed during the late 1940s as part of Britain's military response to the rapid expansion of the Soviet Navy, in particular its submarine force. Produced as the primary type equipping RAF Coastal Command, the Type 696, as it was initially designated, incorporated major elements of the Lincoln, as well as the Avro Tudor passenger aircraft, and was furnished with extensive electronics suites in order to perform the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) mission along with a much-improved crew environment to accommodate the long mission times involved in patrol work. Being known for a short time as the Lincoln ASR.3, it was decided that the Type 696 would be named Shackleton in service, after the polar explorer Sir Ernest Shackleton.[N 1]
It entered operational service with the RAF in April 1951. The Shackleton was used primarily in the ASW and MPA roles, but it was also frequently deployed as an aerial search and rescue (SAR) platform and for performing several other secondary roles such as mail delivery and as a crude troop-transport aircraft. In addition to its service with the RAF, South Africa also elected to procure the Shackleton to equip the SAAF. In South African service, the type was operated in the maritime patrol capacity between 1957 and 1984. During March 1971, a number of SAAF Shackletons were used during the SS Wafra oil spill, intentionally sinking the stricken oil tanker using depth charges to prevent further ecological contamination.
During the 1970s, the Shackleton was replaced in the maritime patrol role by the jet-powered Hawker Siddeley Nimrod. During its later life, a small number of the RAF's existing Shackletons received extensive modifications in order to adapt them to perform the airborne early warning (AEW) role. The type continued to be used in this support capacity until 1991, when it was replaced by the Boeing E-3 Sentry AEW aircraft. These were the last examples of the type remaining in active service.
OriginsThe Battle of the Atlantic was a crucial element of the Second World War, in which Britain sought to protect its shipping from the German U-boat threat. The development of increasingly capable diesel-electric submarines had been rapid, in particular the snorkel virtually eliminated the need for submarines to surface while on patrol. Aircraft that had once been highly effective submarine-killers had very quickly become incapable in the face of these advances.[3] In addition, lend-leased aircraft such as the Consolidated B-24 Liberator had been returned following the end of hostilities. Several Avro Lancasters had undergone rapid conversion – designated as Maritime Reconnaissance Mk 3 (MR3) – as a stopgap measure for maritime search and rescue and general reconnaissance duties;[4] however, RAF Coastal Command had diminished to only a third of its size immediately after the Second World War.[5]
In the emerging climate of the Cold War and the potential requirement to guard the North Atlantic from an anticipated rapid expansion of the Soviet Navy's submarine force, a new aerial platform to perform the anti-submarine mission was required.[5][6] Work had begun on the requirement for a new maritime patrol aircraft in 1944, at which point there had been an emphasis for long-range platforms for Far East operations; however, with the early end of the war in the Pacific, the requirement was refined considerably. In late 1945, the Air Staff had expressed interest in a conversion of the Avro Lincoln as general reconnaissance and air/sea rescue aircraft; they formalised their requirements for such an aircraft under Air Ministry specification R.5/46. Avro's Chief Designer Roy Chadwick initially led the effort to build an aircraft to this requirement, designated as the Avro Type 696.[2][7]
Interior of a Shackleton MR.3The Type 696 was a significant development upon the Lincoln. Elements of the Avro Tudor airliner were also reused in the design; Lincoln and Tudor had been derivatives of the successful wartime Avro Lancaster bomber.[8][9] Crucially, the new aircraft was to be capable of a 3,000-nautical-mile (3,500 mi; 5,600 km) range while carrying up to 6,000 pounds (2,700 kg) of weapons and equipment. In addition to featuring a large amount of electronic equipment, the Type 696 had a much-improved crew environment over other aircraft types to allow them to be more effective during the lengthy mission times anticipated.[10][11] During development the Type 696 was provisionally referred to as the Lincoln ASR.3 before the officially allocated name 'Shackleton' was selected.
The first test flight of the prototype Shackleton GR.1, serial VW135, was made on 9 March 1949 from the manufacturer's airfield at Woodford, Cheshire in the hands of Avro's Chief Test Pilot J.H. "Jimmy" Orrell.[12] The GR.1 was later redesignated "Maritime Reconnaissance Mark I" (MR 1). The prototype differed from subsequent production Shackletons in a number of areas; it featured a number of turrets and was equipped for air-to-air refuelling using the looped-line method. These did not feature on production aircraft due to judgments of ineffectiveness or performance difficulties incurred.[13] However, the performance of the prototype had been such that, in addition to the go-ahead for the MR1's production, a specification for improved variant was issued in December 1949, before the first production Shackleton had even flown.[14] By 1951, the MR1 had become officially considered as an interim type due to several shortcomings.[15]
The Merlin engines were replaced with the larger, more powerful and slower-revving Rolls-Royce Griffons with 13-foot-diameter (4.0 m) contra-rotating propellers. This engine's distinctive noise often caused crew members to develop high-tone deafness. The Griffon was needed because the Shackleton was heavier and had more drag than the Lincoln.[31][32] The Griffon provided equivalent power to the Merlin but at lower engine speed, which led to reduced fuel consumption in the denser air at low altitudes; the Shackleton would often loiter for several hours at roughly 500 ft (150 m) or lower when searching for submarines. Lower-revving Griffons, compared to Merlins, reduced engine stress which improved their reliability. Using conventional propellers would have needed an increase in propeller diameter to absorb the engine's power and torque, this not being possible due to space limitations imposed by the undercarriage length and engine nacelle positioning; the contra-rotating propellers gave greater blade area within the same propeller diameter.
Numerous problems were encountered during the Shackleton's operational service. In practice, the diesel fume detection system was prone to false alarms and thus received little operational use. The engines, hydraulics, and elements of the avionics were known for their unreliability, and the aircraft proved to be fairly maintenance-intensive. The prototype MR 3 was lost due to poor stalling characteristics; this was rectified prior to production, although a satisfactory stall-warning device was not installed until 1969. The Shackleton is often incorrectly assigned the unfortunate distinction of holding the record for the highest number of aircrew killed in one type in peacetime in the RAF.[33] The true figures suggest rather differently in that some of its contemporaries fared far worse, such as the Gloster Meteor with over 430 fatal losses of aircrew[34] against the Shackleton's 156. Several programs to support and extend the fatigue life limits of the Shackleton's airframe were required; the fatigue life problems ultimately necessitated the rapid introduction of a whole new maritime patrol aircraft in the form of the Hawker Siddeley Nimrod, which began being introduced to RAF service in 1969.[35]
The Shackleton would often be used to perform search and rescue missions, at all times one crew being kept on standby somewhere across the UK for this role. The Shackleton had also replaced the Avro Lincoln in the colonial policing mission, aircraft often being stationed in the Aden Protectorate and Oman to carry out various support missions, including convoy escorting, supply dropping, photo reconnaissance, communication relaying, and ground-attack missions; the Shackleton was also employed in several short-term bombing operations.[46] Other roles included weather reconnaissance and transport duties, in the latter role each Shackleton could carry freight panniers in the bomb bay or up to 16 fully equipped soldiers.[47]
In 1969, a jet-powered replacement patrol aircraft, the Hawker Siddeley Nimrod, began to enter RAF service, which was to spell the end for the Shackleton in most roles. While radically differing in external appearance, the Shackleton and the initial version of the Nimrod shared many sensor systems and onboard equipment.[48]
AN/APS-20 radar scannerThe intention to retire the Shackleton was thwarted by the need to provide AEW coverage in the North Sea and northern Atlantic following the withdrawal of the Fleet Air Arm's Fairey Gannet aircraft used in the AEW role in the 1970s. As an interim replacement, the existing AN/APS-20 radar was installed in modified Shackleton MR 2s, redesignated the AEW 2, as an interim measure from 1972. These were operated by No. 8 Sqn, based at RAF Lossiemouth. All 12 AEW aircraft were given names from The Magic Roundabout and The Herbs TV series.[16] The intended replacement, the British Aerospace Nimrod AEW3, suffered considerable development difficulties which culminated in the Nimrod AEW 3 being cancelled in favour of an off-the-shelf purchase of the Boeing E-3 Sentry, which allowed the last Shackletons to be retired in 1991.[49]
BAE Systems Nimrod – Aeroflight
Development
Named after the ‘mighty hunter’ described in the Bible (Genesis X, 8-12) the Nimrod has successfully patrolled the seas around the British Isles for more than three decades. Successive updates have maintained the pre-eminence of the Nimrod in its primary role of hunting and killing enemy submarines, and a new upgraded version is now under development.
After an abortive attempt at finding a NATO-standard Maritime Patrol Aircraft had failed in 1959, a renewed attempt to replace the Avro Shackleton in the maritime patrol role began in July 1963 when Air Staff Target (AST) 357 was issued. This called for a sophisticated medium-sized jet-powered aircraft. Proposals submitted included the HS.800, a tri-jet design based on the Hawker Siddeley Trident, but the estimated costs involved in developing such an aircraft proved much too high. This became clear in June 1964 when Air Staff Requirement (ASR) 381 was issued, calling for a much less capable aircraft which could match or exceed the performance of the French Breguet Atlantic.
In an attempt to prevent the French aircraft from winning the contest, engineers at Hawker Siddeley (formerly Avro) at Chadderton came up with the idea of mating the proven Comet airframe with an under fuselage pannier similar to the one developed for the HS.800 proposal. In a very short space of time, the design office developed an unpressurised lower fuselage fairing which snugly fitted over the lower portion of the Comet fuselage, giving it a distinctive ‘double-bubble’ shape. Extending from the nose to the rear fuselage the pannier brought a dramatic increase in useable space for operational equipment and weapons while minimising additional drag. By replacing the existing Rolls-Royce Avon engines with new, less-thirsty, Spey turbofan engines a very acceptable endurance could be achieved. To keep costs down, much of the mission avionics would be similar to that already used in the Shackleton. Designated HS.801, the Comet derivative was offered to meet ASR 381 in July 1964.
In February 1965 it was announced in Parliament that the HS.801 had been selected to replace the Shackleton. A fixed price contract for thirty eight production aircraft was agreed in January 1966, at which time the name Nimrod was selected. In the meantime the conversion of two unsold Comet 4C airframes to act as prototypes had begun. The first to fly, XV148, took the role of aerodynamic test vehicle. It was fitted with a early version of the fuselage fairing and also served to flight test the Spey engine installation. The second prototype, XV147, retained its original Avon engines to reduce risk and timescales, and assumed the role of avionics testbed. Less than a year later, on 28 June 1968, the first new-build production Nimrod MR.Mk 1 took to the air. The flight test programme was remarkably trouble free and on 2 October 1969 the RAF took delivery of its first aircraft, the Maritime Operational Conversion Unit (MOCU – later 236 OCU) at St Mawgan in Cornwall being the first to operate the type. Production aircraft were soon being delivered to operational units at RAF Kinloss, Morayshire, and at RAF St Mawgan, Cornwall. The last unit to begin re-equipping was 203 Sqn at Luqa on Malta, which received its first aircraft in October 1971.
While production was getting underway, it was realised that the Nimrod airframe would make an ideal replacement for the ageing Comet 4Cs still used by the RAF for Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) duties. The Comet offered ample internal space for electronic equipment and excellent cruise performance. Accordingly, three additional airframes were ordered under the designation Nimrod R.Mk 1, with the first being delivered to 51 Squadron at RAF Wyton as virtually an empty shell in July 1971. Over the next three years a complex array of sophisticated electronic eavesdropping equipment was fitted to the three aircraft, resulting in a large number of antennae appearing on the fuselage. The aircraft initially only differed externally in having the MAD probe in the tail deleted and dieletric radomes in the nose of each external wing tank and in the tailcone.
Over the years, the R.Mk 1 aircraft have undergone numerous equipment upgrades as electronic surveillance becomes ever more sophisticated. Some of the cabin windows have been blocked up to allow installation of more equipment, and the fuselage antennae have exhibited several changes. Around 1982 the three R.Mk 1s gained wing tip ESM (Electronic Sensing Measures) pods of a design later fitted to the AEW.Mk 3. and MR.Mk 2 variants. In 1995 R. 1 XW666 was lost in an accident after an engine fire. To replace it, MR.1 XV249 was converted to R.1 standard. The R.1 has played a low profile but key role in many conflicts, from the Falklands War to the 2003 Second Gulf War, identifying and classifying enemy air defence systems and gathering information on enemy activities.
Meanwhile, an order for a second batch of eight MR.1s (bringing the total to 46) was announced in January 1972 to bring the existing Nimrod squadrons up to full strength. The 1974 defence cuts resulted in 203 Sqn being disbanded in 1977. It’s Nimrods were flown back to the UK and placed in storage. In 1975 work began on a comprehensive avionics upgrade for the MR.1. The new equipment suite included a Thorn EMI Searchwater radar in place of the aging ASV-21D unit, a new GEC Central Tactical System and the AQS-901 acoustics system compatible with the latest ‘Barra’ sonobuoys. Thirty-five MR.1 were upgraded to the new MR.2 standard, with the first aircraft being redelivered to 201 Sqn on 23 August 1979.
The invasion of the Falkland Islands in 1982 brought the Nimrod to public attention. Eight MR.2s were fitted with ex-Vulcan in-flight refuelling probes on the fuselage and small swept finlets on the tailplane in the space of just 18 days under the designation MR.2P. The previously unused underwing hardpoints were adapted to carry Sidewinder missiles, allowing the MR.2P to be described in the popular press as the world’s largest fighter. Patrols were flown over the south Atlantic looking for Argentine submarines and surface vessels, and also in support of British operations from Ascension Island. In the late 1980s, all MR.2s were fitted with new BAe designed in-flight refuelling probes. From 1985 the MR.2s began to be fitted with wingtip ESM pods, as developed for the R.1, to enhance their surveillance capability. In late 1990 several Nimrod MR.2s were fitted with an underwing FLIR turret under the starboard wing, BOZ pod under the port wing and a Towed Radar Decoy, under the unofficial designation MR.2(GM) – where GM stood for Gulf Mod. Nimrods helped to secure the Arabian Gulf sea lanes during the 1991 Gulf War and returned in 2003 to take part in the liberation of Iraq.
A much less successful variant of the Nimrod was the AEW.3 In 1973 the RAF had begun to examine the options for replacing the Airborne Early Warning (AEW) variant of the Shackleton operated by No.8 Squadron. Boeing offered a variant of the successful E-3A, but the over water performance of its radar was judged to be poor and in March 1977 it was announced that a specialised version of the Nimrod, the AEW. Mk3 would be procured instead. This would be based on the Nimrod airframe but featured a large bulbous radome in the nose and a similar radome in the tail, providing 360 degree radar coverage. A weather radar was located in the starboard external fuel tank and ESM pods fitted on the wing tips. On 28 June 1977 a Comet 4C (XW626) converted to carry the nose radar unit made the first of a series of flight trials. Initial results were promising, and so 3 AEW.3 development aircraft were produced by converting redundant MR.1 airframes to carry the prototype radar equipment. The first flew on 16 July 1980.
While development of the radar electronics, (and the software that controlled it), was proceeding, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) chose to impose a new and more stringent specification on the radar system. Meeting the new requirement meant a lot of redesign and retesting for British Aerospace and GEC, which inevitably delayed the planned in-service date for the aircraft. Nevertheless, in anticipation of a successful outcome of the revised system, a production batch of 8 aircraft was laid down down, using further redundant MR.1 airframes. The first example flew on 9 March 1982. By now the MoD had changed the technical specification several more times. The increased workload of trying to meet a constantly changing requirement with an extremely advanced electronics system which depended on sophisticated hardware and software was now proving to be extremely taxing task, and forecast timescales extended even further into the future. The first interim standard AEW aircraft was delivered to No.8 Sqn in 1984 to allow crew training to commence. At the same time a thorough review of the whole AEW programme was launched to determine whether a reliable and effective system could be produced and put into service. In September 1986 the AEW requirement was reopened to competing bidders and in December of that year the Boeing E-3 Sentry was declared the winner. The Nimrod AEW was immediately cancelled. Unusable AEW airframes were stored at RAF Abingdon until they were scrapped in the 1990s. Poor management by the MoD had doomed a promising programme, despite the best efforts of the systems developers.
In 1993 ASR420 was issued calling for a Replacement Maritime Patrol Aircraft (RPMA) for the RAF. Bids were submitted in 1995 and included a new-build version of the P-3 Orion, upgraded second-hand Orions and from BAe an upgraded version of the Nimrod MR.2 called Nimrod 2000. At the time BAe was rather short of work, and its bid was seen as a relatively low risk update which would be able to use much of the existing Nimrod training and support infrastructure. On 25 July 1996 the RMPA contract was awarded to BAe for the Nimrod 2000. Unfortunately, by this time BAe had also won several other important contracts and the staff and resources available to work on this particular project had become rather limited. With MoD agreement, the necessary work was therefore parcelled up into a number of work packages and subcontracted a number of different partner companies and also split between several different BAe sites including Woodford, Brough and Filton.
The Nimrod 2000 proposal comprised a complete strip-down and zero-life programme for the airframe, new larger wings housing Rolls-Royce BMW BR.710 engines, new radar and sensor systems and new tactical computer system. Boeing was contracted as the avionics systems integrator. In February 1997 the first three stripped-down Nimrod fuselages were delivered to FR Aviation in Bournemouth. Due to the lack of resources at BAe and poor management oversight of the many geographically dispersed work packages, the programme soon began to run late and over budget. In 1999 Rolls-Royce were ready to deliver the first engines, but BAe had no airframes ready to accept them. A programme review in 1999 revealed that work was already running 3 years behind schedule. BAe was forced to renegotiate the contract, incurring a substantial financial penalty in the process. By now, the Nimrod 2000 name had been quietly dropped. The first reburbished airframe was returned to Woodford in January 2000. Incredibly, it took until 2003 for assembly of the first prototype MRA.4 (ZJ516) to be carried out. Unfortunately, when the second set of Airbus-build wings were offered up to the second prototype fuselage, it was found that they didn’t fit. Build tolerances acceptable in the 1960s for the fuselage were too great for the laser-precise tolerances used in the new wing. This problem highlighted BAe management’s fundamental lack of understanding of what it was they were actually trying to achieve. After an interminable amount of time performing system checks, the first prototype MRA.4 took to the air on 26 August 2004 – more than four years late. In September 2004 a round of politically inspired defence cuts resulted in the planned order for MRA.4 being reduced from 18 to ‘about 12’. Delivery of the sixth aircraft is now planned for 2009, with all aircraft likely to be based at RAF Kinloss initially.
The Nimrod MRA.4 is but a crude charicature of the MR.2 that it is intended to replace, exhibiting a complete absence of the elegant blending of form and function which characterised the original 1960s design. In the same vein, the MR.2, which in 1981 was described as the most complex airborne system ever to enter service with the RAF, serves as a model of efficient project managment compared to the inept bungling exhibited by the present generation of project managers. However, despite it’s ugly appearance and late delivery, the updated Nimrod should reclaim it’s crown as the world’s leading maritime patrol aircraft.
MR.1 XV233 shows the original grey-white
colour scheme. (photo, Keith McKenzie)MR.1 XV245 in a classic pose
(photo, Crown Copyright)
VariantsRequirement Specification: ASR381 – MR.Mk 1, ASR389 – R.Mk 1, ASR420 – MRA.Mk 4
Manufacturers Designation: HS.801
Development History:
HS.801 prototypesTwo Comet 4Cs converted to act as Nimrod prototypes. Ventral weapons pannier under cabin, search radar in nose, MAD stinger in tail, fin-tip radome, dorsal fin added. 1st prototype (aerodynamic testbed) with RB.163-20 Spey engines, 2nd prototype (electronic testbed) with Avon engines.
Nimrod MR.Mk 1Initial production version (38 aircraft). ASV-21D search radar, Marconi Elliott 920B central computer.
Nimrod MR.Mk 1Last 8 production aircraft (second batch) delivered with updated communications system – as later used on MR.Mk 2. Strengthened structure for gross weights of 192,000 lb (87090 kg).
Nimrod R.Mk 1Specialised ELINT version of MR.Mk 1 with completely new avionics fit. No MAD tailboom, no searchlight. Dielectric radomes in each external wing tank nose, numerous antenna above and below fuselage. Auxiliary fuel tanks in weapons bay. Later fitted with wingtip ESM pods and some cabin windows deleted as additional equipment fitted.
Nimrod R.Mk 1PDesignation applied to R.Mk 1 when fitted with in-flight refuelling probe in 1982. Small swept finlets added to tailplane. ‘P’ suffix later dropped.
Nimrod MR.Mk 2Upgraded Maritime Reconnaissance version. New avionics fit with Thorn EMI Searchwater radar, new GEC central tactical system, new AQS-901 acoustics system, new communications suite. Air scoop on port rear fuselage close to dorsal fin, for avionics cooling system.
Export NimrodVersion of MR.Mk 2 offered to Canada and Australia. Strengthened structure for gross weights of 192,000 lb (87090 kg). Additional fuel tanks in weapons bay. New APU. Provision for Flight Refuelling drogue pod under each wing. Not built.
Nimrod MR.Mk 2PDesignation applied to MR.Mk 2 when fitted with in-flight refuelling probe in 1982. Small swept finlets added to tailplane. Wingtip ESM pods subsequently fitted and tailplane finlets enlarged. ‘P’ suffix dropped in late 1990s.
Nimrod MR.Mk 2P(GM)‘Gulf Mod’ version tailored for use in 1991 Gulf War. Underwing FLIR turret on starboard wing, BOZ pods, Towed Radar Decoy.
Nimrod AEW.Mk 3Specialised Airborne Early Warning (AEW) version. Conversion of MR.Mk 1 with bulbous radome in nose and tailcone. Weather radar in starboard external fuel tank. ESM pods on wing tips.
Nimrod AEW.Mk 3PDesignation applied to AEW.Mk 3 XV263 when fitted with in-flight refuelling probe.
Nimrod MRA.4Significantly upgraded Maritime Reconnaissance Attack version with new larger wing, larger engine air intakes, BR710 engines, new stronger wider-track undercarriage, large tailplane finlets. Completely new mission system: Searchwater 2000MR radar, UXS503/AQS970 acoustic processor, Nighthunter IR/TV electro-optical turret under nose, EL/L-8300UK ESM suite, DASS self-protection system, advanced communication system. 2-man Airbus-style ‘glass’ cockpit.
MR.1 (note lack of cooling air scoop) XV251
in ‘Hemp’ colours. (photo, Keith McKenzie)R.1 XW664 of 51 Sqn in 1988 – note ‘hockey
stick’ aerials. (photo, Keith McKenzie)
HistoryKey Dates:
July 1963 AST 357 issued, calling for a sophisticated jet aircraft to replace the Shackleton by 1972.
October 1963 Hawker Siddeley submits MR aircraft feasibility study.
April 1964 Hawker Siddeley submits proposal based on HS.800 version of Trident airliner.
4 June 1964 ASR 381 issued, calling for cheaper and more rapid Shackleton replacement.
June 1964 Design of HS.801 based on Comet 4 airliner begins.
July 1964 HS.801 offered to meet ASR 381.
February 1965 Decision to order HS.801 announced.
June 1965 Hawker Siddeley receives Instruction to Proceed (ITP).
January 1966 Fixed price contract placed for 38 Nimrod MR.Mk 1s.
23 May 1967 First flight of Spey-engined prototype (XV148).
31 July 1967 First flight of Avon-engined prototype (XV147).
28 June 1968 Maiden flight of first production Nimrod MR.Mk 1 (XV226).
2 October 1969 First production MR.Mk1 (XV230) delivered to RAF – 236 OCU at St Mawgan.
October 1969 Order placed for 3 R.Mk 1 ELINT versions.
27 Nov 1969 RAF Strike Command absorbs Coastal Command.
October 1970 RAF Kinloss (201 Sqn) begins conversion to Nimrod
7 July 1971 First R.Mk 1 (XW664) delivered to 51 Sqn as an ’empty shell’.
January 1972 Second batch of 8 MR.Mk 1s announced.
1973 Project definition for Nimrod AEW version carried out.
21 October 1973 Flight trials begin of mission-equipped R.Mk 1s.
10 May 1974 51 Sqn formally commissioned with Nimrod R.Mk.1.
1975 Work starts on MR.Mk 2 upgrade
31 March 1977 Nimrod AEW chosen to meet British AEW requirement.
28 June 1977 Converted Comet 4C (XW626) begins AEW radar trials.
13 February 1979 First MR.Mk 2 production conversion first flight (XV236).
23 August 1979 Redelivery of first upgraded MR.Mk 2 to RAF.
1980 Major avionics update for R.Mk 1s carried out.
16 July 1980 First flight of first development AEW.Mk 3 (XZ286).
9 March 1982 First production AEW.Mk 3 first flight.
14 April 1982 Work starts on in-flight refuelling probe installation design for MR.Mk 2.
27 April 1982 First probe equipped MR.Mk 2P flies (XV229).
29 May 1982 First carriage of AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles (XV229).
early 1982 Initial planned Nimrod AEW service entry date.
Spring 1985 ESM wingtip pods introduced to MR.Mk 2.
1985 Upgrade of 35 MR.1 aircraft to MR.2 standard completed.
1984 First AEW aircraft delivered to 8 Sqn for crew training
September 1986 AEW competition reopened by MoD.
December 1986 E-3 Sentry selected as winner, Nimrod AEW.Mk 3 cancelled.
15 May 1995 R.Mk 1 XW666 ditches after catastrophic engine fire.
1993 Request for information for Replacement Maritime Patrol Aircraft (RMPA) to meet ASR 420
April 1994 Installation of ‘Starwindow’ avionics update for R.Mk 1 commences.
1995 Bids submitted for RMPA
25 July 1996 Nimrod 2000 wins RMPA competition
2 December 1996 Fixed price contract awarded to BAE SYSTEMS for Nimrod 2000 development
14 February 1997 First of 3 Nimrod fuselages delivered to FR Aviation at Bournemouth
early 1998 Nimrod 2000 renamed Nimrod MRA.4
late 1998 Nimrod MRA.4 programme reviewed due to poor progress.
1999 Nimrod MRA.4 contract re-negotiated – 3 years slip in delivery to service.
1999 First BR.710-48 engine deliveries for Nimrod MRA.4.
January 2000 First fuselage returned to Woodford.
19 December 2001 Electrical ‘power on’ for first MRA.4.
2002 Initial planned delivery date for MRA.4.
March 2002 Engines installed in first MRA.4.
February 2003 Programe restructured again – further delay to in-service date.
21 July 2004 MRA.4 order reduced to ‘about 12’.
26 August 2004 First flight of MRA.4 first prototype (ZJ516).
15 December 2004 Second prototype (ZJ518) first flight
2009 Current forecast for MRA.4 in-service date.
Nimrod AEW3 (globalsecurity.org)
Nimrod AEW3The Navy's decision to phase out fixed wing operations during the early 1970s led to the task of providing Airborne Early Warning [AEW] cover to the fleet being transferred to the Royal Air Force. It was decided that twelve low hour Shackleton MR Mk 2s would be converted as an "interim solution" until a new purpose built aircraft could be procured. Again, the same podded AN/APS 20 radar sets were fitted to the Avro designed airframes and No. 8 Sqn was declared operational with the Shackleton AEW2 at Lossiemouth in 1972.
Throughout the 1970s the need to replace the ageing Shackletons gathered pace. In August 1972, the RAF issued an AST to replace its Airborne Early Warning (AEW) variant of the Shackleton operated by No. 8 Squadron. This airborne early warning aircraft was developed from the Nimrod MR2 which was developed from the Comet airliner. All three of which can be similarly recognized, although the AEW has the bulbous nose and tail boom that houses radar equipment. Manufacturing AEW aircraft is extremely challenging.
Boeing was offering the Boeing 707 based E-3A to all NATO countries interested in providing its own AWACs / AEW. It was soon realised that the cost of the E-3 was way beyond the budgets of most member nations so Boeing then offered the aircraft to NATO. However, the inability of the member nations to come to an agreement on how and when this fleet of aircraft would be operated led to the British Government to go it alone in 1977.
In March 1977, the procurement was announced of a specialised version of the Nimrod. This variant would have a large bulbous radome in the nose and tail to house Marconi scanners providing 360º radar coverage. Unlike the American solution of a single radar antenna mounted in a rotating radome high above a Boeing 707 fuselage (which resulted in small "blind spots" directly below the aircraft), Hawker Siddeley decided to have a GEC Avionics two-antenna system mounted in the nose and tail of a Nimrod airframe. The scanners would work together each providing 180 degrees of uninterrupted coverage of the surrounding airspace. Initial tests of the system were carried out aboard a converted Comet 4 airliner. This aircraft was only fitted with the forward scanner and following its first flight in 1977 with its new bulbous nose profile, development work began on the new system.
Three AEW3 development aircraft were manufactured and the first of the eleven Nimrod AEW-3s to be completed made its maiden flight from Woodford on 16 July 1980. A production batch of eight Nimrod AEW3 aircraft was then laid down using a further eight redundant Nimrod MR1 airframes. The first flew on 9 March 1982 and by late 1984 the first 'interim standard' Nimrod AEW3 aircraft was delivered by British Aerospace to No. 8 Squadron to allow crew training to commence.
The original Nimrod air-to-air refueling [AAR] installation was fitted during the Falklands conflict in 1982. Subsequently, the MOD decided to upgrade the AAR system and move the refuelling pipes, for the most part, out of the cabin and into the bomb bay. In 1985, in the course of the AEW3 program, which was also required to have an AAR capability, the AAR system design was refined, to enable its incorporation as a formal modification to the aircraft design. During the initial incorporation of AAR into the AEW3, one of the fuel system design features which was considered by British Aerospace was the effect of the fuel tank blow-off valves. These valves are fitted to all, bar two, of the aircraft's fuel tanks and operate as pressure relief valves: should the pressure in a fuel tank exceed a prescribed limit, fuel is ejected from the tank through the valves to the atmosphere. The blow-off outlet for the No. 5 tank is situated forward of the port engine intakes and there was concern that, should fuel be ejected during AAR, it might enter these intakes. Therefore, the No. 5 tank blow-off valve was disabled to prevent this occurring. Nonetheless, the AEW3 flight trials team noted that there was a potential risk from other blow-off valves, including that of No. 1 tank, and recommended investigation to determine the effect should blow-off occur from these tanks. Unfortunately, it appears that the subsequent demise of the AEW3 project led to these recommendations remaining on the shelf, and potential sources of fuel blow-off and overflow during AAR remained unremedied.
It was also decided that the Nimrod would be made available for sale to NATO to fulfil their requirement once development was complete. (Subsequently NATO decided to order the American solution and deliveries of the ten E-3A aircraft began at Geilenkirchen, Germany in 1982). What followed has filled many volumes. The Nimrod was to have provided for Britain's early warning needs, and would have been compatible with the NATO AWACS. However, the Nimrod suffered from serious technical ?awsand major cost overruns.
In the summer of 1986, the British Government opened a competition for a system to fulfill its early warning needs. Seven companies submitted bids to the Ministry of Defence: Boeing (AWACS), Grumman (E-2 Hawkeye and Nimrod fitted with U.S. avionics), Lockheed (P-3 Orion), Airship Industries, Pilatus Britten-Norman, MEL (a subsidiary of Philips Electronics), and GEC Avionics (Nimrod AEW.3). It is important to note that had the British been successful in developing their own early warning system, the Nimrod AEW.3, the radar for which has been under development at GEC since 1977, there probably never would have been any competition at all. When the U.K. opened its airline early warning competition, Boeing submitted a preliminary offset bid of 35 percent of the "contract value. But in July, 1986 this offer was increased to 100 percent of the contract value, which is the normal minimum acceptable to the British Government.
In September, 1986, the Ministry selected two of the seven bidders as semi-finalists, the GEC Nimrod and the Boeing AWACS, stressing that only these two had the potential to meet all of the Royal Air Force's requirements. According to Lord Trefgarne, British Minister of Defence for Acquisition, the selection of the two finalists was based on demonstrated capabilities, the amountof risk foreseen in completing development, cost, and the amount of time needed for completion. At this time, France, which was also considering an early warning purchase, joined Britain in theevaluation of the two early warning systems.
In November, 1986 Boeing and its subcontractors (including Westinghouse, G.E. and SNECMA) again upped the offset offer to 130 percent of the contract value over eight years if AWACS were selected. This figure was the highest ever made by Boeing in an international competition. By this time, Boeing had already negotiated participation agreements with three British avionics companies -- Plessey, Ferranti, and Racal -- and these firms publicly supported AWACS over the Nimrod. These firms were not participants in the Nimrod program. The "agreements" were vague, simply stating the intent to cooperate in any offsets that may result if the AWACS were eventually selected by the UK. However, the fact that three of Britain's largest aerospace-related firms favored the AWACS played the important role of making an American buy seem less onerous. The Risk Assessment Group of the British Ministry of Defence, an internal committee which studies technical risks in new programs, also came out in favor of the AWACS.
After years of rising costs and delays due to the inability of the radar to work to specification the decision was made by the Government to cancel the order for the Nimrod solution. On 18 December 1986 the ill-fated Nimrod Airborne Early Warning project was finally cancelled after numerous delays and setbacks. It was also announced at the same time that Britain was procuring the Boeing E-3D Sentry as the Shackleton replacement - 6 (later changed to 7) Boeing E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft were ordered.
This came despite the fact that over $1.37 billion had already been spent by the Government to research and develop the Nimrod. The Nimrod AEW3 airframes were stored at RAF Abingdon until they were scrapped in the 1990s.
According to the British Govemment, the decision was made solely on the system's proven ability to meet the country's defense requirement. This decision resulted in public outrage, especially by GEC, that the negative implications were "tremendous" for the British electronics industry, including loss of over 2,500 prime and subcontractor jobs and a substantial future export market for early waming devices. But the British Minister of Defence, George Younger, in announcing the AWACS decision to the House of Commons, held that the gains for other British firms will equal or even exceed losses to GEC.
Lord Levene of Portsoken, who was then the Chief of Defence Procurement and also the National Armaments Director, later recelled the Government " ... had got to the stage where we had written off £500 million. "We cannot stop now. We have written off £600 million. We cannot stop now. We have written off £700 million. We cannot stop now." I then walked in and we had to decide that that project unfortunately was not going to work. We were forced to buy in the United States. It is a very difficult issue."
Richard D. Fisher, Jr., Senior Fellow, International Assessment and Strategy Center, stated in 2010 that "Britain's Marconi apparently sold at least one example of its Argus radar from the cancelled Nimrod AEW program, which China placed on a modified Russian Ilyushin Il-76 transport. Then in the mid-1990s Britain's Racal Co. sold six of its Skymaster lightweight naval airborne early warning (AEW) radar, which still fly on the PLA Navy Air Force's Y-8J aircraft. Ostensibly sold to help China "combat piracy," by 1999 the Y-8J was observed in exercises providing long-distance cuing for ship-launched anti-ship missiles."
Cancelled | The Spyflight Website V2
BAe Nimrod AEW 3The unmitigated disaster of the Nimrod AEW 3 programme probably stands comparison with any of the other 'great' shambolic defence procurement fiascos, that have caused such embarrassment to the MOD and various governments over the years. It was certainly one of the most expensive and the final bill has probably never been accurately calculated, but even the most conservative estimate of £1 billion takes little account of the damage caused to the reputations of the companies involved. This overview will briefly describe the lengthy gestation of the project, some of the main problems that were encountered and why the whole sorry shambles was finally brought to an end.
Nimrod AEW 3
The Falklands War of 1982 came virtually out of the blue and the eventual success of the Task Force was, as usual, based on the ability of British servicemen and women to 'make do' with many items of inferior, outdated equipment, such as one of the flagships, HMS Hermes, even down to basic items such as boots that leaked and fell apart. The defence review of 1965 had started the process of ending the era of the RN's large aircraft carriers, each capable of operating a fixed-wing AEW aircraft, such as the Fairey Gannet AEW3. Consequently, by 1982 the RN lacked any intrinsic AEW capability to send with the Falklands Task Force - in theory it should have been provided by the RAF with the Nimrod AEW 3, but this programme was in an almost total shambles. The net result was the loss of a number of ships to air attack and the death of many brave men whose lives might well have been saved if an AEW aircraft had been available. Quite how it would have been possible to sustain a land-based AEW aircraft in orbit over the Task Force during daylight hours, when it took virtually the whole of the AAR resources of the RAF to get one Vulcan there and back is another matter, either way it certainly proves the need for the RN to have a carrier based AEW capability, if they are expected to conduct blue-water operations.
Nimrod AEW 3
When Grumman and General Electric began development of the E-2 Hawkeye in the early 1960's, the capability of this carrier based AEW radar, operating at UHF wavelengths with an Airborne Moving Target Indicator (ATMI), was set to revolutionise AEW development. British industry and the MOD watched the development in the USA with some trepidation, realising that unless they set about defining a replacement for the antiquated Gannet, they would be out of the AEW market forever. Various design ideas were considered, including a Buccaneer with two sideways facing antennas in the bomb-bay and an HS-125 with a mushroom radome mounted above the fuselage - however, this is where the problems began. The E-2 Hawkeye is a very clever design, which compresses 2 crew, 3 systems operators and a considerable amount of electronic equipment into an airframe small enough to operate from a carrier whilst carrying a rotordome - an achievement no other country has been able to match. Size became a crucial factor in the British design proposals when it was decided that a rotordome mounted radar which met the design specification, could not be carried on an HS-125 sized aircraft and attention switched to a new design with a Fore and Aft Scanner System (FASS).
Nimrod AEW 3
By 1965 British industry was keen to develop a Frequency-Modulated Intermittent Continuous-Wave (FMICW) radar using elliptical or circular inverted-cassegrain antennas. The properties of these types of radar do not allow them to operate effectively near propellers, so the proposed AEW aircraft had to be jet powered. Again size became a factor and it was soon apparent that the large antennas necessary to meet the range criteria, together the associated equipment and crew, could only be carried by a fairly large aircraft - certainly one too big to fit on a carrier, which was fortuitous as the Labour government had by then decided to get rid of them. Various options were considered for a FASS installation including a jet-powered version of the HS 748 Andover and the BAC 111, before engineers finally settled on an adaptation of the proposed HS.801 anti-submarine version of the Comet - the Nimrod.
Nimrod AEW 3
Eventually, UK scientists deciding to ditch the FMICW radar in favour of the pulse-Doppler radar and funding for the system was finally approved in 1972. Various options for the Nimrod airframe were considered; the first option involved mounting the E-2C AN/APS-125 radar and associated avionics above and inside the airframe. The second option was to use the AN/APS-125 radar with British avionics. The third option was to mount the AN/APA-171 radome and antenna on the Nimrod, with Britain supplying the radar transmitter, receiver and avionics. The fourth option was an all British radar and avionics system, with some American components, and a FASS with pulse-Dopper processing operating in the S-band. Although this option provided the greatest input from British industry, it also carried the greatest technical risk and the alarm bells should already have been ringing. But, as in so many UK defence fiasco's over the years, political decisions, namely keeping BAe & GEC workers employed and retaining AEW radar technical expertise in the UK, overcame the many doubters and outweighed common sense.
Nimrod AEW 3
By the end of 1974, instead of purchasing an off-the-shelf system with a proven track record, the Labour government predictably decided on the fourth option, the Nimrod AEW 3, accepting whatever extra cost and technical risk that involved. At the time the Labour government also considered that joining a possible NATO purchase of the Boeing E-3A was just too politically complicated, expensive and subject to unknown delay - which is rather ironic considering how things eventually turned out. At this point it was widely reported that the RAF was in favour of a dedicated UK purchase of the E-3A, rather than the Nimrod, but the cost, together with the potential loss of jobs in some marginal Labour seats, was always going to mitigate against this option.
Comet 4 with AWACS nose
A modified Comet 4 fitted with a forward scanner was used for a series of trials to prove the basic concept of the system. Then on 31 Mar 77, the government gave the go ahead for Hawker Siddeley (soon to be merged with the British Aircraft Corporation to form British Aerospace - BAe) who would supply the airframe and Marconi-Elliot, (soon to be renamed Marconi Avionics) who would supply the mission avionics, to build and deliver 11 Nimrod AEW 3 aircraft. The airframes comprised 8 that were built, but never delivered to the RAF and 3 that became available when 203 Sqn was disbanded after the RAF withdrew from Malta.
Nimrod AEW 3 interior
The 1976 operating specification of the planned Nimrod AEW 3, ASR 400, was to say the least very demanding. It called for exceptional detection capabilities of both sea vessels and aircraft over land and sea, far in excess of the E-2C and with the ability to automatically initiate and track up to 400 targets. Six operators consoles (four radar, one communications and one for ESM) were planned and, although this is double the number of the E-2C, it is much less than 9 originally planned for the E-3A, which also had considerable empty space for additional consoles. The Nimrod AEW 3 was planned to carry a comprehensive communications fit, which would also allow combined operations with NATO E-3A's. However, space was always at a premium - the Nimrod was planned to be about half the weight of an E-3A, but three times that of the E-2C and this sheer lack of space eventually became one of the major problems. In 1977 ASR 400 was re-drafted to ASR 400 Revision 1, yet it was never clearly established to which standard the production aircraft were to be produced to - a classic example of shifting goalposts and lack of communication between the contractor and the customer.
Nimrod AEW 3
Despite the chaotic project management of the earlier TSR-2, which contributed considerably to its eventual cancellation, similar problems occurred in the project management of the Nimrod AEW 3. The normal procedure for a project of this size was for the RAF Operational Requirements (OR) branch to lead the project through the feasibility stage, with the operational aspects stated by the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (ACAS) and financial input from the Air Plans branch. The Ministry of Defence (Procurement Executive) Controller of Aircraft (MOD(PE) CA) had responsibility for project definition and development, usually under as assistant director. Reporting to the MOD(PE) CA was the Director of Military Aircraft Projects, who had a Nimrod Director and an assistant Nimrod director, and it was this individual was actually responsible for the AEW 3. Generally, the individual in this appointment was a wg cdr, considerably down the 'food chain' in the MOD and with little real clout.
Nimrod AEW 3
However, responsibility for the electronic system in the AEW 3 lay elsewhere, namely with the Director of Air Weapons and Electronic Systems, whose Assistant Director Electronics, Radar (Airborne) was actually responsible for this vital equipment. Ultimate financial authority rested with the Minister of State for Defence, and although representatives of the various parties with a 'finger in the AEW 3 pie' met as necessary, only at the quarterly review boards Nimrod AEW 3 nose radar was an overall view of the entire project undertaken. Essentially, the prime contractors were left to sort out the physical integration of the various systems, with minimal input from the MOD or RAF. As usual, service personnel remained in their appointments for around 2 years and were then posted, just as they had developed a sound grasp of the technicalities of the task. MOD civil servants involved in the project usually had considerable technical expertise in specific areas, but lacked much understanding of the operational aspects and some displayed poor management skills. This muddled project management system was in stark contrast to that employed by the USAF, who usually appointed a high ranking, ambitious officer, as the Project Manager and this individual then had ultimate responsibility for over-seeing every aspect of a project and remained in post until entry into service.
Nimrod AEW 3
The first structurally complete aircraft was rolled-out on 30 Mar 80 and flew on 16 Jul - this was followed in Jan 81 by the second production aircraft, which was planned to develop the and the radar. A Joint Trials Unit (JTU) was established at RAF Waddington to help develop the Mission System Avionics (MSA) and in no time at all serious problems with the MSA were identified. The heart of the MSA was the GEC 4080M computer that received data from the radar scanners, the Loral ARI-18240/1 ESM system, the Cossor Jubilee Guardsman IFF equipment and the two Ferranti FIN 1012 inertial navigation systems. The computer processed this mass of data and then displayed it on the multi function display and control consoles (MDCC) where the operators communicated to the various command organisations and operational units through the Automatic Management of Radio and Intercom Systems (AMRICS). Independently, these systems worked correctly, but after they were integrated in 1980 serious problems emerged. The fundamental problem was that the computer simply was not powerful enough. The GEC 4080M computer had a storage capacity of 1 megabyte (Yes ONE!), which could be augmented via a data-bus with an additional 1.4 megabytes, giving a grand total of just 2.4 megabytes total storage capacity, small even by the standards of the time and particularly so given the task it had to perform. The computer quickly showed it was too slow for the task and soon became overloaded, at which point track continuity suffered, this then led to track duplication, which slowly increased and further overloaded the system.
Nimrod AEW 3
Another major problem was the sheer amount of heat generated by all the electronic systems when operating the radar and other systems at full power. This was a real problem, because the fuel system was used as a 'heat-sink' and to be able to dissipate the heat generated when the MSA and radar operated at full power, the fuel tanks needed to be at least half full. Essentially, like so many other MOD procurement disasters, the Nimrod AEW 3 suffered from requirements that changed, inadequate project management and, in an attempt to save money, the 'bodged' adaptation of an elderly airframe, rather than shelling out on a new airframe designed exactly for the purpose.
Nimrod AEW 3
Although the Nimrod AEW project struggled on, the MSA could rarely be made to work consistently. Under test by the MOD(PE) in 1984 the MSA, whilst falling short of the ASR 400 requirements, worked well and showed promise, but it was very unreliable and its performance changed from sortie to sortie. During the first 8 sorties only 3 hours of full system operation was achieved. Detection range was 30% below the specified distance, tracking continuity was erratic with numerous false plots, all-round surveillance was poor and did not provide the anticipated twin hemispheric coverage and last, but not least, maritime detection resolution was poor.
Nimrod AEW 3
All the time the costs mounted, with little sign that this grotesque white elephant would ever work as designed. Finally, common sense prevailed and in 1986 the axe finally fell, bringing the curtain down on the entire farce which ended up costing the taxpayer somewhere in the region of £1 billion. In 1988 a Boeing proposal for the supply of 7 E-3D Sentry's was accepted and the aircraft eventually entered service in 1991.
Nimrod AEW 3
To fill in the 'AEW gap' after the Gannet retired and before the Nimrod AEW 3 entered service, in 1971, the RAF was forced to convert 12 obsolete Shackleton MR2 aircraft to carry the obsolescent TPS-20 radar removed from the Gannets. Entering service with 8 Sqn at RAF Lossiemouth in 1972, the Shackleton was cold, incredibly noisy and thoroughly uncomfortable for the unfortunate crew - high-tone deafness after a couple of tours was routine. It was often said that one of the nicest sounds in the world was a Shackleton getting airborne, because that meant you weren't on board. Unpressurised, the Shackleton was limited to around 10,000ft and usually operated much lower. The TPS-20 radar had a range of only 150km and had no height finding capability, so in reality there was little point in flying high anyway. However, because of the Nimrod AEW 3 fiasco, five of these obsolete, antiquated, uncomfortable aircraft had to soldier on for 20 years until the E-3D entered service in 1991 - such is the price of political interference, poor planning and inept project management.
Nimrod AEW 3
Despite all the problems with the Nimrod AEW 3, GEC Marconi continued development of the radar system, now named ARGUS, and the Chinese expressed an interest in mounting it on an Il-76 Candid. However, it appears the Chinese saw sense, as they eventually tried to purchase the Phalcon phased array AEW system from Israel, until this was blocked by the USA. The Chinese are now believed to be developing an AEW system using an electronically scanned phased array radar mounted above the fuselage of the Y-8X Cub. The system the Chinese are developing appears very similar to the Swedish SAAB 340 Argus, which given the Chinese track record of stealing Western technology, may be more than just a coincidence.So what can be learnt from the Nimrod AEW fiasco? Well, firstly an AEW airframe needs to be large enough to carry the equipment and crew, ideally with something in reserve - attempting to squeeze everything into what was essentially an airframe designed in the 1940's, was bound to lead to problems. Secondly, effective long range AEW radar technology is highly complex, difficult to develop and needs to be updated on a regular basis to remain effective. Unless you have bottomless pockets, it's safer and less expensive in the long run to buy proven American equipment off the shelf.
Amazingly, the collective memory of the Nimrod AEW farce seems to have been completely ignored when it was decided to replace the Nimrod MR2 with the Nimrod MRA4. Astonishingly many of the same mistakes of attempting to once again adapt an airframe designed in the 1940's, have been repeated for the second time - but more on the MRA4 farce at a later date and I only hope the final bill this time around is less than £1 billion squandered on the Nimrod AEW 3.
Da Alternatehistory.org:
- The RN-FAA acquired 50 Skyraider AEW1 in 1951, there were operated in a different, more independent fashion than USN aircraft. The Radar was the APS20.
- The RAF formed 1453 Vanguard flight with 4 Neptunes in 1953, to trial their APS20 radar in the AEW mode. The trails were half-arsed and despite some encouraging results were ended inn 1956 and AEW was not pursued by the RAF.
- The Gannet AEW3 entered squadron service in 1960, using APS 20 radars taken from Skyraiders. As stated in Post #1 the radar displays were tied into the aircraft Doppler navigation system, a radar amplifier, Doppler MTI and IFF interrogator were installed so the Gannet could track both friendlies and hostiles and direct interceptions. The AN/APS20E in the Gannet had a maximum range against fighters of 65 nm, so it cruised at 3000 feet.
The P139B was proposed in 1963 as a replacement for the Gannet AEW3, featuring Fore-Aft-Scanning-System and Frequency Modulated Interrupted Continuous Wave (FMICW). P139B development was cancelled in 1964 but work on the FASS and FMICW radar was continued.
A set of proposals came from BAC for an updated Gannet -two spearate schemes:
- A minimum change version of the existing AEW.3 with updated radar and systems.
- A stripped down and rebuilt version with all new systems, which became known as the AEW.7. (I think this is more pie in the sky than the ridiculous P139B)
Interest in FMICW radar waned during the 60s and in 1972 the funding was approved for the development of a Pulse Doppler radar for AEW.
At the time of the 1974 Defence Review there was the equivalent of 6 Nimrod MR Mk 1 squadrons and the OCU. These were Nos. 42, 120, 201 and 206 Squadrons in No. 18 Group of Strike Command and No. 203 Squadron in Malta plus detachments at Gibraltar and Singapore which were equivalent to a sixth squadron. The 1974 Defence Review cut the squadron at Malta (disbanded in December 1977) and the Singapore detachment, and some 8 Nimrods were ordered in 1973, so 8 brand new Nimrod airframes available with others no more than 5 years old.
In 1974 There were 4 options for the Nimrod AEW3.
- Purchase the AN/APS-125 pulse-Doppler radar system and its associated avionics, as fitted to the E-2 Hawkeye, and fit them into the Nimrod.
- Purchase the AN/APS-125 radar and combine it with a British avionics package.
- Purchase the rotodome and antenna from the E-2 and combine with a British radar transmitter, receiver and avionics package.
- Develop a wholly British radar system and avionics package using a Fore Aft Scanner System (FASS) rather than the E-2 radome.
Reggieperrin
Riain said:
If Britain had chosen any other option than the one they did it's likely that the Nimrod AEW3 would have seen service. However it would not have looked like the bneast we know and loathe, it would likely have the flying-saucer rotodome of the E2 Hawkeye and E3 Sentry.
I think even option 4 might have been made to work eventually if it hadn’t had to squeeze into a Nimrod airframe. If the MR4 saga is anything to go by there were some issues with those aircraft beyond the lack of volume, and it’s not immediately obvious why the Nimrod airframe was the go-to choice rather than a VC10 or something similar from the inventory.
A nice modern airbus would be an even better choice but seems to go against the MoD tradition of being penny wise and pound foolish.
Crowbar Six
The computers were too slow and old to handle overland clutter such as Germany which is one of the places the RAF was intending to use them, the computers were the old Argus mini-computer which had been around since the mid 1960's and were not really powerful enough for the job. The system worked OK over water but once they were over land they had issues.
hugh lupus
I helped build Nimrods and worked on a major rebuild of one. I've even been close up to the AEW version before it was scrapped. Back in the 80's I did maintenance work on the Dan Air Comet 4's.
Yes I'm old.
But a more labour intensive to build, poorly conceived, maintenance unfriendly aircraft you would be unlikely to find.
I remember being told that as the fuel tanks were used as heat sinks there was a prohibition on flying beyond a certain fuel level.
As others have said, dump a 1940's design and go for the A300 and equip it with inflight refueling
Like most British aircraft of the time the most important thing was not the drawings or the build parameters or anything like that.What was important, vital even was 'Institutional knowledge'
You knew that part 'A' needed a few thou shaved off in order that it fit part 'B' even though the drawing did not show this. Production plan says to drill this hole now? If you do then when Fred comes to do his work then it won't line up with his parts.Far better to let Fred drill the hole.
British aircraft of that ERA were hand built and hand built by craftsmen (not me obviously, but everyone else) and as you point out each one was different.
As a young lad I built the fuel baffles for 125's . Each one despite every attempt at interchangeability was different.
It was impossible to take a part that had been drilled off on one aircraft and fit it to another.
It was only with the advent of the Airbus line in the late 70's that this began to change.
So yes you are right....I was that man with the hammer!
Edit.
Not lasers. Lasers produce heat and destroy the temper of the metal but early forms of CNC probably.
Crowbar Six
Dorknought said:
It's interesting that as AWAC was showing itself as not just a force multiplier but without it - you lose, why'd you'd skimp on it is unfathomable.
The Russians were gone, we were not going to fight anyone without the US backing us up and anyone we did was unlikely to have the best or latest tech. The same rational is why we have been enjoying "capability holidays" and didn't buy a Nimrod replacement for years, why the RAF did not have any replacements for the Sea Eagle anti-shipping or ALARM missiles. The Sea Eagle were scrapped as they were due for deep maintenance to the turbines which would have cost a total of £4 million for the entire fleet.
The UK treasury just would not pay for even basic upgrade to the UK military.
Mike D
mtpalmer1 said:
Essentially this. The MRA.4 was a casualty of the War on Terror. The latter was a rather expensive venture and the MRA.4 was an especially easy project to place on the chopping block with Haddon-Cave fulminating. Pity as the Nimrod MRA.4 promised to finally be a mightily capable platform. I'm still not sold on medium-altitude ASW, sorry Boeing fans.
Oh well, not the first goat to befall the political T-Rex and certainly not the last.
The electronic fit was, apparently, a world leading game changer. Unfortunately the aircraft was a death trap with over 200 safety faults identified.
We're probably lucky we only had one XV230 over Afghanistan.
Have the BAe Nimrod AEW be more successful and enter service | alternatehistory.com
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